JUDGMENT R.L. Anand, J. - This is defendants appeal and has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 8.12.1999 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Faridabad who affirmed the judgment and decree dated 6.3.1999 passed by the Court of Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Division) who decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff and against the present defendant-appellant with costs and the declaration was granted in favour of the plaintiff that lease deed dated 25.6.1987 qua suit land, is illegal, void and is not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs and the same was set aside. Consequential relief was also given in favour of the plaintiffs by way of passing a decree of possession of the suit land. 2. Some facts can be noticed in the following manner. A lease deed dated 25.6.1987 was executed by Shri Rajpal Singh in favour of Shri Duli Chand for a period of 99 years. The challenge was given by the plaintiffs to this lease deed on the plea that the property measuring 8 kanals in the hands of Shri Raj Pal Singh was ancestral/co-parcenary and Shri Rajpal Singh was a man of questionable habits and he had no legal necessity to transfer the property by way of lease. 3. The defendant No. 1 had taken advantage of the weakness of defendant No. 2 and got the lease deed executed on 25.6.1987 for a period of 99 years. This document of lease is not an act of good management on the part of defendant No. 2 nor it was so executed for the benefit of the family. Only a nominal amount of Rs. 200/- per annum has been fixed as lease money by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 and this act on the part of defendant No. 2 speaks volumes of the fact that the lease deed was not executed as an act of good management. The plaintiffs further alleged that Shri Rajinder Pal Singh was a man of immoral character and the execution of lease deed does not affect the reversionary rights of the plaintiff. 4. The contest was given to the suit by the present defendant-appellant on the plea that the property is not ancestral and that there was an act of good management on the part of defendant No. 2 when he executed the lease deed. 5. 4. The contest was given to the suit by the present defendant-appellant on the plea that the property is not ancestral and that there was an act of good management on the part of defendant No. 2 when he executed the lease deed. 5. From the pleadings of the parties the trial Court framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the impugned lease deed dated 25.6.1987 is illegal, void and hence not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs ? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for possession of the suit property ? OPP 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? OPD 4. Whether the suit is collusive between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 2 ? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the suit ? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their own act and conduct from filing the present suit ? OPD 7. Whether the suit is not maintainable ? OPD 8. Relief. An additional issue was also framed as issue No. 2-A, which is as under :- "2-A. Whether the plaintiffs and defendant No. 2 constitute Joint Hindu Family and the suit property is their ancestral joint undivided Hindu family coparcenary property ? OPP" The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 6.3.1999 decreed the suit of the plaintiffs in the terms as stated above. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, defendant- appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Additional District Judge, who for the valid reasons given in paras No. 14 to 28 of its judgment dismissed the appeal. Paras No. 14 to 28 of the judgment of the first appellate Court are reproduced as under :- "14. Learned counsel for the appellant assailed the finding of the court below on issue No. 2-A by contending that there was no cogent evidence on record on the basis of which it could be held that the suit land was Joint Hindu Family property in the hands of respondent No. 3 Raj Pal Singh as karta. It was candidly conceded that while there was presumption of family of the father and sons among the Hindus being joint but there was no presumption that a Joint Hindu Family had also Joint Hindu Family property. Presumption was rather otherwise. It was candidly conceded that while there was presumption of family of the father and sons among the Hindus being joint but there was no presumption that a Joint Hindu Family had also Joint Hindu Family property. Presumption was rather otherwise. The learned counsel contended that the suit land could be established to be the Joint Hindu Family property in the hands of respondent No. 3 qua his sons respondents No. 1 and 2 only if the said property had devolved upon respondent No. 3 Raj Pal Singh from his father Ram Dayal by way of inheritance. Reliance in this connection was placed upon a Supreme Court judgment reported as Mst. Shyam Kaur v. Hari Singh, 1971 Current Law Journal 702 wherein it was held that for property to be ancestral in nature, it has to be shown firstly that it was owned by a common ancestor, secondly that it had descended to the party or parties concerned by inheritance and in no other manner. Learned counsel contended that Ex. P-7 was the copy of jamabandi for the year 1967-68 in which both Raj Pal Singh respondent No. 3 and his brother Rajinder Singh are recorded to be the joint owners of the suit land. Same