Judgment : Defendant in O.S.No.169 of 1996 on the file of Additional District Munsif Court, Cuddalore is the revision petitioner herein. 2. Suit filed by plaintiff was one for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendant and their men from in any way interfering with his possession and for other reliefs. 3. In the written statement filed by defendant one of the contention raised was that suit has been under valued and the market value of the property as on the date will be Rs.68,400 and consequently court will have no jurisdiction to deal with the case. 4. When defendant wanted to decide the case of court-fee as preliminary issue, by the impugned order lower court heard on the preliminary issue and decided that the suit is properly valued and court fee paid is also sufficient. The said order is challenged in this revision petition. 5. Main reason urgedby learned counsel for petition is that the court fee payable must be under Sec.27(c) of the Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, when there is an issue regarding title to the property. According to counsel, if market value is to be considered, it will be more than Rs.68,000 and therefore court-fee paid is not sufficient. 6. I heard the counsel on both sides. It is not disputed by learned counsel that originally suit was filed before Sub Court since suit was valued more than Rs.30,000. When pecuniary jurisdiction of Munsif Court was enhanced, suit was transferred to Munsif Court and renumbered as O.S.No.169 of 1996. Suit was originally filed before court of unlimited jurisdiction is admitted. 7. Relevant portion of Sec.27 of Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act reads thus: “Sec.27. Suit for injunction: In a suit for injunction- .(a) where the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, and .(i) where the plaintiff alleges that his title to the property is denied, or .(ii) where an issue is framed regarding the plaintiffs title to the property, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher.” As stated earlier, court-fee is paid under Sec.27(a) taking into consideration the market value of the property at Rs.31,000 and court-fee is paid on 1 1/2 of the market value of Rs.15,500. 8. 8. Before further proceeding into the matter it is only proper to consider the averments in the plaint as it is. .• “(1) The plaintiff is the owner of the property described below. the property is situated at Alpettai, Manjakuppam, Cuddalore-1, within the jurisdiction of this Court. The property was purchased from one Mr.Managalan Padayachi and others for proper and valid consideration for a sum of Rs.30,000. The said sale deed is filed herewith as document No.1 and the same may be read as part of this plaint. .• (2) The plaintiff submits that he has taken possession of this property and since then he is in due possession and enjoyment of this property, he is using this property for storage of rubbish, straw and building materials. The plaintiff has also put up a small thatched shed for storage building materials. The plaintiff submits that as a lawful owner he is entitled to be in possession and enjoyment of this property. .• (3) Whileso, the defendant herein aggrieved that the plaintiff has purchased this property which they want to use for their own private purposes. They are trying to trespass upon this property for the past four days in a high handed manner. The defendant has no manner of right for title or interest in this property. The act of the defendant is illegal. The defendant has no right to cause obstruction to the peaceful enjoyment by the plaintiff. The defendant and their men cannot take law into their own hand and cause obstruction to the plaintiff. In view of the hostile attitude of the defendant the plaintiff is obliged to file this suit for declaration and permanent injunction. • (4) The cause of action for the suit arose on 211. 1991, when the plaintiff has purchased the property and since when the plaintiff is in continuous possession and enjoyment of this property and since 24. 1994 when the defendant and their men are trying to disturb the possession of the plaintiff to the suit property situated at Alpettai, Manjakuppam, Cuddalore Taluk within the jurisdiction of this Court. .• (5) The plaintiff values the suit for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction at Rs.18,500 and pays a court-fee thereon of Rs.1,163 under Sec.27(c) of the Court-fees Act. .• (5) The plaintiff values the suit for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction at Rs.18,500 and pays a court-fee thereon of Rs.1,163 under Sec.27(c) of the Court-fees Act. Details of valuation Market value of the suit property… Rs.31,000.00 Suit for injunction 1/2 of it under Sec.27(a)… Rs.15,500.00 Court-fee thereon at… Rs.1,163.00” A reading of the above paragraphs show that there is no averments in the plaint that defendant is denying title. 9. As early as in Ponnuswami v. Sinnana , (1955)2 MLJ. 323 : A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 52. more or less a similar question came for consideration. A notification issued by this Court under Sec.9 of the then Suits Valuation Act reads thus: “In suits for injunction where the relief is sought with reference to any immoveable property on the ground that the defendant denies title of the plaintiff to the property and disturbs or threatens plaintiffs possession thereto, the value of the subject matter of the suit shall not be less than half the value of the immoveable property calculated in the manner provided for by paragraph (v) of Sec.7 of the Court-fees Act of 1870.” In that case plaintiff filed simple suit for injunction on the allegation that defendant is attempting to object title. An objection was taken regarding payment of court fee on the ground that defendant is denying title in the written statement. The question was whether notification could be applied when there is no allegation in the plaint that defendant is denying title. Munsif Court held that Commission will have to be issued to ascertain the market value of the property and court fee will have to be paid on the basis of notification. The same is challenged before this Court in that case and in paragraphs 4 and 5 it is held thus, “4. The reasoning by which the learned District Munsif reached his decision against the plaintiff was that as the suit was admittedly one for a permanent injunction it fell within Sec.7(iv) (d), Court-fees Act, under which court-fee is payable according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The relief sought was with reference to immovable property and therefore this condition of the notification was also satisfied. The relief sought was with reference to immovable property and therefore this condition of the notification was also satisfied. The only question that remained related to the other condition required before the notification could apply namely, “that the relief of injunction should be sought on the ground that the defendant denied the title of the plaintiff to the property and disturbed or threatened to disturb plaintiffs possession.