Judgment : Tenant in R.C.O.P.No.8 of 1996 on the file of the Rent Controller, Arni, is the revision petitioner. 2. Parties herein will be referred to according to their rank before the Rent Controller. .3. Landlord filed an application for eviction on the ground that he requires the schedule building for his own occupation as additional accommodation and also on the ground that the building requires immediate demolition and re-construction. It is the case of the landlord that he purchased all the shop rooms bearing Door Nos.85/N, 85/O, 85/P and 85/Q as per sale deed dated 2. 1993. Respondent who was earlier a tenant continued to be the tenant of the landlord after purchase and they have attorned the tenancy. It is further averred that landlords are doing wholesale and retail business under the name and style of ‘Baggiyam & Co’ in a rented building. It is their case that they wanted to do business in their own building and so has purchased the four shops. All the four shops constitute a single building and each of the shops is separated by a thin wall. The landlord who is having several business in his name, his fathers name, mothers name and wifes name, has removed the intervening walls and has provided door ways to link three shops in his possession. Except the schedule shop room, the rest of the shop rooms are in his possession. After purchase, the landlord intimated the respondent about the purchase and also about his requirement. The tenant agree to vacate the premises after two years period time was also given. In spite of waiting for more than three years, the tenant did not vacate and therefore eviction petition was filed after issuance of lawyers notice. According to landlord, he requires the schedule premises for his additional accommodation. It is further averred that he is having funds to demolish the building and put up a new construction and he further averred that all the four shop room have to be demolished as they constitute a single and composite building. 4. In the counter statement filed by the tenant, he admitted the tenancy and he also attorned the tenancy in favour of the landlords. But, according to him, the claim for eviction is not bona fide. 4. In the counter statement filed by the tenant, he admitted the tenancy and he also attorned the tenancy in favour of the landlords. But, according to him, the claim for eviction is not bona fide. He also said that the claim for eviction on the ground of bona fide use and requirement for additional accommodation cannot go together and the claim is mutually contradictory. He said that the landlord is running a medical shop in the main market, which is owned by the Municipality of Arni Town and the landlord is doing business in that place for the past more than 25 years. There is no threat for eviction. According to him, the schedule threat for eviction. According to him, the schedule premises, which is situated in an interior place, is not suitable to be used as a Medical shop. According to him, the petition was filed, only when the petitioner refused to give enhanced rent and additional advance. The claim for eviction on the ground of demolition and re-construction was also disputed by the tenant. According to him, there is no necessity to demolish the building. He prayed for the dismissal of the eviction petition. 5. Rent Controller took oral and documentary evidence. Exs.P-10 to P-12 were marked on the side of the landlord and Exs.R-1 to R-4 were marked on the side of the tenant. Exs.C-1 and C-2 are the Commissioners report and plan. Landlord and tenant got themselves examined as P.W.1 and R.W.1 respectively. Rent Controller held that the landlord has proved all the grounds for eviction and eviction was ordered as prayed for. The Rent Controller held that the landlord is making use of three shop rooms in his possession as godown and the schedule building is required to construct the staircase. For that purpose, the schedule building will have to be demolished. It also found that since the landlord is making use of the rented premises, his requirement for the schedule building has to be held as bona fide. Rent Controller was of the view that when owner wants to occupy his own building, the lack of bona fides cannot be found in that case especially when the landlord is occupying the rented premises. Rent Controller further held that the landlord has proved all the ingredients under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Rent Control Act. Rent Controller was of the view that when owner wants to occupy his own building, the lack of bona fides cannot be found in that case especially when the landlord is occupying the rented premises. Rent Controller further held that the landlord has proved all the ingredients under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Rent Control Act. In this connection, it may be noted that even though the pleading was that the four shop rooms have to be demolished for the purpose of reconstruction, during evidence, the landlord gave up that case and contended that he only wanted to demolish the schedule premises. He wanted to retain other three shop rooms and wanted to put up first floor. For that purpose, he wanted to demolish the schedule premises to put up staircase. That claim was also found to be genuine by the Rent Controller. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.5 of 1997 on the file of the Appellate Authority/Subordinate Judge, Arni. The Appellate Authority found that the claim of eviction for own occupation and additional accommodation are genuine. Regarding the claim for eviction on the ground of demolition and re-construction, the Appellate Authority found that when the landlord wanted to provide a stair case and first floor, that claim also will come under Sec.14(1)(b) and the claim is genuine. In the result, the appeal was dismissed. .7. The concurrent findings of the Authorities below are challenged in this revision under Sec.25 of the Tamilnadu Rent Control Act. 8. Since caveat was entered by the respondent, I heard the revision itself at the time of admission. 