very position was depicted in the copy of jamabandi for the year 1950-51 Ex. P-9. The learned counsel urged that as per copy of jamabandi Ex. P-7, old khewat number of the suit land was 67 but from the document Ex. P-8, it was clear that the said khewat No. 657 came into existence in place of old khewat Nos. 50, 51 and 58. The learned counsel further urged that in the jamabandi for the year 1950-51 which was of pre-consolidation period, there was the mention of khasra No. 50 and 51 only and not of khasra No. 58. No khatoni paimaish having been produced, it, therefore, could not be said that the suit land devolved upon Rajinder Singh and Raj Pal Singh in lieu of the lands comprised in old khewat No. 50, 51 and 58 which might have been inherited by them from their father. It was thus contended that the suit land was not proved to be ancestral in the hands of Rajpal Singh qua his sons Mahabir and Gulab Singh. It was thus contended that the suit land was not proved to be ancestral in the hands of Rajpal Singh qua his sons Mahabir and Gulab Singh. The learned counsel also placed reliance upon the authorities Ram Dutt v. Ashok Kumar, 1983 CLJ (Civil and Crl.) 612 and Chhaju Ram v. Kapuria Ram, 1987 SLJ 725. In Ram Dutts case (supra), the Courts below had raised the presumption that the two brothers, who had been recorded owners might have inherited the same from their father. This presumption was discarded by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by holding that the same could be raised only from the entries of first settlement before which there was no record. In Chhaju Rams case (supra), mutation of inheritance was not produced and in this background, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that in the absence of mutation of inheritance, it could not be said that the property was inherited from the common ancestors and thus it was held that the property was not proved to be ancestral in nature. In the present case also, argued the counsel, it was not established at all if respondent No. 3 Raj Pal Singh and his brother Rajinder had inherited the suit land by way of inheritance from their father Ram Dayal as mutation of inheritance had not been placed on record. So, prayer was made for reversing the finding of the trial Court on issue No. 2-A in so far as it has been held therein that the suit land was the ancestral co-parcenary property in the hands of Rajpal Singh qua his sons Mahabir and Gulab Singh. 15. I am, however, afraid to accept the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. In the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, it does not make much difference that respondents No. 1 and 2 did not place on record the mutation showing the mode of devolution of the suit land from Ram Dayal to Rajpal Singh. This is because the appellant Duli Chand himself has admitted in his cross-examination that the suit land had devolved upon Raj Pal Singh and his brother Rajinder Singh in equal shares after the death of their father Ram Dayal. Thus, it is clear that the suit land descended upon Raj Pal Singh from his father Ram Dayal by way of inheritance. Thus, it is clear that the suit land descended upon Raj Pal Singh from his father Ram Dayal by way of inheritance. It was thus ancestal co-parcenary property in the hands of Raj Pal Singh qua his sons Mahabir and Gulab Singh. In Chhaju Rams case (supra) there was no admission of the opposite party that the suit land was ancestral in nature and for this reason, the absence of mutation was held to be decisive factor. 16 . Once finding of the trial Court on issue No. 2-A is confirmed, them from the evidence on record, there is no escape from the conclusion that the impugned lease-deed dated 25.6.1987 is a nullity in the eyes of law. This is because under Hindu law, karta of a Joint Hindu Family can alienate the suit property only by way of legal necessity and consideration or as an act of good management. In the present case, there are circumstances galore from which it is more than clear that the transaction of lease-deed dated 25.6.1987 was not an act of good management. 17. Ex. P-1 is the certified copy of the lease-deed dated 25.6.1987. It shows that Raj Pal Singh executed this lease-deed for a period of 99 years in favour of Duli Chand appellant on payment of Rs. 200/- annually as lease money. Receipt of a paltry amount of Rs. 200/- annually as lease money was clearly an act of waste or bad management. PW-1 Tek Chand has stated that the suit land was chahi in character and was yielding two crops. One acre of land in this area was yielding 50 mounds of wheat besides some other produce in the second crop. He has then stated that in this area such like lands could be given on annual patta of Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 6,000/-. To the same effect is the statement of PW-2 Mahabir. Matter does not rest here. Even DW-1 Om Parkash has stated that the suit land was lilting two crops in a year and one acre of land could produce 35-40 mounds of wheat and the second crop of jawar, bajra or rice could also be grown after that. Therefore, leasing out the suit land on annual payment of Rs. Matter does not rest here. Even DW-1 Om Parkash has stated that the suit land was lilting two crops in a year and one acre of land could produce 35-40 mounds of wheat and the second crop of jawar, bajra or rice could also be grown after that. Therefore, leasing out the suit land on annual payment of Rs. 200/- as lease money and that too for a period of 99 years cannot be said to be a prudent act on the part of Raj Pal Singh. 