Mir-J: 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been directed against a judgment of the writ court passed in SWP No. 518/95 on May 19. 1997 whereunder the inquiry proceedings initiated and Order No. D-IX-30/92-CRC dated 18-04-1995, passed against the respondent, have been set aside. BRIEF FACTS: 2. Respondent worked as Assistant Commandant in C.R.P.F. In August, 1991, he was posted as Incharge Special Task Force (STF) in 98 Bn. of the organisation at Srinagar, on 19-08-1991, having been ambushed by militants, on Raj Bagh Link Road, Srinagar, he alongwith his three member raiding party, broke open the house of one Smt. Naeema. While conducting the search of the house, respondent is alleged to have removed/caused to be removed, gold ornaments, cash and other valuables from the house. These items were later on recovered from an unused cistern of a toilet in one of the Rambagh™s barraks. Thus on his failure to maintain utmost integrity and exercise proper command and control, disciplinary action against the respondent was initiated in terms of Rule 3(1) under heads (I), (II) and (III) of the CCS (conduct) Rules of 1964, thereinafter referred to as the Rules). The investigating officer found that the charges against the respondent were proved, thus Memorandum No.4.F.4/I/93-Estt(CRPF) dated 26.4.1993 was issued by R-2 whereunder intention of the Central Government to hold an enquiry with respect to articles of charge was conveyed copy of the Article of charge framed a list of documents by which the articles of charge were sought to be proved and list of witnesses was supplied, alongwith the AOC. Reply to the above memorandum was filed by the respondent on 30.5.1993. The Inquiry officer completed the enquiry and submitted his report on 21.05.1994. Thereafter the Directorate of C.R.P.F., vide communication dated 8th June, 1994 informed the respondent that enquiry report had been revived, and before the Disciplinary Authority would take appropriate decision on Inquiry officer™s report, he would be at liberty to make a representation. Alongwith this communication, besides other documents, a copy of the enquiry report was also made available. The central Government took a final decision vide order No. D.IX-3U/92-CRC dated 18.4.1995, whereunder the respondent was removed from service. The respondent approached the writ court. The writ court directed that the status of the respondent be maintained and finally passed the judgment impugned on 19.5.1997. Hence this appeal. 3. The central Government took a final decision vide order No. D.IX-3U/92-CRC dated 18.4.1995, whereunder the respondent was removed from service. The respondent approached the writ court. The writ court directed that the status of the respondent be maintained and finally passed the judgment impugned on 19.5.1997. Hence this appeal. 3. The main ground upon which the impugned judgment is challenged is that the writ court has erroneously held the present case to be a case of no evidence. Another ground, ancillary to the first ground is that the writ court has lent support to the finding from fenciful surmises, while in fact and law no support was available. 4. Mr. Bhardwaj, appearing for the respondent, has tried to impress upon the court that there was no evidence before the central Government, the writ court was justified in holding it to be a case of no evidence and that judicial intervention is called for wherever the decision of the disciplinary authority is perverse. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record 6. In the first instance we would like to reproduce the factual features of the case, such reproduction may, for their repetition, sound distasteful but in the light of the circumstances of the case and particularly the observations made by the writ court, we are constrained to do it. We have gone through the statement of the respondent, which was recorded by the Inquiry officer, we have also gone through the resumes of facts drawn by the Inquiry officer from the statement of the respondent, we have also gone through the preliminary and uncontested report of Sh. Daljit Singh, commandant 67 Bn CRPF. On appreciation of the statement of the respondent, we find the following facts having been admitted: - i That the respondent was the officer in command of the raiding team comprised of three persons, including himself. ii That the raiding team broke open the lock of the house of Mst. Naeema while they claim to have been chased by the militants. iii While the team broke open the house and forced their entry, the house was locked and no inmate was available. iv. The team leaves the house unlocked, without its proper handing over to the owners; v. That the respondent and his team of two members remained together while search was being conducted collectively. vi/ Ct. iii While the team broke open the house and forced their entry, the house was locked and no inmate was available. iv. The team leaves the house unlocked, without its proper handing over to the owners; v. That the respondent and his team of two members remained together while search was being conducted collectively. vi/ Ct. Raj Narian Singh had stolen jewelry, cash and other valuable from the house and placed the same in the Gypsy which the team members, including the respondent, boarded. The valuables having been kept by Ct. Raj Narian Singh under drivers seat; vii/ That the gold, jewelry, cash and other valuables were recovered at the instance of Ct. Raj Narian Singh from an unused cistern of a toilet in CRPF barraks; viii/ That Ct. Raj Narian Singh in this behalf has confessed his guilty; ix/ That the respondent did not evolve any defined or tactful strategy for conducting the search operation; The respondent has not led any defence. 7. What emerges out of the whole stand of the respondent is that he could not be punished for the wrongful act of Ct. Raj Narian Singh. According to learned counsel for the respondent there was the direct evidence to prove that theft was committed by the respondent. Mr. Bhardwaj, appearing for him has not been able to satisfy us that charge No. 2 was not proved. In the first instance we would like to place on record that neither the disciplinary authority nor the High Court, while dealing with the matter is trying a criminal case. The sheet-anchor of rule 3 of the rules is to find out as under;- A) Whether or not the requisite standards of integrity and devotior to duty were maintained by the respondent; B) Whether or not he failed to exercise proper command and control over his team. Rule 37 of the rules expects definite standards of integrity and devotion which, if not maintained, renders the conduct of the officer as one which is unbecoming of a Government servant. There seems to be an inherent discrepancy in the stand taken by the respondent with respect to the origin of the necessity to break open the lock of the house. There seems to be an inherent discrepancy in the stand taken by the respondent with respect to the origin of the necessity to break open the lock of the house. The respondent seems to have taken the plea that they had been ambushed by the militants and it was because of this ambush that they had broke open the lock of the house. It primarily seems that the lock was broken because the party wanted a refuge. This is not same thing to say that the party, after feeling suspicion that the militants were hold up in the house, wanted to raid the house because in the latter case a party of three people could hardly carry on a U-man™s adventure of fighting an unknown number of militants. This inherent discrepancy is to be viewed from the purview of the disorganised manner in which the raid� was conducted. 8. Viewed form any perspective, respondent™s defence seems to be a cock and bull story. 9. The writ court interestingly ignored all the above facts and started finding fault with the inquiry report and the other of dismissal. The judgment impugned, in our opinion, makes a confused reading. It reproduces various findings of the Supreme Court but does not show as to how those findings are applicable to the facts of the case. We quot some instances of perplexity and confusion as under:- 1- The argument raised before the writ court was that the order impugned was violative of principle of natural justice, because the three persons named in the list as witnesses were not produced. Non-production of these witnesses, especially Ct. Raj Narian Singh, violated the rules of natural justice. The writ court, after registering this point refers to AIR 1963 SC 779 and AIR 1976 SC 2372 and some other judgments. Some parts of said judgments have been reproduced and writ court proceeds to return the following finding qua this argument:- Having referred to the submission advanced by the learned counsel for both sides, it is necessary to appreciate them within the parameters of law laid down by the Apex Court from time to time in cantena of decisions some of which are referred to above. Giving anxious consideration to the matter, it may be safely held that it is a case of no evidence. Thus concluded, findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are patently perverse and unsupported by evidence. Giving anxious consideration to the matter, it may be safely held that it is a case of no evidence. Thus concluded, findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are patently perverse and unsupported by evidence. Error being apparent on the record, the grievance of petitioner has substance and his claim for quashing all the proceedings is liable to be accepted.� The judgment impugned does not take its reader into confidence as to how were the rules of natural justice violated. We better make a passing reference to this argument at this stage. No doubt the Inquiry Officer had suggested that it would be better if the three witnesses would be produced. This suggestion was considered by the competent authority which showed its inability to call these witnesses. Cogent reasons for doing so were afforded. Sh. Raj Narian Singh because of his termination had left the organisation and was not under its control. Sh. Tariq Ahmed Bhat and Sh. Khalid Ahmed Baba were two civilians, who also left the organisation and could not be located. These were the only three witnesses to whom reference was made by learned counsel for the respondent, before the writ court. Non-production of these witnesses does not in any way tell upon the finding of the competent authority because the same is hedged into admissions made by the respondent and the nature of the charges to be established. We find that witnesses Tariq Ahmed Bhat and Khalid Ahmed Baba were kept at a distance and were admittedly not allowed to escort the team when the house was broken in. Therefore, their non-production was immaterial. However, Raj Narian Singh could have been said to be a star witness but his testimony would at best determine culpability of the respondent for an offence of theft. His non-production does not absolve the respondent from his inability to demonstrate the requisite standard of integrity and devotion and command. On facts, as narrated in the beginning, derilictions are admitted. Law does not ask for proof if facts are admitted. Raj Narian was not a material witness for determining the allegation of not having demonstrated sufficient amount of integrity, devotion or command and control by the respondent. 10. While dealing with the point, reference was made to a case titled M/S Khushiram Beharilal and Co., reported in AIR 1976 SC 2372. Raj Narian was not a material witness for determining the allegation of not having demonstrated sufficient amount of integrity, devotion or command and control by the respondent. 10. While dealing with the point, reference was made to a case titled M/S Khushiram Beharilal and Co., reported in AIR 1976 SC 2372. This judgment deals with the limitations placed on the power of the court of embarking upon a judicial scrutiny, of course exempting the finding which is perverse. So is the case with other judgments, to which we will be referring in the later part of this judgment. Suffice it to say that the impugned judgment omits to return a finding on the point raised. 