JUDGMENT Singh, C.J. (Oral) -- This group of three appeals (M.A. No. 225 of 1991, M.A. No. 226 of 1991 and M.A. No. 278 of 1991) and Cross Objection under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC in M.A. No. 278 of 1991" are proposed to be disposed of by this common order as they arise out of the common award and same accident. Claimant in all the three appeals is Smt. Shanta Bai, widow of Kishan Singh Raghuvanshi (deceased) and her children. Cross objection has been filed by Harjit Singh Geep owner). Accident took place on 27.4.1985 when jeep M.B.C. 185 turned turtle resulting in the death of Kishan Singh Raghuvanshi, Ku. Kavita and Ku. Sangita. The vehicle was insured with the appellant at the time of accident. Allegation is that accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. Appellant Insurance Company has taken the defence that jeep was carrying passenger for hire and reward and therefore it was not covered by the policy and the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation. The Tribunal has rejected this defence and has awarded compensation to the claimants in these cases. The award has been challenged through these appeals and cross-objection by the owner of the jeep. Shri Ruprah, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the award is liable to be set aside since it has wrongly been held that the appellant is liable to pay compensation. This conclusion could not have been drawn in face of statement Of Nain Singh that he paid Rs. 12/towards fare and Kishan Singh Raghuvanshi (deceased) also paid some amount for himself and his daughters. Learned counsel places reliance on Apex Court decision in 1999 ACJ 1 (Mallawwa v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.) and 1989 JLJ 282 (Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Pramila and others). We are unable to appreciate the contentions so raised. The appellant may have taken the defence that the vehicle was being used in violation of the Insurance policy having been used for hire and reward but it has to be proved by evidence. Taking the plea in the pleadings does not form part of the evidence unless it is proved in accordance with law. It may be true that Nain Singh has stated that he paid Rs. Taking the plea in the pleadings does not form part of the evidence unless it is proved in accordance with law. It may be true that Nain Singh has stated that he paid Rs. 12/- towards fare for himself and Kishan Singh Raghuvanshi (deceased) also paid fare at some rate for himself and his daughters but claimant has not said so either in the pleadings or in evidence recorded in the case. Justice required that the same should have been put to her in her crossexamination, otherwise the appellant cannot use it (AIR 1958 Punjab 440 - M/s Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. and another) and AIR 1961 Calcutta 359 - A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian). This apart, the appellant should have put its defence to the· claimant. It has failed to do so, not only in case of claimant but also for the owner of the vehicle. The appellant should have proved that driver of the vehicle allowed the passengers to travel in the vehicle for hire and reward. The owner of the vehicle has specifically stated that he had asked the driver not to allow any passenger. Consequently, apart from the finding arrived at by us, it can be said that the solitary statement of Nain Singh would not militate against the case of the claimants. With this background, decisions referred to by Shri Ruprah do not apply in the facts of this case since facts for consideration in those cases were entirely different. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that there is no merit in these appeals and the same' are dismissed. We have examined the cross-objection also. We find no merit therein. Award is quite just and reasonable calling for no interference. The cross objection is also dismissed. At this stage, Shri Ruprah, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant may be given two months' time for payment of compensation. Prayer is allowed. Costs on parties.