JUDGMENT - B.H. MARLAPALLE, J.:---The petitioner No. 1 Shri Fakira s/o Motiram Meshram, is the President of Nagarpalika Kamgar Union and petitioner No. 2 is the President of the Maharashtra Safai and General Kamgar Union at Amalner. Both the Unions represent the employees of the Municipal Council at Amalner, District Jalgaon. These petitioners have filed Writ Petition No. 2809/99 and on 14-6-99 a Division Bench of this Court had issued notice before admission returnable after four weeks with leave to amend. It is alleged that on 15-6-99 when Fakira s/o Motiram Meshram, attended his duties and came out of Municipal Council office at about 6.30 p.m., he was obstructed by respondents Nos. 2 to 7 and respondent No. 2 Rambhau threatened the petitioner as to why he had filed the writ petition before this Court and respondent Nos. 3 to 7 started beating with wooden sticks to the said Fakira. He had received serious injuries and both his legs were fractured. It is further alleged that respondent No. 2 Rambhau and respondent No. 6 Ramesh threatened to set Fakira on fire by pouring kerosene on his body. He was shifted to the hospital and his statement was recorded by the Police on the same night. Consequently, Crime No. 98/99 came to be registered against the said respondents through the Police Station at Amalner for the offences punishable under sections 143, 147, 149, 323, 504, 506 of I.P.C. which charges were later on converted for offences punishable under sections 325, 326 read with section 149 of I.P.C. 2. The learned Counsel for the petitioners vehemently submitted before this Court that the acts as attributed to respondents Nos. 2 to 7 amount to interference and obstructions in the administration of justice by this Court. The alleged acts amount to Criminal contempt as defined under section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The learned Counsel also urged before us that this is a fit case for invoking the inherent powers of this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution and punish the respondents Nos. 2 to 7. 3. The contempt petition was admitted by this Court on 30-1-2000 and rule was made returnable on 22-2-2000 i.e. today. Hence, the Contempt Petition has been taken up for final hearing. 4. The respondents Nos. 2 to 7. 3. The contempt petition was admitted by this Court on 30-1-2000 and rule was made returnable on 22-2-2000 i.e. today. Hence, the Contempt Petition has been taken up for final hearing. 4. The respondents Nos. 2 to 7 have filed affidavit-in-reply and while setting out series of litigations between the parties it has been specifically denied that any of the said respondents had assaulted the petitioner No. 1 on 15-6-99 and that too in connection with the pendency of Writ Petition No. 2809/99 or filing of the said petition before this Court. We are therefore, required to examine whether the allegations of assault for the reasons solely attributable to the filing and pendency of Writ Petition No. 2809/99 amount to Criminal contempt as defined under section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of (Yogeshwar Prasad Sinha v. Pratap Narain Sinha)1, A.I.R. 1964 Patna 245 and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Waryam Singh and another v. Sadhu Ram)2, 1972(1) Supreme Court Cases 796. In the case of Yogeshwar Prasad (supra) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that attempt of interrupting the usual course of litigation in a direct or indirect manner is a contempt of Court and it is all the more so when a litigant who has already come to the Court, is coerced or threatened with dire consequences in case he proceeds with his litigation. Even pressure or threat to persons who may be cited as witnesses in a case comes under the purview of such a contempt. 6. In the case of Waryam Singh and another (supra) a Police Head Constable alongwith two Police Officers had trespassed into the house of Sadhu Ram when he was not at home and maltreated his wife, mother and children including extortion of money amounting to Rs. 500/-. After hearing the hue and cry of the inmates of the house, several persons including Charanji Lal had come to the scene. Sadhu Ram filed a complaint under sections 452, 323, 504 and 384 read with section 34 of the I.P.C. before the Chief Judicial Magistrate against the Police Officers. 500/-. After hearing the hue and cry of the inmates of the house, several persons including Charanji Lal had come to the scene. Sadhu Ram filed a complaint under sections 452, 323, 504 and 384 read with section 34 of the I.P.C. before the Chief Judicial Magistrate against the Police Officers. The case was fixed for hearing on 5-7-68 and on 4-7-68, the complaint Sadhu Ram was arrested at 4 p.m. from his house by the said Police Officers alongwith Charanji Lal who was a witness in the earlier case pending before the Magistrate. On the next day even the other witness Duni Chand also came to be arrested from the Court premises where he was present to give evidence in the Criminal case. It was only when these persons wee presented before the Chief Judicial Magistrate for a remand order, they came to know that their arrest was due to F.I.R. under sections 457, 379 of the I.P.C. lodged