ORDER: Tenant in R.C.O.P.329 of 1985 on the file of Rent Controller, Madurai is the revision petitioner. 2. Landlord sought eviction of non-residential building in the occupation of tenant on the ground that the building is required for own occupation of her 4th son who is doing business in hardware and who is occupying a rented premises in the same city. It is his further case that landlord of that building is demanding vacant possession of that premises and son must be accommodated in the scheduled premises. It is further that neither mother nor son are in possession of any other non-residential premises for their own occupation. They require the building for bona fide own occupation. 3. In his counter statement tenant contended that the claim of the landlord is not bona fide. According to him, he took the building on rent at the rate of Rs.23 per month and slowly the same was enhanced to Rs.90 excluding electric charges. Landlord also received an advance of Rs.6,000. Tenant has also installed 5 horse power motor and accessories after getting permission from the Corporation and also from the landlord. According to him,the demised premises consist of 7’x 6’ open terrace and 7’ x 6’ of tin shed and rest is vacant site and there is also no side wall and it consists only of wooden planks to a length of 17 feet. He further said that walls of the terraced portion and the tin sheet roof portion is made of mud walls and the wood is country wood and bamboo rafters. There is also no bathroom or other facilities in the scheduled building. It is further said that merely because landlord’s family got numerical strength that should not be a ground for getting eviction. According to tenant, contention of landlord that he is having 7 children of whom three sons are doing business in rented building are not true. Claim of eviction that building is required for own use of 4th son is not true. He further averred that 4th son is not occupying rented premises and 4th son is also not doing business as alleged. 4. Claim of eviction that building is required for own use of 4th son is not true. He further averred that 4th son is not occupying rented premises and 4th son is also not doing business as alleged. 4. Main thrust of tenant is that landlord moved another application in R.C.O.P.No.52 of 1977 on the file of Rent Controller, Madurai claiming eviction for the same reason i.e., for own occupation and the same was transferred to District Munsif’s Court, Madurai taluk and renumbered as R.C.O.P.No.71 of 1978 which was dismissed and the matter was taken in appeal as C.M.A.No.393 of 1978, which also met with same fate. According to tenant, requirement for own use for doing business having been negatived by Rent Controller, will operate as res judicata for the present petition. He therefore prayed for dismissal of the eviction petition. 5. Rent Controller after taking oral and documentary evidence as per order dated 22.1.1992 held that the claim of landlord is bona fide. Rent Controller held that 4th son of petitioner who has been examined is doing business in hardware in D.NO.86/2, Chinnakadai Street for more than 7 years in a rented premises. The case of landlord that the son is carrying on business in a rented premises was also found to be true. It is further found that for the purpose of conveniently doing business scheduled building is suitable for landlord’s son. Rent Controller further held that even though there had been prior proceedings the same will not be res judicata in this proceeding. Sec.19 of the Rent Control Act was held to be not applicable to the facts of this case. Eviction was ordered. 6. Aggrieved by the order of Rent Controller, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.39 of 1992 on the file of Principal Sub Judge, Appellate Authority. Appellate Authority also after reconsidering entire evidence confirmed the decision of Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal. 7. The concurrent findings of authorities below are assailed in this revision petition. 8. One of the main point argued by learned counsel for petitioner was that the claim of the landlord is not bona fide and barred by res judicata. To substantiate the case that the claim is without bona fides, counsel submitted that following proceedings have been initiated against tenant: (a) R.C.O.P.No.344 of 1982 on the ground that tenant has committed wilful default. To substantiate the case that the claim is without bona fides, counsel submitted that following proceedings have been initiated against tenant: (a) R.C.O.P.No.344 of 1982 on the ground that tenant has committed wilful default. The same was dismissed and appeal taken against that order in R.C.A.No.7 of 1988 was also dismissed. (b) R.C.O.P.No.48 of 1987 on the ground that tenant has sub let the building and the same was also dismissed. (c) R.C.O.P.No.327 of 1985 was filed for fixation of fair rent. (d) R.C.O.P.No.19 of 1990 was filed for demolition and reconstruction. (e) O.S.No.380 of 1990 was filed against tenant for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction from effecting any repairs in the building. (f) R.C.O.P.No.52 of 1977 was filed on the ground that the building is required for own occupation and the same was transferred to Rent Controller, Madurai Taluk and renumbered as R.C.O.P.No.71 of 1978 which was also not successful. There was an appeal against that order in C.M.A.No.393 of 1978 which was also dismissed. Learned counsel submitted that landlord initiated various litigations one after the other from 1977 