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2000 DIGILAW 1181 (PAT)

Krishna Nandan Choudhary v. Bihar State Electricity Board

2000-10-16

S.K.KATRIAR

body2000
Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. This writ petition has been preferred with the prayer to set aside the gradation list (Annexure 1) of the Junior Electrical Engineers, GTO Cadre ot the Bihar State Electricity Board, inter alia, on the ground that the same has been prepared by applying wrong principles. 2. 28 petitioners have joined this writ petition, and impleading as many as 133 employees of the same cadre as party respondents, all of whom figure in the gradation list. The history of initial recruitment, employment and absorption of the parties in the services of the Board is indicated in its counter affidavit. In October, 1975, the Board had engaged 174 Graduate Engineers and 300 Diploma Holder Engineers through Employment Exchange under Employment/Promotion Programme and the Apprentices Act 1973. These engineers had to undergo training for 4 months, whereas the Engineers who were engaged under the Employment/promotion programme had to undergo training for 4 months, and those engaged under Apprentices Act, had to undergo training for a period of 12 months. After completion of their training, the Engineers resorted to relay-fast for their absorption in the Board in the respective cadres of Assistant Engineers/Junior Engineers. The Board however had engaged them for further period of 6 months after training and 158 Graduate Engineers and 182 Diploma Holder Engineers were registered and engaged as Trainee Engineers with effect from 1.4.1977. After a few months these trainee engineers again resorted to agitational programme to pressurise for absorption in the service of the Board. The Board decided that Trainee Engineers could continue as such till they were absorbed in the services of the Board. Subsequently, 57 Graduate Engineers and 57 Diploma Holder Engineers were also selected through the Employment Exchange for 1 year training programme under the Apprentices Act, with effect from 1.4.97. The Board had also taken a decision to meet the requirement of Engineers for the extension Unit of PTPS, BTPS, MTPS, TTPS and Swam Rekha Hydel Project and they were placed under one year extensive training. The Board had envisaged that after completion of the training they were required to appear in the examination and the successful candidate among the trainee engineers were to be employed in power stations. The Board had envisaged that after completion of the training they were required to appear in the examination and the successful candidate among the trainee engineers were to be employed in power stations. This decision of the Board, however, was again opposed by the aforementioned Trainee Engineers who again resorted to agitational programme against the said examination and they had demanded that they should be straightway absorbed in the Board services on completion of their training. The matter was raised in the Legislative Assembly by the Members of the House and a Committee headed by the then Speaker, Late Tripurari Prasad Singh was constituted by the House to suggest the remedial measures for absorption of the trainee Engineers by the Board. The Tripurari Committee submitted its recommendation vide proceeding of the meeting dated 10.3.1979 and some of the prominent recommendation of the Committee was as follows : (i) That after completion of one year training which ended by October, 1979 the Trainee Engineers will be appointed provisionally on the post of Assistant Electrical Engineer/Junior Electrical Engineer. They will remain on probation for two years and thereafter will be absorbed in the services of the Board provided their act and conduct was found satisfactory during the period of probation. Such absorption was to be made against the available permanent post and in order of seniority. (ii) The condition imposed by the Board of appearing in written examination imposed by Boards office order no. 1548 dated 26.10.78, after completion of training to qualify for regular absorption in the service of the Board was to be waived and they were to get their regular appointment after completion of training. (iii) That such Engineers who were either appointed temporarily or permanently were to rank senior to the Trainee Engineers who had been engaged in October, 1975 or thereafter. (iv) That their inter se seniority was to be decided on the basis of changed system approved by the State Government. 3. After the petitioners and the private respondents have been absorbed in the service of the Board, difficulties arose in preparing the gradation list. After a good deal of effort, the gradation list was finally prepared and circulated along with the letter dated 6.6.90 (Annexure 1), and impugned herein. 3. After the petitioners and the private respondents have been absorbed in the service of the Board, difficulties arose in preparing the gradation list. After a good deal of effort, the gradation list was finally prepared and circulated along with the letter dated 6.6.90 (Annexure 1), and impugned herein. The same has been prepared in terms of rule 11 of the Bihar State Electricity Board Junior Electrical Engineers (General Cadre) Rules, 1982, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. 4. While assailing the validity of the basis of preparation of the impugned gradation list, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Committee constituted for this purpose had gone into the depth of the matter and submitted its report dated 26.4.79 (Annexure 2), paragraph 4 of which reads as follows : (Local Language) 4.1. The chain system is indicated in the Government communication dated 27.2.79 (Annexure 3), the relevant portion of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : (Local Language) 4.2. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the Government is bound by this executive instruction set out hereinabove and, therefore, a right has accrued in favour of the petitioners. In that view of the matter, in his submission, preparation of the gradation list on the basis of rule 11 of the Rules is illegal. 5. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 20, 54 and 133 submits that this writ petition is hit by delay. He next submits that the changed (sicchain ?) system has been deprecated by this Court on various occasions and in fact has been set aside. He next submits that the justification and the basis for preparation of the impugned gradation list has been clearly stated in the Boards counter affidavit, particularly in paragraphs 13 and 14. He lastly submits that the executive instructions lose all force if the same have been supplanted by rules. He submits that the impugned gradation list should be upheld. 6. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha, learned Standing Counsel for the Board, has made his own submissions in opposition on the lines of the learned counsel for the private respondents. 