JUDGMENT Surinder Sarup, J.—The facts giving rise to this revision petition are as follows. On 22.4.1982, the petitioners, who are the plaintiffs in the main suit, had leased out the land in dispute in favour of defendant-respondent No.3, i.e. M/s. Kalima Enterpries Pvt. Ltd. This lease was through execution of a registered lease deed of even date. Thereafter, the said defendant-respondent No. 3 took a loan from defendant-respondents No. 1 and 2 i.e. Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation and Himachal Pradesh State Industrial Development, Corporation, respectively, for setting up an Industrial Unit at Parwanoo. As part of the terms and conditions of the raising of this loan, the said defendant-respondent No. 3 pledged interest of lease-hold rights including building and machinery etc. set up or to be set up, with the said defendant-respondents No. 1 and 2. It is the admitted case of the parties that the land which was on lease with defendant-respondent No. 3 from the petitioners, was also included in the hypothecation and mortgage which was part of the loan agreement between the defendant-respondents inter se. 2. Since defendant-respondent No. 3 failed to repay the loan amount plus interest as stipulated in the loan agreement aforementioned, defendant-respondent No. 1 took possession of the hypothecated land, building, plant and machinery etc. in terms of Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act (hereinafter to be called the Act). In order to realise the amount of loan etc., the property of which the possession was taken over by defendant-respondent No. 1 as aforementioned, was intended to be sold by auction. It was in these circumstances that the petitioners filed their suit for declaration and injunction whereby, they challenged the action of defendant-respondents No. 1 and 2 and taking over the possession of the leased out land measuring 3500 Sq. Yds. This challenge was laid on the ground that the action of taking over possession was illegal inasmuch as the lease-hold rights originally given to defendant No. 3 by the petitioners had been extinguished. In the suit, the petitioners prayed for injunction against the defendant-respondents restraining them from alienating the same. 3. The stand taken by the defendant-respondent No. 1 in its written statement was that the lease had been cancelled by the petitioners only after the taking over the property in question by the answering respondents under Section 29 of the Act. In the suit, the petitioners prayed for injunction against the defendant-respondents restraining them from alienating the same. 3. The stand taken by the defendant-respondent No. 1 in its written statement was that the lease had been cancelled by the petitioners only after the taking over the property in question by the answering respondents under Section 29 of the Act. Therefore, the defendant-respondent No. 3 was not competent to transfer, surrender or cancel any such property which has been taken over by defendant-respondent No. 1 under the law. This plea was raised on the ground that by virtue of taking over of the property in question, defendant-respondent No. 1 is deemed to have become owner of the same and the cancellation of the lease inter se the petitioners and defendant-respondent No. 3 after the date of taking over is illegal and void. It was further submitted that the property thus taken over was to be sold because the liability of the defendant-respondent No. 3 was increasing from that day. 4. The admitted case of the parties is that by an order dated 4.8.1995 the trial Court of the Senior Sub-Judge, Solan issued an interim injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC restraining defendants-respondents No. 1 and 2 from selling or purchasing any machinery or land beyond the limit of hypothecation and mortgage till final disposal of the suit. Thereafter, the petitioner No. 1 moved another application under Sections 151 and 152 C.P.C. read with Order 39, Rules 1, 2 and 4 thereof for amending its order of ad-interim injunction dated 4,8.1995. 5. The above-mentioned application was dismissed by the trial Court i.e. Senior Sub-Judge, Solan by his order dated 24.12.1996. Then, an appeal was taken on behalf of the petitioners which has also been dismissed by the learned District Judge, Solan by his order dated 4.7.1997. It is in these circumstances that the present revision petition has been filed. 6. Originally, petitioners had impleaded only H.P.F.C. and HPSIDC as respondents No. 1 and 2. During the pendency of the revision petition, on the application of the petitioners, respondent No. 3 i.e. the lessee aforementioned was also impleaded as a party by an order of this Court dated 20.7.1998. 7. The learned Counsel for the parties have been heard at length and the records of the case have also been perused. During the pendency of the revision petition, on the application of the petitioners, respondent No. 3 i.e. the lessee aforementioned was also impleaded as a party by an order of this Court dated 20.7.1998. 