JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.:---This revision application arises from judgment and order dated 21st November, 1998 passed in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 62/98 by the Additional District Judge, Panaji. By the impugned judgment, the lower Appellate Court has allowed the appeal filed by the respondent herein against the order dated 29th January, 1998 passed in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 191/96/B in Regular Civil Suit No. 103/96/B by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ponda. While allowing the appeal, the lower Appellate Court has set aside the said order of the trial Court whereby the trial Court had granted the injunction in favour of the petitioner restraining the respondent from carrying out any construction in the suit property or from interfering whatsoever in the suit property. The lower Appellate Court has also dismissed the application for injunction filed by the petitioners in the trial Court. 2. The case of the petitioners is that they are the co-owners in possession and enjoyment of the property bearing Survey No. 103/O which is mainly a coconut garden consisting of fruit bearing trees and situated at Nagzar, Ponda. It is their case that the coconuts and other fruits from the fruit bearing trees are being plucked by the petitioners through the pluckers/labourers and agricultural operations are also being carried out with the help of labourers. The respondent is a 'torl' residing at Nagzar and rendering the services of watch and ward in relation to the suit property and on that count the petitioners pay to the respondent 8% of the coconut yield plucked at each plucking. It is the contention of the petitioners that the services rendered by the respondent are purely personal in nature and do not create any right in the suit property. However, the defendant filed tenancy proceedings laying claim of tenancy in the year 1983 and thereafter in January, 1994 constructed a shed of laterite stones occupying some area of the suit property and the petitioners thereupon lodged complaint with the Panchayat regarding the said construction and also represented to the Director of Panchayat and B.D.O., Ponda for necessary action in relation to the said construction. On account of inaction on the part of the authorities, the respondent was further encouraged to dump construction materials in the suit property on or about 7th December, 1996 and as such the petitioners apprehending interference in the suit property filed the suit for injunction and also prayed for interim relief. 3. It is the case of the respondent that he is the lawful tenant in possession of the petitioners in respect of the suit property and the tenancy case filed by him in that regard is pending before the competent authority. The suit property was earlier managed and looked after by one Anant Manguesh Sinai Kaissare and he used to collect the rents on behalf of the plaintiffs and it was only from 1980 onwards that the rents were collected by the petitioners and their family members. The suit property is not a merely coconut grove but also a cashew garden in which substantial plantation has been done by the respondent and pluckings are also being done by the respondent and at every such plucking a part of yield is taken by the petitioners as their share for which receipts were issued by the petitioners in note book kept by the respondent with the signatures of the petitioners and the remaining yield was taken by the respondent and in that manner the rents were settled which used to differ from time to time as per the yield of coconuts. The petitioners stopped bringing their pluckers since 1993 and then onwards it was exclusively done by the respondents. After recording the share of yield in favour of the petitioners in the note-book, the said yield used to be entrusted with the respondent who used to sell the same to the Bagaytdar Society and monies collected were distributed by the petitioners in two equal shares to the petitioners' family. According to the respondents, receipts have been issued by the petitioners towards the coconuts and cashews from 1981 onwards. The respondent has paid rents upto the year 1992-93. It is his further case that the structure in the suit property is in existence for the last more than fifty years which was originally a thatched structure but since 1978, it was replaced with laterite stone structure and there is no other shed besides the said structure in the suit property. It is his further case that the structure in the suit property is in existence for the last more than fifty years which was originally a thatched structure but since 1978, it was replaced with laterite stone structure and there is no other shed besides the said structure in the suit property. It is also his case that the respondent is not having any other property on tenancy basis either from the petitioners or even from any third party. It is his further case that since in the year 1981 it was noticed by the respondent that the shed was not entered in the Records of Right of the suit property and necessary application to the Mamlatdar for necessary entry in that regard in the survey records had been filed by the respondents. 4. It is the contention of the petitioners that the impugned order has been passed in total disregard to the law laid down by the Apex Court in (Wander Limited and another v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd.)1, reported in 1990(Supp.) S.C.C. 727. The lower Appellate Court has interfered with the discretionary order of the trial Court in improper exercise of its jurisdiction resulting in miscarriage of justice. On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondent that the view taken by the trial Court was not a possible view on the basis of materials on record and, therefore, in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in Wander Limited and another v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. case as well as in (Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd.)2, reported in 1999(7) Supreme 240 the interference by the lower Appellate Court was justified in the matter. 