ORDER C.K. Prasad, J. 1. Petitioner No. 1 is a company incorporated under the Companies Act and engaged in the business of manufacture of Cement and one of its Unit is at Jamul in the district of Durg. Petitioner No. 2 is a share holder of Petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. 1 i.e. Associated Cement Companies Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the Petitioner) as also the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the 'Board') entered into an agreement for high tension supply of 33,530 KVA electric energy on 22nd October, 1986. The agreement was to be valid for 5 years from the date of its commencement which is to continue upon the same terms and conditions after the expiry of the aforesaid period. After expiry of the period of 5 years, same is subject to termination by either party by giving 3 months notice in writing. 2. The Government of India, the Government of Madhya Pradesh and the M. P. Electricity Board took cognizance of the fact that the availability of electricity, which is an important component for giving thrust to the industrial growth leading to the economic development, is not adequate and consequently framed power policy and published it from time to time emphasising and encouraging the industries to install captive power plants to meet their requirement. The policy statement made by the State Government and the Board do indicate the constant power deficiency. One of such policy decision of the State Government is dated 20th May, 1996 which inter alia provides that the Board shall permit a consumer who establishes its captive power plant, to reduce its contract demand to the extent of zero. Last of the power policy dated 9-10-1998 framed by the State Government had been published in the State Gazette on 16th October, 1998. In the light of the policy of the State Government, Board wrote letters to various industries including the Petitioner to install its own power plant by letter dated 19-6-1997. 3. Prior to that, by letter No. JML/PH/963 dated 5-12-1995 (Annexure P/13) Petitioner wrote to the Board for grant of consent to install and run generating sets based on thermal energy sources as captive generating set to meet its partial power requirement. In this letter, Petitioner stated that the present contract demand shall be continued and maximum power available from the Board shall be availed. In this letter, Petitioner stated that the present contract demand shall be continued and maximum power available from the Board shall be availed. Petitioner wrote another letter on the same day bearing No. JML/PH/964 dated 5-12-1995 for grant of consent for installation and running generating sets; but unlike the earlier letter, there is no mention as regard to the continuance of present contract demand. Board by its letter dated 25-3-1996 (Annexure P/15) granted consent under Section 44 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 to instal and run one 25 MW thermal generating set. While granting consent; the Board put the following condition in regard to contract demand: (v) From the date of operation of the aforesaid TG set, you would be required to guarantee a minimum monthly consumption equivalent to load factors, as under: (i) For the period when power cut is imposed by the Board. Consumption in units equivalent to 66% load factor on the ceiling on CD. (ii) For the period when power cut is not imposed. Consumption in units equivalent to 40% load factor on the CD. From the date of operation of the TG Set, for the purpose of billing, the relevant provisions of tariff minimum charges in the HT tariff, as amended applicable to the consumer from time to time, shall stand modified to the above extent. While granting the consent, the Board has referred to the Petitioner's letter No. JML/PH/964 dated 5-12-1995. 4. It is the stand of the Petitioner that in its letter No. JML/PH/964 dated 5-12-1995 it did not give any assurance that it will continue with the contract demand and the consent having been given in response to the said letter, Board ought not to have put any condition of minimum monthly consumption. 5. Petitioner in the light of the consent granted by the Board, installed 25 MW captive power plant and by letter dated 27-12-1997 made request for reduction of the contract demand from 33,530 KVA to 18,000 KVA which was agreed to by the Board and supplementary agreement for reduction of the contract demand was entered into on 11-2-1998 (Annexure P/2). 5. Petitioner in the light of the consent granted by the Board, installed 25 MW captive power plant and by letter dated 27-12-1997 made request for reduction of the contract demand from 33,530 KVA to 18,000 KVA which was agreed to by the Board and supplementary agreement for reduction of the contract demand was entered into on 11-2-1998 (Annexure P/2). Again on 19-1-1999 Petitioner made request for reduction of the contract demand from 18 MVA to 9 MVA to the Board followed by reminders and representations to the State Government but the Board by letter dated 22-4-1999 (Annexure P/25) did not accede to the Petitioner's request and declined to permit further reduction in contract demand and advised the Petitioner to regulate its own captive generation. 