ARUN MISHRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff assailing the judgment and decree passed by two Courts below. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF filed a suit for declaring the sale-deed dated 29-7-85 executed by the deceased Ladaitibai in favour of Aram Singh and Khemraj, as void. The sale-deed dated 29-7-85 related to the agricultural land comprised in Survey No. 1634 area 0. 40, and Survey No. 1652 area 2. 40 acres. Plaintiff alleged that the said lands were owned and possessed by one Buddhe and after his death, his widow Ladaitibai succeeded. She did not execute any such sale-deed. It was executed by putting some impostor before the Registrar of Registration. Ladaiti Bai died on 18-2-85 before the date of execution of sale-deed which was fraudulently got executed. The sale-deed is illegal and void. Plaintiff himself claimed to be a close relation of the deceased Ladaitibai. Hence, he filed the suit. ( 3 ) DEFENDANTS Nos. 1 and 2 in their written statement contested that the sale-deed was duly executed by Mahila Ladaitibai herself. She had received the full consideration, Ladaitibai had died in the year 1986 i. e. after executing the sale-deed and not in the year 1985 as suggested by the plaintiff. Plaintiff is not the legal heir of the deceased Ladaitibai and thus has no right to maintain the suit. ( 4 ) THE trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the sale-deed was duly executed by Ladaitibai when she was alive and she had received consideration during her life time. No imposter was put before the Registrar and plaintiff was unable to prove that Ladaitibai died on 18-2-85. ( 5 ) IN the first appeal, the first appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Hence this second appeal came to be filed before this Court, which was admitted on 20-4-98 on the following substantial questions of law :-"1. Whether, the death certificate (Ex. ( 5 ) IN the first appeal, the first appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Hence this second appeal came to be filed before this Court, which was admitted on 20-4-98 on the following substantial questions of law :-"1. Whether, the death certificate (Ex. P-1) issued by Police Station, Indergarh has been wrongly interpreted by the two Courts below being a public-document u/s. 74 of the Evidence Act and Section 35 of the Evidence Act?2 Whether, the burden of proof has been wrongly shifted upon the plaintiff/appellant by the two Courts below and the findings are vitiated on that ground?3 Whether, the judgment and decree passed by the two Courts below are against the weight of evidence and in this regard provisions are under Order 20, Rule 5 and Order 41, Rule 31, CPC? Its effect?" ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has submitted that the certificate Ex. P-1 issued by the Police Station with respect to the date of death is a public document and ought to have been taken into consideration without any further proof and without completing the formality to examine the person who issued it. It is further submitted that the attesting witness to the sale deed, viz. Pope was examined by the plaintiff as PW 2 who stated that Ladaitibai had executed the sale-deed. Another attesting witness has been examined by the defendants. The deposition of DW 2 Parsu is not reliable. He has also submitted that an application under Order 41, Rule 27 has been filed which is on the record. He has also placed on the record a certificate from the Registrar, Births and Deaths Registration and submitted that the same be taken on the record and the matter be remanded for fresh trial. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel Shri K. S. Shrivastava appearing for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 submitted that it is purely a finding of fact which has been arrived at by the two Courts below. It is further submitted that the certificate issued by the police station is not based on the entries in the register maintained by the Registrar of Births and Deaths Registration, but is based on the Panchnama and the said Panchnama has not been placed on the record. It is further submitted that the certificate issued by the police station is not based on the entries in the register maintained by the Registrar of Births and Deaths Registration, but is based on the Panchnama and the said Panchnama has not been placed on the record. What enquiry was made has also not been mentioned and no witness has been examined of the police station in support of the certificate. It is also not mentioned that the Panchnama was prepared in which connection and whether it was in discharge of official duty has also not been brought on the record. It is further submitted that there is no provision in the M. P. Police Regulations that such entries are maintained at the police station with respect to the document filed with the application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC which has been filed with the present second appeal. Registration was done 1-1-98 i. e. before the filing of the present appeal and after the decision of the first appellate Court. There is no sufficient reason for not to apply for death certificate at earlier point of time and the same cannot be taken on the record as from the evidence led in the case it is established that Ladaitibai was alive at the time of the execution of the sale-deed. It is further submitted that this is a concurrent finding of fact which calls for no interference in the second appeal under Section 100, CPC. ( 8 ) AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that this appeal has no merit and deserves to be dismissed. ( 9 ) THE substantial question of law No. 1 which has been framed by this Court is with respect to the Death Certificate (Ex. P-1) issued by the police station. Whether it is a public document? The first appellate Court has found that it was based on some Panchnama. That Panchnama has not been placed on the record. No police officer has been examined. What enquiries were made and in what connection the enquiry was made and whether this enquiry was in discharge of any official duty are the facts not been brought on the record. The first appellate Court has found that it was based on some Panchnama. That Panchnama has not been placed on the record. No police officer has been examined. What enquiries were made and in what connection the enquiry was made and whether this enquiry was in discharge of any official duty are the facts not been brought on the record. Section 74 of the Evidence Act defines public documents and lays down the following documents to be public documents :-" (1) documents forming the acts or records of the act.