Judgment V.M.Jain, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner for the issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus for the release of the petitioner on the ground that he was illegally detained by the respondents in Model Jail, Chandigarh, without any authority and provision of law. 2. It has been alleged in the petition that the petitioner was arrested by the CBI on 9.5.2000, in case bearing FIR RC-3 dated 6.4.2000 under Section 120-B, IPC read with Sections 13(1)(a) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act), registered with the CBI at Chandigarh. It was alleged that the petitioner was produced in the Court on 10.5.2000 and was given police remand and was remanded to CBI for 3 days initially and thereafter, he was sent to judicial custody. It was alleged that in this manner, the petitioner was in custody since 9.5.2000 in this case. It was alleged that under Section 19 of the Act, no court could take cognizance without prior sanction granted by a competent authority to prosecute a public servant. It was alleged that the petitioner was admittedly a public servant and thus, no Court could take cognizance against the petitioner on the police report without prior sanction of the competent authority. It was alleged that till the date of filing of the petition (the petition is dated and filed on 17.7.2000), the CBI had not obtained any sanction for prosecution of the petitioner in this case. It was alleged that the CBI had filed the charge-sheet against the petitioner on 7.7.2000 in the Court of Special Judge (Sessions Judge), Chandigarh, who entrusted the same to Shri Lakhbir Singh, Special Judge (Additional Sessions Judge), Chandigarh, on 8.7.2000 and on the same day, the matter was taken up by Shri Lakhbir Singh, Special Judge and he adjourned the proceedings till 17.7.2000. It was alleged that the petitioner was already on judicial remand till 17.7.2000, when the CBI was required to produce the petitioner in the Court of Special Judge, Chandigarh. It was alleged that since the CBI had not obtained any sanction for prosecution of the petitioner, the Special Judge could not take cognizance, on the charge-sheet submitted by the CBI on 7.7.2000. It was alleged that since the CBI had not obtained any sanction for prosecution of the petitioner, the Special Judge could not take cognizance, on the charge-sheet submitted by the CBI on 7.7.2000. It was alleged that now the case before the Special Judge stands adjourned to 17.7.2000. It was further alleged that from a reading of Sections 167 and 309, Cr.P.C., it would be clear that the moment the charge- sheet was filed in the Court, the power of remand, as provided under Section 167, Cr.P.C., came to an end inasmuch as no accused, against whom charge- sheet had been filed in the Court, could be remanded to custody under Section 167, Cr.P.C. It was further alleged that after the filing of the charge-sheet, an accused could be remanded to custody only under the provisions of Section 309, Cr.P.C. It was further alleged that under Section 309, Cr.P.C., Court could Act only after taking cognizance of an offence and not prior thereto. Reliance was placed on the law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court, in the case reported as Matabar Parida and others v. The State of Orissa, 1975 SCC (Cri.) 484. It was further alleged that in the present case, the CBI had submitted the charge-sheet before the Special Judge, Chandigarh, on 7.7.2000 and thus, the power of remand under Section 167, Cr.P.C., came to an end on the filing of the challan. It was further alleged that the Court could not exercise the power of remand under Section 309, Cr.P.C., without taking cognizance and as such the Special Judge, Chandigarh, had no power to remand the petitioner to custody, without taking cognizance on the charge-sheet filed by the CBI and cognizance could not be taken because prior sanction had not been obtained from the competent authority to prosecute the petitioner. It was further alleged that the custody of the petitioner, thus, became illegal from 12.7.2000. It was further alleged that the petitioner had filed a petition before the Special Judge, Chandigarh, through Jail regarding the illegal detention on 10.7.2000 and another application on behalf of the petitioner was also moved through his counsel before the Special Judge on 8.7.2000 in this regard. It was alleged that the learned Special Judge, Chandigarh, dismissed both these applications, vide order dated 15.7.2000 (copy Annexure P1). It was alleged that the learned Special Judge, Chandigarh, dismissed both these applications, vide order dated 15.7.2000 (copy Annexure P1). It was further alleged that the said order of the Special Judge was, on the face of it, illegal and deserves to be set aside by this Court. Reliance was placed on the law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court, in the case reported as CBI, Special Investigation Cell-I, New Delhi v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, New Delhi, 1992 Criminal Law Journal 2768 for the proposition that Section 309, Cr.P.C., would come into operation only after taking cognizance and not during the period of investigation. It was accordingly prayed that a writ in the nature of habeas corpus be issued for the release of the petitioner from the illegal custody of the respondents. 