B. PANIGRAHI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the case No. C/2197/96 pending in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. ( 2 ) THE opposite party was admittedly the financier of the revision-petitioner as a reason whereof there was a lease agreement dated 10. 1. 96 between the parties whereby the petitioner had agreed to pay Rs. 7,41,709 per quarter as rental from the total amount of Rs. 1,48,34. 180. From time to time the petitioner had claimed to have paid the amount but the cheque bearing No. 528582 dated 8th October, 1996 was bounced and immediately thereafter the opposite party sent a notice to the petitioner informing such dishonour of cheque. Even then, when no payment was made the opposite party had filed a case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with section 141. From time to time although summons was sent to the petitioner but when they intentionally avoided to attend the Court, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate was, therefore, obliged to issue Warrant of Arrest against the petitioners. Therefore, being aggrieved by such issuance of Warrant of Arrest, the petitioners have filed this application for quashing of the criminal case. ( 3 ) MR. Mukherjee, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the amount for which the cheque of Rs. 7,41,709 was dishonoured, the petitioners had subsequently sent the cheque for the said amount which was duly accepted by the opposite party. In that view of the case the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioners cannot be legally said to have been committed by them in view of such payment. It is said that the lease agreement seems to have been executed at Delhi in which there was agreement between the parties that any dispute with regard to the interpretation of Clause or enforcement of the Clause of the Lease Deed, the Delhi Court should have jurisdiction to try such cases. In that view of the matter, the complainant-opposite party should not have been permitted to file a complaint under section 132 read section 141 within the Calcutta Metropolitan Magistrate's jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, the complainant-opposite party should not have been permitted to file a complaint under section 132 read section 141 within the Calcutta Metropolitan Magistrate's jurisdiction. Another contention has been made that all the payments made through cheque to the opposite party were encashed only at Bombay but how the respondent had preferred to present the cheque which is in dispute, at Calcutta. ( 4 ) MR. Rahaman, the learned advocate appearing for the complainant/opposite party have of course disputed the above facts and submitted that the agreement was executed in Calcutta and the cheque was delivered in Calcutta which was also dishonoured here at Calcutta. Therefore, the Calcutta Metropolitan Magistrate is legally competent to take cognizance of such offence. ( 5 ) RELIANCE was placed by Mr. Mukherjee on 138 (c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 which runs as follows:"the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee, or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice". Explanation-For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. ( 6 ) IT has been submitted that since the debt or other liability means a legally enforceable debt of other liability as the payment had been already made to the respondent, thus it cannot be said to be legally enforceable at the moment so that the petitioners can be asked to contest the case. It has been further submitted that cognizance under section142 can be taken under Clause (c) of the proviso to section138 since there has been no cause of action. Therefore, the Calcutta Metropolitan Magistrate has no jurisdiction. ( 7 ) FROM the submission of the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners it appears that since the payment has already been made against the cheque which was bounced, at the moment no offence can be said to have been committed by the petitioners. I am not in a position to accept the submission since the payment cannot absolutely absolve the liability of the petitioners. But, however, the rigour of the offence may be lessen by payment. I am not in a position to accept the submission since the payment cannot absolutely absolve the liability of the petitioners. But, however, the rigour of the offence may be lessen by payment. In this respect reliance can be placed on a judgment reported in Judgments Today 1999 (10) Supreme Court 398 in the case of E. Sukumaran v. E. K. Vimala Kumari. Upon reading of the judgment it has appeared that although the accused was convicted in both the cases. But, since there was a compromise between the parties whereby the amount was accepted by the drawee of the cheque, the Hon'ble Supreme Court recorded an order of acquittal against the defaulting parties. It is premature at this stage to conclude the issue in either way. It has to be ascertained by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate about the alleged payment made by the petitioners. In case such payment was made the rigo of the offence whatever stipulated under section 138 read with 142 shall certainly minimise. 'in the judgment it is stated as follows :"the parties appear to have compromised the matter. An amount of Rs. 30,000/- has already been deposited in this Court in terms of the order dated 12. 4. 