7. The learned Counsel for the parties have been heard at length and the records of the case have also been perused. It has been strenuously urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the findings of both the Courts below that the surrender of the lease hold rights by defendant-respondent No. 3 in favour of the petitioners (plaintiffs) was a collusive act and a sham transaction, is untenable in law. According to him, the deed of surrender of the lease hold rights between them dated 18.7.1994, could not be ajudicated upon on merits during the pendency of the suit, while deciding the application of the petitioners under Order 39, C.P.C. On the other hand, it has been submitted by the learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 that acting under Section 29 of the Act respondent No. 1 took over the lease-hold rights as well as possession in between April and June, 1994 which was earlier in point of time to the surrender of the lease-hold rights by respondent No. 3 to the petitioners vide deed of surrender executed on 18.7.1994 between them. In other words, according to the learned Counsel, being later in point of time it could not have any legal effect qua the rights of respondent No. 1. 8. In order to appreciate the respective content of the learned Counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer to this aspect of the case as stated in the impugned orders. In this behalf it is stated in the order of the Senior Sub-Judge Solan dated 24.12.1996 that the surrender of the lease-hold rights by respondent No. 3 in favour of the petitioners are nothing but to avoid sale of the property by respondents No. 1 and 2 to realise the loan and is a sham transaction as both the petitioners and respondent No. 3 are sister concerns and both run by the same person. In other words, the learned Senior Sub-Judge has given a finding on the merits of the suit while dismissing the application of the petitioners. In other words, the learned Senior Sub-Judge has given a finding on the merits of the suit while dismissing the application of the petitioners. This amounts to pre-judging the said deed of surrender dated 18.7.1994 which is the basis and cause of action giving rise to the suit of the petitioners which is still to be tried and decided on merits. Moreover, it is wrong to say that both the petitioners and respondent No. 3 are sister concerns and both run by the same person (emphasis supplied). This is so because in para 6 of the written statement of defendant-respondent No. 1, it has been admitted that a change of management took place in the defendant-respondent No. 3 Company and Shri B.N. Kataria and his associates were to cease as share-holders and directors of defendant-respondent No. 3 Company. The attention of this Court has been pointedly drawn by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff to two letters purportedly from the H.P.F.C.-Respondent No. 1 to defendant No. 3 dated 27.11.1993 and 16.12.1993, respectively. Both these letters are on the record of the Civil Suit pending in the Court of Senior Sub-Judge, Solan. By both these letters, it has been indicated that the guarantee of the old directors are released with immediate effect and Shri B.N. Kataria, one of such directors, has been absolved from his personal guarantee executed in favour of the HPFC for term loan sanctioned in favour of M/s. Kalima Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. 9. It is manifest from the above that not only the impugned order passed by the Senior Sub-Judge has the effect of pre-judging and giving a finding on merits qua the deed of surrender/ relinquishment dated 18.7.1994, but is also factually wrong in respect of the finding that the parties to the said relinquishment deed are both run by the same person. 10. Coming to the impugned order passed by the District Judge dated 4.7.1997 in appeal, the finding recorded therein is that surrendering of the lease dated 18.7.1994 by defendant-respondent No. 3 in favour of the petitioners (plaintiffs) at the moment appears to be an act to defeat the claim of defendant-respondents No. 1 and 2 consequent upon notification dated 16.4.1994. Here also, the learned appellate Court has fallen into the same error as the trial Judge, by pronouncing on the merits of the deed of surrender/relinquishment dated 18.7.1994. Here also, the learned appellate Court has fallen into the same error as the trial Judge, by pronouncing on the merits of the deed of surrender/relinquishment dated 18.7.1994. This could not be done as it would amount to a finding on merits of the controversy between the parties in the main suit which is still pending. Not only that, neither in the impugned order of the Senior Sub-Judge dated 24.12.1996, nor in the order of the District Judge dated 4.7.1997, there is even an observation that the findings recorded therein will not be deemed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case/controversy between the parties. It is thus manifest that serious prejudice has been caused to the case of the petitioners in their main suit by the above-said findings of the two Courts below. 