6. Although the Petitioner's request for reduction of contract demand from 18 MVA to 9 MVA was not acceded to, still, by letter dated 6-11-1999 (Annexure P/31) it represented for reduction of the contract demand from 18 MVA to 3 MVA stating therein that since its plant is now fully stabilised and capable of producing 25 MVA power, same will meet its entire requirement. This letter further proceeded to state as follows: You will appreciate that our request for reduction in contract demand has not been favourably considered with the result we have already suffered huge losses. Under the circumstances, it is in our interest and also in the fitness of things that we hereby make a request and serve a final notice to the Board to reduce the contract demand from 18 MVA to 3 MVA within 15 days from the date of receipt of this letter. On expiry of the said period, we will start consuming power as per the contract demand of 3 MVA. The Board considered the request of the Petitioner and by letter dated 19-11-1999 (Annexure P/30) conveyed its decision not to permit further reduction in contract demand Petitioner thereafter by letter dated 3-12-1999 (Annexure P/38) gave notice for termination of the agreement in the event of the Board not agreeing for reduction of the contract demand from 18 MVA to 3 MVA. In the said letter Petitioner has stated that "in the event of the Board not agreeing to our above request, this letter may please be treated as the notice for termination to be given under Clause 28(b) of the Agreement dated 22-10-1986, while reserving our rights and remedies in Law against the refusal of the Board to consider our request. 7. Petitioner apprehended that it shall be required to make payment of the electricity charges on the basis of the contract demand; notwithstanding its request to reduce the same, Petitioner wrote to the Board on 6-12-1999 (Annexure P/35) that while billing for the month of November 1999 consumption, its maximum demand be considered a 3 MVA. However, Board issued bill dated 16-12-1999 (Annexure-P/39) for the month of November, 1999 on the basis of the contract demand of 18 MVA. Petitioner represented to the Board for correction of the bill in view of its request for reduction of the contract demand from 18 MVA to 3 MVA but the Board by its letter dated 5-1-2000 (Annexure P/41) wrote to the Petitioner that the bill dated 16-12-1999 is in accordance with the agreement. Petitioner by its letter dated 6-1-2000 wrote to the Board for adjustment of the bill from its security deposit. Board by its letter dated 7-1-2000 gave notice to the Petitioner threatening disconnection on the ground of non-payment of charges. Petitioner was further served with the bill dated 17-1-2000 for the month of December, 1999 on the basis of the contract demand of 18 MVA and the Board ultimately disconnected the electricity supply on 21-1-2000 on the ground of non-payment of the bills. Petitioner has further been served with bills dated 16-2-2000, 16-3-2000 and 17-4-2000 for the months of January, February and March, 2000, respectively on the basis of the contract demand of 18 MVA. Petitioner did not make payment of any of these bills and by letter dated 1-4-2000 (Annexure P/49) informed the Board that the notice period for the HT agreement had expired on 1-4-2000 in terms of Clause 28(b) of the HT agreement. 8. Petitioner did not make payment of any of these bills and by letter dated 1-4-2000 (Annexure P/49) informed the Board that the notice period for the HT agreement had expired on 1-4-2000 in terms of Clause 28(b) of the HT agreement. 8. In the meanwhile, Board issued notice to the Petitioner dated 4-2-2000 (Annexure P/50) to pay the electricity bills which were prepared on the basis of the contract demand within 15 days of receipt of the said notice, failing which to show cause within 15 days; as to why permission for installation of TG sets for its Cement Plant at Kymore and Jamul be not withdrawn. Petitioner challenged the said notice dated 4-2-2000 by filing a writ petition i.e. W. P. 1458/2000 before this Court. By order dated 28-2-2000 said writ petition was disposed of with the direction to the Petitioner to file reply and consequential direction to the Board to consider the reply and take decision in accordance with law within 4 weeks from the date of filing of the reply. While disposing of the said writ petition this Court further observed that the Board shall not take consequential action for a period of 2 weeks in case the decision goes adverse to the Petitioner. Petitioner submitted its reply (Annexure P/53) and on consideration of the same, by letter dated 19-4-2000 Board declined to reduce the contract demand and further directed to make payment of the minimum charges and overdues failing which the permission granted earlier under Section 44 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, shall stand vacated and the Board in exercise of its power under Section 45 of the said Act shall shut down the captive generation plants both at Kymore and Jamul. Thereafter, the Board served demand notice dated 25-4-2000 (Annexure P/54) for an amount of Rs. 8,43,10,853/- failing which petition has been informed that said amount shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue. 9. In this writ petition, filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, prayer made by the Petitioner is to quash letters dated 22-4-1999 (Annexure P/25) and 19-11-1999 (Annexure P/30) whereby the prayer made by the Petitioner for reduction of the contract demand has been refused. 9. In this writ petition, filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, prayer made by the Petitioner is to quash letters dated 22-4-1999 (Annexure P/25) and 19-11-1999 (Annexure P/30) whereby the prayer made by the Petitioner for reduction of the contract demand has been refused. Further prayer made by the Petitioner is to quash the bills from November, 1999 to April, 2000 (Annexure P/39 and P/44 to P/48) which have been raised on the basis of the contract demand of 18 MVA. Consequential, prayer of the Petitioner is to quash the demand notice dated 25-4-2000 (Annexure P/54) whereby the Petitioner has been asked to make payment of Rs. 8,43,10,853/- failing which it has been informed that the said amount shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Petitioner also prays for quashing of the order dated 4-2-2000 (Annexure P/50) whereby it has been asked to show-cause as to why the permission granted under Section 44 of the Electricity (Supply) Act be not cancelled. It also prays for quashing of the order dated 19-4-2000 whereby the Board has communicated to the Petitioner to make payment of the bills on the basis of the contract demand of 18 MVA failing which permission granted under Section 44 of the Electricity (Supply) Act shall stand vacated and the Board shall shut down the captive generation plant in exercise of its power under Section 45 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. 10. Mr. G. L. Sanghi appears on behalf of the Petitioner. Respondents are represented by Shri M. L. Jaiswal. Mr. Sanghi contends that the Board gave consent for installing and running 25 MW generating set in response to the request made by the Petitioner in its letter No. JML/PH/964 dated 5-12-1995, Board lacked jurisdiction to put a condition with regard to the contract demand. He submits that in the letter referred to above, Petitioner did not give any assurance that it will continue with the contract demand. It is relevant here to state that the Petitioner on the same day by letter dated JML/PH/963 dated 5-12-1995 wrote to the Board that the Petitioner shall continue with the present contract demand and maximum power available from the Board shall be availed. Petitioner in his letter of the same date has assured the Board to continue with the contract demand. Petitioner in his letter of the same date has assured the Board to continue with the contract demand. Hence the Board did not err in incorporating that condition while granting consent under Section 44 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. In my opinion, mere reference to letter No. "964" by the Board in the letter of consent dated 25-3-1996 shall not invalidate imposition of condition of continuance of contract demand on this ground alone. In any view of the matter, in case the Petitioner thought; that the aforesaid condition ought not to have been incorporated while granting consent under Section 44 of the Act, it ought to have challenged the same at that particular point of time. Petitioner having accepted the same and acted in accordance with the said condition, at a later stage cannot be permitted to change its posture and challenge the same on the ground that the Petitioner did not convey its willingness to continue with the contract demand. 11. Mr. Sanghi then contends that the Board during the subsistence of the H. T. agreement was unable to supply electricity to the extent required and in that view of the matter, Petitioner ought not to have been asked to pay the minimum charges. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Raymond Limited and Anr. v. State of M. P. and others, 1999(1) M.P.L.J. 648 . In the said case, it has been held as follows: 23. In the tariff which has been issued by the Board, as quoted above, there is no such provision made for a situation that on account of inability of the Board to supply energy, there should be proportionate reduction in the minimum charges or not. After having bestowed our best of consideration, we are of the opinion that Clause 23(b) of the agreement can be invoked in the present situation as when the Board is unable to supply even less than the 40% of the contract demand, that would be treated to be the inability of the Board to supply energy and on account of the reduced supply, the consumer would be entitled to proportionate reduction in the minimum of the contract demand. When the Board is unable to supply the contract demand, then the Board is under an obligation to give a proportionate rebate in the minimum charges also. This is no answer to the fact that since the consumer has entered into an agreement with his eyes open, therefore, he is bound by the statutory contract or that the Board has to cater to outlay and it has worked out 40% contract demand so as to keep the energy going even during the inability of the supplier or of the consumer. Where even the minimum 40% of the contract demand energy is not supplied by the Board and the Board claims charges for the same, it is nothing but travesty of justice. Difficulty arises only when the Board is unable to supply the minimum of the 40% of the contract demand. In case the demand is more than 40% then automatically 40% of the contract demand charge is covered. But where the Board supplies only 20% of the contract demand and charges for the minimum 40% of the contract demand, can this liberty be given to the Board in face of such inequitable and arbitrary action of the Board on the plea that the consumer has entered into a contract with his eyes open and the Board has to cover various outlays? In our humble opinion, this will be inequitable, arbitrary and unreasonable to sustain such an argument. The Courts are not here to do technical justice. The Courts are also Courts of equity. When clauses 11 and 23 of the Agreement make a provision for two situations i.e. in the event of inability of the Board to supply energy or in the event of inability of the consumer to consume the contract demand, then in either case, charges are made on the reduced supply, then there is no justification to say that so far as 40% of the contract demand is concerned, the Board is under no obligation to supply 40% of the contract load. To accede to this interpretation of the Board will be unfair and unjust. 12. To accede to this interpretation of the Board will be unfair and unjust. 