2. The writ court has come to a firm finding that Ct. Raj Narian Singh had committed theft and placed the bundle under driver™s seat in the gypsy in which the team travelled after concluding the raid. The factum of recovery of the packet/bundle is also established, yet the writ court absolves the respondent because it believed that no direct evidence was available against him. In this behalf the relevant portion of its finding reads as under:- From the material on record, it is beyond doubt that theft was committed by Ct. Raj Narayan Singh, the packet/bundle of the same was kept by him under driver™s seat in the Gypsy Vehicle in which they were travelling. Commission of theft was confessed by him and articles were recovered at his instance. He did not involve any other person in the commission of theft. The question when it was committed is hardly relevant, nor it has been proved during the inquiry. Inferences cannot be drawn in this connection as done by the Inquiry Officer, though he has recorded the finding that due to the nature of offence, there is very limited inconclusive direct evidence.� 11. With the above finding qua the allegation of theft by Raj Narian Singh, the writ court, in our opinion, has landed into error by holding that no charge against the respondent was proved. The boot, in our opinion, is on the other leg. If vicarious liability under criminal law is an enabling concept its application could not have been negative but we hasten to repeat that we are concerned with the standard of integrity, devotion and command required of an officer. The boot, in our opinion, is on the other leg. If vicarious liability under criminal law is an enabling concept its application could not have been negative but we hasten to repeat that we are concerned with the standard of integrity, devotion and command required of an officer. In our opinion the very conclusion drawn that the respondent could not be punished is prepostrous and perverse. 3. With respect to the second charge also the writ court has fallen into a serious error. Instead of holding as to whether or not the officer had failed to exercise sufficient command and control, the writ court holds that it was not possible for the respondent to follow the two constable and ensure that they do not commit theft. The writ court in this behalf has held that charge No. 2 was not established. Again the relevant part of the judgment reads as under:- Second question is whether charge-II is unsustainable like charge-I for lack of evidence. This question is answered in the affirmative, petitioner and his team were performing a very delicate, responsible and highly risky duty in militancy affected area against highly trained militants. Petitioner had conducted number of such exercises in the past without any complaint of theft or high-handedness against him. Preceding the incident, his team was ambushed by militants followed by exchange of fire. Petitioner was chasing the militants and in that process entered the house in question, since weapon fire was coming from that side. Question is whether he had alerted his men before undertaking the exercise. Answer to this question can be noticed from the reply of Balraj Singh to question asked for in cross-examination:- Question-4: Before the Commencement of the task, was their group briefed by Sh. V. S. Gill and whether some pre-cautionary measures were taken? Answer: Yes, we were regularly briefed about need to maintain strict discipline and high standard of personal conduct. At times, Shir Vs. V. S. Gill and whether some pre-cautionary measures were taken? Answer: Yes, we were regularly briefed about need to maintain strict discipline and high standard of personal conduct. At times, Shir Vs. Gill A/c used to carry out physical test/frisking of our body also.� Then the writ court itself tenders an explanation in having come to the conclusion by holding as under:- In the context of situation in which the petitioner was put at the time of incident, it is difficult to expect that he should have followed the two other members of his team at every step while search was being conducted in a two-storey house with number of rooms. It was also not possible that theft of valuables would be committed by any of his teammates either when all the three were in the house or some time later when he was searching for the injured militant. Subsequently, when the incident came to light, stolen articles were recovered at the instance of constable Raj Narian Singh, who confessed it without naming any other person party to the crime. In these circumstances, it is hardly possible to say that articles were removed/allowed to be removed with his connivance or that petitioner failed to exercise proper control over his subordinates.� 12. The writ court has missed the nub of charge-II and shelved it. 4. The writ court has, without assigning any reasons, as to how rules of natural justice were violated also held that this was a case of no evidence. The basic plank of the finding seems to be the omission of the appellants to produce Ct. Raj Narian Singh as a witness. We have observed that such omission could not be itself absolve the respondent from either of the charge. We on the basis of the admissions made and particularly on basis of strong circumstantial evidence emerging out of the admissions, find it to be a case of sufficient evidence. We, therefore, do not agree with the writ court when it holds that the finding of the disciplinary authority was perverse. The operative portion of the judgment reads as under: - As a matter of fact, there is no evidence suggesting the involvement of the petitioner under either of the two charges against him. Therefore, entire proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be set aside. Question of proportionality of sentence need not be, therefore, examined. The operative portion of the judgment reads as under: - As a matter of fact, there is no evidence suggesting the involvement of the petitioner under either of the two charges against him. Therefore, entire proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be set aside. Question of proportionality of sentence need not be, therefore, examined. No other point was urged. What emerge out of the aforesaid examination of the matter is that inquiry proceedings as well as order No. D. IX-30/92. CRC dated 18.04.1995 are therefore, set aside. The petitioner will join the service and respondents are directed to extend all consequential benefits of service to him.