onwards and various attempts were made by landlord to evict him for one reason or the other. In all those cases landlord failed and ultimately filed the present petition for eviction on the ground that the building is required for the occupation of his 4th son. 9. It is true that the parties were not in good terms from 1977 onwards and there had been litigations one after the other. It is also true that those litigations were not successful. Merely because landlord was not successful in the earlier litigations, it cannot be presumed that the present application is filed without bona fides if on evidence he establishes that his claim is bona fide. When the question of bona fide is a matter in issue, naturally Court will have to consider the prior conduct also. But on the basis of prior conduct alone the question of bona fide cannot be decided. If there is genuine need, as on this date, merely because in prior litigations landlord failed, can it be said that the claim is not bona fide. I do not think that the contention of counsel for petitioner could be accepted. But on the basis of prior conduct alone the question of bona fide cannot be decided. If there is genuine need, as on this date, merely because in prior litigations landlord failed, can it be said that the claim is not bona fide. I do not think that the contention of counsel for petitioner could be accepted. This Court will certainly take note of those litigations also as circumstances if ultimately landlord has not proved his case and the decisions which went against him previously will be taken as a ground to hold that the claim is not bona fide. 10. Appellate authority in para 8 of the judgment held thus, According to learned counsel, the said finding of appellate authority is result of non-application of mind and he has proved by documentary evidence in this case that landlord has got other non-residential building. He relied on the evidence of P.W.1 itself for the said purpose. According to him, D.No.29 has been let out to one Jaffer Ali on receipt of Rs.10,000. Likewise, door No.192, South Marudhu Street also belongs to landlord and the same has been let out to Durga Broilers. On the date when P.W.1 was examined, tenant has already vacated. He also said that it was let out only two years prior to giving evidence and that is non-residential building. He also said that thereafter building was let out to Meenakshi & Co for sale of coconuts, and on the date he was examined, the building was remaining vacant. Further Door No.83, Chinnakadai Street has been let out to Janaki store subsequent to institution of proceedings. Door No.232-A also belongs to landlord was let out to Sharmila Garments. He also has given details of further door numbers which have been let out to various persons. He further said that Door No.86/2 which is in the possession as tenant was occupied by him in 1979. In the evidence of R.W.1 also it is said that Door No.83 was let out to Janaki Store for non-residential purpose after institution of proceedings and three years prior to his giving evidence. He also gives measurements of that building. He also said that Door No.232-A is a multi-storeyed building belonging to landlord and the same has been let out to a Garment Company. It was occupied by one Urmila Garments and they were using it for non-residential purposes. He also gives measurements of that building. He also said that Door No.232-A is a multi-storeyed building belonging to landlord and the same has been let out to a Garment Company. It was occupied by one Urmila Garments and they were using it for non-residential purposes. They have vacated the building one year prior to the institution of the proceedings. He also said that the length of the building will be 60 x 20 feet. He further said that Door No.192, South Marudhu Street also belongs to landlord and the same was let out to one Meenakshi Stores after institution of the proceeding. Originally same was let out to one Devi cements and they vacated. According to him, Door No.192 has total plinth area of 1,900 sq.ft. Door No.192-B was also let out to one Durga Broilers. They have also vacated and on the date when he was examined, the said building was lying vacant. He further said that landlord’s husband is also owning other buildings and in Chinnakadai Street itself he is owning shop rooms. To substantiate the same Ex.R-1 is produced. Out of the same, Door Nos.10-B and 10-C are even now vacant. He further said that in Door No.43 landlord’s husband is putting up new construction and the same is also remaining vacant. His definite case is that after eviction petition was filed various buildings belonging to landlord was vacant and some were let out to various persons and the claim is not bona fide. 11. Both the Rent Controller as well as appellate authority considered only the plea of res judicata. Having held that there is no res judicata, straight-away ordered eviction. I have already extracted the order of Appellate Authority. It is clear therefrom that the Appellate Authority has not considered any of the documents nor evidence of petitioner when it held that no document has been produced to show that landlord is in possession of other non-residential premises. 