11. The matter can be looked at from another angle. Issue No. 4 as framed/settled by the Senior Sub-Judge, Solan as trial Court of the suit in hand by his order dated 6.3.1997 is as follows: "Whether the surrender of lease is illegal and defendants are entitled to declaration by way of counter claim? OPD" In other words, the legality and status of the surrender of lease is directly in issue between the parties in the main suit. That being the admitted position, it was legally not open to the two Courts below to pronounce upon its validity and legality at the very threshold while dismissing the application of the petitioners under Sections 151 and 152 read with Order 39, Rules 1, 2 and 4 CPC. 12. It has been vehemently argued by the learned counsel for respondent No. l that the prayer in the revision petition does not contain the specific demand/request for relief for setting aside the impugned orders of the two Courts below. Hence, according to the learned counsel, the revision itself is not maintainable being defective. 13. There is no merit in the objection raised by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1. A perusal of the prayer clause in the revision petition shows that apart from the main prayer to the effect that respondents No. 1 and 2 may be injuncted and restrained from transferring etc. 13. There is no merit in the objection raised by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1. A perusal of the prayer clause in the revision petition shows that apart from the main prayer to the effect that respondents No. 1 and 2 may be injuncted and restrained from transferring etc. any portion of the suit land for the so-called leasehold rights over the same till the pendency of the main suit, there is also the ancillary prayer for any other order/direction which this Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case. That being the position, this court has the jurisdiction in exercise of the powers under Section 115 CPC to frame the relief to be granted to the petitioners, in view of a case having been made out by them, which would include setting aside the impugned orders also. This Court is fortified in taking this view by the ratio of the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ude Singh v. The State of Haryana and others, (1972 PLJ 20) which in turn, relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and others, (AIR 1951 SC 41(53)). No doubt, the above-said reported decisions were in respect of Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India, but the principles contained therein would definitely apply to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court under Section 115 C.P.C. 14. It has lastly been submitted by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that the impugned orders do not disclose any error of jurisdiction so as to warrant interference by this court in exercise of its revisional powers. Reliance for this submission has been placed by him on The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanaqar, Hyderabad and another v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad, AIR 1973 SC 76, wherein it has been laid down that the High Court should not interfere even if the order is right or wrong or in accordance with law or not, unless it has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. This is precisely what has happened in the present case where both the courts below have passed the impugned orders while exercising their jurisdiction illegally as well as wit material irregularity. This is precisely what has happened in the present case where both the courts below have passed the impugned orders while exercising their jurisdiction illegally as well as wit material irregularity. As laid down in Thunga Bai and others v. Vishalakshi Heggadthi and another, AIR 1975 Karnataka 111, relied on behalf of the petitioners by their learned counsel, where the order is perverse and unjust it is the duty of the High Court to interfere and the order is perverse when the material pleadings are wilfully disregarded or there is some conscious violation of the rule of law or of procedure on the part of the Subordinate Court. 15. For the reasons recorded above, this revision is allowed. The impugned orders of the trial Court i.e. Senior Sub-Judge, Solan dated 24.12.1996 and the District Judge, Solan dated 4.7.1997 are set aside. Consequently, the respondents No. 1 and 2 are restrained from occupying, alienating or auctioning in any manner the land measuring 3500 Sq. Yards i.e. the land in dispute during the pendency of the main suit of the petitioners. The parties are left to bear their own costs. It is, however, made clear that nothing stated or expressed/ observed hereinbefore in this judgment shall be deemed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the main suit. Revision allowed.