� 13. We have made speaking observations that the present case is neither a case of no evidence nor is the finding of the disciplinary authority perverse. Infact on the admissions of the respondent and those made by Ct. Raj Narian Singh, viewed with the circumstances that the stolen property was recovered from C.R.P.F. Barracks and that also on the disclosure statement of Raj Narian Singh, the evidence sprouting through the circumstances of the case is sufficient to establish bother the charges. In that view of the matter, we would like now to refer to the authoritative finding of the Supreme Court, returned in a case titled Union of India Vs. V.C. Chatturvedi, reported in 1995 (6 SCC) 749, Interestingly para 12 has been relied upon by the writ court. We would reproduce para 12 itself and try to see whether a judicial review in the facts of the case was possible: It reads as under:- 12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority en-trusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority en-trusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein apply to disciplinary proceedings. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion received support therefrom the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or whether the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.� 14. A bird™s eye view of the above para shows that no judicial review in the facts of the case is possible because on facts the finding of the disciplinary authority is the last word. We would hasten to add para 13 wherein the ambit of powers of judicial review of the court has been withhold down on either appreciation of evidence or adequacy of the punishment. Same reads as under: - 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal.� In Chattervedi™s case, Hansaria J, concurring with the view of the other two Judges held as under: - 25.... In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal.� In Chattervedi™s case, Hansaria J, concurring with the view of the other two Judges held as under: - 25.... I would, therefore, think that but for the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no inherent reason to disallow application of judicial mind to the question of proportionality of punishment/penalty. But then, while seized with this question as a writ court interference is permissible only when the punishment/penalty is shockingly disproportionate.� 15. The powers of the writ court in terms of Art. 226 are confined within limits. It is not a court of appeal to substitute its own judgment for that of the authority. The disciplinary authority is cloathed with all powers to give its decision in cases of misconduct. However, where a jurisdictional flaw or a procedural error is committed or there some substantive law is violated, the writ court can interfere, but it cannot interfere in all cases where no such error apparent is located. In Bhim Singh™s case reported in AIR 1977 SC 388 the Apex Court held as under- 2.... It is true that the High Court does not set as a court of appeal to substitute its own judgment for that of the authorities which are empowered to give their decisions in such cases. Apart from jurisdictional errors, the High Court may correct errors apparent on the face of the record.� 16. Their lordships of the Supreme Court in a case titled S.L. Hegde Vs. M.B. Tirumale, reported in AIR I960 SC 137 laid down a simple test for finding out whether an error was apparent. Their lordships observed that the error should be one which does not take prolonged argument to bring it into surface because the proposition said to have been flouted are well established. Summing up, we hold as under: - i) Wherever allegations of misconduct are levelled such allegations are not required to be established on the parameters of criminal law. but those of service law. Under service law it is the Administration who knows what befits the standard of administrative requirements. Summing up, we hold as under: - i) Wherever allegations of misconduct are levelled such allegations are not required to be established on the parameters of criminal law. but those of service law. Under service law it is the Administration who knows what befits the standard of administrative requirements. If the desired standard of integrity and devotion is required, if an amount of control and command is expected, what are the requirements of establishing those standard, this is best known to the Government itself. Courts cannot determine those standards. Therefore, the courts, in the ordinary course, should not replace the finding of the disciplinary authority. It can, of course, intervene only when any defect of jurisdiction exists or when any law has been violated. It can also intervence where there is absolutely no evidence and the finding of the disciplinary authority is perverse, ii) For making a finding perverse, there should absolutely be no evidence. Where admissions are made and circumstantial evidence is available, it cannot be said to be a case of no evidence. Under section 58 of the Evidence Act, facts admitted need not proof. In addition to this, circumstantial evidence is as good an evidence as that led by eye witnesses. iii) In a case relating to Army or paramilitary forces, exercise of control and command assumes greater importance. These are defence forces and are meant to demonstrate an exemplary standard of conduct. An officer, who is heading a small team of two officials, while conducting an operation cannot plead alibi when the factum of theft by one of the components of the team conclusively stood settled. iv) What is the commensurating punishment again is a matter, which must be left to administrative wisdom of the Government. If courts tinker with this absolute power, then a strange half-backed charlietism will have to replace professional expartise. 17. With the above observation, with regard to facts and law involved, we are of the firm opinion that in this case the findings of the disciplinary authority are neither perverse nor violative of rules of natural justice. We, find them to be quite in accordance with law and validly sustainable on the basis of the evidence available. We find that the judgment of the Writ Court bases on surmises and conjectures. Thus we reverse and set aside the same. The appeal is allowed and the writ petition dismissed. No costs.