JUDGMENT A.M. Sapre, J. 1. By this petition preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner assails the legality and validity of two orders one dated March 24, 2000 (annexure P-3) and the other dated November 27, 1995 (annexure P-4), passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax. In order to appreciate the issue involved and urged, a few facts which lie in a narrow compass need mention. 2. The petitioner is a public charitable trust. The petitioner-trust has set up an institution called "Indian Institute of Head and Neck Oncology" which according to the petitioner is rendering yeoman service to the society. Under the scheme of the Income-tax Act, 1961, subject to certain conditions and on compliance of certain requirements of the Act, the income of the charitable trust is exempt from payment of income-tax under Section 12A read with Sections 11/12 ibid. 3. The petitioner claiming the benefit under Section 12A ibid made an application on March 24, 1994/March 30, 1994, to the Commissioner of Income-tax. An application seeking condonation of delay in filing the said application was also made on November 27, 1995. The Commissioner of Income-tax granted registration to the petitioner under Section 12A ibid with effect from April 1, 1993. It was, however, mentioned in the order granting registration that the application was filed late by three years, four months and sixteen days and that the reasons given in the condonation of delay application are not satisfactory. In other words, in the opinion of the Commissioner no good and sufficient ground was made out for condonation of delay and hence the application for condonation of delay was rejected. 4. On October 24, 1997, the petitioner made an application under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act seeking rectification and prayed that the certificate issued under Section 12A on November 27, 1995, need to be rectified/modified as according to the petitioner there was a mistake apparent from the record. According to the petitioner, since no reasons were recorded as to why the registration was not granted from the date of inception, i.e., November 14, 1989, and hence grant of registration with effect from April 1, 1993, amounts to a mistake requiring rectification as envisaged under Section 154 ibid. According to the petitioner, since no reasons were recorded as to why the registration was not granted from the date of inception, i.e., November 14, 1989, and hence grant of registration with effect from April 1, 1993, amounts to a mistake requiring rectification as envisaged under Section 154 ibid. It was also claimed that there were sufficient reasons for the delay in submitting the registration application and hence the delay ought to have been condoned thereby granting registration from the date of inception of the trust. 5. The Commissioner of Income-tax by order dated March 24, 2000 (annexure P-3), rejected the rectification application. This is what the learned Commissioner observed while rejecting the application : "I have heard learned counsel and gone through the facts of the case. There is no dispute over the fact that the learned Commissioner of Income-tax, Bhopal, passed the impugned order ex parte without giving the trust an opportunity of being heard about the reasons which compelled the assessee to file the application for registration under Section 12A late, and such order may not be sustainable in the eyes of law but the question is whether a succeeding Commissioner of Income-tax can sit over the judgment of his predecessor and review his order under the guise of making rectification under Section 154. In my opinion, an answer to the question is emphatically 'no'. The succeeding officer cannot revise or review his predecessor's order on the ground that there was some procedural mistake in not giving full opportunity to the assessee of being heard. In my opinion, therefore, this is not a case where the provisions of Section 154 are applicable as there is no mistake apparent from the records." 6. It is this order, which is mainly assailed by the petitioner in this petition. 7. Heard Shri G.M. Chaphekar with Shri P.B.S. Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Shri A.P. Patankar, learned counsel for the respondents. 8. Assailing the impugned order referred supra, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the learned Commissioner erred in rejecting the Section 154 application made by the petitioner. According to learned counsel, the reasoning on which the application was rejected are totally erroneous. It was his submission that merely because the order sought to be rectified was passed by some other Commissioner is no ground to entertain the application for rectification by another Commissioner. According to learned counsel, the reasoning on which the application was rejected are totally erroneous. It was his submission that merely because the order sought to be rectified was passed by some other Commissioner is no ground to entertain the application for rectification by another Commissioner. It was further submitted that the Commissioner had the jurisdiction to entertain the rectification application on the merits and that he should have decided the same holding that there exists a mistake apparent on the record. It was also urged in the alternative that in any event in view of the law laid down in Society of Divine Providence v. Union of India [1999] 235 ITR 339 (MP), the order passed by the Commissioner rejecting the condonation of delay application be set aside and the matter be remanded to the Commissioner for rehearing on the condonation of delay application after granting an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 9. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned orders and prayed that no interference is called for in any of the orders impugned and hence they be upheld. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record of the case, I am inclined to accept one of the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner which has force. In my opinion, the learned Commissioner was not right in his approach when he observed that he being a succeeding Commissioner cannot sit over the judgment of his predecessor and review his order under the guise of making rectification under Section 154 ibid. In my considered view, the application under Section 154 ibid was very much maintainable before the Commissioner and he was under a legal obligation to decide it on the merits one way or the other with a view to find out whether any case for rectification is made out or not as required under Section 154 ibid. Merely because the earlier order sought to be rectified was passed by some other Commissioner would be of no significance. In order to entertain the application under Section 154, it is not necessary that it has to be made to the same Commissioner who had earlier passed the main order, what is necessary is that application has to be made to an authority which passed an order as in this case the Commissioner. In order to entertain the application under Section 154, it is not necessary that it has to be made to the same Commissioner who had earlier passed the main order, what is necessary is that application has to be made to an authority which passed an order as in this case the Commissioner. It was not in dispute that the application for rectification was made to the Commissioner. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that even the earlier order passed by the Commissioner dated November 27,1995, rejecting the condonation of delay application should be set aside as it was passed behind the back of the petitioner. I do not agree to this submission, firstly it was never challenged after it was passed in 1995. Secondly, even when it was sought to be challenged, it was by way of application under Section 154 ibid before the Commissioner. It was only when the petitioner suffered the order of rejection of their Section 154 application, that the petitioner filed this petition and mainly questioned the correctness of the order passed on the rectification application. The petitioner now cannot be allowed to challenge the correctness of the Commissioner's order dated November 27, 1995, independently for the first time in writ after five years. In other words, the petitioner has to question the legality of the order dated November 27, 1995, only in rectification proceedings for which they have already made an application and suffered its rejection. I find substance in the observation of the learned Commissioner when he in detail observed as to what led the petitioner to wake up from slumber for making an application seeking rectification after the lapse of two years. 12. A perusal of the order dated March 24, 2000, indicates that the learned Commissioner did not render any specific finding on the merits as to whether any case is made out for rectification under Section 154 or in other words whether the grounds urged by the petitioner in their application under Section 154 ibid makes out any case for rectification so as to empower him to modify the earlier order dated November 27, 1995. 13. 13. In the absence of any specific finding rendered by the Commissioner under Section 154 of the Act, the matter has to be remitted to the learned Commissioner for rehearing of the application and decide the same on the merits keeping in view the aforesaid observation. 14. Accordingly, and in view of the aforesaid discussion the petition is partly allowed, the impugned order dated March 24, 2000 (annexure P-3), is set aside and the matter is sent back to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Indore, with a direction to decide the application made by the petitioner under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act afresh on the merits. No costs.