JUDGMENT A.K. Mishra, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred by the defendant-appellant aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the two Courts below decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff for eviction on the ground under Section 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant-appellant on the allegations that the defendant was occupying the suit accommodation on rent at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month. The plaintiff required the suit accommodation for bonafide requirement of residence of her sons. She was not possessing any other accommodation within the limits of Municipal Council, Guna. She also required the suit accommodation for reconstruction which could not be done without vacating the same. The defendant was not paying the rent and rent was in arrears. The defendant has denied tenancy as well as ownership of the plaintiff. The defendant was in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 13,415/-. Hence ejectment was sought on the ground contemplated in Section 12 (1) (c) and (h) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 3. The defendant in his written statement took the plea that he was inducted as a tenant of Gurudayal Shrivastava, the vendor of the plaintiff. However, he was occupying the accommodation on rent at the rate of Rs. 150/-and not at the rate of Rs. 400/-. It was denied that the plaintiff has purchased the suit accommodation and tenancy was also denied. It was further pleaded that he did not receive any intimation from Gurudayal Shrivastava regarding the sale of the house. He had continued to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- to Gurudayal Shrivastava. In 1998 Gurudayal Shrivastava stopped accepting the rent, hence money order was sent, but money was not received. The plaintiff is residing in another house situated in front of the disputed house. He is not in arrears of rent. In reply Paragraph 11, it was alleged that notice dated 9-11-1989 was not sent. Although the whole para was denied specifically it was averred that on the basis of notice the plaintiff was preparing a ground through Gurudayal Shrivastava so that any how the house is got vacated. It was contended that no such notice was received by the defendant. 4. Although the whole para was denied specifically it was averred that on the basis of notice the plaintiff was preparing a ground through Gurudayal Shrivastava so that any how the house is got vacated. It was contended that no such notice was received by the defendant. 4. On trial, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the defendant has denied the title of the plaintiff without any justification. Tenancy and ownership were established. Notice was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant. Other evidence was also taken into consideration and the decree on the ground of denial of title under Section 12 (1) (c) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act was passed. 5. An appeal was taken by the defendant before the lower Appellate Court, which stands dismissed. Hence the present second appeal before this Court by the defendant. The second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law: "Whether challenge by tenant to derivative title of landlord decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act could be passed in view of the judgment of the Division Bench reported in the case of Mirkhan Nathne Khan Vs. Kutub Ali Tayab Ali ( 1979 MPLJ 155 )?" 6. Learned counsel Shri K.K. Lahoti with Shri D.D. Bansal, appearing for the appellant has urged that it is a case where the denial of title was for want of knowledge of the purchase of the house by the plaintiff from the original landlord. Tenancy has been admitted though rate of rent has been disputed. Thus, no decree under Section 12 (1) (c) for denial of derivative title could be passed. 7. Shri H.D. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent, has taken this Court through the evidence and various documents on record so as to suggest that the conduct of the defendant in denying the ownership as well as tenancy with the plaintiff is wholly untenable and unjustifiable. He pointed out para 15 of the deposition of the defendant himself in which the defendant has admitted that he had gone to pay the rent to the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant has admitted tenancy by his conduct. It is further submitted that notice Ex. P-7 was given. The receipt for sending the notice is Ex. P-8 and its acknowledgment is Ex. P-9. Thus, the defendant has admitted tenancy by his conduct. It is further submitted that notice Ex. P-7 was given. The receipt for sending the notice is Ex. P-8 and its acknowledgment is Ex. P-9. Gurudayal Shrivastava had sent the notice and he was not subjected to cross-examination by the defendant on this material aspect. Learned counsel submits that cross-examination is not merely a procedure, but is a matter of substance. Thus, the statement of Gurudayal Shrivastava has gone unchallenged with respect to service of notice. Hence the decree which has been passed by the Courts below based on denial of title i.e. on the ground under Section 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act is just and proper. It is his further submission that appreciation of evidence cannot be done in second appeal and the concurrent finding of fact is binding in second appeal, hence no interference is called for and there is nothing on the basis of which it can be said that the finding is wholly unreasonable, untenable or illegal in any manner. Hence the appeal be dismissed. 8. It is settled law that simple disclaimer of derivative title does not constitute such an injury to the landlord as to make it a ground under Section 12 (1) (c) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act as held in Mirkhan Nathnekhan vs. Kutub Ali Tayab Ali 1979 MPLJ 155 . The doctrine of estoppel does not apply where the landlord himself did not induct the tenant but claims a derivative title. A tenant already in possession is entitled to show that plaintiff does not possess the derivative title he claims but it is in some other person. For challenging such derivative title defendant-tenant does not come within the mischief of Section 12 (1) (c) M.P. Accommodation Control Act. In the said decision, the sale-deed was found to be sham and bogus on the basis of which suit was filed and it was laid down by this Court that in colourable or sham transaction there is no transfer but property is merely put in a false name. Hence, it is to be seen in the instant case whether the denial which has been made by the tenant is justifiable and is based on sufficient reasoning. Hence, it is to be seen in the instant case whether the denial which has been made by the tenant is justifiable and is based on sufficient reasoning. If it is a disclaimer of the title which the landlord had derived by a tenant knowing full well that property has been transferred by the landlord to the purchaser, and if he was intimated of the same, and in case he was attorned the tenancy by his conduct or otherwise, he cannot deny the title and such denial, if made, constitutes ground under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. 9. In the case of C. Chandramohan Vs. Sengottaiyan (2000) 1 SCC 451 , the Apex Court has laid down in the context of denial of title as under : "To constitute denial of title of the landlord, a tenant should renounce his character as tenant and set up title or right inconsistent with the relationship of landlord and tenant, either in himself or in a third person. In case of derivative title of the landlord, in the absence of a notice of transfer of title in favour of the landlord or attornment of tenancy, tenant's assertion that the landlord is a co-owner does not amount to denial of his title, unless the tenant has also renounced his relationship as a tenant. The principle of equity that a person cannot approbate and reprobate finds legislative recognition in Section 116 of the Evidence Act and Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is in the light of this principle, we have to construe clause (vii) of sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act. (T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960)." Notice is required to be given by the landlord of the transfer of the properly to the tenant. Thereafter, tenant's obligation arises to recognise the purchaser as the landlord. This is the law laid down by the Single Bench of this court in Santosh Kumar Vs. Biran, 1990 MPRCJ 39. This proposition is not disputed. 10. The evidence in the present case indicates that the plaintiff purchases the house by registered sale-deed dated September 7, 1987. On September 27, 1989 a registered notice was sent which was served on the defendant on 7th October, 1989. Copy of registered notice is Ex. P-2, its postal receipt is Ex. P-3 and the acknowledgment is Ex. P-4. 10. The evidence in the present case indicates that the plaintiff purchases the house by registered sale-deed dated September 7, 1987. On September 27, 1989 a registered notice was sent which was served on the defendant on 7th October, 1989. Copy of registered notice is Ex. P-2, its postal receipt is Ex. P-3 and the acknowledgment is Ex. P-4. A reply to the notice was sent by the defendant on October 11, 1989 which is Ex. P-5 equal to Ex. D-9 on record. After the reply/notice was sent denying the purchase and showing payment of rent to Gurudayal Shrivastava as contained in Ex. P-5, by the tenant-appellant, Gurudayal Shrivastava had sent another registered notice (Ex. P-7). The original receipt of sending it on 9-11-1989 bearing postal seal is on record as Ex. P-8 and the acknowledgment of the notice signed by the defendant is on record as Ex. P-9. The said document bears the date of receipt as 18-11-1989. The suit was filed by the plaintiff on 22-4-1991 after serving notice on the defendant by Gurudayal with respect to sale by him. Gurudayal (P.W. 2) has categorically stated in his deposition that he had sent notice Ex. P-7 the postal receipt of which is Ex. P-8 and acknowledgment Ex. P-9. He has not been subjected to cross- examination on the said aspect. His statement has thus gone unchallenged and has to be accepted. There was no suggestion by the defendant in cross-examination of the witness that the said documents were manufactured by him. Cross-examination is not a matter of procedure but a matter of substance. True that the defendant has denied to have received the notice but that by itself is not sufficient to discard the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff. In the written statement filed in November, 1991 there is categorical statement of the defendant denying ownership of the plaintiff as well as landlord-tenant relationship between them. Simple denial of receipt of Ex. P-7 notice by the defendant does not inspire confidence and both the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that it is a case of denial without any justifiable reason after having received the intimation of transfer. 11. Simple denial of receipt of Ex. P-7 notice by the defendant does not inspire confidence and both the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that it is a case of denial without any justifiable reason after having received the intimation of transfer. 11. Moreover, a close scrutiny of the deposition of the defendant himself in paras 14 and 15 would show that he has clearly stated that after receipt of the notice he had gone to pay the rent to Kamlabai, the plaintiff-respondent. Thus, he himself accepted the tenancy i.e. landlord-tenant relationship with the plaintiff as he accepted that he went to pay rent to the plaintiff but she was demanding rent at the rate of Rs. 400/- and did not accept rent at the rate of Rs. 150/-. Thus, from the conduct of the defendant and the evidence afforded by him it is to be inferred that he was accepted the plaintiff to be the landlord and he was having full knowledge of transfer and he had received the notice Ex. P-7. Therefore, there was no justification to deny the title of the plaintiff after accepting her as landlord. 12. The finding arrived at by the two Courts below are findings of fact and I find no infirmity in the said findings. 13. Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellant has made submission that it is difficult to get another accommodation immediately and hence one year's time be granted to the tenant- appellant to vacate the suit accommodation. To this submission, the counsel for the respondent-plaintiff agrees that in case the appellant submits and undertaking within one month from today that he would handover peaceful possession to the plaintiff on or before the expiry of one year from the date of this order, and that he shall deposit all arrears of rent up-to-date within one month and shall also deposit future rent regularly. 14. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. 14. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. However, the appellant is granted one year's time to vacate the suit accommodation on the following conditions: (i) The appellant shall furnish an undertaking within one month from today that he shall handover vacant and peaceful possession of the accommodation to the plaintiff on or before the expiry of one year from the date of this judgment; and (ii) He shall deposit the entire arrears of rent up-to-date within one month and shall continue to deposit future rent regularly on month to month basis. Any default shall result in eviction of the appellant at once without reference to Court and the decree shall become executable at once. The appellant shall bear the costs of the respondent apart from his own as incurred in the present appeal. 15. Second Appeal dismissed.