18. Contention of the appellants counsel that the suit land was not under the possession of Raj Pal Singh is without any basis because the lease-deed Ex. P-1 shows that Raj Pal Singh had handed over actual physical possession of the suit land to the appellant. Ex. P-3 copy of jamabandi for the year 1987-88 undoubtedly shows the suit land under the cultivating possession of the mortgagee Leela but then subsequent jamabandi for the year 1992-93 (Ex. P-1) shows the cultivating possession of the appellant on the suit land. This means, that before the execution of the lease-deed, Raj Pal Singh had got the suit land redeemed from the mortgagee Smt. Leela. Ex. D-8 is the copy of mutation No. 726 sanctioned on 18.3.1989 showing that the suit land had been redeemed from Smt. Leela by Rajpal Singh. 19. There is no averment at all in the appellant lease-deed Ex. P-1 from which it can be inferred or shown that this lease-deed was executed by Rajpal Singh for any legal necessity. As a matter of fact, there was no question of any such recital because this lease-deed was executed for a consideration of Rs. 200/- per year as lease money. From this meagre amount, no legal necessity could be fulfilled. It is, therefore, idle to contend that after executing this lease-deed, Raj Pal Singh used its proceeds in getting his other mortgaged lands redeemed, for marrying his daughter and for constructing a house. 20. Appellants counsel also drew my attention towards Ex. D-1 which is some receipt dated 25.6.1987 showing that at the time of execution of the lease- deed, Rajpal Singh had been paid an amount of Rs. 6400/- in lump-sum towards the lease money of 32 years. 21. The aforesaid receipt Ex. D-1 is clearly a fabricated one. Its witnesses are Tek Chand and Om Parkash. D-1 which is some receipt dated 25.6.1987 showing that at the time of execution of the lease- deed, Rajpal Singh had been paid an amount of Rs. 6400/- in lump-sum towards the lease money of 32 years. 21. The aforesaid receipt Ex. D-1 is clearly a fabricated one. Its witnesses are Tek Chand and Om Parkash. Tek Chand has appeared in the witness-box as DW1 and stated that no such payment was made in his presence and that he had signed the said receipt in good faith on the asking of the parties. Om Parkash has appeared in the witnees-box as DW1. He has stated that the payment of Rs. 6400/- was made to Rajpal Singh in the presence of the Sub Registrar. There is, however, no endorsement of the Sub Registrar to this effect on the lease deed Ex. P-1. Thus, then alleged payment of Rs. 6400/- to Raj Pal Singh as lease money in lump sum is a cock and bull story and more so, when there is no recital of this payment in the body of the lease-deed Ex. P-1. 22. Even if for arguments sake, this payment of Rs. 6400/- is held to be genuine, then also transaction of lease-deed cannot be said to be a prudent bargain. When suit land could be given on payment of Rs. 5000/- to 6000/- annually as lease money, then receipt of Rs. 6400/- in advance towards lease money of 32 years carried no sense. 23. Appellant Duli Chand as DW-1 has also stated that as a matter of fact, he had purchased the suit land for a sum of Rs. 42000/- but no formal sale-deed could be executed and that before getting the sale-deed executed, he had got executed in his favour this lease-deed from Raj Pal on account of fear of the suit land being pre-empted. He has further claimed that he had made the payment of Rs. 42000/- to Rajpal Singh. This statement on the face of it is not reliable as in the written statement, it is not pleaded that the impugned lease-deed was sham transaction and actually it was a sale for a sum of Rs. 42000/-. Then it is not understandable as to why any receipt was not got executed showing payment of the alleged amount of Rs. 42000/- to Rajpal Singh. The appellant had obtained receipt Ex. D-1 the sum of Rs. 6400/-. 42000/-. Then it is not understandable as to why any receipt was not got executed showing payment of the alleged amount of Rs. 42000/- to Rajpal Singh. The appellant had obtained receipt Ex. D-1 the sum of Rs. 6400/-. In such a background, it is difficult to believe that he will make payment of Rs. 42000/- without any document being executed. 24. So, in the net result, I agree with the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the trial Court that the impugned lease-deed dated 25.6.1987 tantamounts to alienation and an act of bad and imprudent management. The same cannot be binding upon the respondents No. 1 and 2 who were co-parceners in the Joint Hindu Family of which their father Raj Pal Singh was karta. I, therefore, affirm this finding without any reservation. 25. Counsel for the appellant further assailed the findings of the Court below on issues No. 2 and 3 by contending that the appellants were not entitled for the relief claimed as Smt. Kailashi and Gulab Singh were the owners of the suit land by virtue of a civil Court decree dated 16.5.1992 rendered by the Court of Shri A.K. Bhardwaj, then Subordinate Judge, Palwal. My attention in this regard was drawn towards Ex. D-9 which is a certified copy of mutation No. 841 sanctioned on 31.1.1995 on the basis of this civil Court decree dated 16.5.1992. 