Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing the Notification dated 13.9.96 (Annexure 2) issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ``the Act); Declaration under Section 6 of the Act, dated 27.5.97 (Annexure 5) and Award dated 15.5.99 (Annexure 7) in respect of the land of the petitioner. (2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued in respect of the land measuring 68 Bighas 9 Biswas situate in the revenue estate of village Mandeswar-Ka-Guda and neighbouring villages in Udaipur district, which also included petitioners land measuring about 2 Bighas and 18 Biswas. Petitioner filed objection under Section 5-A of the Act on 16.1.97 (Annexure 3) contending that the land of the petitioner be not acquired. However, after considering objections. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 27.5.97 (Annexure 5). The substance of Section 6 Declaration was published in the Official Gazette and also in news papers and the last publication was made on 8.7.97. Petitioner filed Statement of Claim under Section 9 of the Act on 23.12.97 and impugned award was made on 15.5.99 (Annexure 7). (3). The instant writ petition has been filed on various grounds, but mainly on the ground of not affixing the substance of Section 4 notification at the conspicuous places in the locality and that the Award has been made without seeking ``previous approval of the ``appropriate Government or the Officer authorised to approve it by the ``appropriate Government. (4). There can be no quarrel with the legal proposition that the substance of the notification under Section 4 must also be affixed in the common conspicuous places in the locality and this requirement is mandatory in law. (Vide Babu Barkya Thakur vs. State of Bombay, (1), Smt. Somawanti & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (2), Khub Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (3), State of Mysore vs. Abdul Razak Sahib (4) and Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal (5). (5). (Vide Babu Barkya Thakur vs. State of Bombay, (1), Smt. Somawanti & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (2), Khub Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (3), State of Mysore vs. Abdul Razak Sahib (4) and Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal (5). (5). But as the validity of Section 4 Notification is concerned the same cannot be agitated at such a belated stage as it is settled proposition of law that when a person challenges Section 4 Notification on any ground, it should be challenged within reasonable period and if the acquisition is challenged at a belated stage, the petition deserves to be dismissed only on this count, as explained by Honble the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Singh & Ors. State of U.P. (6), wherein it has been held that where a large area of land is acquired and the plots which are subject to acquisition belong to large number of persons, if other persons have not challenged the acquisition proceedings, it is difficult to believe that petitioner was not aware of the initiation of the acquisition proceedings as the acquisition of the said land would be the talk of the town in a short time and if the person interested failed to approach the writ court within reasonable period, the petition should fail only on the ground of delay. A Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors. (7), has observed as under:- ``.....to have sat in fence and allowed the government to complete the acquisition on the basis that notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on the grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published, would be putting a premium of delatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners. (6). Same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Mysore vs. V.K. Kangan (8), wherein it was observed that respondent was not entitled to challenge the validity of Section 4 notification after an unreasonable lapse of time. (6). Same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Mysore vs. V.K. Kangan (8), wherein it was observed that respondent was not entitled to challenge the validity of Section 4 notification after an unreasonable lapse of time. If public notice as required by Section 4 of the Act was not given and that would, per se, vitiate the notification under Section 4, the person interested should have challenged its validity within a reasonable time of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. (7). A similar view has been reiterated in the Ramjas Foundation & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (9) and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (10). (8). The issue of delay in filing the writ petition was considered by the Honble Apex Court in Smt. Sudama Devi vs. Commissioner & Ors. (11), wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:- ``There is no period of limitation prescribed by any law for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is, in fact, doubtful whether any such period of limitation can be prescribed by law. In any event, one thing is clear and beyond doubt that no such period of limitation can be laid down either under the rules made by the High Court or by practice. For every case, it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances whether the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as period of limitation. There may be cases where even short delay may be fatal while there may be cases where even a long delay may not be evidence of laches on the part of the petitioner. (9). Similarly, in State of U.P. vs. Raj Bahadur Singh & Anr. (12), the Honble Apex Court held that ``there is no time limit for filing the writ petition. All that the Court has to see is whether the laches on the part of the petitioner are such as to disentitle him to the relief claimed by him. (10). This aspect also requires to be examined from another angle. (12), the Honble Apex Court held that ``there is no time limit for filing the writ petition. All that the Court has to see is whether the laches on the part of the petitioner are such as to disentitle him to the relief claimed by him. (10). This aspect also requires to be examined from another angle. Petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the said Notification for the reason that the purpose of publication of the substance in local news papers and affixing it on the conspicuous places is to inform the tenure-holders about the proposed acquisition proceedings and as the petitioner has filed his objection under Section 5-A of the Act, it is not permissible for him to agitate that he had not been aware of the proposed acquisition proceedings initiated by Section 4 Notification for the reason that mere violation of law does not give rise to cause of action for filing a writ petition. Suffering in legal injury by the petitioner by non-observance of the mandatory provision of the statute is a condition precedent for maintaining a writ petition unless the issue itself hinges on the jurisdiction of the Authority concerned. (11). A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory right or when there is a complaint by the petitioner that there is a breach of statutory duty on the part of the respondent and the same has adversely affected the petition. Therefore, there must be judicially enforceable right for the enforcement of which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such writ jurisdiction. (State of Kerala vs. K.G. Madhavan Pillai (13), State of Kerala vs. A Lakshmikutty & Ors. (14), Mani Subrat Jain and others vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (15), Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and others (16), and Smt. Rampati Jaiswal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (17). (12). (State of Kerala vs. K.G. Madhavan Pillai (13), State of Kerala vs. A Lakshmikutty & Ors. (14), Mani Subrat Jain and others vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (15), Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and others (16), and Smt. Rampati Jaiswal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (17). (12). In Rajendra Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (18), the Apex Court held that mere violation of each and every provision of law does not furnish a ground for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In most of the cases, substantial compliance of law would be enough and unless it is established that violation of law has caused substantial prejudice to the petitioner, no interference is warranted. (13). In the facts and circumstances of the case, I fail to understand how the cause of the petitioner is prejudiced as the action of the respondents has to be tested on the touch-stone of the Doctrine of Prejudice. (Vide Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors vs. B. Karunakar & Ors. (19), State Bank of Patiala & Ors. vs. S.K. Sharma (20), Maj. G.S. Sodhi vs. Union of India (21), S.K. Singh vs. Central Bank of India & Ors. (22), and Monika Jain vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (23). Thus, I am of the candid view that the petitioner cannot challenge the validity of Section 4 on the ground of not giving due publicity to its substance as even if it was so, it did not prejudice the cause of the petitioner. (14). Thus, there is no force in the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner regarding the validity of Section 4 Notification and are hereby rejected. (15). It has vehemently been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Award was made on 15.5.99 (Annexure 7) without ``previous approval of the ``appropriate Government or the Officer authorised by the appropriate Government on this behalf. Undisputed facts remain that the award could have been made upto 7.7.99, i.e. within two years from the date of last publication of Section 6 Declaration, which was made on 8.7.97. Award was made on 15.5.99 and was sent for approval and the approval was granted on 14.6.99 and against the said award, petitioner filed reference under Section 18 of the Act on 15.11.99. Award was made on 15.5.99 and was sent for approval and the approval was granted on 14.6.99 and against the said award, petitioner filed reference under Section 18 of the Act on 15.11.99. Petitioners case is that making the Award without seeking prior approval of the Government is not permissible in law. Respondents have submitted that the Award was made and sent for approval and as the approval has been accorded within a period of two years from the date of last publication of Section 6 Declaration, no fault can be found with it. (16). Thus, the only controversy, which remains to be resolved, is : whether approval of the ``Appropriate Government or the Officer authorised on this behalf, is mandatory, or the approval can be sought after making the Award? In support of his case, petitioners counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Rajeev Gupta & Anr. (24), wherein it has categorically been held that the provisions contained in the proviso to Section 11 are mandatory in nature as the same relate to the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Collector. In case the Collector had already been authorised to make the award without approval upto a particular pecuniary limit, the Award will not vitiate if the approval is not sought and award is within the said authorised limit. In that case it would be a case of general ``previous approval as held by the Honble Supreme Court in N. Raghavendra Rao vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Manglore, (25). In case such an authorisation has not been made or the award is for more than the authorised limit, prior approval is mandatory and as it relates to the jurisdictional issue and goes to the route of the cause, Award made by the Land Acquisition Collector without such approval would be nullity, and inconsequential. The contention raised by the respondents that the Award stood approved by the Authority within the limitation, i.e. two years from the date of last publication of Section 6 Declaration and, therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner is not tenable, as the matter relates to the jurisdiction and after approval the award has not been made by the Collector within the limitation, not uptil now, nor the statute provides for making the award twice. (17). (17). While dealing with identical case, the Calcutta High Court, in Somari Debi vs. Howrah Improvement Trust & Ors. (26), has held that in absence of express authorisation by the appropriate Government or Officer Authorised in this behalf, if the Award is made by the Land Acquisition Collector/Officer without previous approval, the Award is of no consequence. More so, such an authorisation should be in writing for the reasons that Section 11(1) shows that an award relates to; (i) the true area of the land; (ii) the compensation to be allowed for the land; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation. Thus, even if such an authorisation is there, it must cover all the relevant issues. (18). Similarly, the Madras High Court, in case of C. Jayarama Reddy vs. Land Acquisition Officer (27), held that under the first proviso to Section 11 of the Act, no award can be made by the Collector without ``previous approval of the appropriate Government or such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf and any award passed in violation thereto renders the award non est and void as it hinges upon the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Collector to make the award. In the eye of law, when there is no award passed within the period of two years, as contemplated under Section 11-A of the Act, the entire land acquisition proceedings under the Act would lapse. In Abdul Majid Sahib & Anr. vs. The District Collector & Ors. (28), the Apex Court held that ``the Land Acquisition Officer is statutorily under...an obligation, at the pain of invalidation of the acquisition itself, to make the award within two years unless it falls within one of the provisions or the explanation added thereto. The Act does not contemplate for subsequent ratification. (Vide Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal vs. State of Punjab (29). (19). The specific words contained in the provision are ``previous approval. The literal meaning of it comes to prior approval and if the interpretation given by the respondents is accepted, the word ``previous becomes redundant, which is not permissible in law. (20). No word in a Statute has to be construed as surplusage. No word can be rendered ineffective or purposeless. Courts are required to carry out the legislative intent fully and completely. (20). No word in a Statute has to be construed as surplusage. No word can be rendered ineffective or purposeless. Courts are required to carry out the legislative intent fully and completely. While construing a provision, full effect is to be given to the language used therein, giving reference to the context and other provisions of the Statute. By construction, a provision should not be reduced as a ``dead letter or ``useless lumber. An interpretation which renders a provision an exercise in futility, should be avoided, otherwise it would mean that enacting such a provision in subordinate legislation was ``an exercise in futility and the product came as a ``purposeless piece of legislation and provision had been enacted without any purpose and entire exercise to enact such a provision was ``most unwarranted besides being uncharitable. (Vide M.V. Elisabeth and others vs. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. (30), and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. Price Water-house & Anr. (31), Martin Burn Ltd. vs. Corporation of Calcutta (32), Patel Chunibhai Dejibhai vs. Narayanrao K. Jambekar & Anr. (33), Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain (34), State of Bihar vs. Bihar Distillery Ltd. and others (35), South Central Railway Employees Co-operative Credit Society Employees Union, Secunderabad vs. Registrar of Co-operative Societies & Ors. (36), and Subash Chandra Sharma vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (37). (21). The language of the Act is very clear and it does not require any interpretation because there is no ambiguity in it. In case the language of a Statute is unambiguous, there can be no need to interpret it or examine the intent or object of the Act and the Courts must give effect to it unless it leads to an absurdity or injustice. It is well recognised canon of interpretation that provision curbing the jurisdiction of the Court or Authority must normally receive strict interpretation unless the statute or the context requires otherwise. (Vide Abdul Waheed Khan vs. Bhawani (38), Sachida Nand Singh vs. State of Bihar (39), Jagdish Ch. Patnaik vs. State of Orissa (40), and Arul Nadar vs. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms (41). (22). When the statute provides for a particular procedure, the authority has to follow the same and cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the same. (Vide Abdul Waheed Khan vs. Bhawani (38), Sachida Nand Singh vs. State of Bihar (39), Jagdish Ch. Patnaik vs. State of Orissa (40), and Arul Nadar vs. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms (41). (22). When the statute provides for a particular procedure, the authority has to follow the same and cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the same. It has been hither to uncontroverted legal position that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. (Vide Taylor vs. Taylor (42), Nazir Ahmed vs. King Emperor (43), Deep Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (44), Patna Improvement Trust vs. Smt. Lakshmi Devi (45), State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh & Ors (46), Nika Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (47), Ramchandra Keshav Adke vs. Govind Joti Chavare & Ors (48), Chettiam Veettil Ammad vs. Taluk Land Board & Ors. (49), State of Bihar vs. J.A.C. Saldanna (50), A.K. Roy & Anr. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (51), State of Mizoram vs. Biakchhawana (52), J.N. Ganatra vs. Morvi Municipality Morvi (53), Babu Verghese & Ors vs. Bar Council of Kerala & Ors (54), and Chandra Kishore Jha vs. Mahavir Prasad (55). But in the instant case, it cannot be said that State Government has not followed the procedure or not acted in the manner as provided under the statutory provisions. (23). In the instant case, the Land Acquisition Collector did not follow the procedure as prescribed by the Statute and it cannot be held that it is permissible in law to get approval of the Award after making it. (24). The award made by the Land Acquisition Collector without prior approval of the Authorities provided in the Statute tentamounts to no award in the eye of law and the Statute does not provide for subsequent ratification by the State Government or Officer authorised by it in this behalf. Since provisions of Section 11-A of the Act are mandatory in nature, on expiry of two years from the date of last publication of the Declaration under Section 6 of the Act, i.e. 7.7.1999, the entire proceedings under the Act have lapsed. Authorities under the Act have no jurisdiction to proceed further. (25). Since provisions of Section 11-A of the Act are mandatory in nature, on expiry of two years from the date of last publication of the Declaration under Section 6 of the Act, i.e. 7.7.1999, the entire proceedings under the Act have lapsed. Authorities under the Act have no jurisdiction to proceed further. (25). It is clarified that quashing of the land acquisition proceedings would be limited to the extend of the land belonging to the petitioner and it would not amount to quashing the whole of the proceedings, as in such cases the proceedings stand qua-shed or lapsed only in the cases of individual writ petitioners. (Vide Abhey Ram & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.(56), & Delhi Administration vs. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors. (57). (26). Thus, in view of the above, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The proceedings, qua the land of the petitioner, are declared to have lapsed. There shall be no order as to costs.