12. Petitioner has although averred vaguely that "very often less than the minimum guarantee demand of 40% load factor was made available" but this assertion of the Petitioner has been denied by the Board and it has been stated that Petitioner's contention that "they were not made available with enough power to ensure consumption requirement to 40% load factor is baseless and is a false and is an excuse to shy away from their commitment". There is nothing on record to disbelieve the Board's stand. In that view of the matter, the authority relied on in no way supports the case of the Petitioner.One has to bear in mind that paucity of electricity is one thing than non availability of the electricity to the minimum of the contract demand. 13. Mr. Sanghi further contends that the Board ought to have acceded to the request of the Petitioner to reduce the contract demand. Mr. Jaiswal however, contends that once the Board on consideration of relevant material took the decision not to reduce the demand, Petitioner has no legal right to seek a writ from this Court to compel the Board to reduce the contract demand. 14. Having appreciated the rival submissions, I find substance in the submission of Shri Jaiswal. True it is that the power policy of the State do contemplate reduction in the contract demand and in fact the Petitioner's request for reduction of contract demand from 33,530 KVA to 18,000 KVA was acceded to by the Board at the first instance. Thereafter, the Petitioner's prayer for reduction of the contract demand from 18 MVA to 3 MVA has not been accepted by the Board. While granting consent for establishment of the generating set under Section 44 of the Act, Board has made it clear that the Petitioner shall continue with the existing contract demand. In that view of the matter, the decision taken by the Board declining reduction in the contract demand cannot be said to be erroneous. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4528/1991, Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and Anr. v. Mrs. Manju Singh Chauhan. In that view of the matter, the decision taken by the Board declining reduction in the contract demand cannot be said to be erroneous. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4528/1991, Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and Anr. v. Mrs. Manju Singh Chauhan. In the said case, it has been held as follows: We are firmly of the view that the action of the Board in refusing of the load from 168 KVA to 100 KVA as requested by the Respondent was wholly in consonance with the terms of the agreement between the parties. That being so, there was no deficiency of service involved in this case and the claim petition was not maintainable before the National Commission under the Act. 15. Mr. Sanghi's further contention is that while granting consent under Section 44 of the Act, Board is not competent to compel an industry to continue with the existing contract-demand with it. He submits that this not only runs counter to the power policy of the State but also not sanctioned under the scheme of the Act. Mr. Jaiswal, however, submits that when Board has given the discretion to grant consent under Section 44 of the Act, all powers incidental to and ancillary for exercise of power of consent have to be assumed in its favour. In support of his submission, Mr. Jaiswal has placed reliance on a large number of authorities. 16. I do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Shri Jaiswal that conferral of statutory power to grant consent must be construed as impliedly authorising everything which would fairly and reasonably be regarded as incidental or consequential to the power itself. However, the question in the present case is as to whether putting conditions for continuance of existing contract demand can be regarded as incidental to the power of grant of consent under Section 44 of the Act. To answer this question, it would be apt to reproduce relevant provision of Section 44 of the Act. It reads as follows: S. 44. To answer this question, it would be apt to reproduce relevant provision of Section 44 of the Act. It reads as follows: S. 44. Restriction on establishment of new generating stations or major additions or replacement of plant in generating stations: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any licence, but subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall not be lawful for a licensee, or any other person, not being the Central Government or any Corporation created by a Central Act or any Generating Company, except with the previous consent in writing of the Board, to establish or acquire a new generating station or to extend or replace any major unit of plant or works pertaining to the generation of electricity in a generating station: Provided that such consent shall not, except in relation to a controlled station, be withheld unless within three months from the date of receipt of an application: (a) for consent to the establishment or acquisition of a new generating station, the Board: (i) gives to the applicant being a licensee an undertaking that it is competent to, and will, within twenty-four months from the said date, afford to him a supply of electricity sufficient for his requirements pursuant to his application; or (ii) shows to the applicant that the electricity required by him pursuant to his application could be more economically obtained within a reasonable time from another appropriate source; (b) xx xx xx (i) xx xx xx (ii) xx xx xx (c) xx xx xx (i) xx xx xx (ii) xx xx xx (2) There shall be stated in every application under this section such particulars as the Board may reasonably require of the station plant or works, as the case