Judgment D.N.Prasad, J. 1. This application under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed by the sole petitioner, the Secretary, Agricultural Produce Market Committee for quashing of criminal prosecution including the order talcing cognizance dated July 4, 1997 in Complaint Case No. C(iii)-107/97 (T.B. No. 1612 of 1997). The snort facts of the prosecution case alleging to this application are that the Opposite party No. 2, Labour Enforcement Officer submitted a prosecution report in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi alleging therein that he had inspected the place of occurrence on January 22, 1997 and found that the employers were paying less wages to the labourers. It is further alleged that the employers were not maintaining register required under the provisions of the Act. It is also alleged that the opposite party No, 2 issued show cause but no explanation was submitted. Accordingly, the prosecution was submitted on the basis of which the learned Chief judicial Magistrate, Ranchi took cognizance by an order dated July 4, 1997 against the petitioner and others for the offence under Secs. 22, 22 (a) and 22 (b) of the Minimum Wages Act. 2. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, at the outset, submitted that the petitioner is the Secretary, Agricultural Produce Market Committee which is a statutory body established under the provisions of Section 6 and incorporated under Sec. 17 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1960. It is further submitted that the market fee realised by the committee has to be spent for the development in the market area including construction of approach road for the benefit of Agriculturists in particular and public at large. It is also argued that the Board approved the plan for construction of road from Kulhi to Dhanbad Patratoli and estimated costs in the said construction work was Rs. 8,43,200.00 as length road under the development plan of market committee. The said work, after issuance of tender and on acceptance, was allotted to one Shri Rajkumar Singh who was getting the work done at the spot and it was responsibility and duty of the contractor to get the work done in accordance with the specification and as such the petitioner has got no concern with the said work at the spot. It is further argued that everything was specifically maintained by the Contractor for getting the work done as the work was allotted to the Contractor and the labourers, who were working at the spot, were actually under the control of the said contractor. The total liability of engaging the number of labourers and payment to the labourers is of the contractor and the petitioner, who is the Secretary, has no liability at all to make any payment to the labourers engaged by the contractor nor the Market Committee has power for superintendence or control over the labourers employed by the contractor. It is further argued that the allegation made in the complaint petition is also vague and not specific against the petitioner. It is also argued that the petitioner, being the Secretary of Market Committee, is immuned from the prosecution as per Sec. 47 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act and as such the whole prosecution is fit to be quashed against the petitioner. 3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the opposite party submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order as there is specific allegation about payment of less wages to the labourers employed by the contractor. 4. There is no dispute that the labourers said to have been working at the spot were actually employed by the contractor. It is also obvious that even if any register or documents said to have been maintained for the employment of the labourers that is to be maintained by the contractor for the labourers who were employed by him. There is nothing specific to show about participation or involvement of this petitioner who is said to be Secretary of the Market Committee for the alleged offence. It is clear that the work was allotted after approval and acceptance of the tender to the contractor and there is nothing specific to show that the petitioner had any power of superintendence or control over the labourers employed by the contractor. No doubt, labourers said to have been working at the spot, were engaged by the contractor and payment of the wages was also made by the contractor. No doubt, labourers said to have been working at the spot, were engaged by the contractor and payment of the wages was also made by the contractor. The Employer has been defined in Section 2(e) of the Minimum Wages Act as under: "Employer means any person, who employs, whether directly or through another person, or whether on behalf of himself or any other person, one or more employees in any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, and includes, except in Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 26." 5. As noticed above, the work for construction of the road was allotted to the contractor and there is nothing to show that the said labourers were engaged or employed by the petitioner for the said work. It may be noted here that the prosecution report is also silent as to what was the actual prescribed rate of wages at the particular time and what was actually being paid to the labourers at the relevant time. There is only allegation that the labourers were paid less wages than that prescribed under the provisions but there is nothing specific as to how much it was less paid and as such the allegation appears to be vague against the petitioner. 6. Inherent jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised to quash a proceeding in appropriate cases either to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In the instant case, in my view, it would be abuse of process of Court for continuance of the proceeding against the petitioner, when the allegation appears to be vague and there is nothing specific against the petitioner. Thus, I find merit in this application which is accordingly allowed. 7. In the result, the whole criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated July 4, 1997 against the petitioner is, hereby, quashed.