Judgment :- P. SATHASIVAM, J. Aggrieved by the order of the firstrespondent/the Appropriate Authority (Income-tax Department), Chennai-34, dated August 21, 1997, passed under section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, Hindustan Motors Limited, Calcutta-1, has filed Writ Petition No. 13303 of 1997. Aggrieved by the very same order, the other party to the"exchange", Smt. A. R. Chandrika has filed Writ Petition No. 15631 of 1997. Since the issue raised is one and the same in boththe writ petitions, they are being disposed of by the followingcommon order. Inasmuch as the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 15631 of 1997, is also the fifth respondent in Writ Petition No. 13303 of 1997, for convenience I shall refer to Hindustan MotorsLimited as petitioner and Smt. A. R. Chandrika as fifthrespondent. The case of the petitioner is briefly stated hereunder : The petitioner is a public limited company having its registeredoffice at Calcutta and a division at Chennai. The petitioner ownsa property comprising the land and building situated at No. 10, First Avenue, Harrington Road, Chetput, Chennai-31. The propertycomprises land measuring three grounds 777 square feet with aresidential building thereon. The fifth respondent is the ownerof the property comprising land measuring five grounds and 1, 552square feet with residential building thereon situated at No. 1, Second Main Road, Gandhinagar, Adyar, Chennai-20. The petitionerdesired to construct a housing complex for the benefit of itsemplo- yees. They were informed that the fifth respondent owns aproperty comprising more than five grounds at Adyar. On aninspection, the petitioner was convinced that the said propertywould be eminently suitable for its purpose of putting up ahousing complex as required by it. After discussions and aftervarious proposals on either side, the petitioner and the fifthrespondent came to an agreement that the property belonging tothe petitioner and the property belonging to the fifth respondentcould be mutually exchanged. Pursuant to the agreement betweenthe petitioner and the fifth respondent to exchange theproperties mutually, they sought the assistance of a registeredvaluer to arrive at the terms of exchange after considering thenature of the properties and all relevant and connected mattersin regard thereto. After detailed discussions, the parties agreedthat the property at Adyar belonging to the fifth respondentshall be exchanged for the property at Harrington Road belongingto the petitioner, the petitioner paying to the fifth respondenta sum of Rs. 63, 00, 000 pursuant to the above exchange of theproperties. After detailed discussions, the parties agreedthat the property at Adyar belonging to the fifth respondentshall be exchanged for the property at Harrington Road belongingto the petitioner, the petitioner paying to the fifth respondenta sum of Rs. 63, 00, 000 pursuant to the above exchange of theproperties. The parties entered into an agreement of exchangedated March 28, 1997, setting out the terms mutually agreed tobetween them with regard to the above exchange. They were advisedthat in so far an exchange was a "transfer" within the meaning ofthe said expression under section 269UA(f) of the Income-tax Act, they should obtain a "no objection certificate" to secure theregistration of the deed of exchange and for the said purpose, they were required to file a statement in Form No. 37-I in termsof section 269UC of the Income-tax Act. Accordingly, thepetitioner filed a statement in Form No. 37-I, dated March 28, 1997, prescribed under rule 48L of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. On May 19, 1997, the petitioner received a notice under sub-section (1A) of section 269UD of the Income-tax Act. The firstrespondent called upon the petitioner to show cause why an ordershould not be made in respect of the property at Harrington Road, Chetput, Chennai, in accordance with the provisions of section269UD of the Income-tax Act. The notice stated that the firstrespondent had come across two sale instances in the past in thevicinity of the said property which he sought to compare with thesaid property. Apart from the aforesaid two sale instancesrelating to the property at Harrington Road, the first respondentincidentally pointed out that the property at Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, belonging to the fifth respondent and sought to beexchanged for the petitioner's property has shown "considerableappreciation" when compared to two sale instances relating to1995. After dealing with the two sale instances, the firstrespondent has stated that the variation between the prices inrespect of the sale instances would raise a presumption of anattempt to evade tax. The petitioner submitted objections to the said notice, in termsof its letter dated June 9, 1997. Apart from submitting detailedobjections, the petitioner submitted valuation reports as well asdetailed technical objec- tion from a registered valuer apart from its own objectionsobjecting to the assumption of the first respondent that therewas an undervaluation of the petitioner's property and that thepresumption of attempt to evade tax would arise. Apart from submitting detailedobjections, the petitioner submitted valuation reports as well asdetailed