JUDGMENT Rajendra Babu, J.-These appeals by special leave are against a common order made in O.P. Nos. 12184, 14840, 14686, 15700, 17258, 18398 and 20913/97. Section 32 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 [hereinafter referred to as the Act ] enables the Registrar of Co-operative Societies to supersede the Committee of Management under the circumstances set forth in sub-section (1) thereto. After supersession of the Committee of Management, the Registrar can appoint an administrator or administrators or a Committee as provided in Section 32(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. Such Committee or administrator or administrators so appointed shall, subject to the control of the Registrar and to such instructions as he may from time to time give, have power to exercise all or any of the functions of the Committee or of any officer of the society and take all such action as may be required in the interests of the society. When the administrator appointed on supersession of the Committee of Management of certain Cooperative Societies wanted to enrol new members to the society the same was objected to and the original petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution were filed before the High Court on the ground that the Registrar is only expected to carry on day-to-day functions of the society and see that election is conducted and a new Committee in accordance with the Act, Rules and bye-laws of the society is constituted. It was contended before the court that the earlier decision in George v. Joint Registrar1, is no longer good law in the light of the decision of this Court in K. Shantharaj & Anr. v. M.L. Nagaraj & Ors.2. The Full Bench of the High Court, after referring to the earlier decision of the High Court and the decision of this Court in K. Shantharaj s case (supra) held that the admission of a member is not mere function of the Committee, but is a power of the Committee to admit members or not as provided in Bye Laws of the Society. The Committee can exercise only certain functions and not any powers and, therefore, the administrator or a Committee appointed as aforesaid has no power to enrol new members. This order is in challenge in these appeals. 2. The Committee can exercise only certain functions and not any powers and, therefore, the administrator or a Committee appointed as aforesaid has no power to enrol new members. This order is in challenge in these appeals. 2. It is now brought to our notice that subsequent to the decision of the High Court, the provisions of Section 32 have been amended so that the administrator or the Committee will have power to exercise all or any of the powers and functions of the Committee. It is further brought to our notice that in Cherthala Agricultural Rural Development Bank & Ors. v. Joint Registrar & Ors.3, it has been held that the decision in the Cherthala Agricultural Rural Development Bank & Ors. v. Joint Registrar & Ors. (supra) is required to be considered by us in these proceedings. 3. The question whether an administrator appointed during supersession of a Committee of Management of a Cooperative Society can enrol new members is no longer res integra. When an identical question came up before this Court for consideration in K. Shantharaj s case [supra], this Court held that from the language of Sections 30 (which is similar to Section 32(4) of the Act) and 30A of the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act, 1959, it would be clear that the administrator, subject to control of Registrar exercise all or any of the functions of the society, and the Special Officer subject to control of the State Government and the Registrar exercise and perform all the powers and functions of the committee of the society and in the interest of the society can take such action as is necessary for proper functioning of the society as per law. He should conduct elections as is enjoined thereunder, that is, he is to conduct election with the members as on the rolls and by necessary implication, he is not vested with power to enrol new members of the society. In the light of this clear enunciation of law the view taken by the High Court appears to be correct. 4. However, the learned Addl. In the light of this clear enunciation of law the view taken by the High Court appears to be correct. 4. However, the learned Addl. Solicitor General appearing for the appellants, submitted that there is difference in language between the provisions of the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act and the Act which was, in fact, noticed by the Karnataka High Court and, therefore, submitted that the decision in K. Shantharaj s case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. For the purpose of appreciation of this submission, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act and the Kerala Act : Section 30(2) of the Karnataka Act "The administrator so appointed shall subject to the control of the Registrar and such instructions as he may give from time to time, exercise all or any of the functions of the Committee or of any officer of the Cooperative Society and take such action as he may consider necessary in the interest of the society." Section 32(4) of the Act "The Committee or administrator or administrators so appointed shall, subject to the control of the Registrar and to such instructions as he may be from time to time give, have power to exercise all or any of the functions of the Committee or of any officer the society and take such action as may be required in the interests of the society." Section 30-A of the Karnataka Act "Appointment of Special Officer.-(1) Where the State Government, on a report made to it by the Registrar or otherwise, is satisfied that any Cooperative Society is not functioning in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder or its bye-laws or any order, direction or circular issued by the State Government or the Registrar, it may notwithstanding anything in this Act, by order, appoint a Special Officer for such Cooperative Society for such period not exceeding two years : Provided that the State Government may, if it considers it necessary extend the said period of two years by such further period not exceeding one year. (2) * * * (3) The Special Officer shall, subject to the control of the State Government and the Registrar, exercise and perform all the powers and functions of the Committee of the Cooperative Society or any officer of the Co-operative Society and take all such actions as may be required in the interest of the Cooperative Society." 