ORDER 1. Petitioner, a limited company, has filed this writ under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, claiming following relief by way of issuance of writ of mandamlls against the respondents: "The petitioner be awarded interest at the rate of 18% p.a., on amounts illegally realised from the date of realisation till date of repayment. Interest be also awarded on the quantified amount of interest of Rs. 1,37,77,570=70 ps. at the rate of 18% from December, 1984 till the date of payment thereof. The non-petitioners be directed to pay the aforesaid amounts to petitioner within a reasonably stipulated period by issuance of a suitable writ. order or direction." 2. In substance, the petition is for claiming interest on delayed payment of excise duty refunded by the respondents to petitioner. This relief is founded on the allegation that the petitioner - a limited company, is engaged in the business of manufacturing of mono-block pumps. According to petitioner, they filed a classification list in respect of monoblock pumps and claimed that due to their peculier manufacturing, they are not eligible to any excise duty. In other words, the case of petitioner was that the rate of duty leviable on these pumps was nil in terms of one exemption notification no. 57/78, dated 1.3.1978. The excise authorities did not accept the stand taken, by the petitioner and insisted for payment of excise duty. It is the case of petitioner that due to insistence on the part of excise authorities, the petitioner had to pay excise duty under protest. The petitioner then contested the issue before the departmental authorities and contended inter alia that they are not liable to pay any excise duty on these pumps in terms of the aforementioned exemption notification. This issue was eventually decided in favour of petitioner at the appellate stage. As a consequence of a declaration granted in favour of petitioner in appeal and it having attained the finality, that no duty is payable on these monoblock pumps, the petitioner became entitled to claim refund of the excise duty which was paid by them under protest. Eventually, after some correspondence, the department refunded a sum of Rs. 1,28,27,885/- in two instalments i.e. one on 29.11.1986 and other on 17.10.1988 to the petitioner. Eventually, after some correspondence, the department refunded a sum of Rs. 1,28,27,885/- in two instalments i.e. one on 29.11.1986 and other on 17.10.1988 to the petitioner. It is on this amount the petitioner claimed interest from the respondents inter alia on the ground that due to wrong witholding of the amount for a long period, the petitioner has become entitled to claim interest not only on the ground of equity but also under the general law. Since the respondents (Excise Department) did not acceed to the prayer made by the petitioner; the present petition was filed by the petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to pay a sum of Rs. 1,37,77,570/- by way of interest which was calculated at the rate of 18% per anum on the amount which was refunded but late. 3. Heard Shri J.P. Gupta, learned senior counsel with Shri Abhyankar, learned counsel for petitioner, and Shri E.G. Neema, learned counsel for respondents. 4. Shri Gupta, learned senior counsel relying upon series of cases decided by Supreme Court as also by High COUl1S cases viz. 1979 EL T (1181) [Vijay Textile v. Union of India High Court, Gujrat, 1979 ELT (1546)] [Jyoti Limited v. Union of India,: High Court, Gujarat], 1980 ELT (437) (Vallabh Glass Works Co. Ltd. v. Union of India; HC Gujarat), 1985 (19) ELT 3 (SC) [Elpro International v. Joint Secretary, Ministry (Finance)], 1986 (26) EL T 298 Cal (Dilichand Shreelal v. Collector of Central Excise). 1986 (25) ELT 939 (Cal) [Calcutta Paper Mills MFC v. Customs Excise and Gold (Control)], 1987 (31 % ELT 58 (Radheyshyam Tulsiram v. Collector of Customs, HC Calcutta), 1987 (31) ELT 696 (Born) (Mettal Box India Limited v. Union of India), 1988 (5) ELT 88 (Dharangdhara Municipality v: Dharangadhara Chemicals HC Guj.), 1988 (33) ELT 321 (Mettal Distributors Limited v. Union of India, HC Born.), 1988 (38) EL T 507 (Still Strips Limited v. Collector Central Excise, New Delhi), 1988 (36) ELT 537 (u. FOAM Private Limited v. Assistant Collector Central Excise; HC, Hydrabad). 1988 (33) ELT 591 (Engineering Projects Limited v. Collector Customs, Calcutta), 1988 (33) ELT 648 (Gurucharan Industry Ltd. v. Union of India HC Allahabad), 1989 (41) ELT 186. (Caira District Coop. Milk Producer v. Union of India; HC, Bombay), 1989 (43) EL T 253 (Redihot Electricals v. Union of India; HC, New Delhi). 1988 (33) ELT 591 (Engineering Projects Limited v. Collector Customs, Calcutta), 1988 (33) ELT 648 (Gurucharan Industry Ltd. v. Union of India HC Allahabad), 1989 (41) ELT 186. (Caira District Coop. Milk Producer v. Union of India; HC, Bombay), 1989 (43) EL T 253 (Redihot Electricals v. Union of India; HC, New Delhi). 1989 ELT 279 (Orient Enterprises v. Collector of Customs CEAT, New Delhi), 1989 (41) ELT 358 HC (India Cements Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Excise, SC), 1989 (44) EL T 423 (Shri Virendra Amritlala Thakkar v. Union of India; HC, AIL), 1991 (52) ELT 165 (Union of India v. Coromadal Prodorites SC Mad.), 1991 (51) ELT 214 [Sandoz (/) Ltd. v. Unon of India; HC, Born.], 1991 (51) ELT 255 [Prestige Engineering (P) LTD. v. Union of India; HC, AIL], 1991 (53) ELT 299 (Rubber Products Ltd. v Union of India; HC, Born.), and 1991 (51) ELT 325 (Kirloskar Cummins Ltd. v. Union of India; HC, Born.) urged that the claim of the petitioner towards interest is not only genuine but bona fide and legal as well. According to learned counsel, the decisions cited by him supra, were also dealing with the same issue which is involved in this case arid on all these cases the High Court and in some cases Supreme Court was pleased to award interest to the assessee. It was urged that writ does lie even in cases where only a claim of interest is made. It was also urged that in the peculier facts of this case, where, the amount of duty was not payable since inception but was paid under protest, a claim for interest is well founded in its writ jurisdiction. 