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2000 DIGILAW 120 (PNJ)

Tek Chand v. Harbhajan Chand

2000-02-01

AMAR DUTT

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JUDGMENT Amar Dutt, J. - This revision petition is directed against the judgment dated 8.7.1998 passed by the Sessions Judge, Bhatinda, by which the respondents were acquitted of the charge framed against them under Sections 302/34 Indian Penal Code. 2. On 5.6.1997, an FIR had been registered at the behest of the petitioner in Police Station Dialpura about the incident in which his daughter Pawanjit had been killed at 7 p.m. on 4.6.1997. After investigation, challan had been put in against the accused whereafter charges had been framed under Sections 302/34 Indian Penal Code. The trial Court had, after recording of the evidence and the explanation of the accused under Section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, heard arguments and come to the conclusion that "genesis of the occurrence is shrouded by doubtful circumstances and it can well be said that the occurrence had not taken place in the way and manner as has been suggested by the prosecution as also that there is an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, giving sufficient time to the prosecution to deliberate and ponder over the issue leading to an irresistible conclusion that a story was coined to suit the prosecution, as also in view of the fact that the presence of only two eye-witnesses, who have been examined, at the scene of occurrence, is doubtful and I have no option but to acquit all the accused of the charge framed against them by giving benefit of doubt and I order accordingly." 3. Since the State did not choose to come up in appeal, the petitioner who is the father of the deceased, has filed the present revision. 4. Sh. C.M. Munjal, learned counsel for the petitioner, has tried to assail the findings returned by the Court below on the ground that the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court regarding delay and the reliability of the witnesses ought not to be accepted. 5. 4. Sh. C.M. Munjal, learned counsel for the petitioner, has tried to assail the findings returned by the Court below on the ground that the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court regarding delay and the reliability of the witnesses ought not to be accepted. 5. It is not disputed before me that the scope of a revision filed by a private party against an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted on a police report, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1788, in which it has been observed as under :- "It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice." 6. Thereafter, the Apex Court has in Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh, 1998(4) RCR 423 again observed as under :- "Coming to the ambit of power of High Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial Court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is limited only to exceptional case when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial Court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue have been overlooked." 7. This view ws reiterated again in Kishan Swaroop v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 1998(3) RCR 137. This view ws reiterated again in Kishan Swaroop v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 1998(3) RCR 137. Even in a later judgment reported as State of Kerala v. Puttamana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, 1999(1) RCR 808, which has been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as under :- "Having examined the impugned judgment of the High Court and bearing in mind the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that in the case in hand, the High Court has exceeded its revisional jurisdiction. In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court not can it be treated even a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its on conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice." 8. After going through the judgments, I find that the revision is liable to be dismissed as I am not able to find out any circumstances which would enable this Court to come to the conclusion that on account of any particular lapse committed by the Court below, grave miscarriage of justice has been perpetrated on the petitioner by the impugned order. For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. Revision dismissed.