P. VENKATARAMA REDDI J. ( 1 ) ). THIS appeal is by, unsuccessful writ petitioners who questioned the notice dated 20-11-1999 issued by the District Collector (Co-operation), Warangal convening the meeting of the Managing Committee of the district Co-operative Central Bank Limited, warangal on 7-2-1999 for consideration of the proposed motion of no confidence against its President (first appellant herein ). The said notice was issued under section 34-A of A. P. Co-operative Societies act The writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge and the notice issued by the Collector was quashed on the ground that the notice fell short of 15 clear days and therefore violative of the mandatory requirement of Section 34-A (3 ). Naturally, the appellants are not aggrieved by this part of the judgment. However, the appellants are aggrieved by the further direction given by the learned Single Judge leaving it open to the Registrar to issue notice for convening a meeting in accordance with Section 34-A (3 ). According to sub-section (3) of Sec. 34-A, the Registrar on receipt of the notice of communication to move a motion expressing want of confidence in the President or Vice president of the Committee, shall convene a meeting for consideration of the motion on a date appointed by him which shall not be later than 30 days from the date on which the notice was delivered to him. The second part of sub-section (3) requires the Registrar to give to the members notice of not less than 15 clear days of such meeting in such manner as may be prescribed. The proviso to sub-section (3) is an exception to the first part of sub-section (3 ). We shall advert to that proviso later. ( 2 ) ). In the present case, it is not in dispute that the notice dated 20-11-1999 issued by the District Collector, acting as Registrar under the Act convening the meeting on 7-12-1999 fell short of 15 clear days as enjoined by the Legislature. On that ground/ the learned Judge set aside the notice. One more fact to be noticed is that by an interim order dated 3-12-1999 passed in the writ petition which gives rise to this writ appeal, this Court granted stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the notice dated 20-11-1999 issued by the Registrar. On that ground/ the learned Judge set aside the notice. One more fact to be noticed is that by an interim order dated 3-12-1999 passed in the writ petition which gives rise to this writ appeal, this Court granted stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the notice dated 20-11-1999 issued by the Registrar. That interim order continued till the writ petition was disposed of by the impugned judgment. What should follow as a consequence of quashing the notice dated 20-11-1999 was the next question that was debated before the learned Single Judge. It was the contention of the writ petitioners that the first part of Section 34-A which requires the meeting to be held not later than 30 days from the date on which the notice of no-confidence motion was delivered to the Registrar, cannot be applied at this stage because 30 days period expired long back. Therefore, the appellants pleaded that the notice of noconfidence given by the members of the managing Committee of the Co-operative society loses its effect and remains a dead letter. Unless a fresh notice of no-confidence is delivered to the Registrar, it is argued, the registrar cannot act further in the matter. This contention was negatived by the learned Single Judge in the following words:"since the impugned notice dated 20-11-1999 is invalidated by this Court on the ground that the notice is ultra vires the provisions of Section 34-A (3), the notice is void ab initio and nonest. The Registrar is thus obligated to convene a meeting founded on the notice of the members dated 18-11-1999 for considering the motion expressing want of confidence in the president, by duly adhering to the legislative prescription that the notice should be of not less than fifteen clear days. Since the validity of the registrar s notice dated 20-11-1999 has been under consideration of this Court in this writ petition and has been interdicted by the interim orders of this Court dated 3-12-1999, the inability of the Registrar to conform to the legislative requirement set out in the first part of Section 34-A (3) of the act viz. Since the validity of the registrar s notice dated 20-11-1999 has been under consideration of this Court in this writ petition and has been interdicted by the interim orders of this Court dated 3-12-1999, the inability of the Registrar to conform to the legislative requirement set out in the first part of Section 34-A (3) of the act viz. , that he should convene a meeting for the consfderation of the motion on a date appointed by him which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to him, is the consequence of circumstances beyond his control and circumstances integral to the operation of the Rule of Law and would thus be of no consequence. In the premise the registrar may now proceed to issue a notice for convening a meeting in accordance with Section 34-A (3) of the act," ( 3 ) EARLIER, the learned Single Judge held that the proviso to Section 34-A (3) which the respondents relied on has no application and does not come to the aid of the Registrar. ( 4 ) IT may be stated that subsequent to the disposal of the writ petition, the Registrar on the basis of the aforementioned observations in the judgment under appeal, issued a notice on 31-12-1999 under section 34-A (3) convening the meeting for the purpose of considering the no- confidence motion against the President (1st appellant) on 29-1-2000. The validity of this notice is incidentally assailed in this writ appeal. We may mention that pending hearing of the writ appeal, by an order dated 28-1-2000, we directed that the result of the no-confidence motion shall not be declared. We made it clear that the meeting could take place as per schedule. Accordingly, we are informed that the meeting was held. A formal announcement of the outcome of the result has been deferred. The conclusion which we are going to reach will now pave the way for declaration of the result. ( 5 ) WHILE justifying the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the proviso to sec. 34-A (3) is not attracted, Mr. T. Ananta babu, learned senior Counsel appearing for the appellants assails the correctness of the view taken by the learned Judge that the registrar can now proceed to issue a fresh notice irrespective of the expiry of 30 days time limit. 34-A (3) is not attracted, Mr. T. Ananta babu, learned senior Counsel appearing for the appellants assails the correctness of the view taken by the learned Judge that the registrar can now proceed to issue a fresh notice irrespective of the expiry of 30 days time limit. The inability of the Registrar to convene the meeting on account of the operation of stay or for reasons beyond his control, cannot, according to the learned counsel stop the extinction of the notice of motion. The learned senior Counsel submits that the provisions which tend to put the elected representatives out of Office prematurely ought to be construed strictly and the Court cannot go beyond the specific legislative mandate. The learned Counsel elaborates his argument stating that when the situation arising out of grant of stay is dealt with by the proviso and the said proviso has been rightly held to be inapplicable, the learned Judge erred in supplying the omission by evolving an exception outside the ambit of the Section, the learned Counsel for the appellants therefore submits that the requisition given by a majority of members cannot be acted upon by the Registrar/collector in view of the supervening circumstances making it impossible to comply with the mandatory requirement in the first part of subsection (3) of Section 34-A. Reliance is placed on the Full Bench decision of karnataka High Court in Puttaswamy vs. V. Prema. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, the learned Addl. Advocate General submits that the writ petition should have been dismissed in toto on the ground that want of 15 clays clear days notice being directory in nature, the notice will not be invalid. Reliance for this proposition is placed on a decision of this court in Kistayya vs. State of A. P. It is also contended that in any case, the proviso to sub-sec. (3) is clearly attracted and therefore the meeting notice dated 31-12-1999 is immune from attack. The learned Addl. Advocate General thus, canvasses the correctness of conclusions reached by the learned Single Judge on these two aspects while supporting the ultimate conclusion reached. (3) is clearly attracted and therefore the meeting notice dated 31-12-1999 is immune from attack. The learned Addl. Advocate General thus, canvasses the correctness of conclusions reached by the learned Single Judge on these two aspects while supporting the ultimate conclusion reached. ( 7 ) IN the view we are going to take vis-avis the proviso to sub-section (3), it is not necessary for us to delve into the question whether the decision in 1972 (2) APLJ 201 lays down the correct law and whether the impugned notice dated 20-11-1999 is invalid for want of 15 clear days notice as held by the learned Single Judge. We agree with the learned Addl. Advocate-General that the proviso to Section 34-A (3) is squarely attracted in the instant case and the learned single Judge erred in taking a view to the contra. Sub-section (3) and the proviso thereto read as follows:"the Registrar shall then convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion at the office of the society on a date appointed by him which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to him. He shall give to the members notice of not less than fifteen clear days of such meeting in such manner as may be prescribed. Provided that where the holding of such meeting is stayed by an order of a Court the meeting shall be adjourned and the Registrar shall hold the adjourned meeting on a date not later than thirty days from the date on which he received the intimation about the vacation of stay, after giving to the members notice of not less than fifteen clear days of such adjourned meeting. " ( 8 ) THE reasoning of the learned Single judge in holding that the proviso does not come into play is as follows:"in this case stay granted on 3-12-1999 by the Court in WPMP No. 31159 of 1990 in the writ petition has not been vacated, but the notice of the Registrar dated 20-11-1999 issued under section 34-A (3) of the Act impugned in this writ petition is set aside as being violative of the Act. Section 34-A (3) proviso is thus not attracted. " ( 9 ) WE find it difficult to concur with the reasoning of the learned Judge. Section 34-A (3) proviso is thus not attracted. " ( 9 ) WE find it difficult to concur with the reasoning of the learned Judge. We are of the view that the disposal of the writ petition giving liberty to the Registrar to proceed further to convene the meeting stayed earlier by issuing a fresh notice, tantamounts to vacation of stay. It is not necessary that specific words should be found in the judgment that stay is vacated. Final judgment dismissing the writ petition or giving clearance to the competent authority to go ahead with the holding of meeting is as good as an order vacating the stay. True, in the light of the judgment, the registrar cannot act on the original notice and he has to issue a fresh notice. But that is immaterial. The fact remains that the ultimate verdict of the Court has cleared the obstacle for holding the meeting pursuant to the notice of proposed no-confidence motion. Even if the writ petition has been dismissed upholding the validity of the notice dated 20-11-1999, the formality of giving fresh notice in terms of the proviso, has got to be fulfilled. Therefore, the fact that the writ petition was partly allowed by quashing the notice issued by the Registrar does not make any difference in substance as regards the applicability of the proviso. In the instant case, the stay must be deemed to have been vacated for all intents and purposes with the disposal of the writ petition on 22-12-1999 and the proviso therefore springs into action and saves the validity of the notice of motion already given by the members of the Managing committee. ( 10 ) THE Full Bench judgment of the karnataka High Court in Puttaswamy s case (supra) does not come to the aid of the appellants. That decision may only support the petitioners contention that notice of not less than 15 clear days for the meeting to discuss no-confidence motion, is a mandatory requirement. The observation that the underlying idea of Section 47 of karnataka Zilla Parishad and Nyaya panchayats Act is to ensure that the position of men holding high elective offices of pradhan and Upa Pradhan is not easily disturbed does not carry the case of the petitioners any further. That observation cannot be divorced from the context. The observation that the underlying idea of Section 47 of karnataka Zilla Parishad and Nyaya panchayats Act is to ensure that the position of men holding high elective offices of pradhan and Upa Pradhan is not easily disturbed does not carry the case of the petitioners any further. That observation cannot be divorced from the context. The learned Single Judge himself upheld the contention that the duration of notice is a mandatory requirement. Whether or not that view of the learned Single Judge is in conformity of the Full Bench decision of the karnataka High Court though it is apparently contrary to the Division Bench decision of this Court cited supra need not be gone into. We are assuming that the learned Single Judge now is correct on this aspect. Yet, we are resting our conclusion on the proviso to Section 34-A (3) which is similar to Section 47 (3) of the Karnataka act. That proviso did not fall consideration of the Full Bench. Nothing said by the Full bench of Karnataka High Court will militate against the construction placed by us on the proviso vis-a-vis the factual events of the present case. ( 11 ) WE would only add that while the conditions precedent for taking action pursuant to the notice of proposed noconfidence motion are to be satisfied, at the same time, we must give full effect to the provisions meant to overcome the situations that block the progress of the proceedings for no-confidence motion. The grant of stay by the Courts and subsequent vacation thereof is one such situation which is taken care of by the proviso to section 34-A (3 ). It is not legitimate for the court to place a narrow and truncated interpretation on the proviso so as to frustrate the purpose and scheme underlying the provision. ( 12 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants then advanced the argument that the notice expressing want of confidence was a composite notice pertaining to the president and Vice-President and the Vice- President having resigned, the Registrar cannot act on that notice of motion in respect of President alone It is difficult to sustain this argument. Too much of subtlety and legalism cannot be imported into the notice. The proposed motion of noconfidence is clearly severable as far as vice-President is concerned because he resigned from the office. Too much of subtlety and legalism cannot be imported into the notice. The proposed motion of noconfidence is clearly severable as far as vice-President is concerned because he resigned from the office. The Collector can therefore proceed further to convene the meeting to consider the no-confidence motion against the President. There is nothing in the language of sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 34-A or Form AAA as prescribed by Rule 6-A which would suggest that the proposed motion falls to ground if it cannot be put into effect as far as one of the Office bearers named therein. ( 13 ) THE next contention is that the meeting held on 29-1-2000 was beyond 30 days from the date on which the Registrar (District Collector) received the intimation about the vacation of stay and therefore goes against the proviso to Section 34-A{3 ). This contention proceeds on the premise that as soon as the judgment was delivered by the learned Single Judge, the information should have reached the District Collector. In the absence of definite material, it is difficult to assume that the Collector had prior information even before the authentic information was received from the government Pleader s Office. The Registrar is not expected to act on some rumour or vague information. In a case like this, where the notice issued by the Registrar was quashed and the writ petition was thus allowed subject to certain observations, the registrar would naturally like to have correct and authentic information about the judgment from his own Counsel, if not a copy of the judgment. We therefore reject this contention as well. ( 14 ) THE result is that the writ appeal is dismissed and the judgment of the learned single Judge is confirmed though for a different reason. Pursuant to the meeting that was held on 29-1-2000, we direct the first respondent to declare the result of such meeting. We make no order as to costs.