Judgment : R. K. AGRAWAL, J. - These six revisions have been filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow, against separate orders dated September 27, 1990 and October 9, 1990 passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Kanpur Bench-II, Kanpur in Second Appeal Nos. 72 to 77 of 1989 (assessment years 1980-81 to 1985-86) under section 11 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 now known as U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act"). The facts of the case in brief are that the Jal Sansthan, Kanpur, is a U.P. Government organisation constituted under the provisions of the U.P. Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as, "the 1975 Act") for the purpose of water supply and sewerage services. Vide notification dated April 30, 1979, the State Government constituted the Kanpur Jal Sansthan which had the jurisdiction over the entire area of the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur. One of the main activities of the opposite party is to collect water from river Ganges, canals and tube wells and after removing the sand and silt from it and mixing chlorine, the water is purified after filtering the same. Thereafter it is supplied to the general public by the opposite party. The opposite party had issued form IIID during the aforesaid period for purchase of goods which were used in desalting and purification of water. The assessing authority being of the view that the opposite party is not entitled to issue form IIID for such purchases initiated proceedings under section 3G(3) of the Act and vide separate orders imposed tax for misuse of form IIID. The appeals filed by the opposite party had been dismissed by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) vide order dated August 24, 1988. Feeling aggrieved by the said order the opposite party preferred second appeal under section 10 of the Act before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by the impugned orders have allowed the appeals and had set aside the orders passed by the assessing authority. I have heard Shri B. K. Pandey, learned counsel on behalf of the applicant and Shri R. M. Saggi, Advocate on behalf of the respondent. The Tribunal by the impugned orders have allowed the appeals and had set aside the orders passed by the assessing authority. I have heard Shri B. K. Pandey, learned counsel on behalf of the applicant and Shri R. M. Saggi, Advocate on behalf of the respondent. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that the desalting, filtration and purification of the water collected by the opposite party amounts to manufacture within the definition of word "manufacture" as defined in section 2(e1) of the Act and therefore in view of the restriction/prohibition contained in section 3G(2) of the Act, thus the tax has rightly been assessed under section 3G(3) of the Act. It may be mentioned here that the Jal Sansthan has been constituted under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975 (U.P. Act No. 43 of 1975). Under section 2(g) of the Act "Jal Sansthan" has been defined to mean a local authority constituted by the State Government under section 18 to perform its functions under this Act in one or more local area. Section 18 of the 1975 Act provides for establishment of Jal Sansthan. Section 19 of the said Act empowers the State Government to notify Jal Nigam as Jal Sansthan in such rural areas as are specified. Section 20 of the said Act provides for constitution of Jal Sansthan, whereas section 24 provides for functions of a Jal Sansthan. Section 24 of the Act of 1975 is reproduced below : "24. Functions of a Jal Sansthan. - The functions of a Jal Sansthan shall be as follows : (i) to plan, promote and execute schemes of and operate an efficient system of water supply; (ii) where feasible, to plan, promote and execute schemes of, and operate, sewerage, sewage treatment and disposal and treatment of trade effluents; (iii) to manage all its affairs so as to provide the people of the area within its jurisdiction with wholesome water and where feasible, efficient sewerage service; (iv) to take such other measures, as may be necessary, to ensure water supply in times of any emergency; (v) such other functions as may be entrusted to it by the State Government by notification in the Gazette." Section 25 of the Act of 1975 enumerates the powers of a Jal Sansthan which is reproduced below : "25. Powers of a Jal Sansthan. Powers of a Jal Sansthan. - (1) Every Jal Sansthan shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have power to do anything which may be necessary or expedient for carrying out its functions under this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions of such powers shall include the power - (i) to exercise all powers and perform all the functions relating to water supply, sewerage and sewage disposal of the area which lies within its jurisdiction. (ii) to acquire, possess and hold lands and other property and to carry any water or sewerage works through, across, over or under any highway, road, street or place and, after reasonable notice, in writing to the owner or occupier, into, through over or under any building or land; (iii) to abstract water from any natural source and dispose of waste water; (iv) to enter into contract or agreement with any person or body as the Jal Sansthan may deem necessary; (v) to adopt