9. At the time of argument, learned counsel for the petitioner filed C.M.P.No.153 of 2000, seeking permission to raise additional grounds in the revision with a supporting affidavit. He also produced certain photographs with negatives to substantiate his case in the affidavit. In the additional grounds, the revision petitioner has stated that subsequent to the decision of the Appellate Authority, the landlord has sold shop No.85-N to one Palani as per registered sale deed dated 112. 1999 and shop No.85-O was also sold to one Mathiazhagan on the same date. He has also given document number by which the sale deed was executed. In the affidavit, it is said that the main purpose for claiming additional accommodation is for putting up a staircase in the petition schedule premises. 1999 and shop No.85-O was also sold to one Mathiazhagan on the same date. He has also given document number by which the sale deed was executed. In the affidavit, it is said that the main purpose for claiming additional accommodation is for putting up a staircase in the petition schedule premises. The revision petitioner contended that the landlord has already put up a stair case from that portion of the building in his possession and there is no necessity to demolish the schedule premises. Therefore, there is no necessity for any re-construction nor the claim for eviction on the ground of own use and additional accommodation subsists. Learned counsel also wanted these facts also brought to the notice of this Court. 10. Counsel for the respondent seriously disputed the averments made by the counsel. He also did not admit the averments in the affidavit in C.M.P.No.153 of 2000. He also argued that being a concurrent finding of fact, this Court shall not interfere unless the findings are perverse or based on no evidence. Counsel relied on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ubaiba v. Damodaran , (1999)5 S.C.C. 645 and Raghunat G. Panhale Learned counsel for the respondent also argued that on the basis of decisions of this Court regarding the scope of Secs.10(3)(a)(iii), 10(3)(c) and 14(1)(b) of the Rent Control Act. According to him, no ground is made out for interference under Sec.25 of the Act and the representation is only to be dismissed. 11. Much reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondent in the decision rendered by me in Sastha v. Gomathi Ammal , (1997)2 MLJ. 521 wherein I considered the scope of Secs.10(3)(c) and 14(1) of the Rent Control Act. In that case, I have held that own occupation coming under Sec.10(3)(c) is another species of ‘own occupation’ coming under Sec.10(3)(a)(i) and Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) ofthe Act. In that case, I have held that the only difference is that in one case the landlord is seeking eviction for the entire building and in the other, only that part of the building occupied by the tenant. In a case of additional accommodation, the landlord comes to court with a plea that the space occupied is not sufficient, and he needs some more accommodation to suit his needs. In a case of additional accommodation, the landlord comes to court with a plea that the space occupied is not sufficient, and he needs some more accommodation to suit his needs. In fact, the requirement is for his own occupation and once the court is satisfied that the landlord is in need of additional space, it passes an order of eviction subject to the relative hardship of the parties. It was further held in that case that even if the claim is made under Secs.10(3)(a)(i) and 14(1)(b), the claim is really one for own occupation and reconstruction is only for the purpose of making the building more convenient for the use of landlord. It is further held in that case that if the bona fide of the claim is proved, whether the landlord intends to use the building as it is or after demolition and re-construction or after necessary alterations, is not a matter of concern of court or the tenant. I also relied on various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and other High Courts for the said purpose. Relying on this decision, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the claim of additional accommodation has been proved in this case and the tenant is also in the accommodation of another building which is opposite to the schedule premises and there is no question of hardship to the tenant from vacating the premises. It is also argued by the counsel that when the landlord is occupying the rented premises and he intends to do his business in his own building, bona fides will have to be presumed. 12. As against the said contention, learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that out of four shop rooms, the landlord is already in possession of three shop rooms and he is making use of the same as godown. He wants to vacate the tenant only for the purpose of putting up a staircase in that portion of the building and therefore, it can come only as an additional accommodation. Counsel for the revision petitioner relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.Jermons v. Aliammal J.Jermons v. Aliammal J.Jermons v. Aliammal , A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3041 wherein their Lordships held in paragraphs 35 to 37 of the judgment thus: “35. Counsel for the revision petitioner relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.Jermons v. Aliammal J.Jermons v. Aliammal J.Jermons v. Aliammal , A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3041 wherein their Lordships held in paragraphs 35 to 37 of the judgment thus: “35. Now, we may profitably refer to Sec.10(3)(c) and the provisos thereto to notice as to what is required to be proved by a landlord thereunder. Sec.10(3)(c) is as follows: “10(3)(c). A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building whether residential or non-residential may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be. Provided that, in the case of an application under clause (c), the controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord: Provided further that the controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may be extended such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate.” On an analysis of these provisions the following points emerge: .