technical objec- tion from a registered valuer apart from its own objectionsobjecting to the assumption of the first respondent that therewas an undervaluation of the petitioner's property and that thepresumption of attempt to evade tax would arise. It is furtherstated that the petitioner is a public limited company of reputeand there was no question of avoidance of tax in respect of theabove transaction. The first respondent finally made an impugnedorder dated August 21, 1997, under section 269UD(1) of theIncome-tax Act. In the said order, the first respondentarbitrarily rejected the various contentions submitted by thepetitioner and did not also consider the various sale instancescited by the petitioner in support of its contention that therewas no undervaluation by the petitioner as alleged by the firstrespondent. In such circumstances, having no other effectiveremedy, has filed Writ Petition No. 13303 of 1997. Since thefifth respondent/petitioner in the other Writ Petition (W.P. No. 15631 of 1997) has also raised similar contentions, I am notreferring the same. In the light of the above factual position, I have beard learnedsenior counsel for the petitioner in both the writ petitions andthe senior Central Government standing counsel (income-tax cases) for respondents Nos. 1 to 4 in both the cases. There is no dispute that the petitioner owns a propertycomprising the land and building situated at No. 10, FirstAvenue, Harrington Road, Chetput, Chennai-31. The said propertycomprises land measuring three grounds 777 square feet with aresidential building thereon. Likewise, the fifth respondent isthe owner of the property comprising land measuring five groundsand 1, 552 square feet with residential building thereon situatedat No. 1, Second Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, Chennai-20. After negotiation, the petitioner and the fifth respondent cameto an agreement that the property belonging to the petitioner andthe property belonging to the fifth respondent could be mutuallyexchanged. It is further seen that pursuant to the said agreementbetween the petitioner and the fifth respondent to exchange theproperties mutually, they sought the assistance of a registeredvaluer to arrive at the terms of exchange, after considering thenature of the properties. It is further seen that accordingly, the parties agreed that the property at Adyar belonging to thefifth respondent shall be exchanged for the property atHarrington Road belonging to the petitioner, the petitionerpaying to the fifth respondent a sum of Rs. 63, 00, 000 pursuant tothe exchange of the properties. It is further seen that accordingly, the parties agreed that the property at Adyar belonging to thefifth respondent shall be exchanged for the property atHarrington Road belonging to the petitioner, the petitionerpaying to the fifth respondent a sum of Rs. 63, 00, 000 pursuant tothe exchange of the properties. Finally, the parties entered intoan agreement of exchange dated March 28, 1997, setting out theterms mutually agreed to between them with regard to the saidexchange. It is further seen that both the parties were advisedthat in order to obtain a "no objection certificate" to securethe registration of the deed of exchange, they were required tofile a statement in Form No. 37-I in terms of section 269UC ofthe Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Accordingly, the petitioner filed a statement in FormNo. 37-I, dated March 28, 1997, prescribed under rule 48L of theIncome-tax Rules (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"). In thesaid form, the petitioner was shown as the transferor and thefifth respondent as the transferee. On the basis of the directionto file a separate statement showing the fifth respondent as thetransferor and the petitioner as the transferee in respect of theproperty at No. 1, Second Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, belonging to the fifth respondent, two statements in Form No. 37-I were filed one showing the petitioner as transferor in respectof the property at Harrington Road belonging to the petitionerand the other showing the fifth respondent as the transferor inrespect of the property at Gandhi Nagar belonging to the fifthrespondent. After rectifying certain errors that were noticed inthe statements, a fresh set of statements in Form No. 37-I werefiled rectifying the errors, on May 5, 1997. While so, on May 19, 1997, the petitioner received a show-cause notice relating to theproperty belonging to the petitioner at Harrington Road, Chetput, Chennai, to show cause why an order should not be made in respectof the above property in accordance with the provisions ofsection 269UD of the Act. In the said notice, the firstrespondent referred to two sale instances in the past in thevicinity of the said property and came to the conclusion thatthere was a difference of 39.92 per cent. taking into account thefirst property and 36.74 per cent. taking into account the secondproperty. In the said notice, the firstrespondent referred to two sale instances in the past in thevicinity of the said property and came to the conclusion thatthere was a difference of 39.92 per cent. taking into account thefirst property and 36.74 per cent. taking into account the secondproperty. In the very same notice, it was