3. This petition was contested by respondent No. 1, CBI, by filing a written reply dated 3.8.2000, taking up the preliminary objection that the petitioner had already filed a bail application, which was pending in this Court and as such this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was not maintainable. On merits, it was alleged, that even though the case bearing FIR No. RC-3 dated 6.4.2000 was registered under Section 120B, IPC, read with Sections 13(1)(a) and 13(2) of the Act, yet, during investigation, the offence under Sections 120B read with Sections 420/467/468/471, IPC, and Sections 13(1)(a), 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2) of the Act, besides substantive offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(a) and 13(1)(d) of the Act and under Sections 420/467/468/471, IPC, were also established. It was admitted that the petitioner was arrested on 9.5.2000 and it was alleged that the investigating agency was duty-bound to submit the police report under Section 173(2), Cr.P.C, as and when the investigation was complete. It was further alleged that sanction for prosecution was not sine qua non for filing the police report under Section 173(2), Cr.P.C. It was further alleged that the offences in the present case were not confined to the Prevention of Corruption Act, but offences under Sections 420/467/468/471, IPC had also been added. It was further alleged that the competent authority has granted the sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. It was further alleged that the competent authority has granted the sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. It was further alleged that various other offences, which were added in the original FIR, were intimated to the Special Judge when the application for extension of judicial remand was filed on 28.6.2000 and the Special Judge, on duty, after considering the relevant material, had extended the judicial remand of the petitioner upto 12.7.2000. It was further alleged that since the petitioner was involved for the offences punishable upto imprisonment for life, hence the Special Judge was fully competent to extend the remand upto 90 days, as held by the Special Judge in the order dated 15.7.2000. It was further alleged that the question of sanction would be considered at the time of framing of the charge. It was further alleged that the Special Judge was fully competent to extend the remand of the petitioner when the police report was filed before the investigating agency along with all the documents. It was further alleged that the period of 90 days would expire only on 8.8.2000. It was further alleged that the Court was competent to take cognizance, as it was a case of criminal conspiracy and the competent authority had granted the sanction for prosecution of co-conspirator under the various sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act as well as the IPC. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted before me that once challan was submitted in the Court, as required under Section 173, Cr.P.C, the provisions of Section 167, Cr.P.C. would cease to apply. It has further been submitted that thereafter the only provisions under which the accused could be remanded to judicial custody, would be under Section 309, Cr.P.C, but that would apply only after taking cognizance and not prior thereto. It had further been submitted that the day when the challan was presented before the Special Judge, the Special Judge could not take cognizance, in the absence of the necessary sanction to prosecute the petitioner and as such the Court had no power to remand the accused (beyond 12.7.2000 upto which the petitioner was remanded to judicial custody by the concerned Court before the filing of the challan). It was further submitted that thus, after 12.7.2000, the custody of the petition became illegal and once the custody was illegal, it could not be validated subsequently by a legal remand (after the receipt of sanction). Reliance was placed on Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell-I, New Delhi v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, 1992 SCC (Cri.) 554, Gyanu Madhu Jamkhandi and others v. The State of Karnataka, 1977 Cr.LJ 632, State of Haryana v. Mehal Singh and another, 1978 Cr.LJ 1810 (P&H), Raghavendra Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 1976 Cr.LJ 1782 (Allahabad), Mukhtiar Singh v. State of Haryana and another, 1991(3) RCR 49, Chander Bhan v. State of Haryana, 1991(2) RCR 88, Bishwanath Ram v. State of Bihar, 2000(3) Crimes 164 (Patna), Baijnath and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 220, Vindhya Basini Prasad and others v. State of U.P. and another, 1982 Cr.LJ 2177 (Allahabad), Urooj Abbas v. State of U.P., 1973 Cr.LJ 1458 (Allahabad), Mahesh Chand and etc. v. State of Rajasthan and etc., 1985 Cr.LJ 301 (Rajasthan), Subhash v. State of M.P., 1989 Cr.LJ 1553 (MP) and Kedar v. State, 1977 Cr.LJ 1230 (Allahabad). It was further submitted that the authority Rabindra Rai v. State of Bihar, 1984 Cr.LJ 1412 relied upon by the learned Special Judge, in the order dated 15.7.2000, would have no application to the facts of the present case and was distinguishable on facts. 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the CBI submitted before me that the CBI was competent to submit charge-sheet in the Court even before the sanction was obtained. It was further submitted that a Court was competent to remand the accused after the challan was submitted and before taking cognizance. It was further submitted that in the present case, besides offence under the Act, there were various other offences also under the IPC, qua which the Court was competent to take cognizance even without sanction and to remand the accused to judicial custody after the filing of challan. It was further submitted that where the petitioner had been detained in the custody under the orders of the Court, it could not be said that the detention was illegal. It was further submitted that where the petitioner had been detained in the custody under the orders of the Court, it could not be said that the detention was illegal. Reliance was placed in the matter of Reference made by Shri Ravi Nandan Sahay, Sessions Judge, Patna, 1993(3) Recent Criminal Reports 546 (Patna) (DB) : 1993 Cr.LJ 2436 (Patna), Rabindra Rai v. State of Bihar, 1984 Cr.LJ 1412 (Patna), State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman and another, AIR 1983 SC 439, Babulal Yadav and others v. State of Bihar, 1980 Cr.LJ NOC 170 (Patna), Manmohan Singh Walia v. CBI, Chandigarh, 2000(2) RCR 231 (P&H), Talib Hussain v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1971 SC 62, Col. Dr. B. Ramachandra Rao v. The State of Orissa and others, AIR 1971 SC 2197, Janardhan Dass, Gram Sachiv v. Prem Chand, Ex-Sarpanch and others, 1993(3) Recent Criminal Reports 336, Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC 309, State of Bihar and another v. P.P. Sharma, IAS and another, 1992 SCC (Crl) 192 and Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P. and others, 1997(2) Recent Criminal Reports 539 (SC) : 1997(5) Supreme Court Cases 326. 