26. Even the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel is futile. A perusal of copy of mutation Ex. D-9 shows that Smt. Kailashi and her brother Gulab Singh became joint owners of some land, including the suit land by virtue of civil Court decree dated 16.5.1992. Gulab Singh is admittedly plaintiff No. 2 in the suit who is now respondent No. 2 in this appeal. So, even if Smt. Kailashi was not impleaded as a co-plaintiff, the same does not make any difference because even one of the co-owners is entitled to institute a suit for possession. If any authority is required on this point, then reference can usefully be made to a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana reported as Azmer Singh v. Shamsher Singh, 1983 PLJ 786. If any authority is required on this point, then reference can usefully be made to a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana reported as Azmer Singh v. Shamsher Singh, 1983 PLJ 786. Trial Court has further rightly held that Smt. Kailashi being a female was not a co-parcener and thus she could not assail the alienation of the suit land by her father Rajpal Singh and Gulab Singh being a co-parcener, had every locus standi to assail this transaction as being without any legal necessity and consideration or as being an act of bad management. 27. I, therefore, hold that the suit could not be dismissed for want of impleadment of Smt. Kailashi as a party. A decree for possession in respect of the suit land can well be passed in favour of Gulab Singh who, of course, will hold possession of behalf of the other co-owner Kailashi also. With these observations, I confirm the findings of the trial Court on issues No. 2 and 3 also. 28. Appellants counsel also could not show as to how the suit was collusive between respondents No. 1 and 2 and their father. He further could not point out as to how respondents No. 1 and 2 had no cause of action to bring this suit and as to how they were estopped from filing the suit by their own acts and conduct. Further, it could not be established as to how the suit was not maintainable in its present form. Findings of the trial Court on issues No. 4 to 7 in favour of respondents No. 1 and 2 are also, therefore, affirmed." Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, the present appeal has been filed. 7. I have heard Shri C.B. Goel, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the appellant and with his assistance gone through the paper-book of this case. 8. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, I am of the considered opinion that there is no illegality or impropriety in the impugned judgments. The judgments are well reasoned. 9. There was hardly any legal necessity on the part of defendant No. 2 to execute the lease deed for a period of 99 years. It was not an act of good management. The judgments are well reasoned. 9. There was hardly any legal necessity on the part of defendant No. 2 to execute the lease deed for a period of 99 years. It was not an act of good management. It is further held that the property in the hands of defendant No. 2, in the trial Court, was ancestral and the plaintiffs had interest by birth. 10. Faced with this difficulty, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was illegality on the part of the Court below when they granted a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiffs. At the most the courts below could grant a declaration that the lease deed will not affect the reversionary rights of the plaintiffs. 11. This argument is misplaced. The plaintiffs are not suing under a custom. They filed a suit for declaration under the Hindu law on the plea that they have a right by birth in the property or estate in the hands of defendant No. 2 and if that property had been alienated or transferred or leased out without any legal necessity or without the benefit of the estate or not an act of good management, such an action on the part of the last holder of the property can always be challenged by a co-parcener. Since in this case the possession has been delivered by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1, therefore, the decree for possession was a consequential relief which was always open and available to the plaintiffs because the property will again revert back to the co-parcenary headed by defendant No. 2. 12. It was then submitted by the counsel that the suit of the plaintiffs was hopelessly barred by limitation. Again this argument is not acceptable to this Court. The plaintiffs are virtually suing on the question of their title and as I have stated above, they are co-parceners and had interest in the Joint Hindu Family property by birth. In these circumstances, every day till the lease is set aside, furnishes a cause of action to the plaintiff. Resultantly, the plaintiffs suit was also within limitation. 13. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no finding of the Courts below that defendant No. 2 was a man of bad character and in these circumstances, the lease deed could not be set aside. Resultantly, the plaintiffs suit was also within limitation. 13. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no finding of the Courts below that defendant No. 2 was a man of bad character and in these circumstances, the lease deed could not be set aside. There is no merit in this contention. The plaintiffs had taken many pleas including the one as suggested by the counsel for the appellant. It was the case of the plaintiffs that leasing out the land for 99 years by defendant No. 2, against a nominal consideration, was not an act of good management. Certainly both the Courts could not come to the conclusion that it was an act of good management. In these circumstances, this lease deed of 99 years does not confer any right, title or interest in favour of defendant No. 1. No merit. Dismissed. Appeal dismissed.