Judgment : 1. This civil revision petition has been filed against the fair and decretal order dated 20.7.1998 made in E.A.No.32 of 1998 in E.P.No.79 of 1996 in O.S.No.346 of 1990 on the file of the Court of Principal District Munsif, Sivagangai. 2. In fact, the application in E.A.No.32 of 1998 was filed by the petitioner herein, under Sec.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on averments that though he got impleaded as the second defendant to the suit in O.S.No.346 of 1990 filed by the respondent herein, he did not at all know about his impleadment and whatever that oc- curred in the suit: that one Meyyammal Aachi filed the suit in O.S.No.l 14 of 1971 against the respondent herein before the Court of District Munsif, Sivagangai and the said suit having been decreed, an application in E.P.No.291 of 1974 had been filed and the properties have been sold in court auction on 27.1.1976 and the successful bidder in this Court auction was one Kodhaiyammal for Rs.2,250 and thereafter as per the order passed in E.A.No.98 of 1976, dated 12.6.1976, delivery of possession of the said property had also been effected as a result of which, the said Kodhaiyammal became the absolute owner of the suit properties. 3. The further averments of the petition are that thereafter the petitioner, on 24.5.1990, purchased the suit properties from the said Kodhaiyammal and right from that day he is in possession and enjoyment of those properties besides the patta being granted in his favour: that the auction sale purchase had been effected in favour of Kodhaiyammal, which included the mortgage deed: that since the said Kodhaiyammal, not in her capacity as the mortgagee, but as the full-fledged owner, was in enjoyment of the property on the date of the suit, the respondent herein cannot ask for redemption of the mortgage as a result of which, the decree passed in the suit has become incapable of being executed and the same has become nullity rather and moreover, the death of the said Kodhaiyammal was suppressed by the respondent. On such grounds, the petitioner would pray to declare the decree as “incapable of execution and became nullity. 4. On such grounds, the petitioner would pray to declare the decree as “incapable of execution and became nullity. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent, she would allege that in spite of many summons having been sent to the petitioner besides by affixture and paper publication, without any genuine reason and on manipulated records, the petitioner has now come forward to testify the validity of the decided matters in this application and hence this application is liable to be dismissed in limini. It is further submitted in the counter that it is false to allege on the part of the petitioner that is ignorant of anything that had happened in the suit; that having created a false sale deed in connivance with the said Kodhaiyammal, the petitioner has now come forward with the false claim, which cannot bind this respondent in any manner: that it is again incorrect and objectionable to state that the decree obtained in the suit is incapable of execution and a nullity; that having filed an application to set aside the judgment and decree with the delay excuse petition and the said application having been dismissed, now, the petitioner has come forward to raise the same plea in this application at the execution stage and hence the application becomes liable to be dismissed; that only because of the death of the first defendant to the suit viz., Kodhaiyammal, this petitioner has been impleaded as the second defendant to the suit, as per the orders passed in I.A.No.503 of 1991, dated 3.10.1991 and there is no suppression of any fact as falsely alleged by the petitioner: that having created a false sale deed in connivance with Kodhaiyammal and in spite of having been impleaded as the second defendant to the suit and in spite of sufficient notice having been sent to conduct the case, the petitioner left the case to be decided against him ex parte, which was confirmed upto the High Court, and now he has come forward with the wrong plea, for which he is not entitled. On such averments, the respondent would ultimately pray to dismiss the application with costs. 5. On the above pleadings, the lower court has conducted the enquiry in which on the part of the petitioner, he would examine himself as P.W. 1 and would mark ten documents as Exs.A-1 to A-10. On such averments, the respondent would ultimately pray to dismiss the application with costs. 5. On the above pleadings, the lower court has conducted the enquiry in which on the part of the petitioner, he would examine himself as P.W. 1 and would mark ten documents as Exs.A-1 to A-10. But, on the part of the respondent no real or documentary evidence has been adduced The trial court, in consideration of the pleadings of parties and the evidence made available on record, would ultimately dismiss the petition filed by the petitioner. It is only aggrieved against such dismissal of his petition, the petitioner has come forward to prefer the above civil revision petition on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of revision. 6. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would submit that it was a suit for redemption of mortgage and the same got decreed ex parte; that the suit property is a land and the building forming the southern half of the entire property, which is the subject matter of the mortgage for the right of redemption; that one Valliyamrnal was the original owner of the property in its entirety having purchased the same for valid consideration; that she created as usufructuary mortgage in favour of one Kodhaiyammal, the first defendant in the suit, on 11.3.1969 pertaining to the southern half of the suit property; that the said plaintiff and her brother Gurusamy have also availed some loans from the said Meyyammai Aachi and in the suit for recovery of the said money, Meyyammai Aachi brought the entire property for sale in E.P.No.291 of 1974 and pursuant to the auction sale in the execution, the properties have been purchased in court auction sale by Kodhaiyammal on 27.1.1976; that on that basis the said Kodhaiyammal filed E.A.No.93 of 1976 for delivery of the property, which had also been effected on 12.6.1976 and the same was recorded by the court on 14.6.1976; that subsequently on 24.5.1990, the said Kodhaiyammal sold the property to the petitioner herein under a registered sale deed and this is one aspect of the case. 7. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the second aspect of the case is that it is by the original owner Valliyammals mortgage by purchase in Court auction, Kodhaiyammal became the owner by virtue of the sale proceeding by the court: that the right, title and interest of Valliyamrnal since allegedly been sold in court auction in 1976, thereafter, she had no right at all in the property; that Kodhaiyammal became the owner of the mortgagees right and the mortgagors right since Kodhaiyammal, who already had the right in the mortgage purchased the right of Vallaiyammal also by right of redemption in the court auction and hence Kodhaiyammal can file a suit for recovery of the mortgage amount; that after the sale in 1976, whatever rights that Valliyammal had, were lost by court auction: that if at all, it is the auction purchaser in the Court auction in 1976, who alone would be entitled to file a suit for redemption since Valliyammals right got extinguished; that these aspects were neither pleaded nor brought to the notice of the court: that Valliyammal filed the suit against the mortgagee Kodhaiyammal alone and she filed the written statement setting out all these and she died pending suit; that they impleaded the second defendant i.e., the petitioner herein not on the ground that as a mortgagee in possession but being in possession: that against the second defendant, the suit had been decreed ex parte as prayed for with costs; that as the duty, the plaintiff should have brought it to the notice of the lower court about the pre-existing right of this defendant; that the plaintiff purposely did not disclose the materials necessary for the purpose of the suit; that only when she filed the application for delivery, the second defendant was made aware of these facts: that C.R.P.No.2899 of 1997 filed against the dismissal of the petition to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed on ground that no case was made out for condoning the delay; that now it is the execution and the application is filed under Sec.47 of the C.P.C., questioning the executability of the decree on two grounds and that where the plaintiff knowingly that he has no right, files the suit by fraud, he is not entitled to any relief as held in the decision of the Apex Court delivered in S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by L.Rs. and others S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by L.Rs. and others S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by L.Rs. and others A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 853. 8. The learned counsel would cite another judgment for the same point, delivered in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others (2000)2 MLJ. (S.C.) 181: (2000)3 S.C.C. 581 . The learned counsel would further sum-up: (i) that she has no right of redemption on the date of filing of the suit and therefore a decree for redemption is a nullity; (ii) that the right of redemption has been granted in respect of only half portion that is the southern portion and therefore she cannot execute the decree without filing a suit for partition; (iii) that if at all she files a suit for redemption, it is not maintainable. The learned counsel would end up her arguments by extracting the relevant passage of the judgment delivered in Annapoorni v. Janaki (1995)1 L.W. 141 wherein it is held regarding the powers of the High Court under Seel 15 of the C.P.C. that, “When this Court finds that a decree suffers from an error of law apparent of the face of the record owing to non-application of mind of the court, to the relevant principles of law, this Court cannot keep silent and allow the decree to be in force, particularly, when it causes grave injustice”. On the above arguments, the’learned counsel would submit that the decree cannot be enforced and it is a nullity and would pray to allow the above civil revision petition. 9. On the above arguments, the’learned counsel would submit that the decree cannot be enforced and it is a nullity and would pray to allow the above civil revision petition. 9. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the respondent herein filed the suit in O.S.No.346 of 1990 against Kodhaiyammal: that she filed the written statement also but pending the suit, she died: that then they filed the petition to implead the second defendant as the person in possession and a necessary party: that this petition was allowed on 3.10.1991 and the suit got posted to a subsequent date; that the defendant did not appear and the court decreed the suit ex parte on the day; that the petitioner herein filed an application in I.A.No. 143 of 1997 to set aside the ex parte decree and the same having come to be dismissed by the trial court, C.R.P.No.2899 of 1997 was filed and that too got dismissed thereby the decree passed in the suit becoming final: that thereafter this respondent filed E.P.No.79 of 1996 for execution of the decree and for delivery of possession and at this stage, the petitioner has come forward to file this petition under Sec. 47 of the C.P.C. contending that the decree is inexecut-able on ground that the suit property was purchased by the first defendant to the suit Kodhaiyammal in court auction in execution of a decree against the plaintiff by one Meyyammai Aachi and further alleging that since the right of redemption is merged with the defendant, the right of redemption is extinguished and that this respondent has no right to execute the decree and the same is inexecutable: that on 27.1.1996, Kodhaiyammal had purchased the property in court auction and then the first defendant sold the suit property to the second defendant and her right of redemption of the suit property seized: that suit was filed on 2.5.1990: that the property was sold by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant on 24.5.1990 that is subsequent to the suit: that because of execution of the decree against Valliyammal by Meyyammai Aachi with reference to the suit property on a money decree, she obtained the decree and in execution and court auction sale, it was Kodhaiyammal who became entitled to the same, the learned Judge dismissed the petition saying that the right of redemption always exists with the plaintiff to redeem the mortgaged property. At this juncture, the learned counsel would cite a judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Parichhan Mis try (Dead) by L.Rs. and another v. Acchiabar Mistry and others Parichhan Mis try (Dead) by L.Rs. and another v. Acchiabar Mistry and others Parichhan Mis try (Dead) by L.Rs. and another v. Acchiabar Mistry and others A.I.R. 1997S.C. 456 wherein it is held: “… if for some default in payment of rent a rent decree is obtained and the mortgagee pays off the same even then the mortgage in question is liable to be redeemed at the option of the mortgagor. The mortgagee cannot escape from his obligation by bringing the equity of redemption to sale in execution of a decree on the personal covenant. By virtue of purchase of the property by the mortgagee in court sale, no merger takes place between the two rights nor the mortgage stands extinguished”. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent would further cite a judgment of the Apex Court delivered in State ofM.P. v. Mangilal Sharma State ofM.P. v. Mangilal Sharma State ofM.P. v. Mangilal Sharma A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 743 wherein it has been held: “Executing Court was bound by terms of decree and it could not add or alter decree”. 11. The other judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is also one delivered by the Apex Court in C.Gangacharan v. C.Narayanan C.Gangacharan v. C.Narayanan C.Gangacharan v. C.Narayanan (2000)2MLJ. (S.C.) 44 wherein it has been held: “Executing Court, cannot go behind the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction unless it is void ab initio or without jurisdiction”. With this, the learned counsel would conclude his arguments praying to dismiss the above civil revision petition with costs. 12. In consideration of the pleadings by parties on facts and circumstances encircling the whole case and having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both what comes to be known is that it is an application filed under Sec.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in E.A.No.32 of 1998 in E.P.No.79 of 1996 in O.S.No.346 of 1990 by the petitioner herein praying to determine certain questions that have arisen between the parties relating to the execution of the decree dated 5.6.1995 on the ground that it had been obtained either by manipulation or by fraud and therefore the decree is inexecutable. 13. 