12. Rent Controller also committed some mistakes. Both authorities have not considered the admission of P.W.1 when he said that non-residential building belonging to landlord became vacant and the same was subsequently let out. It is not the case of P.W.1 that those buildings are not suitable for doing business. It is in this context, we have to take into consideration the effect of decisions in previous litigations. It is not the case of P.W.1 that those buildings are not suitable for doing business. It is in this context, we have to take into consideration the effect of decisions in previous litigations. Landlord has not said anything about the previous proceedings except to state that she has filed application for eviction on the ground of wilful default and the same is pending. The suppression of fact is also a circumstance to be taken while considering the question of bona fides. 13. It is at this juncture learned counsel for petitioner submitted that the order in R.C.O.P.No.71 of 1978 is res judicata and for that reason also the application is not maintainable. I do not think that submission of learned counsel could be accepted. 14. Sec.19 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and rent Control) Act reads thus: “Any application under Sec.3-A or Sec.12, and any application under Sub-sec.(2) or Sub-sec.(3) or Sub-sec.(3-A) of Sec.10 or Secs.14, 15 or 16 shall be summarily rejected by the Authorized Officer or the Controller,as the case may be, if such application raises between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim,substantially the same issues as have been finally decided or as purport to have been finally decided,in a former preceding- (i) under this Act, or (ii) under any other law from time to time in force before the date of the commencement of this Act and relating to matters dealt with in this Act.” 15. In Natarajan v. V.M.Sundaram, (1990)2 L.W. 595 , learned Judge Thanikkachalam (as he then was) considered the scope of Sec.19 of the Act and held thus: “The provision contained in Sec.19 of the Act is clearly intended to bar frivolous applications which may be made on the same grounds by the landlord for eviction against the tenant. In order to apply the provisions of Sec.19 two important requisites must be present. One is that there must be identity of issues in the two proceedings and the other is that the former proceeding must have been decided on the very same issue which arises in the later proceedings. But it has no reference to different circumstances, which may exist at different times enabling the landlord to apply for eviction subsequently though his application for eviction might have been refused on an anterior date. But it has no reference to different circumstances, which may exist at different times enabling the landlord to apply for eviction subsequently though his application for eviction might have been refused on an anterior date. Having regard to the circumstances, which are material on which a new application is filed, the principle as stated in Sec.19 of the Act would not stand in the way.” [Italics supplied] 16. The said decision was followed by another Judge of this Court in the decision reported in Rengaiyan, M. v. A.M.Noorullah, (1996)2 L.W. 107 . 17. Sec.15 of the Kerala Rent Control Act is similar to Sec.19 of our Act. Sec.15 of the Kerala Rent Control Act reads thus: "Decisions which have become final not to be reopened: The Rent Control Court shall summarily reject any application under Sub-secs.(2), (3), (4), (5), (7) or Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.11 which raises between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim substantially the same issues as have been finally decided in a former proceeding under this Act or under the corresponding provisions of any law in force prior to the commencement of this Act or the corresponding provisions of any law repealed or superseded by such law." The scope of Sec.15 of Kerala Rent Control Act came for consideration before Kerala High Court in the decision reported in M.Ex-servicemen’s Co-operative Soviety v. Rajamma, 1986 K.L.T. 513. In paragraphs 9 to 11 of the judgment, learned Judge held thus: "9. Sec.15 of the Act postulates a rule of estoppel by res judicata. To understand the integrants of the Section, I feel I should remember the two basic theories on which the doctrine of res judicata is based. Of course, both these theories are so interlinked that they form the two sides of one and the same theory. On one side it is a norm of public policy and on the other side a rule of private justice. The public policy is the general interest of the community in the determination of disputes and in the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions. The private justice is based on the right of the individual to be ensconced from vexatious pollution of suits at the instance of the adversary whose superior opulence, resources and power, may unless clipped by estoppel, gravitate and weigh down judicially declared rights. The private justice is based on the right of the individual to be ensconced from vexatious pollution of suits at the instance of the adversary whose superior opulence, resources and power, may unless clipped by estoppel, gravitate and weigh down judicially declared rights. The House of Lords in New Brunswick Rail Co. v. British and French Trust Corporation Ltd., (1939)1 A.C. 1, said: "The doctrine of estoppel (per rem judicatam) is one founded on considerations of justice and good sense. If an issue has been distinctly raised and decided in an action, in which the parties are represented, it is unjust and unreasonable to permit the same issue to be litigated afresh between the same parties or persons claiming under them." 10. The question is how far the application of the doctrine can be pushed before it breaks down as a matter of practical common sense. Should the doctrine be pushed thus far to hold that the mandate in Sec.15 is that an adverse finding in a proceeding ended in 1972 on the question of bona fide need of a landlord in the year 1970 would constitute estoppel by res judicata when a claim based on bona fide need is raised in 1982 whatever be the changed circumstances. I feel extreme difficulty to attribute such an egregious legislative intention in Sec.15 of the Act of putting a permanent bar to raise the ground of bona fide need in a subsequent proceeding once it was rejected in a former proceeding. I shall attempt a legalistic answer to this question. 