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2000 DIGILAW 1053 (PAT)

Bata India Ltd. And Others v. Keshar Prasad Modi

2000-08-28

GURUSHARAN SHARMA

body2000
Judgment Gurusharan Sharma, J. 1. Title (Eviction) Suit No. 3 of 1996 was filed under Sec. 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 were respectively father and son. Eviction of defendants from shop premises, detailed in Schedule A to the plaint was sought on the grounds of expiry of fixed term lease (Ext. 1) and personal necessity. The suit was decreed by impugned judgment/order dated 24.12.1999. It was held that defendants failed to exercise option for renewal within stipulated time and Plaintiffs have reasonable and bonafide requirement of the suit shop. It was found that no suitable vacant site was available to the plaintiffs to start the proposed business and they have choice to select most suitable premises. Partial eviction could not have fulfilled plaintiffs need. Defendants have, therefore, filed the present Revision application under Sec. 14 (8) of the Act. 2. Mr. Sidheshwari Prasad Singh, Senior Counsel for the petitioners put stress upon the following renewal clause "That after expiry of the lease of 15 (Fifteen) years, there will be a fresh lease at a rent to be mutually settled" and submitted that defendants continued in possession after expiry of period of lease deed, Ext. 1, in part performance of contract and the plaintiffs were to take steps for renewal of the lease. The aforesaid renewal clause was not optional, rather it was mandatory. It was further submitted that plaintiffs claim of allotment of the suit shop exclusively to plaintiff No. 2 by virtue of a sada document dated 9.2.1993, Ext. 5 was not tenable. 3. On the other hand, Mr. Tarakant Jha, Senior Counsel for the opposite parties submitted that on expiry of period of lease defendants were bound to vacate the shop premises in absence of any fresh lease deed or in absence of extension of lease as provided under Sec. 18 of the Act. 4. Defendants claimed to have sent a notice on 20.6.1994 by ordinary post in exercise of their option for renewal of the lease. On 10.1.1996, they sent a registered letter enclosing a copy of the alleged notice dated 20.6.1994. The said registered letter was returned to them without delivery. Further on 29.1.1996, they sent a letter under Certificate of Posting enclosing copy of letter dated 10.1.1996. On 10.1.1996, they sent a registered letter enclosing a copy of the alleged notice dated 20.6.1994. The said registered letter was returned to them without delivery. Further on 29.1.1996, they sent a letter under Certificate of Posting enclosing copy of letter dated 10.1.1996. Defendants failed to prove that in fact, a notice was sent to the plaintiffs expressing their desire for renewal of the lease before expiry of stipulated period in lease, Ext. 1. On the other hand, plaintiffs sent a notice dated 11.7.1995, Ext. 2 and informed the defendants that they would not renew the leasehold premises any more and asked them to vacate the same on expiry of period of lease. In my view, the trial Court rightly came to conclusion that the defendant neither took any step for renewal of lease nor approached the Court under the provisions of the Act. 5. I am, therefore, of the opinion that finding arrived at by the trial Court for eviction of defendants under Sec. 11(1)(e) of the Act on the ground of expiry of period of lease, Ext. 1 is in accordance with law. Plaintiffs also pleaded that by virtue of family arrangement by Ext. 5, the suit shop was exclusively allotted to plaintiff No. 2 and his name was, accordingly, mutated in the Municipal records, but the question whether plaintiff No. 1 who was father of plaintiff No. 2 and who had inducted defendants as stenant in the suit shop was landlord or not on the date of filing of the suit was not of much significance. Here, notice Ext. 2 was sent by both plaintiffs 1 and 2 and therefore, the present suit was also filed by both of them. Arrangement, if any, between plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in respect of the suit shop was not relevant for the purpose of determination of personal necessity of the same as claimed. The Court was, therefore, not required to go into the question whether Ext. 5 was admissible in evidence or not. 6. So far as question of personal necessity was concerned, the plaintiffs established bonafide and reasonable requirement of the suit shop for starting business by plaintiff No. 2 and the defendants failed to prove that any other suitable premises was available to plaintiff No. 2 for starting his proposed business. 5 was admissible in evidence or not. 6. So far as question of personal necessity was concerned, the plaintiffs established bonafide and reasonable requirement of the suit shop for starting business by plaintiff No. 2 and the defendants failed to prove that any other suitable premises was available to plaintiff No. 2 for starting his proposed business. It goes without saying that the landlords have choice to select most suitable premises for their purpose. The carpet area of the suit shop being only 680 square feet, the trial Court rightly held that neither partial eviction of defendants would have fulfilled the plaintiffs requirement nor it was convenient for the defendants. 7. I find no perversity in the finding recorded by the trial Court regarding personal necessity of the plaintiffs for the suit shop and defendants eviction there from under Sec. 11(1)(c) of the Act. 8. I, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned and decree for eviction of the defendants from the suit shop. There is no merit in this Revision application. It is, accordingly, dismissed.