Judgment Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. 1. This application for review of the order dated August 1, 2000 is a sequel to the order passed by their Lordships of the Supreme Coireut on September 29, 2000 in SLP (Civil) No. 14966 of 2000. A few facts as relevant for the decision of the case may be briefly noticed. 2. The building belonging to Budh Khalsa Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. is the bone of contention. It was requisitioned under the provisions of the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953, on April 3, 1973. In pursuance to the order passed by the District Magistrate, Sonepat, respondent No. 4 had given possession of the premises to the Government on May 16, 1973. On September 2, 1987 the owner of the building filed a petition before the Deputy Commissioner with the grievance that the meagre rent of Rs. 400/- was very low. It was urged that "the buildings of this type can easily fetch a monthly rent of Rs. 5,000/-". It, therefore, prayed that "the officers concerned may kindly be directed to pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- till the building is vacated." The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner filed a reply. It was stated that the rent is Rs. 434/- per month and that it "cannot be increased by the undersigned and this can only be increased on the basis of assessment by the P.W.D. Authorities....." 3. It appears that the State of Haryana as also the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, whose office was located in the premises, did not even pay the agreed rent. Thus, respondent No. 4 filed a petition "for ejectment of the respondents from the premises under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban Rent (Control and Eviction) Act No. 11 of 1973." A copy of this petition is on record as Annexure P4. It was, inter alia, urged that an amount of Rs. 17,360/- was due as rent for the period from March, 1, 1992 till June 30, 1995. It was prayed that the respondents having failed to pay the rent, they were liable to be evicted. This claim was contested by the State of Haryana and Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Haryana. It was, inter alia, urged that an amount of Rs. 17,360/- was due as rent for the period from March, 1, 1992 till June 30, 1995. It was prayed that the respondents having failed to pay the rent, they were liable to be evicted. This claim was contested by the State of Haryana and Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Haryana. Ultimately, vide order dated October 1, 1997 the Rent Controller found that the State of Haryana and the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner "have not tendered the rent within the statutory period of fifteen days from 6.12.1995." Thus, they were ordered to be evicted vide order dated October 1, 1997. Aggrieved by the order, the State of Haryana and the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner filed an appeal. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal vide its order dated April 25, 1998. Copies of the two orders are on record as Annexures P6 and P7. Admittedly, the State of Haryana etc. had the remedy of `revision available under the Rent Restriction Law. For reasons best known to them, no revision petition was filed. However, after the lapse of more than a year Civil Writ Petition No. 10470 of 1999 was filed by the State of Haryana through the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Sonepat. In this petition the orders passed by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority were sought to be challenged. 4. While the writ petition was pending, the District Bar Association, Sonepat, the present applicant, filed a Civil Miscellaneous application, viz. C.M. No. 26149 of 1999 for being impleaded as a co-petitioner. It appears that this application was allowed by a Bench of this Court vide order dated January 13, 2000. 5. Notice of motion was issued. Written statements were filed by different parties. The case was ultimately posted for hearing before this Bench on August 1, 2000. On that date, counsel for the State of Haryana had made a categorical statement that he did not press the petition. He prayed for the grant of time to enable him to vacate the premises. Resultantly, the writ petition was dismissed on the undertaking given by the counsel. The time was granted for vacating the premises. 6. Thereafter, C.M. No. 22510 of 2000 was filed by the State of Haryana for extension of time on the ground that it was unable to find any alternative accommodation. Resultantly, the writ petition was dismissed on the undertaking given by the counsel. The time was granted for vacating the premises. 6. Thereafter, C.M. No. 22510 of 2000 was filed by the State of Haryana for extension of time on the ground that it was unable to find any alternative accommodation. It was placed before this Bench. It was noticed that according to the applicant itself the building of the Old Hospital was lying vacant at Sonepat. The writ petitioner had requested the Government to provide accommodation in a part of that building. Even a request had been made to the Deputy Commissioner. Keeping in view of the fact that accommodation was actually available, the Bench took the view that no ground for grant of any extension of time was made out. Resultantly, the prayer for extension of time was rejected. 7. The District Bar Association has filed this application for review. It has been stated in the application that it is "being filed for re-listing the Civil Writ Petition so that the submissions can be made on behalf of writ petitioner No. 2, District Tax Bar Association, Sonepat (Haryana), so that the writ petition can be heard and decided on merits." The only prayer in this application is for the listing of the writ petition. 