pointed out that theproperty at Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, belonging to the fifthrespondent sought to be exchanged for the petitioner's propertyhas shown "considerable appreciation" when compared to two saleinstances relating to 1995. In the said show-cause notice, afterreferring those material aspects, the first respondent sought toexercise the right of pre-emptive purchase. The petitionersubmitted objections to the said notice in their letter datedJune 9, 1997. The petitioner also submitted valuation reports aswell as detailed technical objection from a registered valuerapart from its own objections objecting of the assumption of thefirst respondent that there was an undervaluation of thepetitioner's property and that the presumption of attempt toevade tax would arise. After affording adequate opportunity tothe petitioner and after a full-fledged enquiry, the firstrespondent, by the impugned order dated August 21, 1997, byvirtue of the powers vested on them under section 269UD of theAct, passed an order to purchase the property at Harrington Road, more particularly described in annexure I to the order by theCentral Government for a sum of Rs. 1, 87, 00, 000. By virtue of theprovisions of section 269UE(1) of the Act, the said propertyshall vest in the Central Government from the said date. In sofar as the property of the fifth respondent is concerned, theform submitted by them in Form No. 37-I was rendered asinfructuous. Mr. 1, 87, 00, 000. By virtue of theprovisions of section 269UE(1) of the Act, the said propertyshall vest in the Central Government from the said date. In sofar as the property of the fifth respondent is concerned, theform submitted by them in Form No. 37-I was rendered asinfructuous. Mr. V. Ramachandran , learned senior counsel for the petitioner, after taking me through the agreement of exchange dated March 28, 1997, relevant provisions from the Income-tax Act and the Rulesand the impugned order of the first respondent, has raised thefollowing contentions : The impugned order is contrary to the provisions of Chapter XX-Cof the Act and liable to be quashed; Inasmuch as the transaction is one of exchange, any action interms of Chapter XX-C has to cover all the properties involved inthe exchange and cannot be invoked in respect of any one of theproperties in isolation of the other or others; hence, theimpugned order of the first respondent, ordering the purchase ofonly the petitioner's property and ignoring the transactionrelating to the property sought to be given to the petitioner inexchange, in terms of the agreement of exchange and rejecting thestatement in Form No. 37-I filed in respect of the said propertyas infructuous, is bad in law; The first respondent has no jurisdiction to decide that there isan undervaluation in respect of one of the properties covered byexchange on the basis of the apparent consideration so estimated; The appropriate authority is bound to determine whether theproperty so offered constitutes adequate consideration takinginto account all surrounding circumstances. He cannot merelyproceed on the basis of an estimate of value of one of theproperties or both and come to the arbitrary conclusion that oneof the properties is undervalued on the basis of sale instancesreferred to by him; A mere statement that a presumption of attempt to evade taxarises would not be sufficient discharge of the obligation caston the first respondent under Chapter XX-C; The first respondent has cited two sale instances, bothproperties being situated in the Second Avenue, Harrington Road, Chennai. On the other hand, the property in respect of which theimpugned order is passed is situated in the First Avenue, Harrington Road, Chennai. On the other hand, the property in respect of which theimpugned order is passed is situated in the First Avenue, Harrington Road, Chennai. In view of the difference in road widthof the first and second avenues, the properties in the secondavenue would be far more valuable; Necessary allowances were not taken into account and consequentlythe impugned order which has been made without taking intoaccount the eligible allowances is liable to be quashed; The first respondent has not determined the value in respect ofthe property offered in exchange, the apparent consideration hasnot been determined and, consequently, the first respondentcannot make an order for purchase of property under section269UD(1) of the Act. The first respondent ought to have acceptedthe value fixed by the Registration Department. On the other hand, Mrs. Chitra Venkataraman , learned seniorCentral Government standing counsel (income-tax cases), aftertaking me through the impugned order of the first respondent, would contend that the petitioner was given adequate opportunitybefore passing the impugned order. She also contended that thefirst respondent has correctly referred to two sale instancesnearer to the property of the petitioner and assessed the valuein accordance with the accepted principles and rightly passed theimpugned order. She further contended that this court does notsit in appeal over the decision of the appropriate authority andre-appraise the materials placed before it. She further contendedthat inasmuch as the order of pre-emptive purchase was passedafter considering materials on record and comparitive saleinstances, the judicial review by this court under article 226 ofthe Constitution of India is very limited and accordingly prayedfor dismissal of the writ petitions. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. Since the contentions raised by learned senior counsel for thepetitioners are interconnected, I shall consider and give myreasons hereunder. Chapter XX-C deals with purchase by theCentral Government of immovable properties in certain cases oftransfer. Among other provisions, we are concerned with section269UA which reads as follows : "269UA. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. Since the contentions raised by learned senior counsel for thepetitioners are interconnected, I shall consider and give myreasons hereunder. Chapter XX-C deals with purchase by theCentral Government of immovable properties in certain cases oftransfer. Among other provisions, we are concerned with section269UA which reads as follows : "269UA. In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, - (a)" agreement for transfer "means an agreement, whetherregistered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), or not, for the transfer of any immovable property; (b) "apparent consideration", - (1) in relation to any immovable property in respect of which anagreement for transfer is made, being immovable property of thenature referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (d), means, - (i) if the immovable property is to be transferred by way ofsale, the consideration for such transfer as specified in theagreement for transfer; (ii) if the immovable property is to be transferred by way ofexchange, - (A) in a case where the consideration for the transfer consistsof a thing or things only, the price that such thing or thingswould ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date onwhich the agreement for transfer is made; (B) in a case where the consideration for the transfer consistsof a thing or things and a sum of money, the aggregate of theprice that such thing or things would ordinarily fetch on sale inthe open market on the date on which the agreement for transferis made, and such sum;" Section 269UB speaks about constitution of appropriate authorityand section 269UC refers to restrictions on transfer of immovableproperty. Section 269UD enables the appropriate authority to pass ordersfor purchase by the Central Government of immovable property. Asper sub-section (1A), before making an order under sub-section(1), the appropriate authority shall give a reasonableopportunity of being heard to the transferor, the person inoccupation of the immovable property if the transferor is not inoccupation of the property, the transferee and to every otherperson whom the appropriate authority knows to be interested inthe property. Every order made by the appropriate authority undersub-section (1) shall specify the grounds on which it is made. Every order made by the appropriate authority undersub-section (1) shall specify the grounds on which it is made. Asper sub-section (2), the appropriate authority shall cause a copyof its order under sub-section (1) in respect of any immovableproperty to be served on the transferor, the person in occupationof the immovable property if the transferor is not in occupationthereof, the transferee, and on every other person whom theappropriate authority knows to be interested in the property. Section 269UE(1) says that where an order under sub-section (1) of section 269UD is made by the appropriate authority in respectof an immovable property referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause(d) of section 269UA, such property shall, on the date of suchorder, vest in the Central Government in terms of the agreementfor transfer referred to in sub-section (1) of section 269UC. In view of specific reference including transfer of immovableproperty by way of exchange in sub-clause (ii) of clause (1) ofsection 269UA(b), the said transaction of exchange between thepetitioner and the fifth respondent is covered by Chapter XX-C ofthe Act and, as such, the contra argument regarding lack ofjurisdiction is liable to be rejected. Both the properties in question, namely, at No. 10, First Avenue, Harrington Road, Chetput and at No. 1, Second Main Road, GandhiNagar, Adyar, were valued by a registered valuer, namely, Prashanth Engineers and the petitioner filed a statement in FormNo. 37-I on the basis of the said valuation. The appropriateauthority rejected both the valuation reports as well as apparentconsideration shown in the statement based on the aforesaidvaluation reports. The conclusion of the appropriate authority isthat the report of the registered valuer is not based on anyevidence of the market value of the land. On the other hand, theappropriate authority relied on two sale instances of theproperty in which "no objection certificates" were issued andaccording to the said authority which are authentic documents. Mr. Ramachandran , learned senior counsel for the petitioner, bydrawing my attention to section 269UA(b) of the Act, wouldcontend that in respect of an exchange, the apparentconsideration of the property which is sought to be transferred, would represent the market value of the property that is taken inexchange plus the money, if any, paid in addition to theproperty. Thus, according to him, applying the said definition, the apparent consideration for the property at Harrington Roadbelonging to the petitioner would represent the market value ofthe property at Adyar. Thus, according to him, applying the said definition, the apparent consideration for the property at Harrington Roadbelonging to the petitioner would represent the market value ofthe property at Adyar. It is also stated that in terms of section269UD(1), if the Government desires to purchase the propertywhich is the subject-matter of an exchange, it should pay to theowner the market value of the property which is taken inexchange. Accordingly, it is further stated that the appropriateauthority ought to have valued the Adyar property to determinethe actual consideration that should be paid by the Government tothe petitioner. It is argued that in the absence of valuation ofthe Adyar property by the appropriate authority, it is impossiblefor the appropriate authority to actually determine theconsideration payable to the petitioner for the purchase of thepetitioner's property at Harrington Road. He very much relied ona decision in the case of Hari Krishna Kanoi vs AppropriateAuthority. The following passage is very much pressed into service (page 767) : "One of the grounds for the petitioners contending that theappropriate authority has not determined the apparentconsideration in terms of the agreement is that the appropriateauthority should have taken the market value of the constructionto be made by the petitioners on lot 'B'. It is submitted thatRs. 10 lakhs only represented the cost of construction. Theobjection must be sustained. The appropriate authority hastreated the proposed construction as a 'thing' within the meaningof section 269UA(b)(2)(ii) and (iii). It should have addressedits mind to the market value of such construction on the date ofthe agreement. It has not." A perusal of the relevant provisions would clearly show thatwhere an order for the purchase of any immovable property is madeunder section 269UD(1) of the Act, the Central Government shallpay, by way of consideration for such purchase, an amount equalto the amount of the apparent consideration. In such acircumstance, the question of fulfilling the promises as per theagreement does not arise. In terms of section 269UM, thetransferee cannot make any claim against the transferor by reasonof such transfer being not in accordance with the agreement forthe transfer of the immovable property entered into. Accordingly, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioneris liable to be rejected. Now I shall consider the sale instances cited in the show-causenotice as well as in the ultimate order passed by the appropriateauthority. Accordingly, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioneris liable to be rejected. Now I shall consider the sale instances cited in the show-causenotice as well as in the ultimate order passed by the appropriateauthority. According to the first respondent, both the propertiesare located in Second Avenue, Harrington Road, Chetput, which isadjacent to the First Avenue and similarly located andcomparable. It is seen that the appropriate authority has basedthe valuation on documented sale instances where land value hasbeen fixed as Rs. 2, 100 square feet by the registered valuer. Itis the definite case of the petitioner that the land value inFirst Avenue, Harrington Road, are lower by 32 per cent. ascompared to Second Avenue, Harrington Road, based on a comparison of the guideline value. Inthis regard, the appropriate authority has concluded thatguideline values are fixed by the registering authorities for thepurposes of collection of stamp duty and that guideline values ofland for the purposes of registration of an immovable propertycan have no application for determining the market value underChapter XX-C of the Act. The appropriate authority has relied ona decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Krishna Kumar Rawat vs. Union of India ( 1995 ) , wherein it was held that themarket rates for the purpose of registration of an immovableproperty as notified by the Sub-Registrar can have no applicationfor determining the market value under Chapter XX-C of the Act. It is further stated that it is limited only for payment of stampduty. I am in agreement with the view expressed by the RajasthanHigh Court. Further, the principles for valuation in respect ofan immovable property under the Wealth-tax Act or other taxationlaws are different from the principles which are applicable toacquisition proceedings. The proceedings under Chapter XX-C areakin to the acquisition proceedings and not to the valuationprinciples which are applicable for assessing the tax on thebasis of the valuation of the property. A certain element ofguess has to be there based on objective factors havingreasonable nexus with the evidence on record. The various factorsare there on the basis of which out of the various method bywhich the valuation of the immovable property can be made, appropriate method is to be adopted. It depends on the locationof the property, the purpose for which the property is used, thenature of the property the time when the agreement is enteredinto and similar other objective factors. It depends on the locationof the property, the purpose for which the property is used, thenature of the property the time when the agreement is enteredinto and similar other objective factors. The valuation, therefore, has to be done by a method which is more objective andcould furnish reliable data to arrive at a just conclusion. Asalready stated, the market rates notified by the Sub-Registrarfor the purpose of registration cannot be a proper guide forvaluation in respect of pre-emptive purchase. Appropriate authority has referred to two sale instances in thepast in the vicinity of the said property which are relevant andcomparable. The details of two sale instances as mentioned in theshow-cause notice as well as in the impugned order of theappropriate authority are stated hereunder : Sl. No. Date of agreement Description of the property Rate per ground for land Modified rate as on the date of agreement allowing 1 per cent. p.m. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 1. 28-2-96 No. 6, II Avenue, Harrington Road, Chennai. (i) Rs. 64, 13, 000 considering depreciated cost for building (i) Rs. 72, 46, 690 Land : 5, 500 sq. ft. (2.29 grds) Bldg : About 3, 200 sq. ft. (double storeyed) Year of construction - 1962 (ii) Rs. 66, 28, 000 considering scrap value for building (ii) Rs. 74, 89, 640 Frontage - 15.25 mtrs. Road width - 12.19 mtrs. Residential area. Transferee : Sri M. Avais Murvee and two others, D. No. 2, Kothari Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai. Apparent consideration : Rs. 1, 55, 00, 000 2. 24-10-96 No. 8, II Avenue, Harrington Road, Chennai. (i) Rs. 67, 31, 000 considering depreciated cost for building (i) Rs. 70, 67, 550 Land 62.20 per cent. UDS out of 8, 800 sq, ft. Bldg. About 4, 435 sq. ft. Year of construction - 1963 (ii) Rs. 70, 05, 000 considering scrap value for building (ii) Rs. 73, 53, 250 Frontage - 24.08 mtrs. Road width - 12.19 mtrs. Residential area. Transferee : S.I. Property Invs Ltd., Chennai. Apparent consideration Build up area. 5, 000 sq. ft. at Rs. 1, 000 per sq. ft. Rs. 50, 00, 000 Rs. 1, 18, 60, 000 Total Rs. 1, 68, 00, 000 Discounted consideration Rs. 1, 61, 36, 000. 73, 53, 250 Frontage - 24.08 mtrs. Road width - 12.19 mtrs. Residential area. Transferee : S.I. Property Invs Ltd., Chennai. Apparent consideration Build up area. 5, 000 sq. ft. at Rs. 1, 000 per sq. ft. Rs. 50, 00, 000 Rs. 1, 18, 60, 000 Total Rs. 1, 68, 00, 000 Discounted consideration Rs. 1, 61, 36, 000. Though learned senior counsel for the petitioner would state thatin both the sale instances the properties situate in SecondAvenue whereas the property in question is in First Avenue hencethe same cannot be compared, I am unable to accept the saidcontention in the light of the discussions by the appropriateauthority. It is clear that both the sale instances relate toproperties proximate in location to the subject property and arein the residential zone of development as per M.M.D.A. Development Control Rules. In respect of the property at SerialNo. 1, taking note of efflux of time, the appropriate authorityhas allowed appreciation at 1 per cent. p.m. and worked out thefair market value of the subject property. The fair market valuein this case works out to Rs. 2, 61, 66, 000 as against the apparentconsideration of Rs. 1, 87, 00, 000. Accordingly, the appropriateauthority has concluded that there is significant undervaluationof the subject property by 39.92 per cent. Likewise, if the saleinstance at Sl. No. 2 is considered, according to the appropriateauthority, the understatement will be 36.74 per cent. The detailsfurnished show a reasonable presump- tion of attempt to evade tax. Though it is stated that the otherproperty, namely, Second Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, has notbeen considered by the appropriate authority even in the show-cause notice dated May 19, 1997, the appropriate authority hasreferred to and compared with the sale instances in the samelocality. The following details have been furnished with regardto the Adyar property : It is clear that the land rate reflected in the case of theproperty at door No. 1, Second Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, Chennai, is Rs. 43, 64, 000 which indicates an appreciation of morethan 1 per cent. per month. Here again, the appropriate authorityhave allowed 1 per cent. per month on the consecutive side forupdating the land value. It is also clear that with regard to the first sale instance, "noobjection certificate" has been issued for Rs. 43, 64, 000 which indicates an appreciation of morethan 1 per cent. per month. Here again, the appropriate authorityhave allowed 1 per cent. per month on the consecutive side forupdating the land value. It is also clear that with regard to the first sale instance, "noobjection certificate" has been issued for Rs. 1, 50, 00, 000 whichis also reflected in page 1 of the sale deed document No. 890 of1996, the purchaser having paid and the seller having acceptedthe receipt of the amount. As rightly observed by the appropriateauthority, this represents the true market value of the property. As stated earlier, for the purpose of collecting stamp duty, thevalue is apportioned between land and building, whatever valuefor land indicated by the vendor and the executant in thedocument is