13. On the part of the revision petitioner, both in his application and in the arguments advanced by his counsel, it would be impressed to the effect that the decree that is sought to be executed had been passed ex parte in a suit for redemption of mortgage, wherein the suit property is a land and building forming the southern half of the entire property; that Valliyammal, the respondent herein, was the original owner of the property in its entirety and she created a usufructuary mortgage in favour of one Kodhaiyammal, the first defendant in the suit, on 11.3.1969 pertaining to the southern half of the suit property; that the respondent and her brother Gurusamy have availed some loans from one Meyyammai Aachi and the said Meyyammai Aachi having filed a suit for recovery of the said money and having obtained the decree in her favour, brought the entire property for sale as per E.P.No.291 of 1974 and the properties have been purchased in court auction sale by one Kodhaiyammal and delivery also having been effected in favour of the said Kodhaiyammal oh 12.6.1976; that subsequently on 24.5.1990, the said Kodhaiyammal sold the property in favour of the petitioner herein under the registered sale deed. When the above is one aspect of the case, it would be pointed out on the part of the revision petitioner that when the right, title and interest of Valliyammal had already been sold in the court auction, whatever right that Valliyammal had, was lost by the court auction and if at all, the auction purchaser Kodhaiyammal could file the suit for redemption since Valliyammals right got extinguished and while rights of parties are such, Valliyammal filed the suit against the mortgagee Kodhaiyammal and when Kodhaiyammal died pending suit, the petitioner got impleaded as the second defendant on ground as a mortgagee in possession and against the second defendant, the suit had been decreed ex parte as prayed for with costs and the plaintiff purposely did not disclose any material necessary for the purpose of the suit and that only when she filed the suit for delivery, the petitioner became aware of these facts and filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree with a delay condonation petition, which was dismissed and the C.R.P. preferred against that dismissal order also came to be dismissed on ground that no case was made out for condoning the delay and hence now the petitioner is left with no option but to file this application under Sec.47 of the C.P.C. questioning the executability of the decree. 14. In a nutshell, the learned counsel would sum up that where the plaintiff, to his knowledge that he has no right, files the suit by fraud, he is not entitled to any relief as held in the decision reported in S.P.Chengalyaraya Naidu v. Jagannath S.P.Chengalyaraya Naidu v. Jagannath S.P.Chengalyaraya Naidu v. Jagannath A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 853. Further pointing out that the very suit filed for redemption is not maintainable since she has no right of redemption on the date of filing of the suit and the decree passed for redemption itself is a nullity.The learned counsel would also cite a judgment of the Apex Court reported in Annapoorni v. Janaki (1995(1 L.W 141. 15. So far as the first judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant reported in S.P.Chengalyaraya Naidu v. Jagannath S.P.Chengalyaraya Naidu v. Jagannath S.P.Chengalyaraya Naidu v. Jagannath A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 853 is concerned, it is held therein: “The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. It can be said without hesitation that a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party”. 16. Inthe second judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is one delivered by the Apex Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others (2000)3 S.C.C. 581 wherein it has been held: “…. A party complaining of fraud having been practised on him as well as on the court by another party resulting in a decree, can avail himself of the remedy of review of even the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as there is no other alternative remedy available to him. Therefore the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly-discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wrangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim”. 17. No court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wrangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim”. 17. The extracted portions of both these judgments would reveal that a suit filed by fraud at whatever later stage the fraud committed or* the part of the plaintiff came to be brought forth, the party complaining of fraud playing its part and resulting in a decree, can avail himself of the remedy of review or even the writ jurisdiction of the High Court since the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly disclosed facts amounting, to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed and no court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wrangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension that would affect the very basis of the claim. 