7. In the present case, there is no dispute on facts. As referred to above, initially, the FIR was registered under Section 120-B IPC, and Sections 13(1)(a), 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Act. However, subsequently, during investigation, the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471, IPC, were also added. The petitioner was arrested by the CBI on 9.5.2000 and was produced in the Court on 10.5.2000, on which date, initially he was remanded to police custody and subsequently, he was remanded to judicial custody. On 28.6.2000, the petitioner was remanded to judicial custody upto 12.7.2000. Meanwhile, on 7.7.2000, the CBI submitted the challan before the Special Judge. After 12.7.2000, the petitioner is in judicial custody under the orders of remand passed by the Special Judge. On 17.7.2000, the present habeas corups petition was filed in this Court, which came up for hearing before this Court on 18.7.2000, on which date notice to the Standing Counsel for CBI was ordered to be issued for 27.7.2000, on which date the counsel for CBI appeared in this Court and the case was adjourned to 3.8.2000, at the request of counsel for the CBI. Reply on behalf of the CBI is dated 3.8.2000 and was filed in this Court on 8.8.2000. Thereafter, arguments in this case were heard on different dates and the orders were reserved. 8. Under Section 4 of the Act, it is provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.P.C, 1973, or any other law for the time being in force, the offences specified in Section 3(1) of the Act shall be tried by Special Judge only. It is further provided that when trying any case, a Special Judge may also try any offence, other than an offence specified in Section 3 of the Act, with which the accused may, under the Cr.P.C. be charged at the same trial. Section 5 of the Act provides that a Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial and in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed in the Cr.P.C., 1973, for trial of warrant cases by the Magistrates. It is further provided therein that the provisions of Cr.P.C., 1973 shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with the said Act, apply to the proceedings before the Special Judge and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Court of Special Judge shall be deemed to be the Court of Session. 9. In the present case, as referred to above, the petitioner was arrested by the CBI not only for the various offences under the Act, but was also arrested for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B, IPC. Even otherwise, in the charge-sheet submitted by the CBI, the petitioner is sought to be charged not only under Sections 13(1)(a), 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Act, but also under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, IPC. Even otherwise, in the charge-sheet submitted by the CBI, the petitioner is sought to be charged not only under Sections 13(1)(a), 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Act, but also under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, IPC. The question that comes up for consideration is whether any sanction was required to prosecute the petitioner for the offences punishable under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, IPC, as required under Section 197, Cr.P.C. In AIR 1955 SC 309 (supra), it was held by the Honble Supreme Court that it is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1), Cr.P.C., nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. In Harihar Prasad etc. v. The State of Bihar, 1972 Cri.LJ 707, it was held that their Lordships of Supreme Court that the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable with (under ?) Section 120-B read with Section 409, IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act could not be said to be of the nature mentioned in Section 197, Cr.P.C. It was not part of the duty of the public servant while discharging his official duties to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge with criminal misconduct. It was further held that want of sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. was, therefore, no bar for the prosecution. In 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 (supra), it was held by their Lordships of Supreme Court that the object behind prior sanction (under Section 197, Cr.P.C.) was to prevent malicious/vexatious and unnecessary harassment to a public servant by laying false or frivolous accusation or prosecution. In other words, Section 197(1), Cr.P.C., and related Sections intended to immunise a public servant who discharged his duties honestly and diligently from the threat of prosecution. The nexus between the discharge of the public duty and the offending act or omission must be inseparable. In other words, Section 197(1), Cr.P.C., and related Sections intended to immunise a public servant who discharged his duties honestly and diligently from the threat of prosecution. The nexus between the discharge of the public duty and the offending act or omission must be inseparable. It was further held in this authority that it was no part of the duty of a public servant to enter into a conspiracy; to fabricate the records, falsify the accounts, commit fraud or misappropriation or demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, though the exercise of power gave him an occasion to commit the offence. Reliance was placed on the law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court, in the cases reported as K. Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 266 and Harihar Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1972 SC (Cri) 409, which is equivalent to 1972 Cr.LJ 707 (supra), and B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, 1979 Cr.LJ 939. Similarly, in 1997(5) SCC 326 (supra), it was held by their Lordships of Supreme Court that the essential requirement postulated for the sanction to prosecute the public servant was that the offence alleged against the public servant might have been done while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. In such a situation, it postulates that the public servants act was in furtherance of the act of the performance of his official duties. However, performance of official duty under colour of public authority could not be camouflaged to commit crime. The Court to proceed further in the trial or the enquiry, as the case may be, applied its mind and recorded a finding that the crime and the official duty were not integrally connected. It was further held in the said authority that when the public servant was alleged to have committed the act of fabrication of records or misappropriation of public fund, etc., it vould not be said that he acted in discharge of his official duties because it was not the official duty of the public servant to fabricate the false records and misappropriate the public funds, etc. in furtherance of or in the discharge of his official duties. in furtherance of or in the discharge of his official duties. Similarly, in State of Kerala v. V. Padmanabhan Nair, 1999(3) RCR(Criminal) 442 (SC) : AIR 1999 SC 2405, it was held by their Lordships of Supreme Court that it could not be said that for offence under Sections 406 and 409 read with Section 120-B, IPC, sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C., was a condition precedent for launching the prosecution. It was further held that when in regard to the offence under Section 409, read with Section 120-B, IPC, it was not part of the duty of the public servant to enter into a criminal conspiracy for committing breach of trust, it could not be said that if the offence was under Section 406 read with Section 120-B, IPC, it could make all the difference vis-a-vis Section 197, Cr.P.C. 10. In view of the laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court, in the various authorities referred to above, prima facie, it would be clear that no sanction would be required to prosecute the petitioner for the offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, IPC. The authority AIR 1966 SC 220 (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, would be of no help to the petitioner inasmuch as even in this authority, it was held that for the offence under Section 477-A read with Sections 109 and 409, IPC, sanction for the prosecution of the accused for the offence under Section 409, IPC, was not necessary. Similarly, the authority 1982 Cr.LJ 2177 (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and pertaining to the bar of taking cognizance under Section 195, Cr.P.C., would have no application to the facts of the present case. 11. Once, prima facie it is found that the Court was competent to take cognizance for the offence under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, IPC, even without the sanction from the competent authority, as required under Section 197, Cr.P.C. it cannot be said that the detention of the petitioner in Model Jail, Chandigarh, was illegal merely because no sanction to prosecute him under the various provisions of the Act had been obtained before the challan was submitted in the Court. As referred to above, the Court was competent to take cognizance for the other offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, IPC, and the Court was, thus, competent to remand the accused to judicial custody for the said offences till the sanction to prosecute the petitioner was issued under Section 19 of the Act. In the present case, the sanction to prosecute the petitioner under the provisos of the Act was granted by the competent authority on 31.7.2000 under Section 19 of the Act. Thereafter, the Court was competent to take cognizance of the various offences under the Act and to remand the accused to judicial custody not only for the offences under the Act, but also for the offences under the IPC. That being the position, in my opinion, the custody of the petitioner could not be said to be illegal and as such, the petitioner cannot seek issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his custody in Model Jail, Chandigarh, was illegal. 12. Having taken the above view, with regard to the custody of the petitioner being legal, in my opinion, it is not necessary for this Court to consider as to whether the Special Judge was competent to remand the petitioner (after the challan was submitted in the Court) to judicial custody for the offences under the Act without taking cognizance, or the question that once the detention is illegal, it would not become legal subsequently by obtaining sanction to prosecute under the Act. That being so, it is also not necessary to consider the various authorities relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner as also the learned Counsel for the CBI, referred to above, in this regard. 13. For the reasons recorded above, I find no merit in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed.