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2000 DIGILAW 1166 (PAT)

Umi Special Steel Limited v. Union Of India

2000-09-27

A.K.PRASAD, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA

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Judgment S.J.Mukhopadhaya, J. 1. Both the writ petitions filed by common petitioner and there being common question of law involved, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioner, a Company registered under the Companys Act, 1956 having its registered office at Giribraj, Balkudra, Hazaribagh has a mini steel plant for manufacture of alloy, tool and special steel products. In view of deteriorating operational results, the management of the Company explored possibilities and options for restructuring and reviving the Company by a joint venture and improvement of technology etc. It obtained financial term loan from financial institutions, but ultimately having failed to achieve the desired result. In view of losses, the Company having left with no option, had to approach the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (B.I.F.R.) under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. 3. A case being Case No. 5/98 was registered, on 15th January, 1998, whereinafter B.I.F.R. being satisfied that the petitioner company has become a Sick Industrial Company in terms with section 3(1) O of S.I.C.A.. the B.I.F.R. declared the Company as Sick Company by its proceeding dated 4th March, 1998. 4. The draft Rehabilitation Scheme was circulated on 14th October, 1998 and on receipt of objection, revised scheme submitted on 15th January, 1999 and ultimately sanctioned on 11th February, 1999 under section 19(2) of S.I.C.A. Rehabilitation Scheme. 5. In respect to income tax, assessment for the year 1997-98 was made by Income Tax authorities. For alleged dues, notice was issued on 28th October, 1998 pursuant to order dated 14th October, 1998 passed under section 154/143(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. A penalty proceeding under section 221(1) of Income Tax Act, 1961 was also initiated by Income Tax authorities against petitioner-company for the amount mentioned in the notice dated 1st February, 2000, followed by order dated 24th March, 2000, notice dated 24th March, 2000. 6. The Company being sick, enquiry under section 16 of S.I.C.A. being pending before B.I.F.R.; Rehabilitation Scheme having sanctioned, the petitioner challenged the aforesaid notices and orders, in view of bar created under section 22(1) of S.I.C.A. 1985 Act in C.W.J.C. No. 1931 of 2000(R). 7. 6. The Company being sick, enquiry under section 16 of S.I.C.A. being pending before B.I.F.R.; Rehabilitation Scheme having sanctioned, the petitioner challenged the aforesaid notices and orders, in view of bar created under section 22(1) of S.I.C.A. 1985 Act in C.W.J.C. No. 1931 of 2000(R). 7. In respect to Sales Tax under Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, for the years 1994-95 and 1996-97, another proceeding initiated by State of Bihar, Commercial Taxes Department and a Notice No. 7175 dated 12th July, 2000 issued on petitioner. The same has been challenged by petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2462 of 2000(R) on same ground of prohibition under section 22(1) of S.I.C.A. 1985 Act. 8. Specific plea taken in both the cases that the aforesaid proceeding for realisation cannot be made without prior approval of the B.I.F.R. 9. The cousel for the Union of India and State in both the cases, mainly relied on Supreme Courts decision in Dy. C.T.O. V/s. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals and others, reported in. (1997) 10 S.C.C. 649 = A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 2027. In the said case, the Supreme Court held that the bar applies only to such of those dues recovered or included in sanctioned scheme or rehabilitation; for recovery of Sales tax dues, proceedings are not barred under section 22. The relevant portion of the finding reads, as follows: "... The language of Section 22 of the Act is certainly wide. But, in the totality of the circumstances, the safeguard is only against the impediment, that is likely to be caused in the implementation of the scheme. If that be so, only the liability or amounts covered by the scheme will be taken in, by Section 22 of the Act. So, we are of the view that though the language of Section 22 of the Act is of wide import regarding suspension of legal proceedings from the moment an enquiry started, till after the implementation of the scheme or the disposal of an appeal under Section 25 of the Act, it will be reasonable to hold that the bar or embargo envisaged in Section 22(1) of the Act can apply only to such of those dues reckoned or included in the sanctioned scheme. Such amounts like sales tax, etc., which the sick industrial company is enabled to collect after the date of the sanctioned scheme legitimately belonging to the Revenue, cannot be and could not have been intended to be covered within Section 22 of the Act. Any other construction will be unreasonable and unfair and will lead to a state of affair enabling the sick industrial unit to collect amounts due to the Revenue and withhold it indefinitely and unreasonably. Such a construction which is unfair, unreasonable and against spirit of the statute in a business sense, should be avoided." In the present case, the question is whether the tax (Income Tax/Sales Tax) of period, in question, can be recovered from out of the properties of the sick industrial company, in question (petitioner), without the consent of the Board. 