8. We have heard Mr. Rajinder Chhibbar, learned Counsel for the petitioner No. 2. He has contended that the property in dispute having been requisitioned, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the parties. Thus, the orders passed by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are wholly without jurisdiction and a nullity. He has further contended that in view of the specific remedy under the 1953 Act, the owner of the property could not have sought the remedy under the Haryana Urban (Control and Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. Learned Counsel also submitted that respondent Nos. 5 to 8 having bought the property in March 1999, they had no better title than that of respondent No. 4 in view of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, they were not entitled contended that the petition filed by respondent No. 4 suffered from various mis-statements of facts and, thus, the relief prayed for by it could not have been granted. The order of requisition having not been challenged, the order of eviction should be quashed. 9. Thus, they were not entitled contended that the petition filed by respondent No. 4 suffered from various mis-statements of facts and, thus, the relief prayed for by it could not have been granted. The order of requisition having not been challenged, the order of eviction should be quashed. 9. At the outset we asked the learned Counsel as to what is the right of the District Bar Association to intervene in the dispute. The learned Counsel very candidly admitted that there is no privity of contract between the present applicant and the owners. However, the counsel urged that the Bar Association being an integral part of the office of the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, it was entitled to maintain the present petition. Admittedly, there is no privity of contract between the Bar Association and the respondent-landowners. Still further, the applicant-petitioner had not moved its little finger when the proceedings for eviction were initiated by respondent No. 4. Even after the order of eviction had been passed by the Rent Controller on October 1, 1997, the petitioner-applicant had not filed any appeal or sought to challenge the order. Still further, the State of Haryana, which had requisitioned the property and was in possession of the premises, having voluntarily chosen to give up its claim against the impugned orders passed by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, the petitioner, in our view, has no right to maintain the present petition or to challenge the orders passed under the statute. 10. Irrespective of the above, we have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner on merits. He has contended that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to decide the petition filed by respondent No. 4. 11. We are unable to accept the contention. Admittedly, the dispute was between the State of Haryana and respondent No. 4. It is not disputed that respondent No. 4 was entitled to the payment of rent. It was not being paid. Since the arrears for a fairly long period had accumulated, the landlord- respondent No. 4 had chosen to seek the help of the court by invoking the provisions of Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The Authority entertained the petition. It gave an opportunity to the parties to produce evidence. After examination of the evidence, it came to a firm finding of fact that the State of Haryana etc. The Authority entertained the petition. It gave an opportunity to the parties to produce evidence. After examination of the evidence, it came to a firm finding of fact that the State of Haryana etc. had failed to tender the rent in accordance with the statute. Thus, it ordered the eviction. The order was affirmed by the Appellate Authority. 12. Mr. Chhibbar contends that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority lacked inherent jurisdiction to consider the matter. 13. We are unable to accept this contention. Firstly, the party to the dispute, viz. the State etc., had never raised such an objection. It was not even alleged that the authority lacked jurisdiction. Secondly, it appears to us that the Rent Controller had the jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the dispute as also the parties. There was no inherent lack of jurisdiction. It also deserves notice that the Co-operative Society, to which the property belonged, was in liquidation. The liquidator was charged with the duty of managing the property effectively so that the rights of the creditors etc. could be taken care of. He had to recover the arrears of the amount due and also the possession in case of failure of the party to make the payment. He chose the remedy. The parties that could have taken the objection having not raised any objection, the Court considered the matter and decided the dispute. In our view, there was no error of jurisdiction so as to render the order defective, muchless than a nullity, as suggested by the counsel. 14. Mr. Chhibbar contends that a party cannot invoke the general provisions when it had a specific remedy under a particular statute. That being the position, the counsel submits that respondent No. 4 could not have sought any remedy under the provisions of the 1973 Act. 15. Admittedly, respondent No. 4 had filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Sonepat, for enhancement of the rent. No action had been taken by the competent authority. Still further, even the amount which was, admittedly, payable, was not paid. In this situation, the landowner- respondent No. 2 chose the remedy available to it under the law. 16. Mr. Chhibbar contends that the landowner could have only moved under Sections 8, 9 and 24 of the 1953 Act. 17. We have examined these provisions. Section 8 lays down the principles and methods of determining the compensation. In this situation, the landowner- respondent No. 2 chose the remedy available to it under the law. 16. Mr. Chhibbar contends that the landowner could have only moved under Sections 8, 9 and 24 of the 1953 Act. 17. We have examined these provisions. Section 8 lays down the principles and methods of determining the compensation. Section 9 makes it incumbent upon the competent authority to make the payment in accordance with the