Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. This Judgment shall govern W.A. Nos. 77 of 1997 and 78 of 1997, which arose out of the common order passed by the Labour Court. The learned single Judge has also passed a common order in respect of both. The first Writ Appeal is in respect of the reference made, while the second pertains to the order passed by the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge of this Court, confirming the award passed by the first respondent/Labour Court, the appellant/employer, Company comes before us by way of these Appeals. In the aforementioned Award, the Labour Court has held that the order transferring the second respondent herein Thiru N. D. Talson from Coonoor to Madurai dated July 30, 1982 is illegal. The Labour Court has also decided the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, filed by the worker in his favour, and awarded a sum of Rs. 496.80 as the money value of the benefits claimed. The reference came to be made on account of the failure of the conciliation proceedings in-between the workman and the employer. It is an admitted position that at the relevant time in the year 1982, the said workman was working as a Driver and was posted in Coonoor. It is the claim of the worker that he was also an Executive Member of the Union. He was transferred by the aforementioned order with effect from August 16, 1982. However, he sought for 15 days time to join the Madurai Office, for which he was granted 7 days time, and he was permitted to report for the duty on August 23, 1982. However, he sought time from August 23, 1982 to September 3, 1982 by his application dated August 20, 1982, and also sought for the reconsideration of the order by his communication dated August 22, 1982. However, on being served a notice by the management directing him to join the duty in without fail, he also alleged by a letter dated August 25, 1982 that his transfer was with ulterior motive and the object of victimising him. He again sent a request by letter dated September 1, 1982 to repost him in the Coonoor Estate. However, on being served a notice by the management directing him to join the duty in without fail, he also alleged by a letter dated August 25, 1982 that his transfer was with ulterior motive and the object of victimising him. He again sent a request by letter dated September 1, 1982 to repost him in the Coonoor Estate. In the meantime on August 31, 1982, the Union raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Officer and while conciliation proceedings were pending, the management issued a notice dated November 16, 1982, directing the workman to vacate the quarters. There are letters on record on this subject. However, the fact remains that admittedly on August 4, 1982, the said workman joined his duty. It is his claim that for 16 months, he was kept idle without giving any duties, but was paid his full salaries and allowances. His case as pleaded before the Labour Court was that there was no necessity for his being transferred, as there was no lorry available at Madurai for driving and the transfer was only with an object to teach him a lesson, because, he had joined the Union and was its office bearer. He also pleaded that since he was a worker, he could not be transferred from Coonoor to Madurai, as the workers' transfer was prohibited by the Standing Orders of the Government.The employer-Company took the stand that the Company has its registered Office at Madurai and the Estate owned by it is in the Nilgiris which is called Golden Hills Estates (P) Ltd. It was pointed out by the company that firstly, the second respondent was not a workman, but was a member of the staff, and that as such his transfer was possible under the Standing Orders. They later on pleaded that since they felt that the services of the second respondent could be better utilised as a Driver in the Madurai Office, and since they intended to Purchase a lorry they had transferred him, who was only a Driver. They also pointed out that the driver's duty could be utilised anywhere in the Company's Estates or even at the Headquarters of the Company at Madurai. They pointed out that as per the Standing Order 14, the employer-Company had a right to transfer him. They also pointed out that the driver's duty could be utilised anywhere in the Company's Estates or even at the Headquarters of the Company at Madurai. They pointed out that as per the Standing Order 14, the employer-Company had a right to transfer him. They refused that the transfer was with the objective of victimising the worker and pointed out that he was already a Union member, and there was no question of victimising him. They also pointed out that it was not at their instance that he was kept idle for 16 months, but it was the obstinate attitude of the worker that resulted in his remaining idle. They, therefore, pointed out the worker was not entitled to any of the reliefs, and there was no question of the transfer order being illegal in any manner. During the pendency of his application, the worker also made a claim petition under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, wherein he alleged that he was not given fuel, which was usually supplied to him while he was at Coonoor nor he was supplied with the 1/2 Kg. of tea which was also being supplied while he was serving at Coonoor. To that, the Company replied that these privileges were not payable to a person serving at Madurai, and as such he was not entitled to be given any amounts on account of those facilities.On these rival pleadings, the parties went for evidence. The Labour Court held in favour of the appellant/petitioner Company that the second respondent was not a worker, and he was a member of the Staff. The Labour Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that under the Standing Orders, he could always be transferred, as Standing Order 14 provides that the member of the staff could be transferred from one place to another. The Labour Court, however, held on account of five circumstances, that the transfer order was mala fide and was with the object of victimising the worker. On account of this, the order of transfer was set aside. On a writ petition having been filed, challenging this Award, the learned single Judge of this Court has also reiterated the said findings. It is an admitted fact that during the pendency of the writ appeals, the worker had already retired on account of his superannuation. On account of this, the order of transfer was set aside. On a writ petition having been filed, challenging this Award, the learned single Judge of this Court has also reiterated the said findings. It is an admitted fact that during the pendency of the writ appeals, the worker had already retired on account of his superannuation. It is also a fact which is not controverted by the parties that during the pendency of the writ petitions or during the pendency of even the industrial dispute before the Labour Court, he did not work, or for that matter no disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him, by the company. The learned counsel for the appellant very seriously attacked the orders passed by the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge, and has contended that the basic principles of judging the transfer orders have been ignored in those orders. He pointed out that there was absolutely no basis to hold that the transfer was mala fide in any manner, inasmuch as there were no specific pleadings and no evidence also to support the findings, and that the findings were perverse and not substantiated. We were taken through the evidence to suggest that even during the evidence the worker could not substantiate his claim that the transfer was mala fide.According to the learned counsel, since the second respondent has already been held as a member of the staff, there was no question of the transfer being barred and the contention of the second respondent in that behalf was rightly decided by the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge who had confirmed that finding. The learned counsel therefore says that unless the order of transfer could be found mala fide, it being a transfer order, ordinarily it could not be interfered with. In fact during the pendency of the writ appeals, the second respondent has been superannuated, and therefore really the whole subject of his transfer order has become infructuous. However, both the learned counsel insisted on arguing the matter and getting our finding, in view of the fact that the declaration of the transfer order being illegal, could initiate further rights in the second respondent to claim his wages, which admittedly have not been paid on account of his not working, during the pendency of the industrial dispute, writ petitions and writ appeals. Ordinarily we would not have gone into the merits or demerits of the transfer order and particularly the aspect of the mala fides which is being alleged before us, and which was canvassed before the Labour Court and the learned single Judge. However, we find that the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge have completely ignored the basic principles for declaring any particular action as mala fide. Now when we see the claim petition, suggesting that the order of transfer was by way of victimisation, nothing is suggested in the said claim petition. There is no allegation against any particular Officer or the management as such, nor has the worker stated anything suggesting that on account of the Union activities of the second respondent, the company had to take these decisions. The whole claim petition is totally silent as to what were the union activities on the part of the second respondent, and how the Company, wanted to contain him or to abate or to stop his so called union activities. For that matters Mr. Jayaraman, the learned counsel for the appellant took us through the evidence of the worker, which was also found to be totally silent on this aspect.An order does not become a mala fide order, merely because it is suggested to be so in a distinct (sic) manner as has been done in this case. Any particular action or the order passed by the management to be declared as mala fide, much more evidence is required, and the basis of that evidence has to be pleaded specifically and has to be brought before the Court. We find from the claim statement that no such basis was ever pleaded nor any specific instances of the mala fides have been pointed out either in the claim statement or in the evidence. The Labour Court has generally given five circumstances to be emerging from the evidence, to hold that the action was mala fide. The first amongst those circumstances is that after the transfer, the second respondent was not given work for about 15 months. Mr. Jayaraman, learned counsel for the appellant has very seriously contested these observations on account of the fact that in the evidence, the second respondent himself has admitted that he had refused to drive during night time. The first amongst those circumstances is that after the transfer, the second respondent was not given work for about 15 months. Mr. Jayaraman, learned counsel for the appellant has very seriously contested these observations on account of the fact that in the evidence, the second respondent himself has admitted that he had refused to drive during night time. He says : "When I was given a lorry to drive, I drove it in the day time. I refused to drive it during night time. I refused to drive the lorry because I was given the work in some other place other than the Head office." Now if this was the situation that it was left upto a driver of the company to decide as to whether he would or would not work, that by itself cannot become the reason for holding that his answer was mala fide. The Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge have merely accepted the whole issue that he was kept idle for 15 or 16 months, as the case may be, but have completely ignored the fact that there was no complaint about his having not been paid for all those 16 months, not only his salary but all me other allowances. Again it beats our comprehension as to how merely because a driver was kept idle and without work for 16 months, that by itself would make the order transferring him to that particular place, a mala fide order. It may be an example of a mismanagement of the company that one of its drivers remained idle for 16 months with full salary and allowances, but it does not necessarily make the order a mala fide order. The element of necessity for an order is not the necessary part of the mala fides. The require much more. Even if it is held that the order was unnecessarily passed, it by itself does not make the order mala fide. Be that as it may, we are not even prepared to accept that the said driver remained, idle for 15 or 16 months as the case may be, merely on account of the fact that there was no work for him to do because in his evidence he also accepts that the management had several lorries at Madurai. Be that as it may, we are not even prepared to accept that the said driver remained, idle for 15 or 16 months as the case may be, merely on account of the fact that there was no work for him to do because in his evidence he also accepts that the management had several lorries at Madurai. All that he has to suggest is that he did not refuse to drive the lorry without any reason. Perhaps he thought that he could not be given a night duty or that he could not be asked to drive a vehicle of the sister concern of the Company, and that does not appear to be the state of affairs.The second circumstance stated by the Labour Court is that there was no heavy vehicle at Madurai. There was only an intention to purchase the vehicle when the transfer was made. Even if this suggestion is accepted that it was only an intention on the part of the Company to purchase the vehicle, we fail to follow as to how the transfer could not be