1999. An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent, who is the complainant, that in case the amount of Rs. 30,000/- deposited in this Court is made over to her, she will have no objection if the sentence of three months' simple imprisonment and conviction of the appellant is set aside". ( 8 ) MR. Rahaman, learned advocate of course has submitted that the principle decided in the above Supreme Court judgment has no application in this case inasmuch as there has been no compromise between the parties. But, however, whether there has been any compromise or not, the payment if made, the Court shall consider whether there is any enforceable liability against the petitioners. Another contention has been raised that since the complainant/opposite party has already received the amount. In that case he has waived the right of prosecuting the revision-petitioners. ( 9 ) MR. But, however, whether there has been any compromise or not, the payment if made, the Court shall consider whether there is any enforceable liability against the petitioners. Another contention has been raised that since the complainant/opposite party has already received the amount. In that case he has waived the right of prosecuting the revision-petitioners. ( 9 ) MR. Mukherjee, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners has filed another judgment reported in judgments on Dishonour of Cheques in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar wherein it has been held as follows:"in a generic and wide sense (as in section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) 'cause of action' means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. Viewed in that context, the following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecute the drawer for an offence under section 138 of the Act: (a)that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge of a debt/liability and the cheque was dishonoured; (b)that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period; (c)that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period; and (d)that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. If we were to proceed on the basis of the generic meaning of the term 'cause of action' certainly each of the above facts would constitute a part of the cause of action but then it is significant to note that clause (b) of section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action that it is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The reason behind giving such a restrictive meaning is not far to seek. Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days envisaged under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month of filing the complaint under section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days envisaged under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month of filing the complaint under section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two sections of the act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of section 142 (b) arises and can arise only once. Besides the language of sections 138 and 142 which clearly postulates only one cause of action there are other formidable impediments which negates the concept of successive causes of action. One of them is that for dishonour of one cheque there can be only one offence and such offence is committed by the drawer immediately on his failure to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice served in accordance with clause (b) of the proviso to section 138. That necessarily means that for similar failure after service of fresh notice on subsequent dishonour the drawer cannot be liable for any offence nor can the first offence be treated as non est so as to give the payee a right to file a complaint treating the second offence as the first one. At that stage it will not be a question of waiver of the right of the payee to prosecute the drawer but of absolution of the drawer of an offence, which stands already committed by him and which cannot be committed by him again". ( 10 ) THEIR Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have clearly stated that the cause of action for presenting the complaints shall arise where the cheques tendered for encashment was dishonoured. In that view of the matter Mr. Mukherjee's contention that this Court has no jurisdiction does not hold any water. ( 11 ) MR. Rahaman placed reliance on the judgment on dishonour of cheques 2000 Doch 375 in the case of M/s. Compact Disc India Ltd. and Ors. v. Contour Advertising (P) Ltd. But on a reading of the judgment it appears that the learned Judge was not inclined to quash the proceeding only on the submission made by the defence that there was subsequent payment of cheques. v. Contour Advertising (P) Ltd. But on a reading of the judgment it appears that the learned Judge was not inclined to quash the proceeding only on the submission made by the defence that there was subsequent payment of cheques. There is no dispute with regard to the aforesaid legal position. But, in this, case at the final hearing if it is found that the payment had been already made by the revision petitioner towards the dishonoured cheque, then the Court shall consider whether there has been any present liability of the opposite party to pay any further money towards such dishonoured cheque. Keeping in view the provisions of sections 132, 141 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court shall address to such question and pass appropriate order at the relevant time. ( 12 ) IT is submitted that although the warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioners yet they avoided to attend the Court on some pretext or other. Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate has undertaken to produce the petitioner, if reasonable time is given. ( 13 ) LET the N. B. W. issued against the petitioners remain stayed for a period of one month. In the meantime let the accused appear before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta and make a prayer for bail. With the observations made above the revisional application is dismissed. Application dismissed