7. Having considered the rival submissions, I am of the view that the writ petition is fit to be dismissed on all counts. On the very face of it, this writ petition suffers from gross delay, laches, negligence and acquiescence. 7. Having considered the rival submissions, I am of the view that the writ petition is fit to be dismissed on all counts. On the very face of it, this writ petition suffers from gross delay, laches, negligence and acquiescence. The impugned gradation list is dated 6.6.90 (Annexure 1), whereas this writ petition was lodged in this Court on 13.12.1995. There was thus a delay of more than five years in preferring this writ petition. Law is well settled that proceedings for which a statutory period of limitation has not been prescribed, particularly the extraordinary prerogative writ jurisdiction, writ proceeding, the aggrieved person must move the court before parallel right is created and allowed to be entrenched by lapse of time, laches and acquiescence. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is in no doubt that the petitioners by their belated approach to this Court have allowed the parallel rights in favour of the private respondents, to be entrenched by lapse of time. Interference by this Court at this stage will amount to undoing all that has been done without any valid explanation for the delay. In fact, not the least of explanation has been offered by the petitioners for their belated action. Learned counsel for the private respondents has, therefore, rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1974 SC 2271 : (1975)1 SCC 152 (P.S. Sadasivaswamy V/s. State of Tamil Nadu). The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted herein- below : "A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioners petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellants petition as well as the appeal." 7.1. Learned counsel is equally right placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1993 SC 802 : (1992) 2 SCC 598 : 1992(2) PLJR (SC) 5 (M/s Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. V/s. District Board, Bhojpur), aragraph 13 of which is relevant and is set out hereinbelow: The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. The decision in Tirlok Chand ( AIR 1970 SC 898 ) (supra) relied on is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed." 8. Mr. S.K.Verma, learned counsel for private respondents, has rightly submitted that the chain system has been disapproved by this Court on various occasions. He rightly relies on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court passed in CWJC No. 3020 of 1995 (Ram Jiwan Prasad V/s. Bihar State Electricity Board), paragraphs 15 and 17 of which are relevant in the present context and are set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: "According to the petitioners, what is called the chain system was a mode evolved by the State Government for evaluation for employment (and not for determination of seniority). It seems that the State Government at one time considered making recruitment of degree holder and diploma holder engineers on the basis of chain system which was enunciated in a letter, dated 27.2.1979 (Annexure 9) from the Principal Secretary, Department of Labour & Employment to the Secretaries in the various other departments of the Government According to this letter, the Government had taken the decision to make evaluation for appointment of degree holder and diploma holder engineers on non-gazetted posts on the basis of chain system dispensing with any interview, test or any other mode of selection. According to this system, a candidate would be given three points, subject to a maximum of 20, for each year passed between the year of his passing the degree/diploma examination and the time when he was being considered for appointment. The points, thus, given on the basis of the intervening years (probably in consideration for waiting) would be added to the percentage of marks obtained by the candidate in the degree/diploma engineering examination. For example, if a candidate who had secured 70% marks in the degree/diploma examination was being considered for appointment after three years of the passing of the examination, his total points would be 70+9 = 79. For example, if a candidate who had secured 70% marks in the degree/diploma examination was being considered for appointment after three years of the passing of the examination, his total points would be 70+9 = 79. Again, if a candidate who secured 60% marks in the examination was being considered eight years after he passed the examination, his total points would be 60+20 = 80 (20 being the maximum permissible for the past years). "It may be stated here in passing that the chain system, as a mode of recruitment, was struck down by this Court in Deota Nath Tiwary and others V/s. State of Bihar and others, 1989 PLJR 580. In that decision a Division Bench of this Court held that the decision concerning chain system was not a decision taken by the State Government and the system of recruitment envisaged therein was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution." 8.1. The Division Bench relied on an earlier division bench judgment reported in 1989 PLJR 580 (Deota Nath Tiwary V/s. State of Bihar), wherein the chain system has been struck down as irrational and discriminatory. In that view, the Board was fully justified in completely disowning the chain system and applying the Rules. The net result therefore, is that executive instructions of April 1979 (Annexure 2) have been supplanted by the Rules of the year 1982. 9. Learned counsel for the private respondents has rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1990 SC 463 (C.L.Verma V/s. State of M.P.), which lays down to the effect that statutory rules will prevail over notification, being in the nature of the administrative instructions. The judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court, reported in 2000 (4) PLJR 171 (Para 7) (Munilal Mandal V/s. The State of Bihar), is to the same effect. Learned counsel has invited my attention to the Boards counter affidavit, particularly paragraphs 13 and 14, wherein the Board has tried to put forth the justification for adopting the rules. It is manifest from a plain reading of the same that the Board has adopted a fair and rational basis in preparing the gradation list. In fact, the same are the usual and recognized mode and manner of determination of inter se seniority. I am, therefore, convinced that the Board has acted with fairness in preparing the impugned gradation list. 10. In fact, the same are the usual and recognized mode and manner of determination of inter se seniority. I am, therefore, convinced that the Board has acted with fairness in preparing the impugned gradation list. 10. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed.