JUDGMENT A.K. Mishra, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant/appellant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the two Courts below. Suit was filed by the plaintiff for declaration of title, permanent injunction and restoration of possession which was decreed by the Civil Judge by judgment and decree dated 11-8-94. Plaintiff alleged that he obtained possession of the said property under the sale-deed. After putting the lock he went to Raghavgarh. In two rooms two other tenants were already residing at the time of Amaribai. Taking the advantage of the plaintiffs absence, lock was broken by the defendant and he illegally committed trespass. Police report of the same was also lodged. On refusal to vacate the accommodation suit had been filed. The defendant in his written statement took the plea that plaintiff is not the owner nor was placed in possession. Amaribai never placed him in possession of the suit accommodation. Amaribai was the sister of the plaintiff. If any sale-deed has been obtained by the plaintiff from his sister, the defendant was not aware but he had heard about the sale-deed. However, the same is illegal and fraudulent. Tenants' possession was admitted. Defendant used to reside with Amaribai and was thus in possession of the house. He has not dispossessed and committed the trespass. Amaribai was the brother's wife of the defendant. Plaintiff usurped the valuable property of Amaribai. The Courts below have concurrently found that property was exclusively owned by Amaribai and was not the joint property of the defendant and Amaribai. This finding has been arrived at by the Courts below on the strength of the sale-deed. The house in question was purchased by the husband of Amaribai namely Rambharosa and also the minor son Mahesh. Claim of Ghanshyam was not mentioned as the purchaser. There is no pleading taken in the written statement that the property was joint family property of the defendant and Amaribai. The Courts below came to the conclusion that Amaribai was having the right to transfer the house as she inherited the properly from her husband Rambharosa and the sale-deed has been found to be duly executed on the strength of deposition of Brijkishore who drafted the sale-deed, and Sitaram P.W. 5. 2. The Courts below came to the conclusion that Amaribai was having the right to transfer the house as she inherited the properly from her husband Rambharosa and the sale-deed has been found to be duly executed on the strength of deposition of Brijkishore who drafted the sale-deed, and Sitaram P.W. 5. 2. The second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:-- "(i) Whether the plaintiff has proved his title and has proved the sale-deed in his favour according to law ? (ii) Whether in the absence of original sale-deed the Court below could decree the suit on the basis of title when no permission to lead secondary evidence was granted by the Trial Court ? (iii) Whether in the absence of pleading and proof in respect of title of vendor or plaintiff the plaintiff's suit for possession is liable to be decreed ? 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that one additional substantial question of law has to be considered by this Court to the effect that "whether in view of the fact that defendant was continuing in possession in the absence of the proof of dispossession the plaintiff could maintain the suit for restoration of possession. 4. As to the substantial questions of law Nos. 1 and 2, they are with respect to the proof of title and the proof of sale-deed and it is suffice to observed that execution of the sale-deed has been admitted in the written statement. On the contrary it has been mentioned that defendant had heard about the execution of the sale-deed. Thus production of the original sale-deed was not necessary. There is overwhelming evidence so as to prove the execution of the sale-deed and passing of consideration which has been concurrently found by the two Courts below. Thus the substantial questions of law 1 and 2 do not arise in the present appeal in view of the pleadings of the parties and no benefit arises to the appellant for want production of the original sale-deed. 5. Substantial question of law No. 3 which has been framed is with respect to the title of the vendor of the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in the matter of Sabrani Vs. 5. Substantial question of law No. 3 which has been framed is with respect to the title of the vendor of the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in the matter of Sabrani Vs. Muniya, 1967 R.N. 507, in which it has been held that the execution of the sale-deed alone would not be enough to prove the title of the plaintiff unless the title of the vendor is satisfactorily established. 6. The Court below in its judgment and decree gave a categorical finding that house in question was purchased by husband of Amaribai and minor son of Amaribai namely Mahesh, Ghanshyam is not the real brother of Rambharosa. Their fathers are different and Amaribai was the exclusive owner of the property in question being the widow of Rambharosa. Learned counsel further submitted that Mahesh, son of Amaribai has been accepted to be dead merely on the basis of statement of the counsel but that does not advance the cause of the defendant in any way, whether the Mahesh is dead or alive. Transaction is voidable at the instance of Mahesh-defendant can not be proxy for the son of deceased Amaribai. 7. Learned counsel has submitted that it is a case where it has not been established that the plaintiff was put in possession of the house under the sale-deed. Thus he can not sue for dispossession. He relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shankarsingh Vs. Ramnath 1978 MPLJ 87. The facts of the said case disclose that in the said case plaintiff could not establish the title of his vendor and also failed to establish the fact that he was in possession of the suit house and that the defendants have dispossessed him otherwise than in due course of law, it was not possible to decree the claim of the plaintiff. Since the title was not satisfactorily established, nor the factum of possession had been established, this Court expressed inability to grant the relief either on the basis of title or prior possession. 8. The sale-deed was executed on 20-4-87 and the suit for possession has been filed on 11-1-88. Plaintiff is clearly entitled to the decree for possession. Since the title was not satisfactorily established, nor the factum of possession had been established, this Court expressed inability to grant the relief either on the basis of title or prior possession. 8. The sale-deed was executed on 20-4-87 and the suit for possession has been filed on 11-1-88. Plaintiff is clearly entitled to the decree for possession. Even if possession has not been actually handed-over under the sale deed, it is open for the plaintiff to sue for possession as the status of the defendant is merely that of trespasser. He is having no right, title or interest in the property in question. 9. Thus no substantial question of law arises for consideration of the present appeal. The appeal sans merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. 10. Second Appeal dismissed.