Manmohan Sarin ( 1 ) BY this common order, I would be disposing of the above batch of 14 writ petitions, wherein a common objection as to the maintainability of the writ petitions primarily for want of jurisdiction is raised. With the consent of Counsel for the parties it was agreed that Civil Writ Petitions 1950 and 4221 of 1999 be treated as lead petitions. Liberty was given to the parties who wished to file independent replies in the petitions to do so and complete the pleadings. ( 2 ) MR. S. K. Dholakia, Senior Advocate and Mr. Rajiv Nayyar, Senior Advocate have addressed the Court on behalf of the petitioners in Civil Writ Petitions l950 and 4221 of 1999 respectively; Mr. Anil Grover has argued on behalf of respondents 1 to 3, i. e. State of Haryana and Haryana Urban Development Authority; and Mr. S. K. Taneja, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rajesh Gupta, have argued on behalf of respondent No. 4, M/s. Durga Builders. ( 3 ) PETITIONER in Civil Writ Petition No. l950 of l999 is an Association,viz. Okhla Enclave Plot Holders Association (Regd. ). Members of the petitioner Association are stated to have entered into agreements with respondent No. 4 for purchase of the free-hold plots at the Okhla Enclave, near Delhi Border, in Haryana. ( 4 ) PETITIONERS case, in brief, is that respondent No. 4 had booked thousands of plots without obtaining the requisite licences required for development of land under Section 7 of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Area Act, 1975. Respondent No. 4 had entered into agreements with the plot buyers after receiving their applications and received monies towards price. Petitioners claim that respondent No. 4 induced the purchasers to invest their hard earned, money in the said project, without disclosing to the petitioners and others that while specific plots were being booked, approval for development and setting up the colony itself had not been obtained. Petitioners further claim that gross violations by respondent No.-4 led the Haryana Urban Development Authority to take out advertisements /notices in the newspapers, stating that respondent No. 4 had been acting illegally and without obtaining the requisite licences. ( 5 ) PETITIONERS also claim that respondent No. 4 had claimed that Director, Town and Country Planning, Haryana, had provisionally fixed the development charges at Rs. 329. 00 per sq. ( 5 ) PETITIONERS also claim that respondent No. 4 had claimed that Director, Town and Country Planning, Haryana, had provisionally fixed the development charges at Rs. 329. 00 per sq. yard, petitioners and other members were called upon to pay Rs. 50. 00 per sq. yard on or before 15th of February, 1992 and the balance amount of Rs. 279. 00 per sq. yard within two years. It is stated that respondent No. 4/08/1994 claimed that the Director, Town and Country Planning, had fixed - the final development charges for plots upto 161 sq. yards @ Rs. 878. 00 per sq. yard and for plot upto 263 sq. yards at Rs. 975. 00 per sq. yard. It was, however, not disclosed that these rates included land costs @ Rs. 275. 00 per sq. yard, internal and external development charges, etc. .- ( 6 ) PETITIONERS claim that upon complaints and representations being made to the Government of Haryana against the acts of respondent No. 4, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with purchasers, fixing the development charges at Rs. 550. 00 per sq. yard. As the respondent No. 4 had failed to deliver possession and had cheated a number of plot holders, the persons who booked plots, for sake of convenience of reference are being referred to as plot holders. Petitioners claim that the petitioner Association, representing different set of plot holders and some other Associations and groups of plot holders, filed a number of writ petitions, viz. 113/96,477/96, 792/96 and 876/96 in the Supreme Court. The Hon ble Supreme Court fixed the rate of development charges and other charges liable to be paid and also directed that possession be handed over. The Apex Court has given further directions regarding payment by each petitioner in the writ petitions/plot holders, to the Government of Haryana directly towards development charges. 113/96,477/96, 792/96 and 876/96 in the Supreme Court. The Hon ble Supreme Court fixed the rate of development charges and other charges liable to be paid and also directed that possession be handed over. The Apex Court has given further directions regarding payment by each petitioner in the writ petitions/plot holders, to the Government of Haryana directly towards development charges. ( 7 ) THE petitioners in the present writ petitions are claiming the following reliefs: " (A) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondents to register the allotted plots in the names of all the petitioners, give physical possession of the same to them free from all encumbrances, and give all necessary permissions including "no Objection Certificates" to enable construction of houses thereon; (b) issue an appropriate writ, order or directions directing the respondents to pay interest at a penal rate of 24% to the petitioners on the amount paid by them to the respondent No. 4 over the last 14 years; (c) direct respondents 1- to 3 to initiate appropriate enquiries and take penal actions against the officers responsible for permitting respondent No. 4 to defraud the petitioners; (d) direct the respondents to expedite and complete internal and external development work including providing civic amenities and facilities within a specified frame; (e) award costs; (f) pass such other or further order or direction as this Hon ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. " ( 8 ) COUNTER affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 1,2 and 3, wherein the State of Haryana, Haryana Urban Development Authority, and the Director, Town and Country Planning, have claimed that the petition is liable to be dismissed. It is claimed that there is no privity of contract between the petitioners and the said respondents. There is no failure in fulfilling their statutory obligations and they have complied with the directions given by the Supreme Court. It is also claimed that the petition is liable to be dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The said Authorities are located in Haryana, the land in question of located in Haryana and the nature of reliefs which are sought are against the Authorities and State of Haryana, who are located outside the jurisdiction of this Court. It may also be noted that some of the plot holders, viz. The said Authorities are located in Haryana, the land in question of located in Haryana and the nature of reliefs which are sought are against the Authorities and State of Haryana, who are located outside the jurisdiction of this Court. It may also be noted that some of the plot holders, viz. the Okhla Kalyan Plot Holders Allotment Forum had filed a civil writ petition in the Supreme Court bearing No. 49/2000, which was subsequently dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to make representations before the appropriate Authorities in Haryana. viz. respondents 1 to 3 and a direction being given to the said Authorities to take a decision thereon. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submit that parties or plot holders in the earlier petitions were different from the present one. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for respondent No. 4 has also objected to the maintainability of the writ petition. It is claimed that no part of the alleged cause of action had accrued in Delhi which would provide a ground for the petitions to be filed and entertained within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. ( 10 ) LEARNED Senior Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. S. K. Dholakia, submitted that after the amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if apart of cause of action arose within the j urisdiction of the concerned Court, the petition could be entertained. In the instant case, it is claimed that an integral part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi. According to him, the essential fact to be proved by the petitioner to succeed in the writ petitions is the factum of payment to respondent No. 4. He submits that in the instant case, payments have been made in Delhi and the contract had been entered into with respondent No. 4 in Delhi. Therefore, it is contended that these form an integral part of cause of action. Even the proposal for purchase of land was made and accepted in Delhi. Even the demand for payment of the enhanced amount was received by the petitioners at Delhi. In these circumstances, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that, as a matter of fact, if the petitioner was to invoke the jurisdiction of Punjab and Haryana High Court, the latter could well deny or refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. Even the demand for payment of the enhanced amount was received by the petitioners at Delhi. In these circumstances, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that, as a matter of fact, if the petitioner was to invoke the jurisdiction of Punjab and Haryana High Court, the latter could well deny or refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. Learned counsel, in support of his submissions, relied on the judgment in Sirajjuddin and Co. V. Stale of Orissa, AIR 1991 Cal 415. In the cited case, it was held that after the 5th Amendment, the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition even if a part of the cause of action arises within its territorial jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that respondents do not reside in or are not located within its jurisdiction. In the cited case, the impugned orders and other effective orders had been served on the party, within the territory of Calcutta and, as such, it was held that a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of the High Court of Calcutta. Mr. Dholakia submits that in the instant case the initial booking agreement and the very entitlement of the petitioners to seek the reliefs for which essential facts that will have to be proved, happened in Delhi. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners next relied on the judgment in Dr. P. S. Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1974 Mys 39, submitting that since the facts required to be proved to secure the reliefs sought in the writ petition, were the agreements executed and the payments made, the essential cause of action had arisen in Delhi and it would be immaterial that the seat of the Government or the Authority against whom relief is sought is not within the territory in which the cause of action had arisen. ( 12 ) MR. Rajiv Nayyar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in C. W. 4221 of 1999, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Dholakia, reiterated that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the seat of the Authority against whom relief is sought is not material, but the determinative test is the place where. the cause of action has arisen. He relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Dr. Dholakia, reiterated that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the seat of the Authority against whom relief is sought is not material, but the determinative test is the place where. the cause of action has arisen. He relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Dr. D. L. Suresh Babu v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, AIR 1983 Kar 43 , in support of his contention that if one essential fact required to be proved to secure the relief, arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the High Court would have the jurisdiction. ( 13 ) LEARNED Senior Counsel for respondent No. 4 submitted that the writ petitions were not maintainable. He submitted that the petitioners were defaulters whose amounts had been forfeited and they were wanting the same benefits, as given by the Supreme Court in the case of those petitioners, who had gone before the Supreme Court and were not defaulters. He submitted that the land was situated in Haryana; the land use, its development and urbanisation were all governed under the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975, which has to be implemented by respondents 1 to 3 who are located in Haryana. The implementation of the statutory obligations regard to the allotment, handing over of possession, registration of the sale deeds, issuance of "no- Objection Certificate" and permission for construction are all to be done in the State of Haryana by the said Authorities. The only act to be performed by respondent No. 4 may be the execution of the conveyance. Here again the right of the petitioner was based on assertion of having made the payments due, which was being disputed by respondents. This itself entailed going into disputed questions of fact, which could not be gone into in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The reliefs with regard to enquiry and penal actions being initiated against the officers of respondents 1 to 3 or directions for carrying on the internal and external development work are again to be given to the Authorities in Haryana. The said directions are to be monitored and implemented in Haryana. Moreover, he urged, that