5. The learned Addl. Solicitor General relied on that portion of the judgment of the Division Bench which affirmed the view of the learned Single Judge where a comparison between the Act and the Karnataka Act was considered and we may set out what was stated by the Division Bench : "Accordingly, he is not entitled to enrol new members. But it has to be noted that the wording of Section 32(4) of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act is slightly different from the wording of Section 30 of the Act. In the Kerala Act, the Administrator has power to exercise all or any of the functions of the committee, whereas in the Karnataka Act, the Administrator can only exercise all or any of the functions of the committee. Moreover, as stated earlier, the difference in the authority vested in an Administrator and a Special Officer, as is made in the Karnataka Act is not considered in the Kerala decision. The difference in the authority vested in an Administrator and a Special Officer in the Karnataka Act, is very significant which is absent in the Kerala Act. In that view of the matter, the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, cannot have any application while determining the comparative authority of an Administrator and a Special Officer appointed under Sections 30 and 30A of the Karnataka Act respectively." This very aspect was also brought to the notice of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court. 6. If we carefully analyse the provisions of the Act, it would be clear that the administrator or a Committee appointed while the Committee of Management of the Society is under supersession cannot have the power to enrol new members and such a question ought not to be decided merely by indulging in an exercise on semantics in ascertaining the meaning of the expression have "power to exercise all or any of the function...". Whether an authority is discharging a function or exercising a power will have to be ascertained with reference to the nature of the function or the power discharged or exercised in the background of the enactment. Often we do express that functions are discharged or powers exercised or vice versa depending upon the context of the duty or power enjoined under the law if the two expressions are inter-changeable. What is necessary to bear in mind is that nature of function or power exercised and not the manner in which it is done. Indeed this Court, while considering the provisions of Section 30-A of the Karnataka Act, which enabled a Special Officer appointed to exercise and perform all the powers and functions of the Committee of Management or any officer of the Cooperative Society (and not merely functions), took the view that the administrator or a special officer can exercise powers and functions only as may be required in the interests of the Cooperative Society. In that context, it was stated that he should conduct elections as enjoined under law, that is, he is to conduct elections with the members as on the rolls and by necessary implication, he is not vested with power to enrol new members of the society. We may add that a Cooperative Society is expected to function in a democratic manner through an elected Committee of Management and that Committee of Management is empowered to enrol new members. Enrolment of new members would involve alteration of the composition of the society itself and such a power should be exercised by an elected Committee rather than by an administrator or a Committee appointed by the Registrar while the Committee of Management is under supersession. This Court has taken the view, it did, bearing in mind these aspects, though not spelt out in the course of the judgment. This Court has taken the view, it did, bearing in mind these aspects, though not spelt out in the course of the judgment. Even where the language of Section 30-A of the Karnataka Act empowered a special officer to exercise and perform all the powers and functions of Committee of Management of a Cooperative Society fell for consideration, this Court having expressed that view, we do not think, there is any need to explore the difference in the meaning of the expession "have power to exercise all or any of the functions of the Committee" in the Act and "exercise all or any of the functions of the Committee in the Karnataka Act as they are not different and are in substance one and the same and difference in language will assume no importance. What is of significance is that when the Committee of Management of the Cooperative Society commits any default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed under the Acts, rules and the bye-laws, which is prejudicial to the interest of the society, the same is superseded and an administrator or a Committee is imposed thereon. The duty of such a Committee or an administrator is to set right the default, if any and to enable the society to carry on its functions as enjoined by law. Thus, the role of an administrator or a Committee appointed by the Registrar while the Committee of Management is under supersession, is, as pointed out by this Court, only to bring on an even keel a ship which was in doldrums. If that is the objective and is borne in mind, the interpretation of these provisions will not be difficult. 7. Thus we are of the view that this Court in K. Shantharaj s case (supra) took the view that an administrator or a special officer in the Karnataka Act is not vested with the power to enrol new members of the Cooperative Society in this context. While reiterating that view in regard to the Kerala Act, we afford further reasons to support the said view and dismiss these appeals, though for reasons different from those expressed by the High Court. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs. (C.R.) Appeals dismissed. While reiterating that view in regard to the Kerala Act, we afford further reasons to support the said view and dismiss these appeals, though for reasons different from those expressed by the High Court. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs. (C.R.) Appeals dismissed. ************** ORDER The short question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the Collector of a District has the power to supend the Stipendiary Engineer appointed by the State Government and working in connection with the affairs of the community development. 2. The respondent is a Stipendiary Engineer and at the relevant time as posted at Daspantapur Block in the District of Koraput, Orissa. It appears that since disciplinary proceedings were in contemplation against the respondent and, therefore, the Collector of Koraput by an order dated 8th April, 1996 suspended the respondent. The respondent challenged the aforesaid order of suspension before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the Collector had no authority to suspend him in contemplation of the departmental inquiry against him. The tribunal, on filing of the original application, without issuing notice to the appellants, allowed the said application holding that the Collector had no power to suspend the respondent. It is against the said judgment the appellants are in appeal before us. 3. Despite service of notice, the respondent has not put in appearance in this case. We, therefore, proceed to decide the matter in his absence. 4. Rule 12 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 provides that the appointing authority or any authority empowered by the Governor may place a government servant under suspension where a disciplinary proceeding against such a government servant is in contemplation or where a case against such a government servant in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial. By an order dated 6.2.87, the Governor of Orissa in exercise of power under sub-rule (1) of Rule 12 of the Rules empowered the Collector of the district to suspend a government servant working in connection with the affairs of the Community Development. Subsequently, the governor has also empowered the Collector of the district to inflict minor punishment on the government servants working with the affairs of the community development. 5. Subsequently, the governor has also empowered the Collector of the district to inflict minor punishment on the government servants working with the affairs of the community development. 5. The tribunal was of the view that since the Collector is empowered to impose only minor punishments; the power of suspension could not be delegated to the Collector, as power of suspension is exercisable only in the case of major punishment. This view, according to us, is not legally correct. It was not disputed before the tribunal that, under Rule 12, the Governor is empowered to delegate the power of suspension on the Collector of the district. Merely because the Governor subsequently has empowered the Collector of the district to also inflict minor punishment, it does not mean that by such delegation the Governor is denuded of his power to delegate power of suspension on the Collector. Such a view of the tribunal is neither borne out from reading of Rule 12 nor on the interpretation of the order dated 6th February 1987. We are, therefore, of the view that once the Collector was empowered by the Governor to suspend a government servant working in connection with the affairs of the community development, the said power continued to be exercisable by the Collector even after delegation of power on the Collector to impose minor punishment. 6. On the aforesaid view of the matter, the order under challenge is set aside. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. (C.R.) Appeal allowed. ************** JUDGMENT Raju, J.-The State of Rajasthan, who lost before the Courts below, is the appellant before us, challenging the summary dismissal of a second appeal by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court filed in SB Civil S.A. No. 157/94 and thereby affixing seal of approval to the judgment and decree passed in favour of respondent-plaintiff. 2. Having regard to the nebulous manner in which relevant facts are found to have been stated in the judgments of the trial court as well as the first appellate court, we thought it fit and necessary to look into the plaint of which an English translated copy as made for the respondents has been furnished by the learned counsel, appearing before us. The suit property is said to be a plot of land measuring north-south 60 ft. and east-west 40 ft. situated on Nohar-Bhadra Road at Nohar. The suit property is said to be a plot of land measuring north-south 60 ft. and east-west 40 ft. situated on Nohar-Bhadra Road at Nohar. As per the version of the claim in the plaint he was holding possession of the property since time immemorial by fencing it and in the year 1955 the plaintiff constructed a house on the disputed plot and started living therein. The fact that in the year 1955, he constructed the rooms, kitchen etc., and started living there, is found asserted more than once, claiming at the same time that he was in occupation since long before without specifying anywhere how long before. Further, assertions made in the plaint are that he got electricity connection and water connection in 1965 and 1974 respectively, producing photocopies of an electricity bill of 1965 and water bill of 1981. A grievance has also been made that at the instance of Area Patwari, Nohar, the A.D.M./Secretary Mandi Development Committee, issued a notice calling upon him to vacate the encroachment, to which he claims to have submitted his defence. Since, the A.D.M. without properly appreciating the claims of the plaintiff, ordered eviction, the plaintiff was forced to file the suit and as per the case of the plaintiff projected in the plaint, he by his long possession has become the owner of the plot of land and not only the order passed by the A.D.M. is illegal, null and void but his possession has to be protected by the issue of appropriate orders of permanent injunction. 3. The case of the defendant was that the encroachment was made for the first time only in the year 1981 and the plaintiff was not in possession of the plot before and that no connection of electricity and water was obtained by the plaintiff as claimed during the years 1965 and 1974 respectively and the order of the A.D.M. directing the removal of encroachment is absolutely legal, having been passed in exercise of the powers under Sections 22 and 24 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954. Want of notice under Section 80 CPC has also been urged as an infirmity to non suit the plaintiff. 4. Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective claims. Want of notice under Section 80 CPC has also been urged as an infirmity to non suit the plaintiff. 4. Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective claims. It is only for the first time in evidence the plaintiff as PW-1 introduced the theory of earlier possession of the land by the father of the plaintiff and the two witnesses examined also in a most cavalier and more loyal than the king fashion seem to have asserted that the property in question was in the occupation of the plaintiff s family for nearly 55-60 years. A cursory reference is found made to the evidence produced on the side of the defendant-State. The trial court, on such perfunctory materials, is found to have made certain observations totally lacking in precision and observed, "on the basis of the oral evidence and water and electricity bills produced by the plaintiff in respect of plot in question, the possession of the plaintiff over the land in question has been found continuously and uninterruptedly since 1955". In yet another place, the trial court observed, "Thus, I hold that on the basis of the evidence produced by the plaintiff, it is proved that the plot of land in question has been in possession of the plaintiff for more than 30 years peacefully, continuously and without any obstruction, after raising building thereon". The starting observation is found made in the relief portion and it reads, "on the above discussion, I have decided that the land in question has been in peaceful and continuous possession of the plaintiff since 1955, on which he constructed building and started residing therein in 1955 itself and thus, this period becomes over about 30 years. Under the circumstances, the "adverse possession of the plaintiff over the land in question has been established on the basis of which he has acquired ownership thereon". 5. Aggrieved, the State pursued the matter on appeal before the first appellate Court but we find on a close scrutiny of the judgment that there was no due or proper application of mind or any critical analysis or objective consideration of the matter made, despite the same being the first appellate Court. 5. Aggrieved, the State pursued the matter on appeal before the first appellate Court but we find on a close scrutiny of the judgment that there was no due or proper application of mind or any critical analysis or objective consideration of the matter made, despite the same being the first appellate Court. On the other hand, by merely reproducing the findings of the nature adverted to by us, a mechanical affirmation seems to have been made of them without any reference to the principles of law or the criteria to be satisfied before the claim of the plaintiff of perfection of title by adverse possession could be sustained, involving correspondingly destruction of title of the State in respect of a public property. The first appellate Court further chose to reject the appeal on the ground that the same has not been presented within time even without properly noticing the details as to when the Court closed for summer vacation and when the same was reopened, on some strange method of reasoning. 6. The High Court apparently obsessed by the limitations drawn on the exercise of Second Appellate Jurisdiction, unmindful even of the glaring inconsistencies and contradictions and serious nature of the issues raised involving public property, has chosen to summarily reject the appeal solely for the reason that both the courts below have found the plaintiff to be the owner of the property and if that be the position, Section 22 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954, which provided for summary eviction of those in illegal occupation of public property will have no application and that the declaration granted by the courts had the effect of setting aside the order by the A.D.M. impliedly. Hence, this appeal by the State. 7. Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for the State of Rajasthan, strenuously contended that the courts below committed serious errors of law in upholding the claim of adverse possession projected by the plaintiff and that such findings were based more on hypothetical assumption of vital and necessary facts, based on mere surmises. Reference has been made to the fact that there was no specific finding about the claim of possession by the father projected merely at the time of trial and not raised either when the objections were submitted before the A.D.M. or even when the suit was filed, in the plaint. Reference has been made to the fact that there was no specific finding about the claim of possession by the father projected merely at the time of trial and not raised either when the objections were submitted before the A.D.M. or even when the suit was filed, in the plaint. Argued the learned counsel further that the essential ingredients necessarily to be established to substantiate a claim of perfection of title by adverse possession are totally lacking in the present case and, therefore, our interference is called for to prevent miscarriage of justice. As for the finding of the first appellate court that the appeal presented by the State before it was also barred by limitation, the learned counsel invited our attention to the details relating to the period of vacation and the date of reopening of subordinate courts after summer recess and contended that the said reason also was erroneous both on law and on facts. A plea on the bar of civil court s jurisdiction based on Section 25 of the Act was also raised. 