“ The plaintiff had averred that the defendants were threatening to disturb his possession and enjoyment. The question therefore narrowed down to this viz., whether that portion of the notification which refers to the relief being sought on the ground that the defendant denied the title of the plaintiff to the property was satisfied or not. In dealing with this, the learned District Munsif referred to the written statement filed by the defendants in which they attacked the reality of the sale to the plaintiffs father alleging that this was benami for themselves. From this he drew the inference that the substance of the suit was one in which the plaintiff was seeking the relief of injunction on the ground that the defendants attacked his title. He was conscious that there was no allegation in the plaint regarding the denial of his title and so stated, ”It is true that the plaint does not contain any allegation that the defendants are denying the title of the plaintiff. But according to the notification for valuing the subject-matter of the suit, an allegation of a mere threat to disturb plaintiffs possession is sufficient to call upon the plaintiff to value the subject-matter at half the market value of the property involved. The effect of the notification is that the plaintiff cannot value the suit at less than half the value calculated in the manner mentioned therein in a suit for an injunction upon an allegation that the defendant is threatening to disturb the plaintiffs possession of the property. “ In support of this construction, which he placed on the notification the learned District Munsif referred to two decisions of this Court in Ghosh Beevi IN RE. , A.I.R. 1944 Mad. 406(A) and Satyabhigna Theerthaswami of Uttaradi Mutt v. Narasayya , A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 44(B). (5) Having considered the matter carefully, I find I cannot agree with the view expressed by the learned District Munsif. , A.I.R. 1944 Mad. 406(A) and Satyabhigna Theerthaswami of Uttaradi Mutt v. Narasayya , A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 44(B). (5) Having considered the matter carefully, I find I cannot agree with the view expressed by the learned District Munsif. The notification in question is a fiscal enactment and unless its words are completely satisfied the litigant cannot be charged with the fee payable under it. Under Sec.7(iv)(d) of the Court-fees Act and before the notification the plaintiff was free to put his own valuation which was not open to revision by the courts. In variation of this right we have the notification of 10. 1943 the terms of which I have extracted above. There are two conditions specified in it before it could be attracted; the first being that it must be a suit for an injunction in relation to immoveable property necessitated by the defendants disturbing or threatening to disturb the plaintiffs possession of the property. There is also a second condition laid down namely that the plaint must allege that the defendant was thus threatening to disturb his possession on the ground that the plaintiff had no ‘title to the property. The construction put upon the notification by the learned District Munsif, if accepted, would virtually lead to the elimination of the second condition which I have set out above and I do not consider that this result could be achieved on any reasonable principle of construction. One thing is clear that the allegations in the written statement or the issues raised thereby cannot possibly bear upon the question of the court-fee payable by the plaintiff. This must be determined wholly by the allegations contained in the plaint and the relief sought on the basis of such allegations. If the written statement of the defendant were eliminated what we have in the present case is merely a suit for an injunction in relation to immovable property restraining the defendants from disturbing or unlawfully interfering with the plaintiffs possession of the property belonging to the plaintiff on the allegation that this was done taking advantage of the plaintiffs youth and inexperience.” 10. It is well settled that court-fee is to be calculated only on the allegations in the plaint. It is well settled that court-fee is to be calculated only on the allegations in the plaint. It is also well settled that the contentions of written statement is not to be taken into consideration for payment of court-fee and court-fee will have to be computed considering what are the reliefs claimed on the basis of allegations in the plaint. It was submitted that there is an issue in this case regarding title to the property and therefore he has to pay court fees on 1 1/2 of market value. I have already stated that plaintiff has paid court-fee on 1 1/2 “ of market value of the property and it is the quantum of market value that has been questioned by defendant. 11. Generally, an issue is raised after written statement is filed. But regarding payment of court-fees, allegation of plaint alone is considered. If that be so, the necessity of raising an issue on the question of title must also arise from the allegations in the plaint. For the purpose of determining the right to relief, that issue may be necessary. But for the purpose of calculating court-fees, the issue might have arisen from the allegations in the plaint alone. If there is allegation in the plaint that there is denial of title, naturally issue has to be raised. If there is no allegation of denial of title for the purpose of court-fees, an issue regarding title may not be necessary. Following the decision cited supra, for the applicability of Sec.27(a), the allegations in the plaint must include denial of title issues also might have been framed on that basis. If the issue is raised regarding plaintiffs title on the basis of written statement that is only for the purpose of granting relief to plaintiff and not for the purpose of payment of court-fees. 12. In this case, I do not think that defendant can even contend by filing revision under Sec.115 of Code of Civil Procedure. The court-fee paid is proper and the market value assessed is also correct. 