substantial reliefs which have been sought are against the Authorities who hare located in Haryana and this Court will not have any territorial jurisdiction. The said directions are to be monitored and implemented in Haryana. Moreover, he urged, that substantial reliefs which have been sought are against the Authorities who hare located in Haryana and this Court will not have any territorial jurisdiction. ( 14 ) I have considered the rival contentions of the parties, as noted above. The case of the petitioners, pithily stated, is that petitioner has to establish the factum of the payment and execution of agreement with respondent No. 4 before any relief could be granted. Hence, these facts are claimed to be an integral part of the cause of action, which has arisen in Delhi. Petitioner has relied on certain authorities to submit that this Court would also have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions even if part of cause of action has arisen in Delhi. I am not persuaded to accept this submission in the present case. The factum of the agreement being executed in Delhi or some payment being made in Delhi, in my view, is not an integral part of the substantial and material cause of action for reasons hereinafter noted. From the nature of reliefs sought, as noticed in paras 7 and 13 above, and keeping in mind the directions that have been given from time to time by the Apex Court as well as the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, it would be seen that the substantial reliefs that are sought are from respondents 1 to 3, viz. allotment of land, registration of deeds, no objection certificates for construction, directions for internal and external development, provision of basic amenities, directions for enquiry against the erring official of respondent Nos. 1 and 3 etc. These are the substantial reliefs which the petitioners are seeking in the exercise of writ jurisdiction for which cause of action has arisen and continues to be in State of Haryana. The others are pecuniary and incidental reliefs relating to claim of interest. . ( 15 ) LOOKING at it from another point of view, the submission of the petitioners is that with a view tosucceed they have to prove the factum of payments and the agreements with respondent No. 4. These should, therefore, be regarded as integral part of cause of action. These in the whole conspectus of the case are insignificant part of cause of action. These, as per the petitioners, are disputed. These should, therefore, be regarded as integral part of cause of action. These in the whole conspectus of the case are insignificant part of cause of action. These, as per the petitioners, are disputed. If indeed these are disputed questions, as contended by Counsel for the respondents and need to be proved by evidence in a trial to enable the petitioners 1:0 get the relief sought in the writ petition against respondent No. 4, they need not be gone into in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The same would require invocation of a remedy other than a writ petition in the Civil Forum. Therefore, looked at from any point of view, the writ petition would not be maintainable in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Reference may also be invited to the Division Bench judgment of mis Court in Sector Twenty One Owners Welfare Association v. Air force Naval Housing Board and Ors. , 65 (1997) DLT 81 (DB ). Paras 13 and 14 of the said judgment read as under: "13. The law as reflected by the abovesaid decisions is that the emphasis has shifted from the residence or location of the person or authority sought to be proceeded against to the situs of the accrual of cause of action wholly or in part. It is also clear that a trivial or insignificant part of the cause of action arising at a particular place would not be enough to confer writ jurisdiction; it is the cause of action mainly and substantially arising at a place which would be determinating factor of territorial jurisdiction. So also it shall have to be kept in view who are the real persons or authorities sought to be proceeded against or against whom the writ to be issued by the Court would run. Joining of proforma or ancillary parties and certainly not the joining of unnecessary parties, would be relevant for the purpose of Article 226 (1 ). 14. Reverting back to the case at hand, it is clear that the cause of action has wholly arisen in NOIDA within the State of U. P. The principal and substantial grievance of the petitioner-Association is against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The writ to be issued by the Court shall run against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 though incidentally, the respondent No. 1 may also be required to be bound by the writ. 2 and 3. The writ to be issued by the Court shall run against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 though incidentally, the respondent No. 1 may also be required to be bound by the writ. The reverse is not correct. The writ, if any, to be issued by the Court would not serve any purpose if issued against respondent No. 1 alone. In the matter of registration of the sale deed-cum-sub lease deed merely because a document can be registered at Delhi by virtue of Section 30 (2) of the Registration Act, territorial jurisdiction in the Courts at Delhi cannot be inferred. " Reference may also be usefully made to the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Indo Gulf Explosives Ltd. v. UPSIDC and Anr. , reported as 78 (1999) DLT ( 16 ) APPLYING the above principles to the facts of the present petitions, I am of the view, that based on the nature of reliefs sought in the writ petitions and the authorities from whom these are sought, the integral cause of action of sub-stantial and material part of cause of action cannot be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi. This is especially so in the conspectus of the nature of relief sought, the authorities which are to give the relief and the same being required to be given within the State of Haryana. Moreover, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has already disposed of a similar writ petition, directing the petitioners therein to approach the concerned Authorities with a representation. Additionally, the petitioners plea of the factum of payments and agreement having been executed in Delhi being essential facts to be proved for the reliefs to be granted and, thus, being integral part of cause of action, of necessity, invites objection that these are disputed facts, which cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, the writ petitions instituted in Delhi are dismissed as not maintainable.