- (i) of the sovereign authority, (ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and (iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country; (2) public records kept in any State of private documents. " ( 10 ) IT was incumbent upon the plaintiff to lead evidence that the documents forming acts or records of the act of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive of any part of India and of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country. For this, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that what was the act of the public officers and whether it was done in the discharge of the duties enjoined upon them. No provisions of Police Regulation has been placed on record or pointed out to indicate that the police station is required to maintain such register to make an entry with respect to the death. ( 11 ) THE death of Ladaitibai is not shown as unnatural and hence there appears to be no reason or occasion to make an entry of death of Ladaiti Bai at police station. Thus, it cannot be said that it was pursuant to any discharge of official duty enjoined upon the public officers that such Panchnama has been prepared. It has also not been placed on the record as to in what connection the certificate was issued on the basis of Panchnama prepared. It also cannot be said in view of Section 74 (2) of the Evidence Act that the certificate placed on record is a public record kept in any State of private documents. This is not the case of the plaintiff-appellant. Thus, the grounds for discarding the document are based on sound reasonings and call for no interference. It also cannot be said in view of Section 74 (2) of the Evidence Act that the certificate placed on record is a public record kept in any State of private documents. This is not the case of the plaintiff-appellant. Thus, the grounds for discarding the document are based on sound reasonings and call for no interference. Whatever evidentiary value of the certificate may be, it ought to have been strengthened by examining some police official. Thus, the document is of a weak evidentiary value and has rightly been rejected by the Courts below. ( 12 ) SUBSTANTIAL question of law No. 2 pertains to burden of proof. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff has come to the Court with a plea of fraud. The plea of fraud was taken by the plaintiff. It was for him to establish that before the Registrar it was not Ladaitibai who executed the sale-deed. On the contrary, one of the attesting witnesses Pope who appears to have been won over by the plaintiff was examined to state before the Registrar there was one woman who had admitted the execution of the sale-deed. The deposition of Pope if read in its entirety, does not inspire confidence. He has admitted his signature on the portion over the sale-deed and also admitted that hehad accompanied at the time of the execution of the sale-deed. The execution of the sale-deed was in the discharge of the official acts. The witness Pope was present himself before the Registrar and was unable to state that any impostor was put before the Registrar in place of Ladaitibai. The plea which has been taken by the plaintiff is not established by the plaintiff even by collateral evidence. It is a case of oath against oath. The evidence of DW 2 Parsu establishes the execution of the sale-deed and there is no material on the record and there is no reason to disbelieve his version. Otherwise also, the appreciation of evidence as done by the Courts below, no perversity has been shown by the learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant in the findings arrived at by the two Courts below. In respect of the date of death of Ladaitibai, the burden of proof lies much on the plaintiff who has taken a plea of fraud. Both the parties have led evidence. In respect of the date of death of Ladaitibai, the burden of proof lies much on the plaintiff who has taken a plea of fraud. Both the parties have led evidence. On perusal of entire evidence, it is found that the findings arrived at by the Courts below which are purely findings of fact, cannot be interfered with in the second appeal u/s. 100, CPC. It is established from the evidence that no imposter was used in place of Ladaitibai for getting the sale-deed executed. 12a. With respect to the taking documents on record filed by appellant under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC, the certificate issued by the Registrar, Births and Deaths goes to show it has been granted after the decision of the first appeal. The registration was done on 1-1-98 when the first appeal was already decided by the first appellate Court. Had the registration been done earlier at the time of the death, the document could have been taken into consideration. Moreover, there is no sufficient reason shown as to why it has been filed at the stage of second appeal. When the police certificate was obtained, there was nothing to prevent the plaintiff to obtain such certificate before the decision of the first appellate Court from the Registrar of Births and Deaths on the basis of entry made in the register maintained by the Registrar, Births and Deaths but that was not done. Therefore, inference has to be drawn that there was no such entry in the register maintained by the Registrar, Births and Deaths. Hence, the application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC is rejected. ( 13 ) LEARNED counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex court for taking such documents on record. He has placed reliance on 1997 (7) SCC 297 : ( AIR 1997 SC 3243 ) Jaipur Development Authority v. Kailashwati Devi. The facts of the said case are different. It was not a case of taking such documents on record, and re-open the trial. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on a decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Dasi Ram v. Emperor, AIR 1947 Allahabad 429. The facts of the said case are different. It was not a case of taking such documents on record, and re-open the trial. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on a decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Dasi Ram v. Emperor, AIR 1947 Allahabad 429. In the said case, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has taken a view that A register of births maintained at the police station under para 322, Police Regulations, 1942 Edition, being a public document made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties, entries in this register are admissible in evidence under Section 35 and it is not necessary to prove who wrote those entries and what his source of information was. "no police Regulation has been placed on the record shown that such entry regarding the death of Ladaitibai or other persons was being made in the register maintained at the police station. Thus, it cannot be said that the document in question has to be treated at par as was the case before their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court. What is the crux of the matter, which can be culled out from the said decision that the panchnama prepared was in the discharge of any official duty. From the certificate - Ex. P-1 it is not clear that any register was being maintained at the police station and it also does not appear that such certificate was issued in the discharge of official duty. It has not been placed on the record that issuance of such certificate was in which official duty of a police officer and while making enquiry for such certificate, what official duty was being dishcarged by such police officer. Thus, the case relied on does not help the case of the plaintiff-appellant and is distinguishable. It cannot be said that the entry was made pursuant to an act done in the discharge of official duty. ( 15 ) I find no merit in the appeal. It is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs as incurred in the present appealappeal dismissed .