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2000 DIGILAW 1099 (GUJ)

TALJABHAI S. RABARI v. STATE

2000-12-26

KUNDAN SINGH, R.K.ABICHANDANI

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R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) IN these four petitions, the petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of the newly added provisions of Secs. 61 A to 61g as well as the provisions of Secs. 52 and 53 to the extent that they were amended by the Forest (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1983 on the ground that they violate fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 19 (l) (g) of the constitution of India. ( 2 ) IN all these matters, vehicles were seized in connection with the illicit carriage of forest produce belonging to the State Government. By the amendment made in the Forest Act, 1927 by the Gujarat State Legislature in Sec. 52, the earlier provision of sub-sec. (2) to the effect that a report of seizure was to be made to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the forest offences on account of which the seizure was made, was substituted by providing that such report was to be made to the concerned authorised officer under Sec. 61 A where the offence on account of which the seizure has been made, is in respect of the forest produce which is the property of the State Government or in respect of which the State Government has any interest; while in other cases, such report was to be made to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offences on account of which the seizure has been made. ( 3 ) IN cases, where the report is made under Sec. 61 A of the Act to the authorised officer, on being satisfied that a forest offence is committed, the authorised officer whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the Commission of such forest offence, order confiscation of the property so seized, inter alia, together with the vehicle used in the commission of such offence. Such confiscated property may be ordered to be sold by a public auction. In cases, where the order of confiscation made under Sec. 61a is set aside or annulled by an order under Sec. 61c or 6 ID, the proceeds of the property sold are to be paid to the owner or to the person from whom it was seized, as may be specified in such order. Section 61b provides for issuance of show cause notice before confiscation under Sec. 61a of the Act. Section 61b provides for issuance of show cause notice before confiscation under Sec. 61a of the Act. Section 61c provides for a revision, while Sec. 61c of an appeal against the order made under Sec. 61a or Sec. 61c of the Act. The property which is confiscated under an order under Sec. 61a, which has become final, would vest free from all encumbrances in the state Government. The jurisdiction of any other officer. Court, Tribunal or authority to make orders with regard to the custody, possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of the property which is seized including the vehicle used in committing any offence relating to forest produce, has been ousted by Sec. 61g of the Act. ( 4 ) THE grievance of the petitioners is that, the impugned provisions which provide for a separate treatment in respect of the vehicles seized for the offences relating to forest produce belonging to the State Government and the forest produce belonging to others, create hostile discrimination against the petitioners and violate principles of equality, and therefore, contravene Art. 14 of the constitution. ( 5 ) THE contention that a special provision in respect of the vehicles used in connection with the offences relating to forest produce belonging to the State government violates the principles of equality, is wholly misconceived. The use of vehicles in commission of forest offences by removing the forest produce belonging to the State Government, is a situation which is entirely different from theft of private forest produce. It is a fundamental duty of the citizens to protect and improve the natural environment including forests as provided by Art. 51 A of the Constitution. The State is required by Art. 48a to safeguard the forests. In order to provide for a better deterrent against commission of such offences of cutting trees and removing forest produce, it is absolutely necessary that the vehicles, which are the main medium used for large-scale removal of forest produce, when seized along with illicitly carried forest produce, are dealt with by such special provisions to deter the vehicle owners from allowing them to be used for such nefarious activities. The purpose underlying such special provisions relating to the vehicles used for commission of offences in respect of the forest produce belonging to the State Government, is to ensure that even in cases where the strict standard of proof required for proving an offence in a Magisterial Court, cannot be attained on the standard of proof of preponderance of probabilities, the vehicles used in commission of such offences are confiscated and they vest in the State Government. The forest produce belonging to the state Government cannot ordinarily be found in a private vehicle unless such vehicle is authorised to carry such forest produce. When forest produce belonging to the State Government is detected in a private vehicle, which is not authorised to carry it, then there is full justification in assuming that the vehicle is used in connection with an offence relating to forest produce belonging to the State government, and therefore, liable to be confiscated. In our opinion, as the special provision for treating the vehicles which are used in connection with the offence relating to forest produce belonging to the State Government are in furtherance of the objectives underlying the Act and are designed to effectively deter commission of such offence, the classification of treating such vehicles by such special provisions as regards their seizure and confiscation is rational and based on intelligible differentia having nexus with the object sought to be achieved under the Act. The petitioners challenge, therefore, cannot be sustained on the ground that the impugned provisions violate fundamental right of equality guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) IT is obvious from the nature of the impugned provisions that they constitute a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on trade or business. The owners of vehicles have a duty to ensure that their vehicles are not used for illicit removal of the forest safeguards against any arbitrary action of confiscating the vehicles. The revision and appellate provisions ensure that the order of the competent authority is duly scrutinized. In fact, the appellate power is given to the Sessions Judge having jurisdiction over the area which would ensure an impartial approach, as a judicial body applies its mind to the orders of the quasi-judicial authorities. The revision and appellate provisions ensure that the order of the competent authority is duly scrutinized. In fact, the appellate power is given to the Sessions Judge having jurisdiction over the area which would ensure an impartial approach, as a judicial body applies its mind to the orders of the quasi-judicial authorities. These restrictions intended to ensure curbing commission of forest offences and safeguarding the forests are, therefore, reasonable restrictions in the interest of general public. The petitioners cannot have a fundamental right to use their vehicles for commission of offences relating to forest produce. Therefore, the challenge against these provisions on the ground that they violate Art. 19 (l) (g), is wholly misconceived. ( 7 ) IN this view of the matter, all the petitions fail and are rejected. Rule is discharged in each of them with no orders as to costs. Interim reliefs stands vacated. .