on June 15, 1968. Persual of the said F.I.R. indicated that no names of the alleged offenders were mentioned leave alone the names of the said persons i.e. Charanji Lal. He was suddenly released on 6-7-68 after having been beaten and abused because he did not agree to withdraw his support from the complaint. Sadhu Ram approached the High Court contending that the actions by the Police Officers namely their arrest was to stifle the prosecution of the Police Officers and therefore, it amounted to contempt of Court within the meaning of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The High Court had allowed the Contempt Petition and punished the contemners. In an appeal a Division Bench of 4 judges of the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the High Court and in para 5 of the said judgment the Apex Court observed as under :- "It is clear from an account of the case against the appellant and the evidence and the findings given against them, which we see no reason whatsoever to discard, that each of the two appellants was guilty of gross Contempt of Court. They also made assertions which could not be true in affidavits sworn by them in the course of these proceedings against them. We think that they have been quite leniently dealt with. They also made assertions which could not be true in affidavits sworn by them in the course of these proceedings against them. We think that they have been quite leniently dealt with. Police Officers, who are expected to act as guardians of law and order so as to protect the persons and properties and honour of ordinary citizens, cannot be permitted to take the law in their own hands and go about threatening even untruthful complainants and their witnesses with the object of stifling prosecutions. It is the function of their courts of law to pronounce on the veracity of witnesses before them. Even if the police comes to the conclusion that a complainant and his witnesses are utterly untruthful they have no business to threaten them so that witnesses may not give evidence in Court. It is for courts to punish perjury which is shown to have been committed. The action of the Police Officers, with the object they had in view, was quite indefensible." 7. The power to punish for contempt of Court's proceedings must be exercised with due care and caution and in cases of larger interest for due administration of justice. It is to be used for the purpose of ensuring the rule of law. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be led to be distorted. We are afraid the enunciations relied upon by the learned Counsel do not come to the rescue of the petitioners at least at this juncture. Admittedly on registration of the crime on the complaint filed by the petitioner No. 1 a charge-sheet has been filed and the Criminal Case has been registered as R.C.C. No. 25/2000 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, at Amalner. The case is awaiting trial by the said Court. On one hand the petitioner No. 1 contends that he has been allegedly assaulted resulting into fractures and perhaps some permanent disability and also threatened of being burnt alive by respondent Nos. 2 to 7 for the alleged offences connected with the filing of Writ Petitioner No. 2809/99 before this Court, the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 by way of specific affidavit before this Court have denied these allegations. 2 to 7 for the alleged offences connected with the filing of Writ Petitioner No. 2809/99 before this Court, the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 by way of specific affidavit before this Court have denied these allegations. The allegations made be the petitioner No. 1 regarding the crime committed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 is subjudice in R.C.C. No. 25/2000 and these allegations would be certainly subject to the final order that may be passed by the learned Magistrate. It will be unsafe for this Court to accept the contentions of the petitioners regarding criminal contempt as defined under section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or to invoke the powers under Article 215 of the Constitution. In fact, accepting the contentions of the petitioners at this stage in this contempt petition would almost amount to the final trial of the R.C.C. No. 25/2000 pending before the learned Magistrate at Amalner. Disputed allegations made by the petitioners cannot be accepted so lightly by this Court when contempt jurisdiction of this Court is invoked specially when the allegation are pending for investigations in criminal case before a competent subordinate Court. 8. We are therefore, of the considered view that as on today, the alleged acts on the part of the respondents Nos. 2 to 7 or any of them would not amount to criminal contempts as defined under section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 9. The Contempt Petition is therefore, dismissed and the Rule is discharged. However, we clarify that this order will not come in the way of the petitioners or any one of them to take appropriate legal proceedings including a contempt petition after the pending criminal case is decided by the learned Magistrate. Petition dismissed. -----