(1) Theprovisions of clause (c) have overriding effect over clause (a); .(2) Clause (c) applies to a case where, .(i) the landlord is occupying only a part of building; .(ii) thetenant is occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building; (iii) the landlord requires additional accommodation for residential or for non-residential purposes of a business which he is carrying on; .(iv) the landlord is seeking an order from the Rent Controller directing the landlord be put in possession of that portion or part of the building which is in possession of the tenant; .(3) if the landlord makes out a case under clause (c) the Controller has to evaluate the hardship that will be caused to the tenant if he is evicted from the portion in his occupation and the advantage that will be gained by the landlord; if he is satisfied that the hardship to the tenant will outweigh the advantage to the landlord, the Controller has to reject the application for eviction of tenant; and .(4) in the event of the Controller ordering eviction he is empowered to give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of that portion on the building of which eviction is ordered and to extend the same from time to time but not exceeding three months. 36. It may be noticed that under Sec.3(a) it is incumbent on the landlord to show that he or any member of his family is not occupying any building (residential or non-residential, as the case may be) for his own occupation or for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or for purposes of a business (as the case may be) which he or any member of his family is carrying on, in the city, town or village concerned which is his own. But for the purpose of clause (c) the landlord will indeed be occupying a part of a building of which the remaining part is in occupation of the tenant. Further whereas recovery of possession of a non-residential building under Sub-sec.(3)(a) bars a second application under that clause, no such bar exists in case of clause (c). For granting relief to the tenant under clause (a) the aspect of hardship to the tenant is alien but under clause (c) the Controller is enjoined to reject the application of the landlord for eviction if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the portion of the building in possession of the tenant, will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. Under clause (c) the tenant is also entitled to the indulgence of being granted reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building, which may be extended from time to time up to the maximum period of three months. 37. From the above discussion, it is evident that the requirements of clause (a) are different from the requirements of clause (c). For purposes of clause (c), the following additional facts will be necessary viz., whether the landlord is occupying only a part of the building whether residential or non-residential and whether the tenant is occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building and the facts relevant to the consideration with regard to comparative hardship to the landlord and tenant. Such facts are to be brought on record because they are not subject-matter of consideration in an application filed under Sub-sec.(3)(a). In a case where original application for eviction is based, inter alia, on the ground in clause (a) of Sub-sec.(3) and an application for amendment of eviction is allowed permitting to raise further ground under clause (c) either by the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority, the appropriate course will be to remand the case of the Rent Controller for giving opportunity to the opposite party to file further pleadings and adduce such evidence relevant to the issue, as they desire. Inasmuch as the petition field by the respondents and allowed by the High Court was to raise additional ground in the revision and not to amend the eviction petition, we are of the view it is not a fit case to remand the matter to the Rent Controller.” 13. It is on the basis of this decision, it is argued that the requirements for own occupation are different from clause (3)(c) i.e., for additional accommodation. The same will have to be considered by the authorities for which, there must be necessary pleading and proof. 14. After hearing counsel on both sides, I feel that the matter requires re-consideration by the Rent Controller and the matter will have to be remitted back to it for the following reasons: Both the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority have found that the landlord wanted to put up a staircase in the building of the schedule premises is to be demolished. It is found that the claim is genuine. It was also found by the Authorities below that the said claim comes under bona fide own occupation and also comes within the requirements for additional accommodation. Both the Authorities have further held that putting up a staircase and also putting up first floor of the building come under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act and the landlord has satisfied all the statutory requirements and the claim is also bona fide. From the case put forward by the landlord as well as from the findings of the Authorities below it is clear that the landlord wanted to make use of the schedule premises for his own occupation and for the said purpose, he wanted to put up a stair case and first floor to the entire structure. It was really a case of additional accommodation. Though a claim is also put forward for own occupation, it is really claim for additional accommodation. He wants to re-model the entire building for his requirement. 