may be, in respect of which it is made, and where consent is given thereto, in acting in pursuance of such consent, the application shall not, without the further consent of the Board, make any material variation in the particulars so stated. (2-A) xx xx xx (3) xx xx xx 17. (2-A) xx xx xx (3) xx xx xx 17. From a plain reading of Section 44(1) of the Act it is apparent that the Legislature while conferring the power to grant consent has fixed norms for exercise of the power and has provided that consent cannot be withheld unless the Board informs to the applicant that it is competent to and will within 24 months afford to the applicant supply of electricity sufficient for its requirements or shows to the applicant that the electricity required by the applicant pursuant to its application could be more economically obtained within a reasonable time from another appropriate source. Thus, under the scheme of the Act, consent can be withheld only on satisfaction of either of the aforesaid conditions. Conditions laid down for grant of consent under Section 44 of the Act, nowhere states that the Board can put a condition for continuance of the contract-demand for grant of consent. In my opinion, putting the condition for continuance of the contract-demand cannot be reasonably inferred as incidental or consequential to the power of grant of consent itself. I am of the opinion that for execution of the power to consent, the authority to put condition for continuance of the contract-demand is neither directly or immediately required to carry out the purpose for which power of grant of consent has been conferred on the Board. I am further of the opinion that the power to direct for continuance of existing contract demand or for that matter, compelling a person seeking consent under Section 44 of the Act for availing electricity of fixed quantity cannot be said to be falling in natural consequences from the power to grant consent. 18. Here I must answer an ancillary submission of Shri Jaiswal. Mr. Jaiswal points out that under Section 44(2) the Act, the Board has been conferred with the authority to ask such particulars as the Board may reasonably require for grant of consent and in exercise of the said powers, the Board has asked the Petitioner to furnish particulars as regard "to the quantum of power to be availed from Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, after installing captive generating set". This according to Shri Jaiswal clearly goes to show that such a power is conferred on the Board. This according to Shri Jaiswal clearly goes to show that such a power is conferred on the Board. He submits that use of the expression "such particulars as the Board may reasonably require of the station, plant or work, as the case may be" is illustrative in nature and the power of the Board cannot be confined to particulars in relation to station, plant or work only. 19. True it is that in view of Section 44(2) of the Act, person seeking consent is required to state in the application such particulars as the Board may reasonably require but these particulars have to be of the Station, Plant or Works, as the case may be in respect of which request for grant of consent is made and is granted. The word 'particulars' in relation to 'station', 'plant' or 'works' are facts or details about them and not in relation to other things. Considering the plain language of Section 44(2) of the Act, I am of the opinion that while asking an applicant to state particulars the Board cannot compel an industry to continue with the existing contract demand or can force the Industry to be the Board's consumer for a definite amount of electricity. 20. Thus, I am of the considered opinion that the authority to put condition in relation to the contract-demand cannot be fairly and reasonably be regarded as incidental or consequential to the power of grant of consent itself. Further, the authority to ask an industry to furnish particulars shall not itself confer the authority on the Board to put condition in relation to the quantum of electricity which an Industry is obliged to take in case of grant of consent. In my opinion, any other view would lead to absurdity as in a given case. Board may not be in a position to afford supply of electricity or provide the same at more economical rate and as such obliged to grant consent but at the same time put condition for taking fixed quantity of electricity from it. This will amount to forcing on an unwilling industry the burden of continuance of the contract-demand which does not flow from the scheme of the Act. 21. Mr. This will amount to forcing on an unwilling industry the burden of continuance of the contract-demand which does not flow from the scheme of the Act. 21. Mr. Sanghi points out that once it is held that the Board has no authority to put condition in relation to the contract demand; while granting consent under Section 44 of the Act, it cannot rescind the consent on the ground of non-fulfilment of the said condition. He submits that principle of estoppel will not apply as the Board lacked jurisdiction to put such condition. He emphasises that the condition of contract demand being not permissible to be laid under Section 44 of the Act, notwithstanding the fact that the Petitioner has accepted the same, nothing will prevent it to question the same at the later stage. Mr. Jaiswal, however, points out that to apply the principle of estoppel, one is required to see as to whether the condition put by the Board is sanctioned by law or in other words is in breach of any statutory provision or against the public policy. Mr. Jaiswal submits that the condition of continuance of contract demand does not violate any statutory provision and same is not against any public policy. 22. Having appreciated the rival submission, I find substance in the submission of Shri Jaiswal. Though I have accepted the submissions of Shri Sanghi that condition of continuance of the present contract demand is not incidental or consequential to the power of grant of consent itself, but the same is neither against any public policy or in breach of any statutory provision. In my opinion, principle of estoppel cannot be invoked when it results into breach of any statutory provision or against public policy. Having found that the condition of continuance of the contract demand agreed between the parties being not in breach of any statutory provision or against any public policy; notwithstanding that the same does not flow from Section 44 of the Act, still the Petitioner having accepted the same and acted in accordance with the said condition; at a later stage, cannot be permitted to change its posture and challenge the same on the ground of lack of authority. 23. 23. In my opinion, as the Petitioner has accepted the condition of continuance of the contract-demand imposed by the Board, while granting consent under Section 44 of the Act, the Board has got the authority to withdraw the consent on failure of the Petitioner to comply with those conditions. Here in the present case, according to the HT agreement between the parties, Petitioner was required to make payment of the contract demand. In that view of the matter, in case the Petitioner refuses to continue with the contract-demand or refuses to make payment on account thereof it will amount to breach of the terms and conditions for grant of consent provided at the instance of the Petitioner and agreed and accepted by it. In such a situation, the Board may rescind the consent on account of non-fulfilment of the terms and conditions for grant of consent. As stated earlier, Petitioner has given notice for termination of the HT agreement in terms of the agreement itself which has expired on 1-4-2000. As the HT agreement has itself expired on 1-4-2000 the Petitioner cannot be insisted upon to fulfil this condition. That being the position, the consent granted cannot be withdrawn for non-fulfilment of the condition of the HT agreement after 1-4-2000. 24. During the course of hearing Shri Jaiswal attempted to justify the order withdrawing consent on the ground that the Petitioners are using electricity for the whole of its plant. It is relevant here to state that the only ground assigned; threatening withdrawal of the consent is non-fulfilment of the essential condition of grant of consent as regard to the contract-demand. In the order impugned, nothing has been stated as regard to the use of the electricity for the entire plant. It is well settled that the validity of an order based on certain ground has to be judged by the reasons mentioned and the reasons cannot be supplemented in any other manner. Here in the present case, the statutory consent granted to the Petitioner is sought to be withdrawn and as such, all those reasons which weighed with the Board ought to have been indicated in the order. This argument of Shri Jaiswal further does not deserve acceptance on the ground that the Petitioner was never made aware of this allegation in the show-cause notice issued to it nor its explanation sought in this regard. This argument of Shri Jaiswal further does not deserve acceptance on the ground that the Petitioner was never made aware of this allegation in the show-cause notice issued to it nor its explanation sought in this regard. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, AIR 1978 SC 851 , wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows: 8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. 25. Mr. Sanghi although feebly has taken an extreme stand that once the Board has given consent under Section 44 of the Act, it has become functus officio and later on; cannot withdraw the consent on any ground. I do not have the slightest hesitation in rejecting this submission of Shri Sanghi. It is relevant here to state that the Board has exercised the power for grant of consent under Central Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, expressly provides that power to issue orders shall include power to rescind the same. However, this would not mean that the order granting consent can be rescinded on whims and fancies but in a case when the consent was granted on certain conditions legally permissible to be laid, its breach may entitle the Board to rescind the same. 26. From what has been stated above, it is apparent that the refusal by the Board to the Petitioner's prayer for reduction of the contract-demand cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Further, Petitioner shall be liable to pay the energy bills on the basis of the contract-demand till termination of the agreement i.e. 1-4-2000. Consent granted to the Petitioner under Section 44 of the Act cannot be withdrawn in case the Petitioner pays the energy bills on the basis of the contract demand till the subsistence of the HT agreement i.e. 1-4-2000. Consent granted to the Petitioner under Section 44 of the Act cannot be withdrawn in case the Petitioner pays the energy bills on the basis of the contract demand till the subsistence of the HT agreement i.e. 1-4-2000. Petitioner paying the said amount within 3 weeks from today, consent granted to the Petitioner under Section 44 of the Act shall not be withdrawn and no action under Section 45 of the Act shall be taken. Board may consider the adjustment of the amount already lying with it as security deposit. 27. In the result, writ petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.