5. Secondly, it is contended that the lower Appellate Court has totally ignored the failure on the part of the respondent to establish link between the documentary materials placed on record and the suit property and thereby the lower Appellate Court has acted with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction, while discarding the presumption arising in favour of the petitioner from the entries in the record of rights in respect of the suit property and has illegally refused the relief of injunction to the petitioner. Failure to give due credence to the certificate of record of rights in favour of the petitioner in the face of vague plea of tenancy and insufficient materials to support such plea while denying the equitable relief to the petitioner is clearly in illegal exercise of its jurisdiction by the lower Appellate Court. On the other hand, it is contended that the voluminous documentary evidence in the form of various receipts and the pendency of tenancy case sufficiently rebutted the presumption arising from the entries in the record of rights and, therefore, the lower Appellate Court could not be stated to have acted illegally in attaching no value to the entries in the record of rights. In the absence of disclosure of any lease or any interest of the respondent in any property other than the suit property, there was no occasion to infer that the receipts relate to some other property and, therefore, such inference by the trial Court was clearly in breach of procedure and unwarranted and, therefore, no fault can be found with the order of the lower Appellate Court setting aside the order of the trial Court. 6. Thirdly, it is argued on behalf of the petitioners that in the absence of possession being shown to be related to some better title than one established by the petitioner to the suit property, interference in the order granting protection to the possession of the suit property with the petitioner by the trial Court is clearly in breach of procedure and warrants interference in the revisional jurisdiction by this Court. On the other hand, it is argued on behalf of the respondent that there being no material placed on record to establish the actual possession of the suit property with the petitioner and the case of the petitioner being that the possession was through pluckers and there being no affidavit of any plucker filed by the petitioner, it was evident that the petitioner had failed to establish the possession of the suit property with them as against the same, the respondent had filed documentary evidence as well as affidavit of the plucker in support of his case and the lower Appellate Court having correctly analysed the materials on record, no jurisdictional error has been committed by the lower Appellate Court for interference of this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. 7. 7. Alternatively, it is submitted by the respondent that the petitioner has clearly admitted that the status of the respondent is that of a caretaker and the same has not been terminated by the petitioner. 8. Perusal of impugned judgment of the lower Appellate Court discloses that it considered it necessary to interfere in the judgment of the trial Court on the ground that the trial Court erred in accepting the petitioners case that the respondent is a caretaker, that the trial Court did not properly construe the materials on record while passing its order and that the trial Court did not correctly exercise its discretion in passing the impugned order. 9. On the aspect of status of the respondent as the caretaker of the suit property, the trial Court had referred to the entry in favour of the petitioners in the occupant's column in the Records of Right in respect of the suit property and the entry of the name of the respondent appearing in other rights column as the caretaker and, therefore, the presumption arising under section 105 of the Land Revenue Code in relation to such entries. The trial Court has further considered that the documentary evidence produced by the respondent in the form of receipts did not disclose the status of tenancy of the respondent in relation to the suit property. The contention of the respondent regarding collection of rent by Anant was disbelieved for want of affidavit by Anant Kaissare. Referring to the case of the respondent himself, it was observed by the trial Court that the petitioners used to bring two pluckers and one plucker was engaged by the respondent and after plucking a portion of the yield of coconuts was set aside by the petitioners as his share which was counted out of full lot and the same were sold by the respondent and the monies received out of sale thereof were distributed in two equal shares by the petitioners family; however all these averments do not support the plea of tenancy as the same do not establish the necessary ingredients of the tenancy sought to be claimed by respondent in relation to the suit property. The trial Court has also observed that the respondent had not disclosed as to since when the tenancy has commenced and what was the amount of rent fixed and as to whether the same was agreed to be paid in cash or kind. Referring to the documentary evidence in the form of receipts, the trial Court had observed that the receipts are not in consonance with the case pleaded by the respondent inasmuch as the receipts do not disclose the survey number of the property in respect of which the same are stated to have been issued, besides one of the receipts, which bears no date, discloses that in 1990 out of the total 900 coconuts plucked, 450 each were distributed to Smt. Lilabai and Surya, the owners, and if the said position is to be accepted to be true and correct, then the same is contrary to the plea of tenancy sought to be raised by the respondent. The trial Court has also observed that there is absolutely no disclosure as to what was the rent paid by the respondent. There is also no disclosure of the rent towards the cashew produce from the property. As regards some of the receipts, it has been observed by the trial Court that the same disclose receipts of paddy and cashew. However, the respondent has nowhere stated that any part of the suit property is cultivated as a