JUDGMENT P.K. SINHA, J.:- Respondent Chhatrapal Singh, while working as Head-Clerk in Mairwa Notified Area Committee was .proceeded against departmentally and, on the basis of the enquiry report, was dismissed from service. He filed Title Suit No.98 of 1977 in the Court of Second Munsif at Siwan. admittedly without serving notice under section 377 of the Bihar & Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 (referred to as the "Act", in short), in which the learned Munsif while holding that the dismissal of the plaintiff (Chhatrapal Singh) was illegal, dismissed the suit on the sole ground that notice under section 377 of the Act was not served. 2. The Plaintiff, Chhatrapal Singh, preferred Title Appeal No. 24/2 of 1981/82, which was decided by the First Additional District Judge who allowed the appeal and decreed the suit holding that in a case of such nature, service of notice under section 377 of the Act was not sine qua non for the maintainability of the suit and that the suit was maintainable without such notice. The First Appellate Court also mentioned in the judgment that it did not differ with the conclusions of the trial court with respect to the findings which had gone in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, did not give its own reasons on those issues. 3. In this Second Appeal, two substantial questions of law have been formulated, viz. (a) Whether the Learned Additional District Judge was right in not examining the correctness of the findings of the trial court recorded against the appellants in absence of a cross appeal, and (b) Whether the suit is maintainable in absence of service of notice under section 377 of the Act? This matter then came up for hearing before S.Ali Ahmad, J and his lordship, by order dated 6.4.1989, referred the appeal before a Division Bench also noting disagreement with a decision by a single Judge of this court, relied upon by the appellant, in case of Harihar Tiwary Vs. Commissioner, Monghyr Municipality (1985 PLJR 88)(Noc). This is how this appeal has come up for decision before us. 4. Commissioner, Monghyr Municipality (1985 PLJR 88)(Noc). This is how this appeal has come up for decision before us. 4. In so far as the first point is concerned, the learned lower appellate court in its judgment, after mentioning issues framed by the trial court, the case of the parties and how those issues were decided, also noted that no cross-objections had been preferred by the respondents against the findings of the trial court in favour of the plaintiff. The learned lower appellate court in para 11 of the judgment, as already stated, expressed its agreement with those findings of the trial court and noted in paragraph 12 of the judgment that the only point that was pressed before it by both the parties was whether the suit was rightly dismissed by the trial court for want of notice under section 377 of the Act. 5. The First Appellate court being the court of law and fact both, need not discuss in detail the issues formulated by the trial court in which it finds itself in agreement with the findings of the trial court. Nevertheless, it is desirable that the first appellate court on such issue/issues, records its own reason, in brief, even if no cross appeal has been preferred indicating as to how it agreed with the findings of the trial court. However, in para-12 of the judgment, the learned lower appellate court has clearly stated that the only point that was argued by both the sides was whether the suit was rightly dismissed for want of notice under section 377 of the Act. This shows that the respondent before the First Appellate court did not press its arguments against the findings of the trial court on the issues which went in favour of the plaintiff/appellant. If particular findings of the lower court relating to certain issues are not challenged in course of arguments before the first appellate court, that would only mean that the affected party has forsaken its objections against those findings. In that case, the first appellate court need not scrutinise the findings of the trial court by giving its own reason, even in brief, on such issues when the first appellate court is also in agreement with those findings of the trial court. In that case, the first appellate court need not scrutinise the findings of the trial court by giving its own reason, even in brief, on such issues when the first appellate court is also in agreement with those findings of the trial court. To sum up, though it is desirable that the first appellate court, even if no cross appeal has been preferred, gives its own reasons, in brief, if it agrees with the findings on certain issue/issues arrived at by the trial court though it need not assign its findings in detail, but, however, when the party affected by certain findings of the trial court does not address its objections against such findings, the First Appellate court, if it agrees with such findings of the trial court, need not give its reason, even in brief, on such findings of the trial court. 6. Therefore, on that account no infirmity can be found in the judgment of the first appellate court. 7. Coming to the second point, section 377 of the Act may be reproduced below:- "377(1). No suits shall be brought against the Commissioners of any Municipality, or any of their officers, for anything done under this Act until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the office of such Commissioners, and also (if the suit is intended to be brought against any officer of the said Commissioners or any person acting under their direction) at the place of abode of the person against whom such suit is threatened to be brought, stating the cause of suit and the name and place of abode of the person who intends to bring the suit; and unless such notice be proved, the court shall find for the defendant. (2) Every such action shall be commenced within three months next after the accrual of the cause of action, and not afterwards. (3) If the Commissioners or their Officer, or any person to whom any such notice is given, shall before suit is brought, tender sufficient amends to the plaintiff, such plaintiff shall not recover." Sub-section (3) of section 377 of the Act, therefore, provides that the Commissioners or their Officer, or any person to whom such notice is given, shall before the suit is brought, tender sufficient amends to the plaintiff, and then such plaintiff shall not recover. This 'recovery' is related to the expression "anything done under this Act" in sub-section (1) of sec. 377 of the Act. This clearly indicates that this protection has been given relating to such suits which relate to the claim of damages against bonafide acts purported to have been performed while pursuing a lawful act but when, without mala fide the authority so given by the law has been trespassed and a tort has been committed. 