8. Shri Aman Hingorani, learned counsel appearing for the respondents legal-representatives of the plaintiff, with equal force and vehemence contended that the findings of the courts below concurrently recorded are quite in accordance with law and do not call for interference in the appeal. The learned counsel, at length invited our attention to the findings of the courts below, the copy of the plaint and the evidence of PWs by furnishing his own translated copies of the same. Since, the order passed by the A.D.M. was illegal and a nullity, according to the learned counsel, the bar of suit engrafted in the Act cannot be a hurdle to approach the competent Civil Court to vindicate the property rights of the plaintiff. Both the learned counsel invited our attention to some of the relevant case law on the subject and reference will be made, to the same hereinafter. 9. Adverting first to the question of limitation, on which also the first appellate court chose to reject the appeal before it and pursued before us though not considered by the High Court, we find from the materials, placed on record that the trial court delivered its judgment on 10.4.89, that on 11.4.89, the State applied for a copy of the judgment and the summer vacation started on 9.5.89. It is stated that after the receipt of the copy of the judgment on 9.5.89, an application for a copy of the decree was made only on 12.5.89 and the appeal was filed on 3.7.89, the date on which the courts were said to have been reopened after summer recess. If the copy of the judgment dated 10.4.89 was furnished on 9.5.89, the limitation for filing the appeal would extend upto 8.6.89 and if during such period on 12.5.89 a copy of the decree was applied for it cannot be said to have been made after the limitation period was over and having regard to the intervening summer recess, the filing of the appeal on the reopening day after obtaining the decree copy also, together with copies of judgment and decree on the first day of the reopening after vacation would be well within the period of limitation and there is no merit in the said ground assigned by the first appellate court. Our attention has also been drawn to the original records where we found a specific endorsement made after processing the appeal papers by the office of the first appellate court, that the appeal has been filed within time. The first appellate court, therefore, was in error in holding to the contra. 10. Apart from the serious error committed by the first appellate court on the question of limitation, which the second appellate was obliged but yet failed to consider and correct, the learned Single Judge in the High Court, in our view, committed a grave error in dismissing summarily the appeal when it involved substantial and arguable questions of law of some importance. Since, these issues have been raised and argued before us, we consider it appropriate to deal with them ourselves, instead of remitting the matter back to the High Court for disposal on merits after hearing both parties, at this belated stage. 11. Since, these issues have been raised and argued before us, we consider it appropriate to deal with them ourselves, instead of remitting the matter back to the High Court for disposal on merits after hearing both parties, at this belated stage. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied upon Sections 22 and Section 25 of the Act to contend that the order passed by the A.D.M in exercise of his powers under Section 22 of the Act has become final and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stand ousted in respect of such matters by virtue of Section 25 and therefore the suit could not have been entertained at all by the Civil Court Section 25 of the Act stipulates that a Civil Court shall not have jurisdiction in any matter which the Collector is empowered by that Act to dispose of and shall not take cognisance of the manner in which the State Government or Collector or any officer exercises any power vested in it or in him by or under the said Act. Section 22, provides for a summary eviction of any person who occupies or continues to occupy any land in a colony to which he has no right or title or without lawful authority by treating such person as a trespasser in the manner and after following the procedure prescribed therefor. Reliance has been placed by the respondents on the decisions reported in Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani & Others1; and Firm and Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons v. The State of Andhra Pradesh2, to substantiate his claim that the bar of suit will not be attracted to a case of this nature. In our view, the principles laid down in Abdul Waheed Khan s case (supra) while considering a provision like the one before us, that the bar is with reference to any matter which a Revenue Officer is empowered by the Act to determine and the question of title is foreign to the scope of proceedings under the Act, would apply to this case also with all force, that is on the provisions of Section 25 of the Act, as it stands. Even that apart in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam3 this Court, after adverting to Dhulabhai s case4, held that questions relating to disputed claims of parties for title to an immovable property could be decided only by the competent Civil Court and that in the absence of a machinery in the special enactment to determine disputes relating to title between two rival claimants, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be said to have been ousted. In the case on hand, a citizen is asserting a claim of acquisition of title by adverse possession in derogation of the rights and interests of the State in the property in question in our view, determination of such claims are not only outside the purview of Section 22 which only provide for a summary mode of eviction but in respect of such disputes relating to title to immovable property the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts to adjudicate them cannot be said to have been ousted. The powers and procedure under Section 22 of the Act, in our view, is no substitute for the civil courts jurisdiction and powers to try and adjudicate disputes of title relating to immovable property. 