paddy field nor it is the case of the petitioners that the suit property is comprising of any paddy field. According to the trial Court, the said documentary evidence rather than assisting the case of the respondent regarding the claim of tenancy to the suit property, disproves the same inasmuch as there is a paddy field adjoining the suit property and there is every reason to believe that those receipts relate to the said paddy field. As regards the certificate of Zonal Agricultural Officer and the other receipt, considering the fact that the same refers to a property Baraga at Nagar, Ponda and the suit property being known as 'Oideamolly', it has been held by the trial Court that the said documents do not relate to the suit property. As regards the certificate of Zonal Agricultural Officer and the other receipt, considering the fact that the same refers to a property Baraga at Nagar, Ponda and the suit property being known as 'Oideamolly', it has been held by the trial Court that the said documents do not relate to the suit property. Considering all these materials the plea of tenancy sought to be raised by the respondent and on the other hand the petitioners claim of the ownership of the suit property being not in dispute and Records of Right clearly establishing their actual possession of the suit property with them, it has also been observed that mere pendency of tenancy case do not confer any right in the suit property in favour of the respondent. 10. As rightly submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioners considering that lower Appellate Court basically sought to interfere with the discretionary order of the trial Court on the ground that the trial Court erred in accepting the petitioners case that the respondent is the caretaker, it would be necessary to ascertain whether the interference by the lower Appellate Court in the discretionary order of the trial Court is justifiable, bearing in mind the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Wander Limited and another v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. (supra). If the view taken by the trial Court was one of the possible views in the facts and circumstances of the case and if there was no arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction and the findings were borne out from the records, then the interference by the lower Appellate Court in the order of the trial Court cannot be said to be justifiable. Bearing in mind the parameters of interference by the Appellate Court in a discretionary order of the trial Court, enumerated by the Apex Court in Wander's case, it cannot be disputed that while dealing with an appeal against an order or temporary injunction, the Appellate Court has necessarily to ascertain first whether the discretion exercised by the trial Court in granting or refusing the injunction was reasonable and was judiciously exercised and then to analyse whether the view taken by the trial Court could be one of the reasonable possible views in the matter and whether is born out from the facts and circumstances placed on record. Indeed, the Apex Court in Wander's case has clearly observed thus :--- "An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material." It has been further observed by the Apex Court that :--- "If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion." 11. Even in the recent judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondent i.e. Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (supra) while laying down the consideration which ought to weigh with the Court hearing an application for grant of injunction, it has been observed that amongst various other points, the Court ought not to ignore the factum of strength of one party's case being stronger than the others, while dealing with such matters of temporary injunction. 12. It is needless to say that an order for grant or refusal of injunction is always in discretion of the Court. Undoubtedly, the discretion has to be exercised judiciously and only on satisfaction of the Court that the restraint on the respondent is necessary to avoid irreparable injury to the applicant during the pendency of the suit. The Apex Court in (Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others)3, reported in J.T. 1993(3) S.C. 238 has clearly held that :--- "A party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of course. Grant of injunction is within the discretion of the Court and such discretion is to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff only if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that unless a defendant is restrained by an order of injunction, an irreparable loss or damage will be caused to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of temporary injunction is thus proper to maintain status quo." 13. The purpose of temporary injunction is thus proper to maintain status quo." 13. Similarly, in (Dalpat Kumar and another v. Prahlad Singh and others)4, reported in 1992(1) S.C.C. 719 , the Apex Court has clearly warned that the expression "prima facie case", "balance of convenience" and "irreparable loss" are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity to meet myriad situations presented by men's ingenuity in given facts and circumstances and should always be with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice and that the Court would be circumspect before granting the injunction and look to the conduct of the party, the probable injuries to either party and whether the plaintiff could be adequately compensated if injunction is refused. 14. Bearing in mind the law laid down by the Apex Court in Wander's case read with the decisions in Shiv Kumar Chandha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and other (supra) and Dalpat Kumar and another v. Prahlad Singh and others (supra) as well as in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (supra) and considering the impugned judgment, it is apparent that the lower Appellate Court has sought to re-appreciate the evidence without ascertaining and without even arriving at the conclusion that the trial Court had not exercised its discretion judiciously and reasonably and that the view taken by the trial Court was not at all a probable view in the facts and circumstances of the case brought on record or that the findings arrived by the trial Court were totally perverse and not borne out from the records. Being so, there is no doubt that there is an improper exercise of jurisdiction by the lower Appellate Court while interfering with the discretionary order of the trial Court. 15. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners are owners of the suit property and that the same bears Survey No. 103/O. It is an undisputed fact that the suit property has been registered in the Records of Right in favour of the petitioners as the occupants thereof in the occupants column whereas the respondent has been shown as the caretaker and entry in that regards has been made in the other rights column and was never challenged. In terms of section 105 of the Land Revenue Code the entries in the Records of Right are presumed to be correct until contrary is established. Therefore, till and until the presumption arising from the entries from the records of right in favour of the petitioners is rebutted, the same entries are presumed to be correct. Perusal of the impugned order discloses that the lower Appellate Court while arriving at the finding that the trial Court did not exercise its discretion correctly has held that the trial Court did not properly construe the materials on record and erred in accepting the petitioners case on the point of claim of the respondent as caretaker. The lower Appellate Court however while arriving at the said finding nowhere has disclosed as to how and for what reasons the exercise of the discretion by the trial Court has not been judicious or proper. The lower Appellate Court has not been able to find out any of the findings of the trial Court to be perverse or not borne out from the records. It could not find the analysis of the materials on record by the trial Court to be arbitrary or in any manner in breach of procedure. 16. Considering the fact that the materials pertain to immovable property wherein the ownership of the petitioners is not disputed by the respondent coupled with a certificate of Records of Right in favour of the petitioners, the presumption arising under section 105 of Land Revenue Code being also in favour of the petitioners, and the respondent having not been able to show any better title to the suit property than one in favour of the petitioners certainly it cannot be said that the order refusing the injunction in favour of the petitioners would not occasion failure of justice. Therefore, the impugned order certainly warrants interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The impugned order is apparently in breach of procedure. 17. The detail analysis of the documentary evidence by the trial Court discloses that the receipts relied upon by the respondent do not relate to the suit property. There is neither disclosure of any survey number nor any identification of property in any manner in any of the receipts sought to be relied upon by the respondent, so as to ascertain as to whether the receipts pertain to the suit property or not. There is neither disclosure of any survey number nor any identification of property in any manner in any of the receipts sought to be relied upon by the respondent, so as to ascertain as to whether the receipts pertain to the suit property or not. Undisputedly, the fact that the claim of the respondent that the receipts relate to the suit property was disputed by the petitioners. It has also been observed by the trial Court that receipts disclose payment of paddy. As rightly submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioners, the suit property has been defined in the plaint as well as is apparent from the judgments of both the courts below that the same is in the nature of horticulture land having therein fruit bearing trees. Even the certificate of Records of Right in Form No. I and XIV discloses the land to be the garden land and no part of the same is disclosed as the paddy field. Being so, any receipt regarding the payment of paddy cannot be prima facie relating to the suit property. In this regard, the lower Appellate Court has not made any reference to such receipts or even to the finding arrived at by the trial Court on appreciation of such receipts. As regards other receipts, the trial Court has observed that same relates to a property at Baranga Nagzar, Ponda. The learned Advocate for the respondent did try to contend that Baranga refers to classification of land and the ward Nagzar clearly discloses that it refers to the same ward wherein the suit property is situated. However, I do not find any material on record to entertain any such contention on behalf of the respondent. Neither the trial Court nor the lower Appellate Court has referred to any material disclosing that the expression "Baranga" refers to classification of land and that it does not relate to the name of the property. The finding of the trial Court is in fact to the contrary. Besides, the letter dated 29th August, 1977 by the Zonal Agricultural Officer, copy of which is made available for my perusal by the learned Advocate for the respondent clearly refers to the property "Baranga Nagzar". The finding of the trial Court is in fact to the contrary. Besides, the letter dated 29th August, 1977 by the Zonal Agricultural Officer, copy of which is made available for my perusal by the learned Advocate for the respondent clearly refers to the property "Baranga Nagzar". If Nagzar is only a ward and the name "Baranga" is referring to classification of land then the property would not have been referred to in a manner it has been referred in the said letter. The other receipts, copies of which also are made available for my perusal by learned Advocate for the respondent, disclose that the same refer to sale of coconuts to the Bagayatdar Society. Mere sale of coconuts by itself cannot prima facie lead to any conclusion relating to relationship of tenant and landlord between the respondent and the petitioners in respect of any property. 