10. To decide the aforesaid issue, apart from Sections 16 and 17 of S.I.C.A., 1985, one is to take into consideration Section 22, as far as material, as quoted below : "22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc.(1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an enquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof (and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loan or advance granted to the industrial company) shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the appellate authority." "(5) In computing the period of limitation for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or liabilily, the period during which it or the remedy for the enforcement thereof remain suspended under this section shall be excluded." 11. From aforesaid section 22(1), it will be evident that in case of enquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration by the Board or any appeal under section 25 is pending, then certain proceedings against the sick industrial company to be suspended or presumed to be suspended, including winding up of the industrial company, proceedings for execution, distress or the like against the properties of sick industrial company and the proceedings for the appellant of receiver etc. 12. In Gram Panchayat and another V/s. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Limited, (1990) 2 S.C.C. 440 , the Supreme Court held that the consent of Board for initiating proceeding for execution, distress or the like against the properties of a sick industrial company is necessary. The Board at its discretion may accord its approval and if approval is not granted, the remedy is not extinguished, but only postponed. Sub-section (5) of section 22 provides for exclusion of the period during which the remedy is suspended while computing the period of limitation for recovering the dues. 13. In Maharashtra Tubes Limited V/s. S.I.I. Corporation of Maharashtra Limited, (1993) 2 S.C.C. 144 , while similar view taken by the Supreme Court, it held that the word proceedings in section 22(1) has to be broadly construed, so as not to confine it to "legal proceedings as used in the marginal note of the provision, but all sorts of proceedings. 14. For the first time, the question fell for consideration before the Supreme Court as to whether Sales Tax dues can be recovered from sick industries and proceeding for recovery is barred under section 22 of S.I.C.A. 1985. The Supreme Court in Corromandal Pharmaceuticals (supra) held such recovery of Sales Tax dues is permissible and such proceeding is not barred under section 22, in the facts and circumstances of the said case. 15. Subsequently, similar matter relating to recovery of Sales Tax fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Tata Davy Ltd. V/s. State of Orissa and others, (1997) 6 S.C.C. 669 . The Supreme Court distinguished and explained the case of Corromandal Pharmaceuticals (supra) and held, as follows: "The Corromandal Pharmaceuticals judgment dealt with a sick industrial company which was enabled to collect amounts like sales tax after the date of the sanctioned scheme. The Supreme Court distinguished and explained the case of Corromandal Pharmaceuticals (supra) and held, as follows: "The Corromandal Pharmaceuticals judgment dealt with a sick industrial company which was enabled to collect amounts like sales tax after the date of the sanctioned scheme. This Court said: "Such amounts like sales tax, etc., which the sick industrial company is enabled to collect after the date of the sanctioned scheme legitimately belonging to the Revenue, cannot be and could not have been intended to be covered within section 22 of the Act." It added that the issue that had arisen before it had not arisen in the case of Vallabh Glass Works. It did not appear therefrom or from any other decision of this Court or of the High Courts "that in any one of them, the liability of the sick company dealt with therein itself arose, for the first time after the date of sanctioned scheme. At any rate, in none of those cases, a situation arose whereby the sick industrial unit was enabled to collect tax due to the Revenue from the customers after the sanctioned scheme but the sick unit simply folded its hands and declined to pay it over to the Revenue, for which proceedings for recovery had to be taken". Clearly, the facts in the Corromandal Pharmaceuticals case differ from the facts of the Vallabh Glass Works case and those before us. The reference to the Corromandal Pharmaceuticals case is, therefore, inapposite." 