11. I pose a question. Is the issue to be decided in the second proceedings (the present proceedings) substantially the same issue, as was contested in the first? If it is not, there can be no operation of Sec.15 of the Act. Spencer Bower dealing with the point "the same issue" observes: "For this purpose, identity of subject matter means not only eadem res, but also eadem quaestio-not only the identity of subject matter in a physical sense, but identity of subject matter in a juridical sense." In (1939)1 A.C. 1, the House of Lords held that the construction which the Court has in one proceedings placed on a contract between the parties will not found "an estoppel" precluding any other construction being placed in later proceedings on another, but distinct, contract made between them in identical terms. Commenting on the principle laid down in this decision, Spencer Bower said: "This may be said to be because the two contracts are physically different, in that they are written on different pieces of paper." Sir Alexander Kingcome Turner, Editor of the doctrine of res judicata by Spencer Bower tells us that he would prefer to say that it is because the two contracts will not necessarily have been executed in the same circumstantial context, and that therefore the construction to be placed upon them is not necessarily the same question in each case, even though it may be highly probable that it will be the same . In Burman v. Woods, (1948)1 K.B. 111, the Court of Appeal held that a decision declining an order for possession of premises protected by rent restriction Acts on the ground that balance of hardship does not require making of an order, will not prevent a second proceeding between the same parties in regard to the same premises at a later date, for the factors contributing to hardship may change . Again in Mills v. Cooper, (1967)2 All E.R. 100, the Queens Bench Division held that a decision , the foundation of which was finding that it had not been proved that respondent was a gipsy was held to be no bar to the litigation in subsequent proceedings of different question whether he was a gipsy on a later date. The principle behind these decisions seems to be that there can be, no eadem quaestio and therefore no estoppel by res judicata unless every limb of the controversy in the proceedings where the question of res judicata is raised was also in controversy in the prior litigation which resulted in the judicial decision relied upon for the purpose of res judicata. [Italics supplied] 18. On the basis of these decisions, I have to consider whether the finding of the authorities below holding that the present application is not barred by res judicata is correct or not. The claim for own use for 4th son of petitioner was not in issue. In the earlier application R.C.O.P.No.71 of 1978, and claim was only in regard to elder son of petitioner. It was found to be not bona fide and the application was dismissed. The same was also confirmed in appeal. The claim for own use for 4th son of petitioner was not in issue. In the earlier application R.C.O.P.No.71 of 1978, and claim was only in regard to elder son of petitioner. It was found to be not bona fide and the application was dismissed. The same was also confirmed in appeal. Whether 4th son required the scheduled building was not pleaded in that petition nor the matter agitated earlier. Merely because the claim was made that the building is required for bona fide own occupation that by itself will not be a ground to hold that the claim is barred by res judicata. Unless every limb of controversy in the proceeding was raised in the earlier proceeding and in which a decision is taken, there is no scope of applicability of principle of res judicata. 19. But that by itself is not going to help petitioner/ landlord in any way. As stated by me in the earlier portion of this order, prior litigation will have to be taken into consideration when the question of the bona fide is raised. When there is no explanation from landlord or P.W.1 why the other non-residential building which they are owning and became vacant after institution of proceeding was not occupied is not explained by P.W.1 or landlord. It can only be found that the claim is not bona fide. This material evidence produced by tenant and admitted by P.W.1 was not taken into consideration by authorities below when they decided the case against tenant. Along with the same, landlord has not stated anything about prior proceedings and she has also not pleaded that there is change of circumstance. 20. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999)6 S.C.C. 222 , the question of revisional powers under Delhi Rent Control Act came for consideration and their Lordships have held thus, "The phraseology of the provision as reproduced herein before provides an interesting reading placed in juxtaposition with the phraseology employed by the legislature in drafting Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the latter provision the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is circumscribed by the Subordinate Court having committed one of the three errors, namely, (i) having exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) having failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) having exercised its jurisdiction with illegality or material irregularity. Under the latter provision the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is circumscribed by the Subordinate Court having committed one of the three errors, namely, (i) having exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) having failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) having exercised its jurisdiction with illegality or material irregularity. Under the proviso to Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.25-B, the expression governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is "for the purpose of satisfying if an order made by the Controller is according to law". The revisional jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Sec.25-B(8) is not so limited as is under Sec.115, C.P.C. nor so wide as that of an appellate Court. The High Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of "whether it is according to law". For that limited purpose it may enter into reappraisal of evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available. Ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on a wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion from the established facts as betray a lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the finding of the Controller "not according to law" calling for an interference under the proviso to Sub-sec.(8) of a judgment according to law. (See: Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co.Ltd., A.I.R. 1988 S.C.N. 3451 and Ram Rarain Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999)1 S.C.C. 141 .)." 21. In T.Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari, (1999)7 S.C.C. 275 , a case under our Act, in para 5 of the judgment it is held thus: "So far as the second submission is concerned, the language employed in Sec.25 of the Act, which confers revisional Jurisdiction on the High Court, is very wide. Under Sec.25 of the Act, the High Court can call for and examine the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself as to regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed therein. Under Sec.25 of the Act, the High Court can call for and examine the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself as to regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed therein. The words "to satisfy itself" employed in Sec.25 of the Act no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the Courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Sec.25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the Courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the Courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the Courts below. ..." [Italics supplied] 22. Taking into consideration these decisions. I am of the view that ground has been made out for interference under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Finding of the Rent Controller as well as appellate authority that landlord required building for bona fide own occupation is based on no evidence. At the same time, both authorities have omitted to consider the voluminous evidence adduced by petitioner to show that landlord is in possession of other non-residential premises which became vacant after institution of proceedings and still lying vacant when parties were being examined. Landlord has not given any explanation why those buildings are not available or suitable for P.W.1’s occupation. Finding of the appellate authority that no document has been produced to prove that landlord has no other non-residential premises than scheduled premises is the result of non-application of mind. Non-consideration of documents that are produced in the case has materially affected the decision. If only authorities below considered the evidence, the result would have been otherwise. P.W.11 does not say that the buildings which became vacant are not suitable for his occupation. 23. Non-consideration of documents that are produced in the case has materially affected the decision. If only authorities below considered the evidence, the result would have been otherwise. P.W.11 does not say that the buildings which became vacant are not suitable for his occupation. 23. When the material evidence was omitted to be considered and finding is entered that landlord requires building for own occupation is on no evidence, inspite of the fact that it is concurrent finding, the same is liable to be interfered with Under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act. 24. From the previous litigations it is clear that landlord wanted to get eviction of tenant somehow or the other. For the last 20 years parties are litigating and in most of the occasions, landlord failed. There is force in the present application is filed only as another attempt to evict the tenant, as if landlord’s 4th son requires the building for his own occupation. 25. In the result, the findings of the authorities below are set aside and this revision petition is allowed with costs. R.C.O.P.No.329 of 1985 on the file of Rent Controller, Madurai is dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P.No.3446 of 1996 is also closed.