18. The trial Court had also considered the fact that the pleadings of the respondent do not sufficiently disclose the ingredients of tenancy. It has been well established by the judgment of this Court in the matter of (Pandu Dhondi Yerudkar others v. Ananda Krishna Patil)5, reported in A.I.R. 1975 Bombay 52 that a plea of tenancy cannot be raised in vague terms and the party raising such plea has to give minimum particulars regarding such plea. No doubt, the decision was in relation to the framing of issue under Order 14(1). Similarly the Apex Court in one of its recent judgment in the matter of (D.M. Dehspande v. Janardhan Kashinath Kadam)6, reported in 1999(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)499 : A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1464 has held that an issue of tenancy cannot be raised on vague plea. Needless to say that Order 14 of Code of Civil Procedure deals with the matter summarising the dispute between the parties to enable the parties to know the exact case which they have to meet in a suit. Being so, it is absolutely necessary for a party, who expects the Court to grant necessary protection available under the law to the tenants, to raise such plea with necessary particulars so that the opposite party is put on guard about the case which he has to meet as also to enable the Court to ascertain the exact nature of dispute between the parties. Besides, it cannot be said that moment a party to the proceedings before the Civil Court states that he is a tenant within the meaning of the said expression under Agricultural Tenancy Act, that the Court should immediately develop alergy for the proceedings wherein such claim is made. It is always necessary for the Civil Court to consider whether the plea raised by the party is bona fide contention or not. If there is absolutely no possibility of said plea being upheld by the competent authority on the basis of the materials disclosed, then nothing would prevent the Civil Court to conclude that the question of tenancy does not reasonably arise in the case. The tendency to raise an unreasonable plea with the idea to procrastinate and prolong the litigation is always to be depricated. It is not mere claim seeking to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court but it is only when the issue of tenancy that can halt the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the matter in terms of section 58(2) r/w section 7 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act. I am fortified in the view by the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of (Thomas Antry v. Varlay Vardey)7, reported in 2000(1) S.C.C. 35 . Even in the case of temporary injunction, a party seeking relief of temporary injunction has necessarily to disclose right to the suit property. Once such a right is disclosed and not disputed but the opposite party seeks to claim a better title or right, then such a right or better title has to be disclosed by necessary details in that regard in the pleadings of such party. Such pleading should disclose all the facts necessary to constitute the ingredients of the tenancy when the plea is in that regard. If it is ownership, necessarily the particulars should relate to the incidence of ownership. Such pleading should disclose all the facts necessary to constitute the ingredients of the tenancy when the plea is in that regard. If it is ownership, necessarily the particulars should relate to the incidence of ownership. The trial Court in the case in hand referring to the case pleaded by the respondent has observed that the acts of possession as pleaded by the respondent in the suit property are in the nature of plucking of the fruits and giving part thereof to the petitioners till the petitioners started getting his pluckers and thereafter the petitioners started bringing two pluckers from his side and one plucker was brought by the respondent, and after plucking a portion of the yield was set aside by the petitioners as his share from the entire yield and the same portion was entrusted with the respondent to be sold to Bagayatdar Society and monies received therefrom were distributed in two equal shares by the petitioners. This being a case pleaded regarding acts of possession and the plea of tenancy, the trial Court has observed that the same do not disclose any ingredients of tenancy. Undoubtedly, the issue of tenancy was sought to be raised bearing in mind the provisions contained in the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964. This is apparent from the preliminary objection raised in the written statement by the respondent. Section 2(23) defines a 'tenant' means a person who on or after the date of commencement of this Act holds land on lease and cultivates it personally and includes a person who is or was deemed to be a tenant under the said Act. Section 2(7) defines the expression "to cultivate personally" means to cultivate the land on one's account by one's own labour or by the member of one's family or under the personal supervision of oneself or any member of one's family by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share. There are explanations to this clause with which we are not concerned at this stage. The expression "deemed tenant" is explained in section 4 of the said Act. It cannot be disputed that the pleadings and the material placed on record by the respondent do not disclose the ingredients of tenancy without the meaning of the said expression under the said Act. The expression "deemed tenant" is explained in section 4 of the said Act. It cannot be disputed that the pleadings and the material placed on record by the respondent do not disclose the ingredients of tenancy without the meaning of the said expression under the said Act. There cannot be a doubt that the issue of tenancy cannot be decided by the Civil Court. However, when the plea of tenancy is raised in answer to the application for injunction of the owner of the property and when record of rights clearly discloses entry in favour of the owner being in possession of the property, in such cases it is absolutely necessary while ascertaining the issue of possession, the nature of the possession and right to claim possession by the parties and in that regard, when the party claims to be tenant of the other party, it is necessary for