18. It is true that this Court has got powers to deal with such matters wherein the plaintiff has obtained a decree by playing fraud upon the other side, especially under Sec.47 of the C.P.C., as it has been rightly resorted to by the petitioner. But, the point for determination is, whether really either by playing fraud on the other side or with gross misrepresentation made before the court, the respondent had obtained the decree is the point for consideration here. 19. In fact, the suit was filed against the deceased Kodhaiyammal, who was the original sole defendant to the suit and on her death, on coming to know that this petitioner was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property in some capacity or other, the respondent herein has taken steps to implead him as a party and on his such impleadment, due notice had been issued besides by means of affixture and paper publication. In spite of such steps having been taken on the part of the respondent/ plaintiff, the petitioner has not appeared before the court and hence the suit, which has been instituted on 2.5.1990, had come to be decreed ex parte on 5.6.1995 wherein it was open for the petitioner to have got himself impleaded as a party since his vendor was the only defendant in the suit, who, for no reason, having sold the suit property should have been fighting the case only on behalf of the purchaser. The petitioner herein, to his knowledge since there is no better reason on the part of the deceased Kodhaiyammal to contest the suit till her death, in spite of having sold the property in favour of the petitioner herein as early as on 24.5.1990 had never bothered to contest the suit for years together. It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the very purchase of the property by this petitioner from the said Kodhaiyammal had been done during the pendency of the suit, thus the principles of lis pendens also operating on the said purchase of the suit property by the petitioner. 20. Even after the impleadment of the petitioner as the second defendant, which had been done on 3.10.1991, only on 5.6.1995, the suit had come to be decided ex parte, i.e., after four years of his impleadment and it is only two years thereafter, when the ex parte decree was sought to be executed, the petitioner is said to have awaken from his deep slumber under pretext that only then he came to know of all these happenings that have been going on for the last seven years and had come forward to file an application to set aside the ex parte decree with a delay condonation petition and the said petition having come to be dismissed, the petitioner had appeared before this Court on a revision and this Court not being satisfied with the reasons assigned on the part of the petitioner for the delay, had dismissed the application to condone the delay in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree as a result of which all the chances which were kept open for the petitioner to a-ail in his favour, have been closed. Therefore, the petitioner has now come forward to file this application, at the time of execution of the decree by the respondent/ decree-holder without assigning any reason as to how the reasons assigned and the very orders passed by the executing court and on revision by this Court, dismissing his application to condone the delay in filing a petition to set aside the ex parte decree, become either nullified or get extinguished by an application filed under Sec.47, C.P.C. seeking to raise certain questions involved in the very suit in which all the avenues which were available for the petitioner had been closed by the passing of the decree and thereafter by specific orders passed refusing to condone the delay to set aside the ex parte decree on reasons assigned, ultimately dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner under the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is certain that now filing an application under Sec.47, C.P.C., the petitioner is not entitled to rake up or raise anything regarding the conclusions arrived at by the trial court in the suit culminating in the decree passed. However, he is only at liberty to raise anything regarding the execution of the said decree i.e. the mode of execution, the procedures governing the execution etc., and not regarding what had happened in the suit in the passing of the decree. Nothing comes forth in this regard from the petitioner. 21. However, he is only at liberty to raise anything regarding the execution of the said decree i.e. the mode of execution, the procedures governing the execution etc., and not regarding what had happened in the suit in the passing of the decree. Nothing comes forth in this regard from the petitioner. 21. In the chain of events that have taken place, no fraud seems too have been played on the part of the respondent since on her part, being a mortgagor of her valuable properties in favour of Kodhaiyammal, it is but natural that she had come forward to file a suit for redemption of her properties and for such of her conduct, the petitioner cannot attribute motives either on ground that she was fully apprised of the legalities which are advocated on the part of the petitioner now, and that knowingly she played on him fraud, when on the date of filing of the suit, the petitioner was not at all in the picture nor does it in any manner come to be known that the respondent was aware of the petitioner having purchased the properties since the properties at the time of filing of the suit had not at all been purchased by this petitioner from Kodhaiyammal and therefore, it cannot be said that either the respondent played a fraud on the petitioner or instituted the suit on misrepresentation. Hence, the decisions cited on the part of the’ petitioner reported in S.P. Chengalyaraya Naidu v. Jagannath S.P. Chengalyaraya Naidu v. Jagannath S.P. Chengalyaraya Naidu v. Jagannath A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 853 and United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh (2000)2ML.J. (S.C.J 181: (2000)3S.C.C. 581 are not applicable to the case in hand. 22. So far as the third judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in Annapoorni v. Janaki (1995(1 L. W. 141 is concerned, it is regarding a decree suffering from an error of law apparent on the face of the record owing to non-application of mind on the part of the court to the relevant principles of law; which position is not prevalent so far as the case in hand is concerned and hence this judgment cited on the part of the petitioner also becomes inapplicable to the facts and situation of the case in hand. 23. 