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2000 DIGILAW 117 (MAD)

Ravi v. E. Krishna Reddy

2000-01-31

S.S.SUBRAMANI

body2000
ORDER: Tenant in R.C.O.P.No.719 of 1994 on the file of the XIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, is the revision petitioner. 2. In an application for eviction, the landlord alleged that the petitioner herein, who is the tenant, is occupying the schedule premises on his agreeing to pay a monthly rent of Rs.120 and he took the schedule premises from the previous owner Mrs.Sukanya Purnaya. After the purchase from Mrs.Sukanya Purnaya, the landlord informed the tenant about his purchase and wanted the tenancy to be attorned. Under the same roof, there are other tenants and they surrendered possession and that portion of the building has already been demolished. The petitioner alone refused to vacate the premises. He also did not pay rent from May, 1988 till the date of petition. After purchase, the tenant also moved R.C.O.P.No.2626 of 1993 for depositing the rent in Court as if there is a doubt as to the person entitled to receive rent. In that case, both the previous owner and the present landlord were parties. That application was dismissed ‘as not pressed’ on 11.1.1994. In spite of dismissal of the earlier application, the tenant did not pay any rent and therefore, he is a wilful defaulter, liable to be evicted from the building, is the case of the landlord. 3. In the counter statement filed by the petitioner, he alleged that he is in possession of building for last more than 20 years. Originally, the premises was under the control of Administrator General of Madras and rent was being paid to him. Thereafter, when the property came to Mrs.Sukanya Purnaya, she informed the tenant to deposit the rent in her Bank Account S.B.Account No.34155 and the tenant still continues to deposit the rent in that account. The tenant further contended that he has not received any letter or notice either from the previous landlady about the sale of the schedule property or he did not have any knowledge about the same nor landlord has informed about the sale. On 12.11.1992, a notice was issued to the tenant about the factum of purchase, for which the tenant sent a reply on 2.12.1992, calling upon the landlord to disclose the details of purchase and also to furnish a copy of the sale deed. On 12.11.1992, a notice was issued to the tenant about the factum of purchase, for which the tenant sent a reply on 2.12.1992, calling upon the landlord to disclose the details of purchase and also to furnish a copy of the sale deed. Till date, the landlord has not submitted the particulars and therefore, he was compelled to move an application under Sec.9(3) of the Rent Control Act as to the person entitled to receive the rent. It is admitted in the counter that the application was dismissed. The tenant further submitted that he is continuing to deposit the rent in the Bank Account as directed by the previous owner and therefore, he was not committed any wilful default in paying the rent. 4. The Rent Controller took oral and documentary evidence. Exs.P-1 to P-5 were marked on the side of the landlord. Exs.R-1 to R-9 were marked on the side of the respondent/ tenant. Oral evidence consists of P.W.1 landlord and D.W.1 tenant. 5. After evaluating the entire evidence, the Rent Controller found that the tenant is liable to be evicted since he has wilfully defaulted in paying the rent. The Rent Controller held that the deposit made by the tenant in her Bank Account is not a proper tender. It further held that in spite of the fact that the landlord informed about the purchase, the tenant unneccessarily moved an application under Sec.9(3) of the Rent Control Act and got it dismissed. In spite of dismissal of the earlier application, the tenant did not tender the rent to the respondent herein and that shows his intention is not to pay rent and consequently, he is a wilful defaulter, liable to be evicted. 6. Aggrieved by the order, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.640 of 1996 on the file of the VIII Judge, Small Causes Court at Chennai. 7. The Appellate Authority also reappreciated the entire evidence and confirmed the decision of the Rent Controller by dismissing the appeal. The Appellate Authority further considered the question, whether the non-payment was wilful or not. From May, 1988 till January 1994, the rent was not paid to the respondent herein and the Appellate Authority has found that even though the tenant might have deposited the rent in her Bank Account, that is not a proper tender and therefore, he has committed wilful default in paying rent. From May, 1988 till January 1994, the rent was not paid to the respondent herein and the Appellate Authority has found that even though the tenant might have deposited the rent in her Bank Account, that is not a proper tender and therefore, he has committed wilful default in paying rent. The appeal was dismissed and a month’s time was granted to the tenant to surrender possession. 8. The concurrent findings of the Authorities below are assailed in this revision. 9. Since caveat was entered by the landlord, I heard the revision itself at the stage of admission. 10. It is admitted by the tenant that the building originally belonged to Mrs.Sukanya Purnaya and he was paying rent to her. It is also proved by documentary evidence in this case that Sukanya Purnaya on 26.5.1980 informed the tenant, asking him to deposit the rent in her Bank Account and the Account Number was also given to him. It is his case that ever since Ex.R-3 intimation from Sukanya Purnaya, the rent was being deposited in her Savings Bank Account. The landlord also did not challenge Ex.R-3. 11. According to the landlord, he has obtained the sale deed from the earlier owner and this fact was informed to the tenant as early as on 12.11.1992. Ex.R-8 is the notice issued by the counsel for the landlord. A reply was sent under Ex.R-7 by the revision petitioner, asking the landlord to send the copy of sale deed. Within a few days thereafter the tenant moved an application under Sec.9(3) of the Rent Control Act, impleading Sukanya Purnaya and the present respondent, alleging that there is a dispute or doubt as to the person entitled to receive the rent. Ex.P-1 is the application under Sec.9(3) filed by the petitioner herein. Exs.P-3 and P-4 are the counter statements filed by Sukanya Purnaya and the present respondent to that application. It is clear from those counter statements that Sukanya Purnaya declared that she has already sold the property in 1988 and that she was impleaded unnecessarily and she is also not entitled to receive rent. The Rent Controller as per order dated 11.1.1994, dismissed the application filed by the petitioner ‘as not pressed’. 12. Even though the application was dismissed on 11.1.1994, the tenant again did not pay rent to the landlord. He continued to deposit the rent in the Bank Account. The Rent Controller as per order dated 11.1.1994, dismissed the application filed by the petitioner ‘as not pressed’. 12. Even though the application was dismissed on 11.1.1994, the tenant again did not pay rent to the landlord. He continued to deposit the rent in the Bank Account. The question is, whether such conduct on the part of the tenant can be treated as a wilful default. 13. I have already said that the application filed by the tenant in R.C.O.P.No.2626 of 1993 was dismissed as not pressed. Under Sec.9(3) of the Rent Control Act, an application could be filed by the tenant, seeking permission to deposit the rent in Court if there is a bona fide doubt or dispute as to the person entitled to receive rent. That application was dismissed ‘as not pressed’. What is the consequence of dismissal of an application ‘as not pressed’? 14. As a result of ‘not pressing’ certain allegations and grounds raised in a pleading, a litigant submits that the issues arising therefrom may be decided against him and in favour of his opponent; and those issues are decided accordingly. It is virtually a decision by consent, in that the party asserting or disputing, concedes that his assertion or dispute, as the case may be, merits no consideration as he cannot substantiate the same. The allegations are, however, there, and they are decided. Therefore, what has been said of consent decisions, namely, “......the truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigations between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end” (Lord Horschell in In re: South American and Mexican Company Ex parte Bank of England, (1895)1 Ch.D. 37, can with much more force, be said of a decision that the allegations in the pleading have not been substantiated because they are not ‘pressed’ by the maker of those allegations. It cannot be said that the allegations which have been found and held to be not established are withdrawn in such circumstances. (See: Mohammed Master v. Abu Haji, 1981 K.L.T. 578.) [Italics supplied] 15. It cannot be said that the allegations which have been found and held to be not established are withdrawn in such circumstances. (See: Mohammed Master v. Abu Haji, 1981 K.L.T. 578.) [Italics supplied] 15. From the above decision, it is clear that the doubt or the alleged dispute which the petitioner alleged when he filed an application under Sec.9(3) of the Act did not merit any consideration and by not pressing, he himself was satisfied that there is no dispute as to the person entitled to receive rent. The present eviction petition was filed in March, 1994. Even in the present petition, the petitioner has not stated any reason as to why he did not pay rent even after 11.1.1994. Counter was filed only in July, 1994. Even after the counter, he continued to deposit the rent only in the Bank Account. The lower appellate Court has held in paragraph 14 of the judgment that till 14.12.1995, the rent was being deposited only in the Bank. When the petitioner himself did not have any doubt as to the person entitled to receive rent, the subsequent non-payment to the respondent herein can be considered only as a wilful default. 16. In a recent decision rendered by my learned brother Justice K.Sampath in Abdul Fatha v. Villayaudham, (1998)3 M.L.J. 237 : (1998)3 L.W. 526 , the learned Judge held that if the tenant has been informed about the purchase, invoking the provisions of Sec.9 of the Rent Control Act is mischievous. When an application was dismissed ‘as not pressed’, he agreed that his application merits no consideration since he cannot substantiate the same. When he himself knows that he cannot substantiate his case and agrees that his application merits no consideration moving an application under Sec.9(3) is also without any bona fides. His intention is not to pay rent. It has come out in evidence that all the other tenants under the same roof have vacated and surrendered possession to the present respondent. The petitioner alone disputed the right of the respondent as landlord. After 11.1.1994 what made him to deposit again in the Bank Account of the previous owner. The only explanation offered by the tenant is under Ex.R-3, he was asked to deposit the amount in Bank and therefore, he continued to deposit. I do not think the submission of the counsel could be accepted. After 11.1.1994 what made him to deposit again in the Bank Account of the previous owner. The only explanation offered by the tenant is under Ex.R-3, he was asked to deposit the amount in Bank and therefore, he continued to deposit. I do not think the submission of the counsel could be accepted. In the previous proceedings, the previous owner has admitted that she has ceased to be owner and she has no right to receive rent. When she herself has stated so and the petitioner also did not pursue the earlier petition, he cannot contend that he bona fide believed that he must deposit rent in that account. 