15. It is clear from the evidence and also Exs.P-4 and P-5 that the landlord does not intended to demolish the entire building and he is retaining the three shops intact. How far that case will come under demolition and re-construction is doubtful. The law is well settled that the demolition and reconstruction contemplate demolition of the structure and not a minor portion of it. How far that case will come under demolition and re-construction is doubtful. The law is well settled that the demolition and reconstruction contemplate demolition of the structure and not a minor portion of it. Here, the landlord wanted to retain major portion of the building and wanted to put up a stair case in the schedule premises and the first floor over the entire structure. It is clear that what the landlord wanted is not a demolition and re-construction as contemplated under Sec.14(1)(b), but he wanted to occupy the schedule premises after re-modelling. It is a claim for additional accommodation only. 16. The decision relied on by the counsel for the petitioner in , A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3041, cannot have any application to the facts of this case. In that case, their Lordships set aside the order of the High Court based on the plea of subsequent events, for which there is no pleading. Landlord claimed eviction on the ground that he required the building for his own occupation, but pending proceeding, he wanted to take note of subsequent events and claimed eviction on the ground that the requirement comes underSec.10(3)(a)(c)i.e., additional accommodation. Since there was no pleading in that regard. Their Lordships considered it between 10(3)(a)(iii) and 10(3)(c) and remitted the matter, enabling the parties to file additional pleadings and lead evidence. In this case, the landlord has already pleaded both his claim under own occupation and also his case for own occupation for additional accommodation. Both the Authorities have also held that the tenant is in occupation of other premises and therefore, he will not be put to greater hardship. But, that by itself will not be sufficient to confirm the order. Merely because, the tenant is in occupation of other premises, the landlord is not entitled to take possession unless he satisfies the grounds under the Rent Control Act while considering the grounds for eviction. While considering the requirement, the law is settled that the requirement must continue till the final disposal of the eviction petition. That means, the subsequent events also will have to be taken into consideration by court. While considering the requirement, the law is settled that the requirement must continue till the final disposal of the eviction petition. That means, the subsequent events also will have to be taken into consideration by court. In Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarain , (1986)4 S.C.C. 736 their Lordships held thus: “If the landlady could have reasonable accommodation after her need arose and she by her own conduct disentitled herself to that property by letting it out for higher income, she would be disentitled to evict her tenant on the ground of her need. In a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants, unless the statute prescribes to the contrary, the requirement must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding was finally disposed of either in appeal or revision by the relevant authority. For making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legal and factual in accord with the current realities, the court can and in many cases must take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings, provided rules of fairness to both the sides were scrupulously obeyed. [Italics supplied] 17. It is true that the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it is a concurrent finding and the jurisdiction of this Court is limited under Sec.25 of the Rent Control Act. But, when subsequent events are brought to the notice of court, in spite of limited jurisdiction, the court will have to take into consideration the above fact. It was so held in Govind v. Jeetsingh (1988)1 S.C.C. 198 . In paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment, it was held thus: “7. This Court in the case of Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, had occasion to consider the scope of the second appeal under the Madhya Pradesh Act. There this Court held that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in second appeal in reversing the decision of the first appellate court. This court further observed that the issues whether the respondent required the shop in question for the purpose of starting new business as a dealer in iron and steel materials, and if so, whether his requirement was bona fide were both questions of fact. This court further observed that the issues whether the respondent required the shop in question for the purpose of starting new business as a dealer in iron and steel materials, and if so, whether his requirement was bona fide were both questions of fact. Their determination did not involve the application of any legal principles to the facts established in the evidence. This Court further held in that case that the findings of the first appellate court on these issues were no doubt inferences from other basic facts, but that did not alter the character of these findings and they remained findings of facts and therefore, the conclusion of the first appellate court that the respondent did not bona fide require a shop premises in that case for the purpose of starting new business as a dealer in iron and steel materials represented findings of facts could not be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal unless it was shown that in reaching it a mistake of law was committed or that it was based on no evidence or was such as no reasonable man could reach. [Italics] 8. We are prima face inclined to take the view that it might have been possible in this case to old