13. In Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt.Vimla Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt.Vimla Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt.Vimla , A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1299 their Lordships considered this question and in paras.2 and 3 of the judgment it is held thus: ”2. The court-fee paid is proper and the market value assessed is also correct. 13. In Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt.Vimla Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt.Vimla Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt.Vimla , A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1299 their Lordships considered this question and in paras.2 and 3 of the judgment it is held thus: ”2. The Court-fees Act was enacted to collect revenue for the benefit of the State and not to arm a contesting party with a weapon of defence to obstruct the trial of an action. By recognising that the defendant was entitled to contest the valuation of the properties in dispute as if it were a matter in issue between him and the plaintiff and by entertaining petitions preferred by the defendant to the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction against the order adjudicating court-fee payable on the plaint, all progress in the suit for the trial of the dispute on the merits has been effectively frustrated for nearly five years. We fail to appreciate what grievance the defendant can make by seeking to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on the question whether the plaintiff has paid adequate court-fee on his placing. Whether proper court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. How by an order relating to the adequacy of the court-fee paid by the plaintiff, the defendant may feel aggrieved, it is difficult to appreciate. Again, the jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly conditioned by Clauses (a) to (c) thereof and may be invoked on the ground of refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Subordinate Court or assumption of jurisdiction which the court does not possess or on the ground that the court has acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The defendant who may believe and even honestly that proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has still no right to move the superior courts by appeal or in revision against the order adjudging payment of court-fee payable on the plaint. The defendant who may believe and even honestly that proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has still no right to move the superior courts by appeal or in revision against the order adjudging payment of court-fee payable on the plaint. But counsel for the defendant says that by Act 14 of 1955 enacted by the Madras Legislature which applied to the suit in question, the defendant has been invested with a right not only to contest in the trial court the issue whether adequate court-fee has been paid by the plaintiff, but also to move the High Court in revision if an order contrary to his submission is passed by the court. Reliance in support of that contention is placed upon Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.12. The sub-section, in so far as it is material, provides: “Any defendant may, by his written statement filed before the first hearing of the suit or before the first hearing of the suit or before evidence is recorded on the merits of the claim plead that the subject-matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is not sufficient. All questions arising on such pleas shall be heard and decided before evidence is recorded affecting such defendant, on the merits of the claim. If the court decides that the subject-matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is not sufficient, the court shall fix a date before which the plaint shall be amended in accordance with the courts decision and the deficit fee shall be paid…” 3. But this section only enables the defendant to raise a contention as to the proper court-fee payable on a plaint and to assist the court in arriving at a just decision on that question. Our attention has not been invited to any provision of the Madras Court-fees Act or any other statute which enables the defendant to move the High Court in revision against the decision of the court of first instance on the matter of court-fee payable in a plaint. Our attention has not been invited to any provision of the Madras Court-fees Act or any other statute which enables the defendant to move the High Court in revision against the decision of the court of first instance on the matter of court-fee payable in a plaint. The Act, it is true by Sec.19 provides that for the purpose of deciding whether the subject-matter of the suit or other proceeding has been property valued or whether the fee paid is sufficient, the Court may hold such enquiry as it considers proper and issue a commission to any other person directing him to make such local or other investigation as may be necessary and report thereon. The anxiety of the Legislature to collect court-fee due from the litigant is manifest from the detailed provisions made in Ch.III of the Act, but those provisions do not arm the defendant with a weapon of technicality to obstruct the progress of the suit by approaching the High Court in revision against an order determining the court-fee payable. In our view, the High Court grievously erred in entertaining revision applications on questions of court-fee at the instance of the defendant, when no question of jurisdiction was involved.” 14. When lower court holds that suit has been properly valued and court fee paid is sufficient, I do not think defendant is entitled to file revision under Sec.115 of Code of Civil Procedure. Again, no material is placed before lower court to contend that assessment made by plaintiff is not correct. 15. Much reliance was placed on the documents relied on by plaintiff himself that market value has been stated much higher than Rs.31,000. From the description of the plaint it is clear that the property is vacant land. Under Sec.7 of the Court-fees Act, it is not open market value that has to be taken into consideration for assessing market value. Market value for the land in suits coming under Sec.27(a) is 30 times survey assessment of land. It that provision is alone is to be applied, contention of defendant will have no force. 16. After hearing both sides I do not think that any ground is made out for interference under Sec.115 of Code of Civil Procedure. 17. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No.12039 of 1999 is also dismissed.