JUDGMENT Arun Mishra, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred by the Plaintiff aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below affirming the dismissal of suit filed by him by the trial Court. 2. Plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction for restraining interference by the Defendant No. 1 in his possession over agricultural land comprised in Survey No. 470 area 0.742 hectare alleging himself to be Bhumiswami. Defendant was trying to take possession over a portion of the said survey number in an illegal manner. Demarcation proceedings were drawn and boundaries were duly marked. 2A. The Defendant No. 1 in the written statement denied the plaint allegations and contended that over a part of survey No. 470, area 0.105 hectare towards the northern side the Defendant was in possession, but during pendency of the suit Plaintiff has forcibly taken possession under the guise of an interim prohibitory injunction and the same be ordered to be restored. Thus, counter claim was filed under Order 8, Rule 6A, Code of Civil Procedure Code. It was further contended that possession was continued from the time of his father and for more than 30 years. The Defendant's possession and title over rest of survey No. 470 was not disputed. It was contended that the Defendant had remained in possession over the land in question. As the possession has continued open in derogation to the interest of the Plaintiff for more than 30 years, right of Bhumiswami has been acquired by the Defendant and no right, title or interest of the Plaintiff remain which had come to an end. 3. Plaintiff filed reply to the counter claim. He denied the claim and contended that he has not dispossessed the Defendant and he is continuing in possession. 4. The Trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 23-8-1993 decided issue No. 3 in favour of the Defendant and held that Defendant has perfected his right of Bhumiswami by adverse possession. Declaration was granted and possession was directed to be restored to the Defendant and the Plaintiff s suit for injunction was dismissed. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court Plaintiff preferred a first appeal before the III Additional District Judge, Vidisha. The appeal has been dismissed. Declaration was granted and possession was directed to be restored to the Defendant and the Plaintiff s suit for injunction was dismissed. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court Plaintiff preferred a first appeal before the III Additional District Judge, Vidisha. The appeal has been dismissed. The Appellate Court has categorically found that possession continuously from the year 1967 to 1989 was that of Defendant Krishnapal Singh. It was for more than 12 years and amounts to adverse possession. Thus right of Bhumiswami has been perfected by the Defendant but the Plaintiff dispossessed him during pendency of the suit. Thus, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court has been affirmed. Hence the present successive appeal has been preferred by the Plaintiff. 6. The appeal was admitted by this Court on 5-3-1997 on the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether after recording a finding that Plaintiff is owner and in possession of the suit lands, the counter claim of Defendant on the basis of adverse possession can be decreed? (2) Whether in the absence of any ingredients of pleadings and evidence in respect of adverse possession the Defendant's counter claim for adverse possession can be decreed? 6A. The Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant has urged that it is a case where both the Courts below have committed grave error of law while dismissing the suit and in finding that Defendant had perfected title by adverse possession. His submission is that disclaimer of the title is not borne out from the evidence adduced. He has submitted that long possession is not necessarily adverse possession. The counsel has relied on the deposition of Defendant that he (the Defendant) was treating the land to be his own to contend that Defendant ought to have treated the land to be of the Plaintiff and then ought to have asserted his title in order to constitute adverse possession. It is his submission that possession, if any, was that of a trespasser. He further submitted that entries of possession are in remark column. They do not show ownership nor can it be used for showing the possession. It is also submitted that no statutory presumption of correctness is attracted to entry in the remark column of person in possession, hence Courts below have committed error of law while acting on the Khasra entries. They do not show ownership nor can it be used for showing the possession. It is also submitted that no statutory presumption of correctness is attracted to entry in the remark column of person in possession, hence Courts below have committed error of law while acting on the Khasra entries. He has also placed reliance on various decisions of Supreme Court and this Court in support of his submissions. 