16. Similar question fell for consideration before this Court in Fusion Engineering Products Limited V/s. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1998(3) PLJR 772. That was a case relating to recovery of sales tax and proceeding for such recovery. Taking into consideration the Supreme Courts decision of Corromandal Pharmaceuticals (supra) and Tata Davy Ltd. (supra), the following observations made and finding given." "11. In the case of Corromandal Pharmaceuticals, the sanctioned scheme under section 19(3) of the SICA had come into existence on 19.11.1990. The dues which were sought to be recovered by the Commercial Tax Officer, however related to the subsequent period, namely, 1992- 93 and 1993-94 on the basis of assessment orders passed on 3.1.94 and in 1995 i.e. after the sanctioned scheme had come into effect on 19.11.90. The dues which were sought to be recovered by the Commercial Tax Officer, however related to the subsequent period, namely, 1992- 93 and 1993-94 on the basis of assessment orders passed on 3.1.94 and in 1995 i.e. after the sanctioned scheme had come into effect on 19.11.90. The Supreme Court observed that the provisions of SICA are certainly wide but in the totality of the circumstances, the safeguard is only against the impediments which are likely to be caused in the implementation of the scheme. The Court held that the bar or embargo envisaged in section 22(1) can apply to only such dues which have been reckoned or included in the sanctioned scheme. Amount like sales tax etc. which sick industrial company is enabled to collect after the date of the sanctioned scheme legitimately belong to the Revenue and the same is not covered by section 22." "12. I am afraid, the ratio of the decision in Corromandal Pharmaceutical case is of no avail to the respondents. In the present case, as noted above, the sanctioned scheme under section 19(2) of the Act has come into effect from 11.1.96. The alleged dues for recovery of which the order of attachment/notice has been issued, however, relates to the periods 1989-90, 1991-92 and 1992-93." 17. From the aforesaid finding of the Supreme Court and as explained by this Court in Fusion Engineering Products Ltd. (supra), it will be evident that while sales tax etc. collected by sick industrial company, prior to sanction of scheme under section 19(2) cannot be recovered without permission of B.I.F.R.; sales tax etc. collected or payable by the sick industrial company after the sanction of scheme, is recoverable without permission being not covered by section 22. 18. In the present case, the B.I.F.R. declared the petitioner company as a sick industrial company in its proceedings held on 4th March, 1998. The draft rehabilitation scheme sanctioned on 14th October, 1998 and rehabilitation scheme sanctioned on 11th February, 1999 under section 19(2) of the Act. 19. In the circumstances, while the bar of section 22 is applicable for recovery of taxes for period prior to 11th February, 1999, if any tax collected or payable by petitioner, company after 11th February, 1999, the bar being not applicable, it is open to the Tax authorities to recover such tax and to draw proceedings for such recovery. 20. 19. In the circumstances, while the bar of section 22 is applicable for recovery of taxes for period prior to 11th February, 1999, if any tax collected or payable by petitioner, company after 11th February, 1999, the bar being not applicable, it is open to the Tax authorities to recover such tax and to draw proceedings for such recovery. 20. Admittedly, the income tax relates to assessment year 1997-98, as earlier intimated on 3rd February, 1997 by an order passed under section 143(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, but the other relates to earlier assessment year 1996-97, as shown in C.W.J.C. No. 1931 of 2000(R). 21. Similarly, the C.W.J.C. No. 2462 of 2000(R) relates to sales tax for the year 1994-95 and 1996-97, for which assessments have been made prior to sanction of the scheme. 22. In the facts and circumstances, as both the income tax/sale tax relate to the period prior to sanction of the scheme (11th February, 1999), the Respondents cannot recover such tax or other amount from the petitioner-company, without consent of the Board, as the proceedings shall remain suspended. The Respondents are prohibited accordingly. 23. However, it is always open to the Respondents to seek consent/permission of competent authority under Section 25 of the 1985 Act for taking appropriate action. If the approval is not granted, the Respondents may avail remedy subsequently, as sub-section (5) of section 22 provides for exclusion of the period during which the remedy is suspended, for computing the period of limitation for recovering the dues. 24. Both the writ petitions stand disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions. A.K.Prasad, J. 25 I agree.