taken as base and stamp duty worked out. Hence, thevalue furnished by the petitioner based on the materials suppliedby the Sub-Registrar cannot be accepted for valuing the propertyunder Chapter XX-C. Though the second sale instance relating tothe property at door No. 8, II Avenue, Harrington Road, is notregistered, after considering all the relevant materials, theappropriate authority has issued "no objection certificate" andit reflects the market rate of the land as on the date of thatagreement on October 24, 1996. On the other hand, the valuefurnished by Prashanth Engineers merely on the basis of materialssupplied by the Sub-Registrar here again cannot be accepted. Asrightly observed by the appropriate authority, there was appreciation in land rate in Chetputlocality where the subject property is situated. In fact, Adyararea where the property being exchanged is situated, has alsoshown appreciation in land rate. Though reliance was placed aboutthe statement in the newspapers regarding slump in the prices ofland, as rightly observed, the rise or slump in the prices ofland reported in the newspapers cannot be generalised asapplicable to all areas. The appropriate authority has alsoconsidered the documents in respect of few cases of propertytransactions in Harrington Road filed by the petitioner, andafter giving adequate reasons, rejected those documents. Thedesire of the fifth respondent to retain the building as herresidence and not for development, the appropriate authority hasallowed a reduction of 10 per cent. in the land rate forrestricted market as suggested by the valuer while evaluating thefair market value. Thedesire of the fifth respondent to retain the building as herresidence and not for development, the appropriate authority hasallowed a reduction of 10 per cent. in the land rate forrestricted market as suggested by the valuer while evaluating thefair market value. Further, even though the Coovum river has anyeffect on the property in question, the appropriate authorityhave given due consideration for locational disadvantage onaccount of the Coovum and allowed 5 per cent. reduction in theland rate while evaluating the fair market value. Regarding thewidth of the road, the appropriate authority has obtainednecessary details from the Madras Metropolitan DevelopmentAuthority and considered the claim of the petitioner. In thelight of the detailed discussions by the appropriate authoritybased on acceptable materials, though learned senior counsel forthe petitioner has referred to various decisions regardingfixation of market value and other aspects, I am of the view thatit is unnecessary to refer the same. Further it is settled lawthat when the facts are clear, there is no need to referdecisions for those aspects. Finally, as rightly contended by learned senior CentralGovernment standing counsel, this court exercising jurisdictionunder article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot scrutinisethe matter like an appeal. It is settled law that judicial reviewis limited only to the extent of examining as to whether anyfinding is perverse or there is non-application of mind or theorder is contrary to the established principles of law. Thiscourt is not sitting in appeal over the orders passed by theappropriate authority and the satisfaction has to be arrived atby the appropriate authority on the basis of the valuation reportand the relevant documents which have been taken intoconsideration. Further, it is not the calculation or the mannerwhich could be examined under article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia. The calculation is always a question of fact. Theprinciples of valuation alone have to be considered. I havealready observed that the appropriate authority has consideredthe relevant sale instances and after allowing reduction tocertain extent arrived at a correct conclusion. In this regard, it is useful to refer a decision of the Supreme Court in the caseof Appropriate Authority vs Smt. Sudha Patil ( 1999 ). Theprinciples of valuation alone have to be considered. I havealready observed that the appropriate authority has consideredthe relevant sale instances and after allowing reduction tocertain extent arrived at a correct conclusion. In this regard, it is useful to refer a decision of the Supreme Court in the caseof Appropriate Authority vs Smt. Sudha Patil ( 1999 ). After discussing the provisions referred to in Chapter XX-C ofthe Act as well as power of this court under article 226 of the Constitution of India, theSupreme Court has observed that at (page 128) : "...we are of the considered opinion that merely because noappeal is provided for against the order of the appropriateauthority, directing compulsory acquisition by the Government, the supervisory power of the High Court does not get enlarged northe High Court can exercise an appellate power." In the light of the law laid down by the apex court, afterexamining the order of the appropriate authority, in detail, I donot find any good reason to interfere with the said order. Further, the appropriate authority considered all the aspects andafforded adequate opportunity to the parties concerned. Accordingly, both the writ petitions fail and the same aredismissed. No costs. Consequently, both the writ miscellaneouspetitions are closed.