23. But, so far as the case of the respondent is concerned, the facts have been put forth in a straight forward manner pleading that as the mortgagor, in order to redeem her property, the respondent filed the suit in O.S.No.346 of 1990 and on the death of the sole defendant, Kodhaiyammal, on application and by order dated 3.10.1991, the petitioner got impleaded as the second defendant to the suit and since there was no representation on his part after four years, on 5.6.1995, the suit had been decreed ex parte and the later attempts made on the part of the petitioner to revive the suit setting aside the ex parte order by condoning the delay had failed not only before the lower court but also before this Court as well in C.R.P. since he was not able to explain the delay and hence now the petitioner has come forward to agitate all his claims lock, stock and barrel in this application filed under Sec.47 of the C.P.C. testifying the validity of the decree, at the execution stage wherein, it is settled that the executing Court is bound by the terms of the decree which could not add or alter the decree. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent would also cite three judgments, the first one delivered by the Apex Court in Parichhan Mis try (Dead) by L.Rs. and another v. Acchiabar Mistry and others Parichhan Mis try (Dead) by L.Rs. and another v. Acchiabar Mistry and others Parichhan Mis try (Dead) by L.Rs. and another v. Acchiabar Mistry and others A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 456 wherein it has been held that on account of some default in payment of rent, rent decree is passed and the mortgagee pays off the same, even then the mortgage in question is liable to be redeemed at he option of the mortgagor and by virtue of purchase of the property by the mortgagee incourt sale, no merger takes place between the two rights nor the mortgage stands extinguished. 24. 24. The other judgment cited on the part of the learned counsel for the respondent is one reported in C. Gangacharanate of M.P. v. C. Narayananngilal Sharma C. Gangacharanate of M.P. v. C. Narayananngilal Sharma C. Gangacharanate of M.P. v. C. Narayananngilal Sharma A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 743 wherein it is held that the executing court is bound by the terms of the decree and it could not add or alter the decree. The third judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is one reported in (2000)2 MLJ. (S. C.) 44, wherein also it is held that the executing court cannot go behind the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction unless it is void ab initio or without jurisdiction. 25. Since neither on count of void ab initio nor on the other count of without jurisdiction, the petitioner has come forward to institute the above petition, it has to be decided that the executing court has no right or jurisdiction to go beyond the decree. 26. In all probabilities and in the facts and circumstances covering the whole case, there is no chance of reviving the suit, which is a finished chapter and the only decision that could be arrived at in this regard is that the lower court has arrived at the right conclusion in dismissing the application filed by the petitioner under Sec.47 of the C.P.C. and it has considered all the issues involved in the application in a valid and tangible manner and has arrived at its ultimate decision to reject all the pleas putforth on the part of the petitioner. There is no valid or reasonable ground in existence for considering the application filed by the revision petitioner favourably and it has been rightly rejected by the lower court. There is no inconsistency or infirmity found in the order passed by the court below so as to cause interference into the same and the only conclusion that could be arrived at by this Court, in the circumstances of the case, is to confirm the fair and decretal order passed by the lower court dismissing the civil revision petition. In result, the above civil revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. The fair and decretal order dated 20.7.1998 made in E.A.No.32 of 1998 in E.P.No.79 of 1996 in O.S.No.346 of 1990 by the Court of Principal District Munsif, Sivagangai is hereby confirmed. In result, the above civil revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. The fair and decretal order dated 20.7.1998 made in E.A.No.32 of 1998 in E.P.No.79 of 1996 in O.S.No.346 of 1990 by the Court of Principal District Munsif, Sivagangai is hereby confirmed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P.Nos. 12922 and 16635 of 1998 are closed.