5. In Substance, therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner on the strength of the case cited supra was that this is a fit case where this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution can issue or/and should issue a writ of malldamus and grant a relief of payment of interest in the form of a money decree for Rs. 1,37,77,570/-. 6. 1,37,77,570/-. 6. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent Shri Neema, standing counsel for Union of India placing strong reliance on a recent decision rendered by Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. M/s Orient Enterprises reported in ( AIR 1998 SC 1729 ) urged that the issue involved in this petition no longer remains res illtegra and infact stands concluded by this decision against the petitioner. Learned counsel urged that all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, whether of High Court or Supreme Court are prior to this decision AIR 1998 SC 1729 i.e. Orient Enterprises case) and therefore they are of no assistance to the petitioner. According to learned counsel all these decisions stand overruled on this issue by subsequent decision. It was urged that facts of the present case and that of one in the case of Orient Enterprises supra are identical in nature and hence law laid down by the Supreme Court squarely applies and concludes the controversy against the petitioner. In substance, therefore, the submission of larned counsel for the respondent on the basis of this decision was that writ filed by petitioner under Article 226 of Constitution for claiming interest is not maintainable and has to be dismissed accordingly. 7. The foemost question that falls for consideration in this writ is whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the relief of payment of interest on delayed refund of the amount paid by the petitioner (assessee) towards the custom duty under protest is maintainable? 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having analysied the entire senario in the context of the cases cited at the bar and the question posed, I am inclined to accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondent. In my opinion, the controversy involved in this writ is squarely covered by the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Orient Enterprises supra. In that case also the writ was filed claiming interest only on the delayed refund of the duty paid by the assessee towards custom duty. In my opinion, the controversy involved in this writ is squarely covered by the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Orient Enterprises supra. In that case also the writ was filed claiming interest only on the delayed refund of the duty paid by the assessee towards custom duty. Indeed, preciesly the question posed by their Lordships of Supreme Court for the decision was this :"The common question that falls for consideration in these appeals is whether a writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India seeking the relief of payment of interest on delayed refund of the amount paid by the assessee towards the custom duty, redemption, fine and penalty under the Custom Act was maintainable? After posing the aforesaid question, their Lordships then examined the issue in the context of earlier decision of Apex Court and eventually held that no writ lies in a case of this nature -- namely where the petitioner (assessee) has only claimed a relief of interest by way of mandamus. This is what their Lordship ruled :"The Court has emphasised that there was no legal right in the appellant who had filed the writ petition to claim refund under the relevant statute. In the present case also till the insertion of S. 27 A in the Act by Act 22 of 1995 there was no right entitling payment of interest on delayed refund under the Act. Such a right was conferred for the first time by the said provisions. Act 22 of 1995 also inserted section 28 AA which provides for payment of interest on delayed payment of duty by a person who is liable to pay the duty. Thus at relevant time there was no statutory right entitling the respondent to payment of interest on delayed refund and the writ petition filed by them was not for the inforcement of a legal right available to them under any statute. The claim for interest was in the nature of compensation for wrongful retention by the appellants of money that was collected from the respondents by way of customs duty, redemption fine and penalty. In view of the law laid down by this Court in Suganmal ( AIR 1965 SC 1740 ) (supra) a writ petition seeking the relief of payment of interest on delayed refund of the amount so collected could not, in our opinion be maintained. In view of the law laid down by this Court in Suganmal ( AIR 1965 SC 1740 ) (supra) a writ petition seeking the relief of payment of interest on delayed refund of the amount so collected could not, in our opinion be maintained. The decisions on which the reliance has been made by Shri Rawal were cases where the legality of the orders requiring payment of tax or duty were challanged and the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, while setting aside the said orders has directed the refund of the amount so collected with interest. The direction or payment of interest in these cases was by way of consequential relief along with the main relief of setting aside the order imposing the tax or duty. Those cases stand on a different footing and have no application to the present case. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondents before the High Court is dismissed. No order as to costs. While dealing with civil appeal No. 3374 of 91 we have held that• a writ petition seeking relief of interest in respect of the amount deposited towards redemption charges under an adjudication order which amount had been refunded after the said order was set aside could not be maintained under Art. 226 of Constitution of India. For the reasons given in the said judgment the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. No order as to costs." 9. In the light of an authoratative pronouncement of Supreme Court on an identical issue, I have no hesitation in dismissing this writ as not maintainable for the simple reason that this writ is also for claiming only an interest on delayed refund of excise duty. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner was that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Orient Enterprises (supra) is per incurium because according to learned counsel, earlier decisions of Supreme Court on this issue where interest was awarded were rendered by larger Bench and secondly, those decisions still hold the field. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner was that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Orient Enterprises (supra) is per incurium because according to learned counsel, earlier decisions of Supreme Court on this issue where interest was awarded were rendered by larger Bench and secondly, those decisions still hold the field. I do not agree to this submission. The cases on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner were 1985 (19) ELT 3 (SC) and 1989 (41) ELT 358 (SC). Perusal of these two decisions clearly shows that firstly these two decisions were rendered by a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges and secondly, ,these decisions turned on their own facts. So far as the case reported in 1985 (19) ELT 3 (SC) was concerned, it was a case where petition was filed in High Court questioning the validity of the levy of excise on certain items manufactured by the assessee. The issue was then decided in favour of assessee by the High Court. When the matter went to Supreme Court at the instance of department, their Lordships while granting leave to appeal imposed a condition that it will be open for the assessee to claim interest if the appeal filed by Union of India is eventually dismissed. It is in this context when the appeal filed by Union of India was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court, their Lordships then gave effect to their interim order and allowed some interest. This decision cannot be threfore cited as an authority for the proposition which Supreme Court posed in the case of Orient Enterprises. In other words, the decision turned on its own facts. The same is the situation with other case cited i.e. 1989 (41) ELT 338 (SC). This was also a case where a claim was made by the assesee before the departmental authorities for refund of excise duty. So the issue before the authorities was whether assessee is entitled for refund or not? It was being contested by the department that the claim of assessee for refund is barred. It is this issue which went upto the Supreme Court at the instance of assessee. While allowing the claim of refund, their Lordships passed a consequential order of paying interest. As observed supra, this case was also decided on its facts. It was being contested by the department that the claim of assessee for refund is barred. It is this issue which went upto the Supreme Court at the instance of assessee. While allowing the claim of refund, their Lordships passed a consequential order of paying interest. As observed supra, this case was also decided on its facts. Indeed this type of case was also cited in the case of Orient Enterprises• supra and that was distinguished by their Lordships Holding that a direction to pay interest as a consequential relief stand on a different footing. To quote the wordings of their Lordship in para 7 this is how it was observed :"The direction for payment of interest in these cases was by way of consequential relief along with the main relief of setting aside the order imposing the tax or duty. Those cases stand on a different footing and have no application to the present case. The same reasoning applies to the case cited by petitioner for its distinction. So for as other cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner which are mostly of various High Courts they need not be dealt with case-wise as in my considered view all these cases no longer considered to be good law after the pronouncement of the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Orient Enterprise Case (supra) and in any event, perusal of these cases also exhibit distinguishing features. 10. Since, admittedly, this is not a petition arising out of a claim of interest claimed on delayed refund made after the insertion of section 11 BB of section 75 of the Finance Act, 1995 (22 of 1995) in the Act, no benefit can be extended to petitioner of this newly inserted section which has a prospective operation. 11. In view of aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in this writ. It is accordingly dismissed as not maintainable. No costs. Security amount, if deposited by the petitioner be refunded.