its own budget annually; (vi) to introduce or amend tariff for water supply and sewerage services, subject to approval of the nigam and collect all taxes and charges for these services as may be prescribed : Provided that no decision to introduce or amend such tariff shall be taken except by a special resolution in that behalf brought after giving such notice as may be prescribed, and passed by the majority of two-thirds of the members of the Jal Sansthan; (vii) to incur expenditure and manage its own funds; (viii) to obtain loans, advances, subventions and grants from the Nigam." Section 33 of the 1975 Act deals with the vesting of existing water supply and sewerage services in Jal Sansthan whereas section 34 empowers the Jal Sansthan to assume obligations of local authority in respect of matters to which this Act applies. Section 41 deals with the funds of the Jal Sansthan whereas section 44 deals with the general principles for its finance. Under section 52 of the 1975 Act Jal Sansthan has been empowered to levy taxes. Section 52 is reproduced below : "52. Taxes leviable. Section 41 deals with the funds of the Jal Sansthan whereas section 44 deals with the general principles for its finance. Under section 52 of the 1975 Act Jal Sansthan has been empowered to levy taxes. Section 52 is reproduced below : "52. Taxes leviable. - (1) For the purposes of this Act, a Jal Sansthan shall levy, on premises situated within its area - (a) where the area is covered by the water supply services of Jal Sansthan, a water tax; and (b) where the area is covered by the sewerage services of Jal Sansthan, a sewerage tax. (2) The taxes mentioned in sub-section (1) shall be levied at such rate which in the case of water tax shall be not less than six per cent and not more than 14 per cent and in the case of sewerage tax shall be not less than two per cent and not more than four per cent of the assessed annual value of the premises as the Government may, from time to time, after considering the recommendation of the Nigam, by notification in the Gazette, declare." Section 59 of the 1975 Act empowers the Jal Sansthan to fix the cost of water to be supplied by it and also the minimum cost to be charged in respect of each connection, whereas section 60 empowers the Jal Sansthan to fix the cost of disposal of water and the minimum cost to be charged in respect of such disposal. Section 61 provides for charging of rent for the water meter and section 62 empowers the Jal Sansthan to demand security from the consumers in connection with the supply of meter or for sewer connection. Section 63 of the aforesaid Act empowers the Jal Sansthan to charge fee for connection, disconnection and reconnection of any water supply or sewerage or testing or supervision or for any other services rendered by it. Section 66 of the 1975 Act enjoins upon the Jal Sansthan to grant supply of water for domestic purposes, whereas section 68 has made provisions for fire hydrants. Section 72 of the Act empowers the Jal Sansthan to cut of water supply in certain circumstances. Chapter VIII of 1975 Act deals with the sewerage which contains sections 74 to 82 deals with sewerage and the right and duties of Jal Sansthan regarding it. Section 72 of the Act empowers the Jal Sansthan to cut of water supply in certain circumstances. Chapter VIII of 1975 Act deals with the sewerage which contains sections 74 to 82 deals with sewerage and the right and duties of Jal Sansthan regarding it. Thus, from a perusal of the scheme of the 1975 Act it will be seen that the Jal Sansthan has been constituted for the discharge of its obligations connected with water supply and sewerage in a local area. The main activities of the Jal Sansthan is to provide purified drinking water to the citizens and organisation. It has also to look at the sanitation in the local areas. It has not been constituted as an authority for the purpose of buying and selling any goods. Section 3G(2) of the Act excludes the applicability of sub-section (1) of section 3G to the sale of any goods which are purchased by the said department, corporation, undertaking or company for resale or for use in the manufacture or packing of goods other than electrical energy for sale. The question is as to whether the word "manufacture" used in sub-section (2) of section 3G has to be given the same meaning as has been defined in section 2(e1) of the Act or not. It may be mentioned here that section 2 of the Act which is the definition clause opens with the word "in this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context." Section 2(e1) of the Act defines the word "manufacture" as follows : "Section 2(e1). 'Manufacture' means producing, making, mining, collecting, extracting, altering, ornamenting, finishing, or otherwise processing, treating or adapting any goods; but does not include such manufacture or manufacturing processes as may be prescribed." Section 2(ee) of the Act defines the word "manufacturer" as follows : "Section 2(ee). 'Manufacture' means producing, making, mining, collecting, extracting, altering, ornamenting, finishing, or otherwise processing, treating or adapting any goods; but does not include such manufacture or manufacturing processes as may be prescribed." Section 2(ee) of the Act defines the word "manufacturer" as follows : "Section 2(ee). 