that the High Court was in error in interfering with the findings of the first appellate court but in the facts of this case we need not rest our decision on that basis, because subsequent to the decision of the High Court the first wife of the landlord had died and three rooms which were in her occupation have become vacant. In that view of the matter and taking into cautious consideration all the subsequent events it must be held that there was no more bona fide need of the landlord to evict the tenant of the premises in question.] [Italics supplied] 18. In this case, the revision petitioner has filed C.M.P.No.153 of 2000 along with an affidavit. He has given details about the subsequent events. According to him, even though landlord claimed the schedule premises for his own occupation or as an additional accommodation, that claim cannot be said as bona fide when the landlord has sold 2 shop rooms out of the four shop rooms. It is also submitted that the landlord seeks eviction only for the purpose of putting up staircase for the entire building. It is also submitted that the landlord seeks eviction only for the purpose of putting up staircase for the entire building. The landlord has also spoken that only place where a staircase could be constructed is the site where the schedule shop room is situated. That requirement has ceased to exist when the landlord has put up a staircase in the portion occupied by him. He has also filed photographs along with the negatives. These subsequent events if proved, will have a material effect in the decision. How the subsequent events are proved came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram , (1992)2 S.C.C. (Supp.) 623. In paragraphs 7 to 9 of the judgment, it was held thus: 7. The contention of the appellants learned counsel is that the subsequent events pleaded would require to be proved as otherwise it would amount to granting a decree on pleadings alone without more and without evidence to prove the alleged subsequent factual events. It is urged that the High Court accepted the averments themselves as their own proof and proceeded straightway to reverse the decree of dismissal and to grant possession for the first time in revision. 8. The submissions of the learned counsel are only partly correct. While it is true that a distinction must be made between pleading and proof, the further submissions that these must necessarily be in two successive sequential stages need not always be so and particularly when dealing with pleas of subsequent events in appeals and revisions. If the allegations of facts made in support of such a plea are denied then alone the question of their proof in an appropriate way arises. If those allegations of facts are admitted, there is no need to prove what is admitted or must be deemed to be admitted. There can be admissions by non-traverse. The High Court proceeded to accept the allegations as proved presumably in view of the fact that appellants learned counsel did not even appear, let alone challenge the allegations. But there might also be cases in which, having regard to the nature of the circumstances, the court may insist upon proof independently of such admission by non-traverse. 9. The High Court proceeded to accept the allegations as proved presumably in view of the fact that appellants learned counsel did not even appear, let alone challenge the allegations. But there might also be cases in which, having regard to the nature of the circumstances, the court may insist upon proof independently of such admission by non-traverse. 9. When subsequent events are pleaded in the course of an appeal or proceedings of revision, the court may, having regard to the nature of the allegations of fact on which the plea is based, permit evidence to be adduced by means of affidavits as envisaged in Rule 1 of O.19, C.P.C. The court may also treat any affidavit filed in support of the pleadings itself as one under the said provision and call upon the opposite side to traverse it. The court, if it finds that having regard to the nature of the allegations, it is necessary to record oral evidence tested by oral cross-examination, may have recourse to that procedure. It may record the evidence itself or remit the matter for an enquiry and evidence. All these depend upon the factual and situational differences characterising a particular case and the nature of the plea raised. There can be no hard and fast rule governing the matter. The procedure is not to be burdened with technicalities.” [Italics supplied] 19. While narrating facts, I have said that the learned counsel for the landlord sought time. In fact, though he has not filed any Counter to C.M.P., when the matter is not admitted, as was held in , (1992)2 S.C.C. (Supp.) 623 and Gurdev Singh v. Surjit Kumar , (1996)9 S.C.C. 219 the matter will have to be remitted back to take evidence. 20. Taking into consideration the above fact, I feel that interest of justice require that the parties must be allowed to let in evidence on the facts stated in the affidavit in C.M.P.No.153 of 2000. 21. In the result, I set aside the orders of the Authorities below and remit the case to the Rent Controller for re-consideration. C.M.P.No.153 of 2000 filed by the petitioner also will be sent to the Rent Controller along with the Order of this Court. 21. In the result, I set aside the orders of the Authorities below and remit the case to the Rent Controller for re-consideration. C.M.P.No.153 of 2000 filed by the petitioner also will be sent to the Rent Controller along with the Order of this Court. If the landlord wants to file any counter-affidavit, the Rent Controller may give an opportunity to file the same and the parties will be given reasonable opportunities to adduce additional evidence on the subsequent events pleaded in C.M.P.No.153 of 2000. Parties are directed to appear before Rent Controller on 22. 2000. 22. Revision and C.M.P.No.153 of 2000 are allowed as above. No costs. C.M.P.No.21158 of 1999 is closed.