17. As was held in Selvaraj alias Subbarama Reddiar v. K.Mumtaz Begum, 100 L.W. 510, if the tenant continues to deposit the rent in the account of the previous owner, the said deposit cannot be said as bona fide deposit and the consequences of the wilful default will have to follow. 18. The subsequent conduct of the tenant is also relevant. In this connection, after the Rent Control petition was ordered, the tenant has sent a cheque for Rs.12,360 without giving any explanation. The same was returned by the landlord as per letter dated 25.12.1996. Thereafter, we find, the tenant used to send the amount to the counsel once in three months or four months as and when he chooses. The rent for May, 1988 to December, 1996, a sum of Rs.12,360 was paid as per covering letter dated 5.1.1997. Except for one payment in February, 1997, all the other payments are made within a period three or four months only. The rent from March, 1997 to June, 1997 was sent by demand draft on 9.7.1997. It is clear from the covering letter that even though the demand draft was purchased on 22.5.1997 and 25.6.1997, the amount was sent to the landlord’s counsel only on 9.7.1997. Likewise, the rent for July to September, 1997 was sent in October, 1997 and the rent for the months of January to March, 1998 was sent in May, 1998. I do not want to further give details though the learned counsel for the respondent took me to all payments made till the date of hearing. It is clear from those correspondence that the tenant did not want to pay rent in time and the payment was made only in lump. I do not want to further give details though the learned counsel for the respondent took me to all payments made till the date of hearing. It is clear from those correspondence that the tenant did not want to pay rent in time and the payment was made only in lump. The said conduct also shows the intention of the tenant is not to pay rent or at least he has got an intention that amount due to the landlord should not be received in time. Even the draft purchased is not sent to the landlord within a reasonable time. 19. The subsequent conduct is also relevant in view of the decision reported in A.P.Swamy v. Kunjithapadam, (1994)2 L.W. 661 , wherein Justice Thanikkachalam (as he then was) was held thus: “In this case during the pendency of the eviction petition the tenant failed to pay the rent to the landlord. The landlord filed two petitions under Sec.11(4) of the Act. In pursuance of the orders passed in the said petition, the tenant paid a sum of Rs.15,000 and Rs.4,000 on 6.10.1989 and 2.5.1990 respectively. Under Sec.11(1) of the Act, the tenant should not only pay the arrears of rent, but also should pay the rent regularly every month during the pendency of the eviction proceedings. In any event there is no evidence on the side of the tenant to show that the rent at the rate of Rs.1,000 was paid between July, 1988 and February, 1989. Therefore, the tenant is liable to be evicted under Sec.10(2)(i) of the Act.” 20. Justice Jagadeesan has also taken a similar view in B.Anraj Pipada v. V.Umayal, (1998)3 L.W. 159 : (1998)2 M.L.J. 524 . In para.6 of the judgment, the learned Judge held thus: “6. When the eviction proceedings have been initiated on the ground of wilful default, one would expect the tenant to pay the rent regularly every month at least after the initiation of the proceedings. When the tenant has failed to pay the rent regularly even during the pendency of the proceedings, then there is no doubt that his conduct in paying the rent as he likes, will amount to wilful default. I can have support of Judgment of this Court reported in Sundaram Steel Co., etc. v. S.Lakshmi, (1997)2 L.W. 501 , wherein it is held as follows: 7. I can have support of Judgment of this Court reported in Sundaram Steel Co., etc. v. S.Lakshmi, (1997)2 L.W. 501 , wherein it is held as follows: 7. Further, I also find the observation in the impugned order of the Appellate Authority stating that in the petition filed by the landlady under Sec.11 of the Act, the petitioners were directed to deposit on 29.9.1989 a sum of Rs.14,700 representing the rental dues as on that date. I also find that the said sum was subsequently deposited on 30.9.1989. That is why the Appellate Authority also observes that even after filing of the eviction petition, the tenants did not pay the rental arrears for several months presumably for as many as 21 months. 8. In the above circumstances, there is no case for admission of this civil revision petition and hence it is dismissed. Consequently C.M.P.Nos.15891 and 15892 are dismissed, No costs.” 21. From the above decisions, it is clear that the tenant has no right to contend that he should not be termed as ‘wilful defaulter’. 22. In the result, the C.R.P. is without merit and consequently, the same is dismissed with costs. C.M.P.No.460 of 2000 is also dismissed.