award. Section 24 empowers the competent authority to recover rent or damages in respect of requisitioned property as arrears of land revenue. In the present case it is the admitted position that the landlord had requested the Deputy Commissioner, Sonepat, to determine the compensation and fix it at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- P.M. This application was filed as far back as September 2, 1987. Mr. Chhibbar states that no order has been passed on this application till today. Despite this, he accuses respondent No. 4 of having failed to seek the remedy under the 1953 Act. To us it appears clearly that sincere efforts had been made by respondent No. 4 to get the just compensation fixed. None was fixed. No award was given. Therefore, the suggestion that respondent No. 4 had failed to resort to the remedy under the 1953 Act cannot be sustained. In fact, it appears that the authorities were taking undue advantage of the position in which respondent No. 4 was placed. They were not determining the compensation. They were not giving award and they had even stopped paying what was already fixed. In this situation, respondent No. 4 was constrained to initiate the proceedings under the 1973 Act. We think, he committed no error either in law or in equity in seeking his remedy. 18. Admittedly, the liquidator, who had filed the application, had pointed out that "the Society is indebted to the Sonepat Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., Sonepat, and the amount of loan against the Society is about Rs. 6,00,000/-........... The Society has to pay interest at the rate of 18 per cent annually on the abovesaid amount and the amount of debt is thus mounting up." The Society did not own any other property. It did not have any other source of income. The State had usurped the property and even decided not to determine the just and fair rent. It did not have any other source of income. The State had usurped the property and even decided not to determine the just and fair rent. It was in this situation that respondent No. 4 was constrained to choose an alternative remedy. 19. Keeping in view the factual position, we are not surprised that the counsel for the Sate, who had appeared and argued this petition, had chosen not to press the petition. It was an instance of fairness. So far as the claim of the second petitioner (present applicant) is concerned, we can only lament the total lack of consideration for equity and fair play. 20. Despite the above factual position, the counsel contends that respondent Nos. 5 to 8 had no better title than that of respondent No. 4 or that the order of requisition having not been challenged, the orders passed by the Authorities under the 1973 Act cannot be sustained. 21. We find no merit in these contentions. Respondents Nos. 5 to 8 have merely stepped into the shoes of respondent No. 4. The orders in favour of respondent No. 4 having been upheld by us, we find that the petitioner has no cause for grievance. Equally, we are of the opinion that respondent No. 4 had chosen the remedy under the statute. The Authority had failed to discharge its own part of the duty. No one can be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong. Accepting the present applicants claim would amount to condoning the default on the part of petitioner No. 1. We find no reason to do so. 22. Mr. Chhibbar also made a faint attempt to suggest that the fourth respondent had made a mis-statement of facts. The learned Counsel submits that in paragraph 3 of the written statement filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 5 to 8 it had been wrongly averred that "the application in question was for enhancement of rent and not for any de-requisiton." Mr. Chhibbar submits that the subject of the application was `de-requsiiton. Thus, respondent Nos. 5 to 8 had made a mis-statement. 23. We find no warrant for the suggestion. In fact, it appears to us that there is an attempt to misconstrue the contents of the application submitted by respondent No. 4. Chhibbar submits that the subject of the application was `de-requsiiton. Thus, respondent Nos. 5 to 8 had made a mis-statement. 23. We find no warrant for the suggestion. In fact, it appears to us that there is an attempt to misconstrue the contents of the application submitted by respondent No. 4. In paragraph 2 of the application the categorical averment is that the property had been in possession of the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner since the year 1972. "The occupants are paying only Rs. 400/- as monthly rent. Although such a building is not available at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month." This averment has been repeated in paragraph 4, and, thereafter, it has been prayed that "the officers concerned may kindly be directed to pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month, till the building is vacated." There is not even a prayer for de-requisitioning of the building. It is clear to us that respondent Nos. 5 to 8 had not made any mis-statement so as to call for any adverse inference against them. No other point has been raised. 24. Before we part with this case, we may observe that the Bar Association may be a part of the office of the process of judicial adjudication. The Government is obviously taking steps to locate the office of the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner in some premises. Wherever the Government accommodates the office, the applicant shall find its abode. It has no right to perpetuate the existing injustice against respondent Nos. 4 to 8. Respondent No. 5 had been deprived of the property since the year 1972. Even the owner should get a chance to enjoy its property some time in its own life. 25. In view of the above, we find no merit in the claim of the applicant- petitioner. The application is, consequently, dismissed. 26. It was a fit case for the award of compensatory costs. However, keeping in view the fact that the Bar Association is the petitioner, we take a lenient view and do not pass any order as to costs.