8. For coming to the conclusion that the learned first appellate court arrived at, it had noticed the decision of this court in the case of Dwarika Prasad Marwari & anr. Vs. The Municipal Commissioners through Chairman, Bhagalpur Municipality (1959 BLJR 121). In that decision his lordship, with the help of the other related decisions, came to the conclusion that section 377 of the Act bars only suits filed against the Municipality for damages for a tortious act and not a suit for declaration that certain order was illegal and for injunction restraining the municipality from enforcing that order. 9. In another decision of this court in the case of Lachminarayan Das V. Chairman, Cuttack Municipality (AIR 1936 Pat 323) it has been held that section 377, like similar legislation in India, is for the purpose of protecting a public authority from suits in respect of acts bona-fide purporting to have been performed under the aegis of a lawful act but in which, in spite of the bona fides of the public authority, the law has been overstepped and a tort has been committed. It was held that this section was not intended to apply to suits for the recovery of sums of money other than damages for tort which are lawfully recoverable either under statute or at common law. 10. In another decision by a Division Bench of this court, in the case of Commissioner of Buxar Municipality V. Bhagwan Das & anr. ( AIR 1950 Pat 8 ) it has been held by their lordships that were a suit is brought not for damages for a tortious act, but for a declaration that the assessment was illegal and for an injunction restraining the Municipality from realising the tax, the suit is not barred due to non-service of notice under section 377 of the Act. 11. 11. From a reading of section 377 of the Act as well from the decisions noticed above, it is manifest that this provision provides a protection to the Municipality and its Officers only in a suit for damages for a tortious act, and not to other suits, including a suit for declaration. 12. The counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention t6 a decision of this court in the case of Harihar Tiwary Vs. Commissioner, Monghyr Municipality (Supra) in which the plaintiff-appellant, an employee of Munger Municipality, had filed a suit for declaration that he was illegally retired w.e.f. a particular date though he should have been retired subsequently. His suit was dismissed by the trial court and by the lower appellate court, on the ground of invalid service of notice under section 377 of the Act. It was held that bar under section 377 of the Act was in respect of suits which were sought to be instituted for anything done under the Act, and something done under the Act would mean done in exercise of powers conferred under the Act, as otherwise suit could be instituted even without serving the notice under section 377 (1) of the Act. On this ground the appeal was allowed with costs. 13. In this regard another decision by this court in the case of Executive Officer, Khagaul Municipality vs. Shri Damodar Prasad & Ors. (1985 PLJR 90) (NOC) may also be noticed in which the suit was filed by the aggrieved employee of the Khagaul Municipality against termination of his service in which also the appellant before this court had challenged the maintainability of the suit itself in view of section 377 of the Act. It was held in this case also that section 377 was attracted only when the order was passed under the Act. An order terminating the service of a Municipal Employee without providing him reasonable opportunity, or in excess of jurisdiction was illegal, hence could not be termed to be an act done under the Act, as such section 377 of the Act was not attracted. 14. In both the aforesaid decisions, the earlier decision in the case of Commissioner of Buxar Municipality (Supra) was relied upon. 14. In both the aforesaid decisions, the earlier decision in the case of Commissioner of Buxar Municipality (Supra) was relied upon. Learned counsel for the appellant, in view of the decision in the case of Harihar Tiwary (Supra) has argued that notice was not necessary only when any act was done which was not provided for under the Act. It was argued that since the dismissal of the plaintiff/respondent was done under the provisions of the Act, the notice under section 377 of the Act was necessary. This argument will not succeed on the ground that the suit of the plaintiff-appellant-respondent which was for declaration that the order of his dismissal from service was illegal and unenforceable, and for ad interim injunction for restraining the defendants from taking over charge from the plaintiffs or from attempting to enforce the order of dismissal, a finding was given by the trial court on the basis of facts and law discussed, in the judgment that the order itself was illegal and unenforceable, which finding was not even challenged in course of arguments before the First Appellate Court. As a matter of fact, before us also the only point that was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant was whether the suit was bad for want of notice under section 377 of the Act. Therefore, the action of the appellant in terminating the services of the plaintiff having been found to be illegal, that must be deemed to be an act not having been done under the provisions of the Act. 15. Besides, this decision as argued, and another one noticed by us, in the cases of Harihar Tiwary and in case of Khagaul Municipality (Supra) do not specifically state that notice under section 377 of the Act was required in cases other than those for damages for tortious act of the Municipality or its Officers. In both the cases, the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Commissioner of Buxar Municipality (Supra) has been relied upon. Therefore, the aforesaid decisions should be read in harmony with the Division Bench decision of this court, as noticed above. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, cannot be read to be in conflict with the decision in the case of Commissioner, Buxar Municipality (Supra). Therefore, the aforesaid decisions should be read in harmony with the Division Bench decision of this court, as noticed above. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, cannot be read to be in conflict with the decision in the case of Commissioner, Buxar Municipality (Supra). In any case the decision of the Division Bench would prevail over the decision of a single Judge. 16. In the result, I find that the learned lower appellate court has rightly decided that notice under section 377 of the Act was not a legal requirement in the facts sand circumstances of the case. 17. I, therefore, do not find any merit in this second appeal and the same is dismissed, but without costs.