12. So far as the question of perfection of title by adverse possession and that too in respect of public property is concerned, the question requires to be considered more seriously and effectively for the reason that it ultimately involve destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property and conferring upon a third party encroacher title where, he had none. The decision in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy5, adverted to the ordinary classical requirement-that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario-that is the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. It was also observed therein that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession, his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the required animus. It was also observed therein that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession, his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the required animus. In the decision reported in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan6, strongly relied for the respondents, the Court laid down further that it is sufficient that the possession be overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the person against whom time is running, ought if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening and if the rights of the crown have been openly usurped it cannot be heard to plead that the fact was not brought to its notice. In Annasaheb Bapushaheb Patil & Others v. Balwant alias Balasaheb Babusaheb Patil (dead) by LRs. etc.7, it was observed that a claim of adverse possession being a hostile assertion involving expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner, the burden is always on the person who asserts such a claim to prove by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and in deciding such claim, the Courts must have regard to the animus of the person doing those acts. 13. The High Court without even a cursory scrutiny of the legality and propriety of the findings in order to ascertain at least as to whether they are based upon any legally acceptable evidence and the necessary legal ingredients of adverse possession stood substantiated, mechanically seem to have accorded its approval to the claim of title made by the plaintiff merely on the basis that both the courts below have found the plaintiff to be the owner of the property. Indisputably the State was the owner and the question is as to whether its title has been extinguished and the plaintiff had acquired and perfected title to the same by adverse possession. In order to substantiate such a claim of adverse possession the ingredients of open, hostile and continuous possession with the required animus, as laid down by Courts should be proved for a continuous period of 30 years. Admittedly, the plaintiff claims to have put up the construction in 1955 and absolutely there is no concrete and independent material to prove the same, except an oral assertion. Admittedly, the plaintiff claims to have put up the construction in 1955 and absolutely there is no concrete and independent material to prove the same, except an oral assertion. The story of his father having been there even earlier to 1955 was not projected either before the A.D.M. when the plaintiff submitted his defence, or in the plaint when the suit was filed but for the first time introduced only at the stage of trial when examined as PW1. When the property was a vacant land before the alleged construction was put up, to show open and hostile possession which could alone in law constitute adverse to the State, in this case, some concrete details of the nature of occupation with proper proof thereof would be absolutely necessary and mere vague assertions cannot by themselves be a substitute for such concrete proof required of open and hostile possession. Even if the plaintiff s allegations and claims, as projected in the plaint, are accepted in toto, the period of so-called adverse possession would fall short by 5 years of the required period. There is no scrap of paper or concrete material to prove any such possession of the plaintiff s father nor was there any specific finding supported by any evidence, in this regard. The father of the plaintiff was also an employee of the Telephone Department. It is not as though, if their story of such long possession is true, there would be no correspondence or record to show that his father or the plaintiff were there before 1981. The relevance of the electricity bill to the property in question itself has been questioned and no effort has been taken by the plaintiff to correlate the electricity and water bill to the property claimed by examining any official witnesses connected with those records. While that be the factual position, it is beyond comprehension as to how anyone expected to reasonably and judiciously adjudicate a claim of title by objective process of reasoning could have come to the conclusion that the legal requirement of 30 years of continuous, hostile and open possession with the required animus stood satisfied and proved on such perfunctory and slender material on record in the case. The first appellate court as well as the High Court ought to have seen that perverse findings not based upon legally acceptable evidence and which are patently contrary to law declared by this Court cannot have any immunity from interference in the hands of the appellate authority. The trial court has jumped to certain conclusions virtually on no evidence whatsoever in this connection. Such lackadaisical findings based upon mere surmises and conjectures, if allowed to be mechanically approved by the first appellate court and the second appellate court also withdraws itself into recluse apparently taking umbrage under Section 100, Cr.P.C., the inevitable casualty is justice and approval of such rank injustice would only result in gross miscarriage of justice. 14. We are of the view, on the materials on record that the plaintiff could not be held to have substantiated his claim of perfection of title by adverse possession to the public property. The Courts below could not have legitimately come to any such conclusion in this case. The judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside and the plaintiff s suit shall stand dismissed. No costs. Before parting with this case, we may observe that our decision need not stand in the way of the legal heirs of the plaintiff, if they so desire to approach the concerned authorities to seek for assignment of the land in their favour for value. (C.R.) Appeal allowed. ************** Parallel Citations of other Journals : Jt. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Kerala v. T.A. Kuttappan & Ors. etc., 2000(4) Supreme 226 00071