'Manufacturer' in relation to any goods means the dealer who makes the first sale of such goods in the State after their manufacture." Section 3G of the Act is reproduced below : "Section 3G-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3A or section 3D, and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and such conditions and restrictions, if any, as may be specified by the State Government, by notification, the tax on the turnover of sales of goods to a department of the Central Government or of a State Government or to a Corporation or undertaking, established or constituted by or under a Central Act or an Uttar Pradesh Act, or to a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (not being a Nagar Mahapalika, Municipal Board, Zila Parishad, Town Area Committee, Notified Area Committee, Cantonment Board, a university or an educational institution or an institution managed for the time being by an authorised controller) shall, if the dealer furnishes to the assessing authority a declaration obtained from such department, Corporation, undertaking or company in such form and manner, and within such period, as may be prescribed, be levied and paid at the rate for the time being specified in sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, or at such rate as the State Government may, by notification, specify in relation to any sales, unless the goods are taxable under any other section of this Act at a rate lower than the said rate. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to the sale of any goods which are purchased by such department, corporation, undertaking or company for resale or for use in the manufacture or packing of any goods other than electrical energy for sale, or if such department, corporation, undertaking or company has no office or establishment situated in Uttar Pradesh. (3) Such department, corporation, undertaking or company shall furnish to such dealer the declaration referred to in sub-section (1) within two months of the purchase of goods, and if it fails to do so, or if after purchasing the goods against the declaration referred to in sub-section (1), any such department, corporation, undertaking or company does not put them to use for its own requirements but uses or disposes of the same either in the manner mentioned in sub-section (2) or otherwise, such department, corporation, undertaking or company shall, without prejudice to any other action, including the imposition of penalty, that may be equal to the difference of tax calculated at the rate otherwise applicable to the sale of such goods under this Act and that applicable under sub-section (1)." The phrase "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" came up for consideration before the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Company Limited, Madras v. Phraser and Ross reported in AIR 1960 SC 971 and the honourable Supreme Court had held as follows : "It is well-settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words similar to the words used in the present case, namely, "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context". Therefore in finding out the meaning of the word "insurer" in various sections of the Act, the meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that given in the definition clause." But this is not inflexible and there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word has been used and that will be giving effect to the opening sentence in the definition section, namely, "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context". In view of this qualification, the court has not only to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances. Therefore, though ordinarily the word "insurer" as used in the Act would mean a person or body corporate actually carrying on the business of insurance it may be that in certain sections the word may have a somewhat different meaning. In the case of National Building Construction Corporation Limited v. Preetam Singh Gill reported in AIR 1972 SC 1579 , while considering the meaning to be given to the word "workman" in section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the honourable Supreme Court have observed in paragraph 7 as follows : "7. Now, it is noteworthy that section 2 of the Act, which is the definition section begins, as is usual with most of the definition sections, with the clause 'unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context'. This clearly indicates that it is always a matter for argument whether or not this statutory definition is to apply the word 'workman', as used in the particular clause of the Act which is under consideration, for this word may both be restricted or expanded by its subject-matter. The context and the subject-matter in connection with which the word 'workman' is used are accordingly important factors having a bearing on the question. The propriety or necessity of construing the word 'workman' is obvious because all parts of the Act have to be in harmony with the statutory intent. Keeping this in mind we may turn to the purpose and object of section 33C of the Act. This section was enacted for the purpose of enabling individual workmen to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights against their employers without being compelled to have recourse to section 10 by raising disputes and securing a reference which is obviously a lengthy process. Section 33C of the Act has accordingly been described as a provision which clothes the Labour Court with the powers similar to those of an executing court so that the workman concerned receives speedy relief in respect of his existing individual rights. Section 33C of the Act has accordingly been described as a provision which clothes the Labour Court with the powers similar to those of an executing court so that the workman concerned receives speedy relief in respect of his existing individual rights. The primary purpose of the section being to provide the aggrieved workman with a forum similar to the executing courts it calls for a broad and beneficial construction consistently with other provisions of the Act, which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. It may appropriately be pointed out that the mischief which section 33C was designed to suppress was the difficulties faced by individual workmen in getting relief in respect of their existing rights without having resort to section 10 of the Act. To accept the argument of the appellant, it would always be open to an unfair, unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services of his employee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by section 33C and compel him to have resort to the lengthy procedure by way of reference under section 10 of the Act thereby defeating the very purpose and object of enacting this provision. This in our view, quite clearly brings out the repugnancy visualised in the opening part of section 2 of the Act and such a position could hardly have been contemplated by the Legislature. In order to remove this repugnancy section 33C(2) must be so construed as to take within its fold a workman, who was employed during the period in respect of which he claims relief, even though he is no longer employed at the time of the application. In other words, the term 'workman' as used in section 33C(2) includes all persons whose claim, requiring computation under this sub-section, is in respect of an existing right arising from his relationship as an industrial workman with his employer. By adopting this construction alone can we advance the remedy and suppress the mischief in accordance with the purpose and object of inserting section 33C of the Act." In Smt. Pushpa Devi v. Milkhi Ram (Dead) by his LRs. reported in AIR 1990 SC 808 , the honourable Supreme Court in paragraph 17 had held as follows : "17. By adopting this construction alone can we advance the remedy and suppress the mischief in accordance with the purpose and object of inserting section 33C of the Act." In Smt. Pushpa Devi v. Milkhi Ram (Dead) by his LRs. reported in AIR 1990 SC 808 , the honourable Supreme Court in paragraph 17 had held as follows : "17. It is true when a word has been defined in the interpretation clause, prima facie that definition governs wherever that word is used in the body of the statute unless the context requires otherwise. 'The context' as pointed out in the book Cross Statutory Interpretation (Second Edition, 43) 'is both internal and external'. The internal context requires the interpreter to situate the disputed words within the section of which they are part and in relation to the rest of the Act. The external context involve determining the meaning from ordinary linguistic usage (including any special technical meanings) from the purpose for which the provision was passed, and from the place of the provisions within the general scheme of statutory and common law rules and principles." In the light of the principles laid down by the honourable Supreme Court it is necessary to examine the various provisions of the U.P. Trade Tax Act. The said Act has been enacted for the levy of a tax on the sales or purchase of goods in the State of Uttar Pradesh as stated in the Preamble of the said Act. Section 2(aa) of the Act defines the word "business" as follows : "2(aa). The said Act has been enacted for the levy of a tax on the sales or purchase of goods in the State of Uttar Pradesh as stated in the Preamble of the said Act. Section 2(aa) of the Act defines the word "business" as follows : "2(aa). 'business', in relation to business of buying or selling goods, includes, - (i) any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture, whether or not such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern is carried on with a motive to make profit and whether or not any profit accrues from such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern; and (ii) any transaction of buying, selling or supplying plant, machinery, raw materials, processing materials, packing materials, empties, consumable stores, waste or by-products, or any other goods of a similar nature or any unserviceable or obsolete or discarded machinery, or any parts or accessories thereof or any waste or scrap or any of them or any other transaction whatsoever which is ancillary to or is connected with or is incidental to, or results from such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern; but does not include any activity in the nature of mere service or profession which does not involve the purchase or sale of goods." Section 2(c) of the Act defines "dealer" as follows : "2(c) 'Dealer' means any person who carries on in Uttar Pradesh (whether regularly or otherwise) the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods directly or indirectly, for cash or deferred payment or commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration and includes - (i) a local authority, body corporate, company, any co-operative society or other society, club, firm, Hindu undivided family or other association of person which carries on such business; (ii) a factor, broker, arhti, commission agent, del credere agent or any other mercantile agent, by whatever name called and whether of the same description as hereinbefore mentioned or not, who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods belonging to any principal, whether disclosed or not; (iii) an auctioneer who carries on the business of selling or auctioning goods belonging to any principal, whether disclosed or not, and whether the offer of the intending purchaser is accepted by him or by the principal or nominee of the principal; (iv) a Government which, whether in the course of business or otherwise buys, sells, supplies or distributes goods, directly or otherwise for cash or for deferred payment or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration; (v) every person who acts within the State as an agent of a dealer residing outside the State, and buys, sells, supplies or distributes goods in the State or acts on behalf of such dealer as - (A) a mercantile agent as defined in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930; or (B) an agent for handling of goods or documents of title relating to goods; or (C) an agent for the collection or the payment of the sale price of goods or as a guarantor for such collection or such payment; (vi) a firm or a company or other body corporate, the principal office or head quarter whereof is outside the State having a branch or office in the State, in respect of purchases or sales, supplies or distribution of goods through such branch or office : Provided that a person who sells agricultural or horticultural produce grown by himself or grown on any land in which he has an interest, whether as owner, usufructuary mortgagee, tenant, or otherwise, or who sells poultry or dairy products from fowls or animals kept by him shall not in respect of such goods, be treated as dealer." Section 3 of the Act is the charging section. It provides for the payment of tax by every dealer at the rates provided by or under section 3A or 3D on his turnover of sales or purchases or both. Section 4A to section 5 grants exemption, set off, rebate on the sales. Thus under the U.P. Trade Tax Act, tax is levied only on the sale or purchase of goods. Viewed in the light of the principle laid down by the honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases the purposes for enacting section 3G of the Act was to provide for payment of a maximum rate of tax for the time being specified in sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (which is at present four per cent) on the purchase of goods by a department of the Central Government or a State Government, Corporation, undertaking, established under the Central Act or U.P. Act or a Government company which are to be used for non-business purpose, i.e., not for resale or for manufacture and packing of goods for resale. Thus, the underlying object for using the word "manufacture" in section 3G(2) of the Act was to deny the benefit of the concessional rate of tax where such department of Government, corporation, undertaking or a Government company purchases the goods and after its manufacture resells the goods, as the words "goods for resale" qualifies both manufacture and packing. No doubt under section 2(e1) manufacture would be complete if any of the process as mentioned therein is undertaken as has been held by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of B.P. Oil Mills Ltd. v. Sales Tax Tribunal reported in AIR 1998 SC 3055 , but for the opening phrase in section 2 of the Act, i.e., "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context", the meaning of the word "manufacture" as given in section 2(e1) of the Act is to be restricted while interpreting the word "manufacture" occurring in section 3G(2) of the Act to mean manufacture for sale. As has already been mentioned above, the Jal Sansthan has been created under the 1975 Act for providing pure drinking water and for the sanitation of the local area. The main activity of the Jal Sansthan is not for carrying on any business of buying and selling nor it is engaged in any business as such. As has already been mentioned above, the Jal Sansthan has been created under the 1975 Act for providing pure drinking water and for the sanitation of the local area. The main activity of the Jal Sansthan is not for carrying on any business of buying and selling nor it is engaged in any business as such. As held by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras reported in [1999] 114 STC 520 (SC); AIR 1999 SC 1647 ; 1999 UPTC 530 (SC), if the main activity was not business then the connected incidental or ancillary activities of the sale would not normally amount to business, unless an independent intention to conduct business in these connected, incidental or ancillary activities is established by the Revenue. In view of the foregoing discussions it is held that the Jal Sansthan is not engaged in the business of manufacture and cannot be treated as "manufacturer" of pure drinking water supplied by it. Thus, all the revisions fail and are dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.