JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 23.1.95 by which the petitioner has been dismissed from service and the order dated 28.4.95 by which his appeal has been rejected. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the petitioner, while working as a Clerk-cum-Cashier with the respondent Bank, was placed under suspension vide order dated 4.2.93 pending inquiry on the charges of visiting another village and misappropriating the amount of Rs. 8000/-, for which a criminal case was also lodged. On 13.7.93, a charge sheet was served upon petitioner in departmental proceedings and after inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of his dismissal from to service vide order dated 23.1.95. The order of dismissal was unsuccessfully challenged before the Appellate Authority. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, he preferred the present writ petition, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 22.4.99. The respondent bank preferred Special Appeal against the said order dated 22.4.99 and the same is was allowed vide judgment ana order dated 8.9.99 and after setting aside the said order dated 22.4.99 the case was remanded to be decided afresh on merit. 3. In fact, while entertaining the matter, this Court. on 22.12.97, passed the following order:- "Issue notice why the petition should not be admitted only on the ground of excessive punishment." 4. The matter has been argued not only on the quantum of punishment but also on two more issues, i.e. (i) once the Final Report has been submitted by the investigating agency in a criminal case,whether order of dismissal can be sustained in the eyes of law; and (ii) whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, as per the evidence led before the inquiry officer, the finding of misappropriation could be recorded against the petitioner. These issues were agitated and entertained with the consent of the parties. 5. In a case like instant, the Court can review only the `decision making procedure' and not the `decision' of the authority. The Court, not being a Court of Appeal, is incompetent to substitute its own view on factual aspects of the case. The Court can review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in `exceptional circumstances'. The Court, not being a Court of Appeal, is incompetent to substitute its own view on factual aspects of the case. The Court can review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in `exceptional circumstances'. (Vide Union of India v. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185 ; State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow, (1994) 2 SCC 537 ; State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh, (1996) 8 SCC 350 ; State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Singh, AIR 1996 SC 736 ; State of U.P v. Nand Kishore Shukla & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1561 ; Transport Commissioner, Madras v. Thiru ARK Moorthy, (1995) 1 SCC 332 ; Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1908 ; State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh, AIR 1997 SC 2696 ; and Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 739 . 6. In State of Tamil Nadu v. S. Subramaniam, AIR 1996 SC 1232 , the Apex Court held that as the High Court has power of judicial review of the administrative action on complaint relating to service conditions of the employee, it is within the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority to consider the evidence on record and to record findings whether, the charge stood proved of not. It is equally settled law that technical rules of evidence so have no application in the disciplinary proceedings and the authority is to consider the material on record. In judicial review, the Court `has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches, is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or the Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, the Court or the Tribunal is devoid of power to re- appreciate the evidence and would come to its own conclusion on the proved charges. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, the Court or the Tribunal is devoid of power to re- appreciate the evidence and would come to its own conclusion on the proved charges. The to only consideration the Court/Tribunal has, in its judicial review, is to consider whether the conclusion is based on the evidence on record and support the finding, or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence." 7. In the General Court Martial & Ors. v. Col. Anil Tej Singh Dhaliwal, AIR 1998 SC 983 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court, in its limited power to exercise of judicial review, may interfere by appreciating the evidence only if there is an omission on the part of the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority to consider the relevant evidence. Similarly, in Rajendra Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , the Court observed as under : "It is equally well settled that where a Quasi-judicial Tribunal or arbitrator records findings based on no legal evidence, and the findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated... Viewed from either angle, the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer are wholly perverse and hence unsustainable. The High Court, in our opinion, was clearly in error in declining to examine the contention that the findings were perverse on the short specious and wholly untenable ground that the matter depends on appraisal of evidence. Between appraisal of evidence appreciable difference which could never be lost sight of and the High Court ought not to have short- circuited the writ petition." 8. In the instant case, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are in unequivocal terms as under : "(i) Petitioner had gone to another village on 30.3.92 and received Rs. 8000/- from Jeewa Ram to be deposited in the Bank; (ii) the said amount was not deposited by the petitioner in the Bank though he had filled up the Slip to deposit; (iii) Petitioner did not give the said amount to Shri R.B. Sharma, the Branch Manager; (iv) The amount deposited by Shri Jabar Singh to the extent of Rs. 8000/- from Jeewa Ram to be deposited in the Bank; (ii) the said amount was not deposited by the petitioner in the Bank though he had filled up the Slip to deposit; (iii) Petitioner did not give the said amount to Shri R.B. Sharma, the Branch Manager; (iv) The amount deposited by Shri Jabar Singh to the extent of Rs. 8000/- was his own money and it was not the amount which had been given by the petitioners to Shri R.B. Sharma ; (v) Petitioner had returned the amount of Rs. 8000/- to Jeewa Ram after a long time, for which Jeewa Ram also submitted an affidavit; and (vi) Petitioner had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 8000/-, which he had received from Jeewa Ram from the village. 9. There is no cogent reason to interfere with the aforesaid findings of facts for the reason that it could not be successfully argued by Mr. Dave that those findings are based on no evidence or run counter to the evidence on record. Mr. Dave has not submitted that petitioner had not been given full opportunity to defend himself, nor there has been any complaint by him of violation of principles of natural justice or any other requirement under the law which may vitiate the inquiry on any ground. Therefore, there is no scope of interference on that count. 10. Merely because in criminal case a final report has been submitted by the investigating agency, petitioner cannot take any benefit thereof. 11. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 1981 , the Supreme Court has categorically held as under : "The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding." 12. In State of Karnataka & Anr. v. T. Venkataramanappa, (1996) 6 SCC 455 , the Apex Court held that acquittal in a criminal case cannot be held to be a bar to hold departmental enquiry for the same offence for the reason that in a criminal trial, standard of proof is different and the case is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt but the same is not true in a departmental proceeding as such a strict proof of misconduct is not required therein. 13. 13. Similarly, in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices v. A. Gopalan, (1997) 11 SCC 239 , the Supreme Court held that "in a criminal case the charge has to be proved by standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceeding, the standard of proof for proving the charge is preponderance of probabilities." 14. Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal proposition that as the standard of proof in both is quite different and the termination is not based on conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee in criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. 15. The issue of quantum of punishment has also been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments and it was held that if the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, it would be arbitrary and thus would violate the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, being illegal, it cannot be enforced. (Vide Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454 ; S.K. Giri v. Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs & Ors., 1995 (Suppl) SCC 519 ; Union of India v. Giriraj Sharma, 1994 (Suppl.) 3 SCC 755 ; Bishan Singh & ors. v. State of Punjab, (1996) 10 SCC 461 ; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors., (1987) 4 SCC 611 ; and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 484 ). 16. In Rajneet Thakur (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : "But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias, the doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on the aspect, which is otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court Martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would present be immune from correction. In the present case, the punishment is so stringently disproportionate as to call for and justify interference. It cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected in judicial review." 17. In the present case, the punishment is so stringently disproportionate as to call for and justify interference. It cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected in judicial review." 17. The said judgment has been approved and followed by the Apex Court in Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, AIR 1997 SC 3387 , and after examining elaborately the concept of reasonableness, rationality and proportionality, the same view has been reiterated. 18. In B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), after examining various earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court observed that in exercise of the powers of judicial view, the Court cannot `normally' substitute its own conclusion or penalty. However, if the penalty imposed by an Authority `shocks the conscience' of the Court, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in `exceptional and rare cases', in order to shorten the litigation, itself `impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.' While examining the issue of proportionality, court can also consider the circumstances under which the misconduct was committed. In a given case, the prevailing circumstances might have forced him to do so, though he had no intention to do so. (Vide Giriraj Sharma (supra)). The Court may further examine the effect. If order is set aside or substituted by some other minor penalty. 19. In State of U.P. v. Nand Kishore Shukla (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Court is not an appellate authority and, therefore, the Court will be loath to interfere with that part of the order. In the Government of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Ashok Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 2447 , the Court held that in case of accepting the illegal gratification and refraining from prosecution against the offender, the dismissal of service is warranted. Similarly, in the case of Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari, AIR 1996 SC 1249 . the Apex Court has held that once an employee is found guilty of embezzlement, the minimum punishment is dismissal and Court should not interfere in such cases. 20. Similarly, in the case of Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari, AIR 1996 SC 1249 . the Apex Court has held that once an employee is found guilty of embezzlement, the minimum punishment is dismissal and Court should not interfere in such cases. 20. In G. Ganayutham (supra), the Apex Court has considered the entire law on the subject and compared the Indian Law with English, Australian and Canadian Laws and held that in case the court comes to the conclusion that the punishment awarded is disproportionate or the Disciplinary Authority was irrational in imposing the punishment, the punishment cannot be quashed as even then the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration and it is only in very rare cases that the Court might-to shorten the litigation-think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the Competent Authority. In Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal (supra); and U.P.S.R.T. & ors. v. A.K. Parul, (1998) 9 SCC 416 , the Apex Court has taken the same view. 21. In Council of Civil Services Union v. Minister for Civil Service, 1984 (3) All E.R. 935 , it was held that anything disproportionate should be discarded. It was further observed that judicial review is permissible only on limited grounds, namely, illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety, and proportionality. The concept of irrationality has been explained as a decision which is so outrageous in its deviation of logic or accepted moral stand that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided would have arrived at. Procedural impropriety has been explained as failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who would be affected by the decision. The requirement of procedural propriety depends upon the subject matter of the decision, the executive functions of the decision-maker and the particular circumstances in which the decision came to be made. 22. Similar view has been reiterated in Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1999 SC 677 . In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that if the finding of fact is based on appreciation of evidence, the Writ Court should not normally interfere with those findings unless the findings are shown to be wholly perverse or legally untenable. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that if the finding of fact is based on appreciation of evidence, the Writ Court should not normally interfere with those findings unless the findings are shown to be wholly perverse or legally untenable. The adequacy, or inadequacy of evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the Court as the High Court cannot sit as appellate forum for the factual finding recorded during the disciplinary proceedings for the reason that it exercises a very limited power of judicial review and in exercise of such power, the High Court should not substitute its own conclusion with regard to the guilty or delinquency, for that of the departmental authority. The Court further observed as under : "Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or Departmental Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and imposed some other punishment or penalty." (Emphasis added). 23. Same view has been reiterated in Rajat Baran Roy & ors. v. State of West Bengal & ors., AIR 1999 SC 1661 ; Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (1999) 7 SCC 89 ; Union of India v. Himmat Singh Chahar, AIR 1999 SC 1980 ; Registered Society v. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 2979 ; High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 416 ; and Consumer Education & Research Society v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 599 . 24. Thus, so far as quantum of punishment is concerned, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bihari v. Municipal Board, Bahadurgarh, AIR 1996 SC 1249 , the minimum punishment for embezzlement, even for a petty amount of Rs. 1/-, is dismissal from service. 25. In view of the above, I find no merit in the petition and it is accordingly dismissed.Writ Petition dismissed. *******