the party raising such plea to disclose the necessary ingredients of tenancy so as to disclose prima facie right to be in possession of the suit property as the tenant. As the trial Court had clearly observed in the case in hand there being no materials on record to prima facie establish that the respondent being in possession of the suit property either in capacity as the tenant or otherwise, and the lower Appellate Court having not disturbed the said finding by analysing the materials based on which the said finding was arrived at by the trial Court nor has held that the analysis of the material by the trial Court to be either improper or cannot lead to the conclusion that the trial Court has arrived at or that no prudent man would have so held, the interference by the lower Appellate Court in the order of the trial Court is clearly in improper exercise of its jurisdiction. The lower Appellate Court clearly erred in holding that the trial Court erred in accepting the petitioners case that the respondent is a caretaker. Being so, the finding of the lower Appellate Court arrived at contrary to the finding of the trial Court on this aspect cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. 19. The lower Appellate Court clearly erred in holding that the trial Court erred in accepting the petitioners case that the respondent is a caretaker. Being so, the finding of the lower Appellate Court arrived at contrary to the finding of the trial Court on this aspect cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. 19. In (Narayandas S. Kanuga v. Sarasvathibai D. Joshi)8, reported in 1967(69) Bom.L.R. 627 the Division Bench of this Court reiterated that Rule 2, Order XXXIX of C.P.C. requires that some injury must be threatened and injury must be legal injury and not fanciful injury. It is further held that in cases where injury is alleged the Court is put on enquiry as to what are the contents of the rights claimed by the party. 20. The learned Single Judge of this Court in (Shri Madi Yeshwant Gaude v. Yadu Rama Gaude)9, reported in 1997(1) G.L.T. 71, after considering various decisions of the Apex Court in the matters wherein the relief was sought by person in possession of land against the owner of the property has observed that a person in wrongful/unlawful possession or a trespasser vis-a-vis true owner or against a person who has better title cannot be protected by the Court by way of discretionary relief of injunction and the Court should not aid a wrongdoer and allow him to reap benefits from this wrongful act. 21. The decisions of the Division Bench and the Single Judge of this Court referred to above and relied upon by the Advocates for the parties, are of no assistance in the case in hand having been given any peculiar set of facts which were totally different from the facts of the case in hand. The judgment of the Division Bench was in relation to interpretation of Rule 2, Order XXXIX of C.P.C. with which we are not at all concerned in the case in hand. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was in relation to the suits by trespassers or the person who are in possession against the owners of the property. The situation in the case in hand is just opposite. 22. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was in relation to the suits by trespassers or the person who are in possession against the owners of the property. The situation in the case in hand is just opposite. 22. It is also sought to be contended on behalf of the respondent that even assuming that the respondent is a caretaker, undisputedly, his status as the caretaker has not been put an end and continues to be in possession till the rights on merits are decided and, therefore, there was no justification for grant of relief by the trial Court against the respondent. A caretaker is merely an agent of the owner having no independent right to the property and caretakership does not create any interest in the property. Mere filing of the suit against such decision would amount to termination of caretakership of the person against whom the suit is filed. Being so, there is no substance in the contention that no relief could be granted against a person claiming to be caretakar of the suit property on the ground that prior to the filing of the suit, his caretakership was not terminated. 23. In the result, the petition partly succeeds. The impugned judgment allowing the appeal against the order of the trial Court granting temporary injunction modified and restricted to the suit property bearing Survey No. 103/O and is excluded therefrom the area of land occupied by the suit structure and five metres around it. It is however made clear that the area occupied by the suit structure and five metres around it shall not be changed by the respondent till the disposal of the suit. It is also made clear that during the pendency and final disposal of the suit, the respondent shall be entitled to have access to the suit structure without interfering in the remaining area of the suit property. Rule is made absolute in above terms with no order as to costs. 24. At this stage, Shri V.P. Thali, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent prayed for stay of the order passed today. The request is opposed by Shri M.S. Sonak, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners. It is seen that the trial Court had passed the order of injunction on 20th January, 1998 and during the pendency of the appeal before the lower Appellate Court there was no stay granted of the said order. The request is opposed by Shri M.S. Sonak, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners. It is seen that the trial Court had passed the order of injunction on 20th January, 1998 and during the pendency of the appeal before the lower Appellate Court there was no stay granted of the said order. While granting the stay order in this revision application on 8th October, 1999, it was observed that there was no change in the status quo since the grant of the order by the trial Court. I do not see any justification for grant of stay of the order passed today. Hence, the request for stay of the order is rejected. Certified copy expedited. Petition partly succeed. -----