7. Shri R.D. Jain, Senior Advocate, appearing for the Respondent has submitted that question of adverse possession is a finding of fact. Necessary ingredients constituting adverse possession are on record and can be culled out from the deposition of the Defendant. It is his further submission that "prima facie perverse and error apparent on the face of the record" are not a "Mantra" and cannot be employed to permit High Court to do in second appeal what the law enjoins on it not to do. Reliance is placed on M. G. Hegde and Ors. v. Vasudev D. Hegde, (2000) 2 SCC 213 . He also placed reliance on the decision of Apex Court in Smt. M. M. Amonkar and Ors. v. Dr. S. A. Johari, AIR 1984 SC 931 , to contend that concurrent finding reached need not be interfered with. It is his further submission that rights of Bhumiswami can be acquired on the basis of adverse possession. The entry in the revenue record before finality is attached therewith cannot come in the way of the Defendant's right to recover possession. For this proposition he relied on the decision in Malti v. Deviram, 1993 MPLJ 883, rendered by R. C. Lahoti, J. (as he then was). The Learned Counsel also relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Kashiram Gari v. Nathu and Anr. 1980 MPLJ 670 : 1980 JLJ 879 , wherein it is held that title may be acquired by adverse possession on the land of a Bhumiswami who can transfer his land without any impediment. It is the further submission of the Learned Counsel that presumption of existence of a thing, both backward and forward, can be drawn and he relied on the decision of this Court in Chhitoo v. Sakharam, 1982 MPLJ 499 : 1981 JLJ 487 . 8. The first substantial question of law which has been framed does not advance the cause of the Appellant. 8. The first substantial question of law which has been framed does not advance the cause of the Appellant. The factual matrix is that both the Courts below have concurrently found that during pendency of the suit, after grant of interim injunction, the Plaintiff has obtained possession of the suit land and had dispossessed the Defendant-Respondent. This is also concurrent finding that possession of the Defendant has continued from 1967 and he was in possession upto the date of dispossession during pendency of the suit. Thus, the first question, about declaration that Plaintiff is in possession of the suit land and is recorded as Bhumiswami, does not advance the cause of the Plaintiff as he had dispossessed the Defendant during pendency of the suit. Thus, in case adverse possession has been perfected by possessing the land for the requisite period counter claim of the Defendant can be decreed irrespective of the fact that he has been dispossessed in whatever illegal manner by the Plaintiff. The Defendant has also prayed in the counter claim which has been decreed by the Courts below thus there is no impediment in passing a decree in favour of Defendant in case adverse possession has been perfected by him. 9. The second question framed by this Court is with respect to the point whether necessary ingredients constituting adverse possession have been pleaded and evidence is missing in that regard. Question also arises for consideration whether on the basis of adverse possession right of Bhumiswami can be upheld. 10. With respect to the latter question whether right of Bhumiswami can be acquired, Learned Counsel for the Appellant has drawn attention of this Court to the decision in Deendayal v. Rajaram, 1970 RN 327, wherein their Lordships of the Apex Court have laid down in paragraph 12 that right of tenancy cannot be acquired in a holding by being in wrongful possession. Their Lordships distinguished tenants losing their right in the holding and right of trespassers to become tenant of that holding at the end of the period. Their Lordships considered the question with respect to C.P. Tenancy Act and observed that the Act only governs those matters for which provision is made therein. In other respects the general law continues to apply. The Act does say that a tenant's right in respect of any property can be acquired by adverse possession. Their Lordships considered the question with respect to C.P. Tenancy Act and observed that the Act only governs those matters for which provision is made therein. In other respects the general law continues to apply. The Act does say that a tenant's right in respect of any property can be acquired by adverse possession. Their Lordships observed: We do not think that the provisions of the Act enabled (the Act has been repealed) a trespasser to impose himself as a tenant on the landlord by means of adverse possession of the holding as against the tenant for a period of three years. Similarly, it is not possible to hold that a tenancy right could have been acquired in a holding so as to affect the rights of third parties by being in wrongful possession of that holding for a period of three years. 11. The Full Bench of this Court in Kashiram's case (supra) has held that title may be acquired by adverse possession on the land of a Bhumiswami who can transfer his land without any impediment. A person in possession in his own right and adverse to the recorded Bhumiswami can claim the rights of a Bhumiswami acquired by adverse possession, but when he puts forth such a claim before the State Government his right can be recognised only if it is found that such rights were lawfully acquired. 12. It may be seen that there is distinction between right of tenancy and right of Bhumiswami. Section 157 of M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 defines class of tenure. The said section states that there shall be only one class of tenure-holders of lands held from the State to be known as Bhumiswami. The distinction between tenure rights and tenancy rights is real. A Bhumiswami is neither a tenant nor a Government lessee. 13. Ownership of the State is dealt with under Section 57 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. Ownership as contemplated under Section 57 is also distinguishable from tenure as defined in Section 157 of the Code. 14. In view of the Full Bench decision in the case of Kashiram Gari (supra) which has been followed by this Court in the case of Badrilal and Ors. v. Govind and Anr. Ownership as contemplated under Section 57 is also distinguishable from tenure as defined in Section 157 of the Code. 14. In view of the Full Bench decision in the case of Kashiram Gari (supra) which has been followed by this Court in the case of Badrilal and Ors. v. Govind and Anr. 1992 RN 166, it can be held that right of Bhumiswami can be acquired by adverse possession amidst an individual i.e. on the land of a Bhumiswami. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Deendayal (supra) deals with the question of tenancy right which is different from right of a Bhumiswami. Thus, the case of Deendayal is distinguishable. 15. Now, coming to the question whether there are necessary ingredients pleaded in the plaint constituting plea of adverse possession, in the case of S. M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 , the Apex Court has laid down that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. A mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the Plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title" is not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. True it is that plea of adverse possession cannot be taken in the prayer clause and if possession is of permissive origin it should be brought home from which particular point of time the adverse possession started and also from which particular point of time hostile animous came to be asserted. 16. In the written statement the plea of adverse possession has been specifically taken. The plea indicates that the Defendant's possession is from the time of his father continuously, adversely and openly. Thus, right of Bhumiswami has been acquired by the Defendant and Plaintiffs rights have come to an end. The Defendant has not claimed his possession under a permissive title in its inception. Thus plea raised in plaint can be held to be the plea sufficient to raise the plea of adverse possession as required in the yer of law. 17. Thus, right of Bhumiswami has been acquired by the Defendant and Plaintiffs rights have come to an end. The Defendant has not claimed his possession under a permissive title in its inception. Thus plea raised in plaint can be held to be the plea sufficient to raise the plea of adverse possession as required in the yer of law. 17. Coming to the question whether there is evidence on record to support the plea of adverse possession so as to meet the requirement of substantial question No. 2 framed by this Court, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of D. N. Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 567 , so as to contend that animus on the part of the person claiming adverse possession is necessary. True it is that animus on the part of the person claiming adverse possession is necessary ingredient as classical requirement of adverse possession is nec vi nec claim, nec precario i.e. openly, peacefully and hostile as held in the case of P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 . Submission of the Learned Counsel is that apart from actual continuous possession which are among other ingredients of adverse possession, there should be necessary animus on the part of the person who intends to perfect his title by adverse possession. A person who under the bona fide belief thinks that the property belongs to him and as such he has been in possession, such possession cannot at all be adverse possession because it lacks necessary animus for perfecting title by adverse possession. The counsel has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Delhi, (1981) 2 SCC 103 . 18. It is clear that one of the important ingredients to claim adverse possession is that the person who claims adverse possession must have set up title hostile to the title of the true owner. 18. It is clear that one of the important ingredients to claim adverse possession is that the person who claims adverse possession must have set up title hostile to the title of the true owner. In case a purchaser claims adverse possession, what is required to be pleaded is that he disclaimed his title under which he came into possession, set up adverse possession with necessary animus of asserting open and hostile title to the knowledge of the true owner and the latter allowed the former, without any let or hindrance, to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property adverse to the interest of the true owner until the expiry of the prescribed period. In the case of D. N. Venkatarayappa (supra) the Apex Court has laid down that in order to claim adverse possession against the original grantee, it is necessary to plead facts constituting adverse possession and lead evidence to show that the person claiming adverse possession has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the land in question claiming right, title and interest in the land in question hostile to the right, title and interest of the original grantee. But in the instant case it is not any grant under which the Defendant has asserted his right of adverse possession. Thus, it is necessary to assess the evidence in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of D. N. Venkatarayappa (supra). 19. Before that is resorted, two more decisions cited by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant be noted. He has pressed into service the decision in Kailashnarayan v. Keshav Singh, 1992 MPLJ 320 , which lays down that in order to constitute adverse possession, it must be factual possession with ingredients of corpus and animus and such possession should exclude the original owner and that should be done with the intention of declaring a title hostile to the original owner. The person claiming adverse possession should not merely exclusively possess the property but should so possess in exercise of his own, readable, declared claim to open the property. The Learned Counsel has also relied on General Mines and quarries Ltd. v. Kartar Singh Prem Singh, 1992 MPLJ 563 , wherein it is laid down that mere possession, however old, does not become adverse to the true owner. The Learned Counsel has also relied on General Mines and quarries Ltd. v. Kartar Singh Prem Singh, 1992 MPLJ 563 , wherein it is laid down that mere possession, however old, does not become adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession means express or implied denial of the title of true owner. Illegal possession does not necessarily mean hostile or adverse possession. Possession of immovable property by a tenant even after determination of his tenancy may be called illegal, but that can never be held hostile or adverse to the landlord. There is no dispute with the proposition laid down by this Court in the case of Kailashnarayan and General Mines and Quarries Ltd. (supra). It may be seen that the case of General Mines was that of tenant whose tenancy stood determined and possession was held to be continued and permissive. It is also gatherable that there can be implied denial also and there should be intention to claim possession hostile to the true owner. 20. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Madhav Krishna and Anr. v. Chandrabhaga and others, 1997 (1) JLJ 386 . In the said case plea of adverse possession against Mansaram was pleaded. There was no specific plea of disclaiming title of the Appellant from a particular date, the hostile assertion thereof and then of setting up adverse possession from a particular date to the knowledge of the Appellants and of their acquiescence. In the said case Mansaram, Babulal and Parasram were members of the joint family and each of them was entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property. Under these circumstances it was held by the Apex Court that unless the title is disclaimed and adverse possession with hostile title is pleaded and proved, the plea of adverse possession cannot be held proved. But in the instant case the facts are entirely different. There is no dispute with the law laid down by the Apex Court. In the instant case parties are not joint owners or members of Hindu undivided family. However, it is to be construed and seen to what extent the evidence has been adduced to buttress the plea of adverse possession. 21. Learned Counsel has also submitted that adverse possession should be brought to the notice or knowledge of true owner. In the instant case parties are not joint owners or members of Hindu undivided family. However, it is to be construed and seen to what extent the evidence has been adduced to buttress the plea of adverse possession. 21. Learned Counsel has also submitted that adverse possession should be brought to the notice or knowledge of true owner. For this proposition he placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Nirottam v. Ramdeni, 1990 RN 366. Submission is that as per the deposition of the Defendant, possession is simply unauthorised and that will not constitute adverse possession. He has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Goya Parshad v. Nirmal Chander, AIR 1984 SC 930 . The facts of the case in Goya Parshad (supra) discloses that there was termination of licence of the licensee which by itself does not enable the licensee to claim adverse possession unless and until he sets up title even after termination of his licence. As already held, the present case is not a case of licence which has been terminated. It is not the case of either party. However, it is true that unauthorised possession by itself cannot constitute adverse possession as held by the Apex Court in Gaya Parshad (supra). 22. The evidence in the instant case is in the shape of documentary evidence as well as oral evidence. In the Khasra for the Samvat 2024 corresponding to Gregorian calendar year 1967 (Ex. P/5) possession of Bhagwan Singh is recorded in the remark column. In Ex. D/5 which is Khasra for Samvat 2025 = 1968, possession in column No. 20 i.e. remark column is recorded that of Bhagwansingh. In Khasra entries for the years 1961 to 1971 possession of Bhagwan Singh has been recorded in remark column over the area in question. Same is the position of Khasra entries for the years 1970 to 1973 (Ex. D/7). In the Khasra (Ex. D/8) for the period 1988 to 1991, in the modified entries name of the Defendant has been recorded. Plaintiff Gajraj Singh (P.W. 1) has deposed that he is in possession and prior to him his father was in possession of the land and Defendant has never remained in possession. But the deposition of the Plaintiff is contradicted by the documentary evidence. 23. To the same effect is the evidence of Chandraraj (PW2). Plaintiff Gajraj Singh (P.W. 1) has deposed that he is in possession and prior to him his father was in possession of the land and Defendant has never remained in possession. But the deposition of the Plaintiff is contradicted by the documentary evidence. 23. To the same effect is the evidence of Chandraraj (PW2). He has also deposed that he had never seen the possession of the Defendant over the land in question. Defendant Krishna Pal Singh as D.W. 1 deposed that he was in possession of the land. Prior to him his father was in possession. Thus for 25-30 years his possession had continued. He was treating the land to be his own. In other words, he was asserting his own title over the land. He has given dimensions of the land. He also stated that owing to the interim injunction the Plaintiff had obtained the possession forcibly, which was passed in the instant case. He has deposed that he had applied to the Tahsil Court for recording his possession. It appears that certain order of Tahsildar regarding possession for the year 1988-1989 has been set aside by the Commissioner, but that does not alter the position. Such entry in the revenue paper continued from the year 1967 onwards continuously and there can be presumption of continuity of things both backward and forward as held in the case of Chhitoo v. Sakharam. 1982 MPLJ 499 : 1981 JLJ 487 . The deposition of the Defendant finds support from the other witnesses Nathan Singh (DW 2) and Ramprasad (DW 3) whose evidence has been considered by the Courts below which supports the requisite length of possession for over 12 years. It is also a concurrent finding recorded by the two Courts below. 24. The deposition of the Defendant coupled with the documentary evidence and other evidence is sufficient to come to the conclusion that he was asserting his own title over the land in question. It is not a case where the Defendant was having any hidden intention of possessing the land under a secret animus. He entered into possession openly to the knowledge of the Plaintiff and as deposed by him he was asserting his own title and treating the land to be his own showing that he was having the requisite animus. It is not a case where the Defendant was having any hidden intention of possessing the land under a secret animus. He entered into possession openly to the knowledge of the Plaintiff and as deposed by him he was asserting his own title and treating the land to be his own showing that he was having the requisite animus. Such possession from day one would be adverse as it has not commenced under a valid title or a permission. It was a clearly open and hostile and in derogation to the title of the Plaintiff. It was incumbent upon the Plaintiff to have taken action of ejectment within the period prescribed before expiry of 12 years of the commencement of such possession, but the Plaintiff had failed to take such action. 25. Thus, I hold that possession of Defendant is proved to be adverse possession by the evidence adduced by the Defendant. 26. The Appellant faced with the concurrent finding has relied on a recent decision of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 652 , wherein it has been held that the judgment of the first Appellate Court did not show due or proper application of mind or any critical analysis or objective consideration of the matter made, despite the same being the first Appellate Court. On the other hand, by merely reproducing the findings of the trial Court a mechanical affirmation seems to have been made of them without any reference to the principles of law or the criteria to be satisfied before the claim of the Plaintiff of perfection of title by adverse possession could be sustained involving correspondingly destruction of title of the State in respect of a public property. The Apex Court held that the High Court should not be obsessed by the limitations drawn on the exercise of second appellate jurisdiction and if the lackadaisical findings based upon mere surmises and conjectures are allowed to be mechanically approved by the first Appellate Court and the second Appellate Court also withdraws itself into reclusion taking umbrage under Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure so as to make justice a casualty and it is the duty of the High Court to prevent miscarriage of justice. But I find that in the instant case factual situation is different and this Court has looked into the pleadings and the evidence, though the question of adverse possession is a mixed question of fact and law and not a substantial question of law. 27. The finding recorded by the Courts below has not been shown to be prima facie perverse nor is shown to be suffering with error apparent on the face of record. The words 'perversity and error apparent on the face of record' cannot be used as 'Mantra' so as to interfere under Section 100 as held by the Apex Court in the case of M. G. Hegde and Ors. (supra). 28. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant also urged that there cannot be tagging of the adverse possession of the Defendant and his father. He has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Laxman Singh v. Smt. Bhuri. 1985 M.P.W. N. 705 (Note No. 559). In the said case the Defendant was a trespasser. His legal representatives were held not entitled to inherit wrongful possession. It was held that it was not necessary to bring on record the legal representatives of a trespasser in case of his death. The ratio of Laxman Singh (supra) has different field to operate. In the said case, this Court was dealing with the application under Order 22. Code of Civil Procedure and the question was whether legal representatives of a trespasser can be and are necessary to be brought on record. But the question in the instant case is that whether there can be tagging of adverse possession of father and son. Obviously, the answer is that once adverse possession was commenced by the father it can be continued and inherited by son and title can be perfected by such inheritance of adverse possession. There can be tagging of such possession. 29. The Learned Counsel has also submitted that entries in remark column are no entries in the eye of law and they cannot be used to ascertain the factum of possession even. He has placed reliance on two decisions of this Court in Malti v. Deviram, 1993 MPLJ 883, wherein it has been laid down by this Court that merely because name of a person was entered in remark column of the Khasra he cannot claim ownership or tenancy of the property. He has placed reliance on two decisions of this Court in Malti v. Deviram, 1993 MPLJ 883, wherein it has been laid down by this Court that merely because name of a person was entered in remark column of the Khasra he cannot claim ownership or tenancy of the property. He has also relied on the decision in the case of Harisingh and others. v. Dheeraj Singh, 1983 RN 57 to contend that on the basis of entry in remark column no presumption can be raised about its correctness. The statutory presumption of correctness applies only to those entries which are required to be made under the law. If any entry existing in the land record is not required to be made under Chapter IX of the M. P. Land Revenue Code or under any other provision of the Code, no presumption of correctness can be raised in respect of such an entry. 30. In the case of Beohar Rajendra Singh v. State of M. P. 1970 RN 16, the name was entered in the remark column but the column regarding tenancy right was blank. It was held that possession of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors could not be attributed to ownership or tenancy right of the property, but their Lordships considered the same as a piece of evidence of possession. True it is that when there are different columns prescribed for recording ownership and tenancy, remark column entry cannot be a substitute for the entries of ownership and tenancy and remark column entry cannot be taken to be the proof of tenancy or that of ownership. However, the entry has to be taken to be presumptive proof of possession. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 108 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. 1959 in the record of rights the names of Bhumiswamis, occupancy tenants and such other particulars as have been prescribed are required to be maintained. Khasra is also a prescribed document which contains a remark column. Thus, entry made in the remark column is such other particulars as prescribed and there is procedure prescribed for correction of the land records such as Khasras prepared under Section 114 of the Code. Khasra is also a prescribed document which contains a remark column. Thus, entry made in the remark column is such other particulars as prescribed and there is procedure prescribed for correction of the land records such as Khasras prepared under Section 114 of the Code. Section 115 of the Code prescribes mode of correction of wrong entry in khasra, and if there is any dispute regarding the entry, the person has to apply before Tahsildar for its correction with one year of the date of such entry. Section 117 of the Code deals with the presumption as to entries in land records which are made under this Chapter. It shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved. Thus, I find no substance in the submission raised by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant. 31. In the result, the appeal is held to be without merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the two Courts below are affirmed. The parties are left to bear their own costs as incurred in the present appeal.