Judgment Narayan Roy, J. 1. Heard Mr. Pushkar Narain Shahi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Tara Kant Jha, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party Nos. 2 to 6. 2. This petition has been filed by the petitioner after obtaining due consent of the Advocate-General. Bihar, Patna, as required under Sec. 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred to as Act"). 3. In this Original Criminal Miscellaneous Petition, notice has been issued to opposite-party Nos. 2 to 6 for initiation of a criminal contempt against them for alleged expulsion of the petitioner from Begusarai Bar Association, which amounted to interference with the proceeding of the Courts at Begusarai. 4. The short facts giving rise to this application are as follows: Association, Begusarai on 29-10-1996 that no lawyer belonging to District Bar Association would represent any of the accused in the case relating to murder of late Birendra Kumar, who was a practising Advocate of Begusarai and a member of Advocates Association of Begusarai. On 27-2-1997 bail application on behalf of three accused persons was filed by this petitioner. The bail application was heard by the learned Sessions Judge, Begusarai on 27-2-1997 itself. Thereafter, an emergent meeting of the District Bar Association was convened and under the presidents hip of opposite-party No.5, who was the then President of the District Bar Association of Begusarai, it was resolved that the petitioner and one Sri Sharda Charan Mishra, Advocates, be removed from the membership of Begusarai Bar Association, as they appeared in the case of murder of one of the members of the Association. On 5-12-1996, the petitioner and some other members brought to the notice of the Secretary, District Bar Association, Begusarai, that as per different decisions the action restraining the petitioner from appearing on behalf of accused tantamounts to misconduct and the opposite-parties were also liable for criminal contempt under Sec. 2(c)(iii) of the Act. The Bar Association, Begusarai, having come to know that the accused-persons aforesaid were represented by the petitioner removed him from the membership of the Association. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the aforesaid action of the Bar Association, Begusarai, whose office-bearers were opposite-party Nos. 2 to 6 amounts to interference in the administration of justice and, thus, they are liable to be proceeded against for criminal contempt. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the aforesaid action of the Bar Association, Begusarai, whose office-bearers were opposite-party Nos. 2 to 6 amounts to interference in the administration of justice and, thus, they are liable to be proceeded against for criminal contempt. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, at the same time also submitted that the petitioner despite the resolution passed by the Bar Association, Begusarai, represented the accused persons all through. 6. Mr. T.K. Jha, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party Nos. 2 to 6, on the other hand, submitted that in the given facts of the case, this application for initiation of criminal contempt proceeding against the petitioner is not maintainable, as there had been no interference with the administration of justice, inasmuch as the petitioner appeared all through in the case and at no point of time, he was obstructed either from entering into the court-room or in arguing the case of the accusedpersons. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that administration of justice was not interfered with by the aforesaid resolution passed by the Bar Association, and, therefore, this application is liable to be dismissed. 7. It is not in dispute that even after expulsion of the petitioner from the Bar Association, he represented the accused persons all through and the proceeding of the Court was not interfered with. Merely because the petitioner was expelled from the membership of the Bar Association, the same will not amount to criminal contempt. Sec. 2(c)(iii) reads as follows: "2(c)(iii) interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs, or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner." 8. On reading the provision of law as aforesaid, it appears that on account of obstruction caused by any person in any manner, the administration of justice is obstructed the person doing so shall be liable for criminal contempt. From the facts of this case, it is manifest that administration of justice was not obstructed at any point of time nor it was done so in any manner by the Bar Association, Begusarai, rather the petitioner appeared in the criminal case throughout and no complaint whatsoever, was made by the petitioner before the Court at any point of time that he was obstructed in appearing in the Court by the office-bearers of the Bar Association of Begusarai. 9. 9. The resolution passed by the Bar Association, Begusarai, speaks about the functioning of the Bar Association, Begusarai, outside the Court and it is more domestic in nature and. in no way, it can be said that the resolution adopted by the Bar Association interfered with the administration of justice. 10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in support of his contention, has relied upon three decisions of this Court and one of the apex Court. In the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs. Bihar V/s. Murali Manohar Prasad, it appears that a contempt proceeding was initiated against the editor of Searchlight Press and their Lordships while dealing with the contempt proceeding only referred to the resolution taken by the Bar Association at Danapur, which was not an issue directedly involved in the case. Similarly, in the case of Ram Parikshan Pandey V/s. M.S.M. Sharma and another, this Court was dealing with a contempt proceeding against sub-editor, Searchlight Press. These two decisions, referred to above, however, have not decided any law for initiation of a contempt proceeding against the members of the Bar Association or Advocates Association for taking resolution expelling a member of the Association. In the case of Jagdish Prasad v. The State of Bihar and others, this Court held that for throwing the law books of a lawyer, it would be a case of criminal contempt. In this case of Jagdish Prasad, (supra), this Court did not lay down law as to under what Circumstances a criminal contempt proceeding should be initiated. Likewise, in the case of Govind Sahni and another V/s. State of U.P. and another, the apex Court has held that passing of the resolution by the President of the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee during the pendency of the injunction matter in the Civil Court amounted to committing of criminal contempt. In the case of Govind Sahni, (supra), it appears that at the time, when circulars were issued by the Working President of the Congress Committee, a suit was pending before the Munsif, involving the issues, whereby and whereunder orders were passed against a particular member of the Congress Committee, who subsequently, was expelled. In the case in hand, no such situation or circumstance has been shown for initiation of a contempt proceeding against any member of the opposite parties. 11. In the case in hand, no such situation or circumstance has been shown for initiation of a contempt proceeding against any member of the opposite parties. 11. I would like to point out that neither any case was pending in the Court concerned, filed by the petitioner against the office-bearers of the Bar Association nor the office-bearers of the Bar Association, at any point of time, interfered with the administration of justice of civil courts, Begusarai, nor they even intended, in any manner, to interfere with the administration of justice, save and except by passing a resolution, as referred to above. The case laws cited by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, in that view of the matter are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. For the discussions and decisions aforementioned, it is held that no case has been made out for initiation of a criminal contempt proceeding against opposite party Nos. 2 to 6. 12. In the result, therefore, this application is dismissed.