ordered to a driver to make an arrangement to drive a particular lorry. We do not think that it would have been a fine policy on the part of the Company to purchase the vehicle and then arrange for its driver. Be that as it may, this circumstance also does not turn the order into a mala fide order. This is apart from the fact that factually this has been found to be incorrect on account of the admission given by the worker-second respondent. Third circumstance which has been considered by the Labour Court and the learned single Judge is that even though he was given work after 15 months, he was asked to drive the vehicle of some other concern. This third circumstance has absolutely no bearing on the earlier order of transfer and is totally irrelevant according to us. Fourth circumstance on which the Labour Court and the learned single Judge relied on is that he was asked to do the work during night shift only, and that previously there were only two cars which he was driving and that the other driver was junior to the second respondent, but he was not transferred. We fall to follow as to how this circumstance makes the transfer a mala fide exercise. We fall to follow as to how this circumstance makes the transfer a mala fide exercise. Merely because a driver was given the work in the night shift, his transfer by itself does not become a mala fide transfer. Again even if he was driving only two cars at Erinkadu Estate, where he was serving for good long 15 to 20 years approximately, merely because of that it does not become obligatory on the Company not to transfer him to another place. In fact in the evidence it has come out that he was an experienced driver and therefore he was required at the Head Office at Madurai. Again the question of juniority and seniority does not become relevant in the matter of a transfer. Merely because if some other driver was junior to him, it could not be said that only the junior driver could be transferred and the senior driver could not be transferred. According to us, even this circumstance is irrelevant.The fifth and the last circumstance which has been cited by the authorities below is that he had put in 21 years of service and that no justification was there for giving night shift to such a person, and there was no corresponding transfer from Madurai to Erinkadu. On the other hand, it was an admitted position that new car driver was recruited for the Estate. According to us, even this circumstance by itself does not become a relevant circumstance for dubbing the earlier action of his transfer as a mala fide exercise. Merely because he had put in 21 years of service, it did not mean that he could not be asked to drive a vehicle in the night shift. Again even if there was some other appointment of a driver in the Estate, it does nor mean that the whole transfer order becomes a mala fide on that account. These are the only circumstances to hold the transfer mala fide. In fact the subject of mala fide is no more res-integra. On number of occasions the Supreme Court right from the case of Canara Banking Corporation v. Vittal 1963-II-LLJ-354 has been holding that it is the discretion of the management to judge how to distribute its manpower and whether a particular transfer can be avoided or not. In fact the subject of mala fide is no more res-integra. On number of occasions the Supreme Court right from the case of Canara Banking Corporation v. Vittal 1963-II-LLJ-354 has been holding that it is the discretion of the management to judge how to distribute its manpower and whether a particular transfer can be avoided or not. The Supreme Court has held specifically in that case that where there is a reason to believe that the management of the bank resorted to the transfer mala fide, by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice or some other ulterior motive not connected with the business interests of the bank, the transfer could be questioned and quashed. The learned single Judge has held that the present transfer could come under the exceptional category. For the reasons given above, we are unable to agree with the learned Judge. There is nothing to suggest that this transfer was mala fide. In Suryanarayana Murthy v. State Bank of Hyderabad and Others, the Supreme Court has held that "who should work where" is primarily for the management to decide in the best public interest and in the interest of the administration, and unless the action is mala fide, arbitrary and such an order is made as a measure of victimisation and punishment, the order cannot be interfered with. Now we have already shown that there was nothing either in the evidence or in the circumstances brought out on record to suggest that this transfer was a mala fide transfer. On this backdrop, it cannot be forgotten that this workman was working as a driver for good long 21 years at Coonoor. If the management thought it better to transfer him from Coonoor to Madurai, it could not be said that merely because he was uprooted from Coonoor, the whole exercise was mala fide. This is all the more prominent on the backdrop of the fact that nothing is pleaded regarding his union activities or nothing to show that he has become an eyesore to the management on account of his active participation therein. In fact the whole evidence is completely silent.In Rajindra Roy v. Union of India and Another, the Apex Court has stressed that the can be inferred only from the pleadings and the antecedent facts and circumstances, and that there must be firm foundation of facts pleaded and established. In fact the whole evidence is completely silent.In Rajindra Roy v. Union of India and Another, the Apex Court has stressed that the can be inferred only from the pleadings and the antecedent facts and circumstances, and that there must be firm foundation of facts pleaded and established. Beyond saying that number of facts have been taken into account before the Labour Court came to conclusion that the transfer was not bona fide, the learned single Judge has not chosen to see the so-called circumstances being culled out. We are afraid, we cannot agree with the learned single Judge. Though the above cases have been considered in the judgment of the learned single Judge, they have merely been paraphrased without comparing the facts in the present case. On this backdrop, we are of the clear opinion that the management could not be said to have acted in a mala fide manner in transferring the second respondent from Coonoor to Madurai, and therefore, the transfer order cannot be found to be illegal and the orders of the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge of this Court holding that order to be illegal are incorrect and liable to be set aside. They are set aside. The reference is answered in the negative. In so far as the other aspect is concerned, for the same reasons, we also do not accept the finding on the question of compensation under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The only reason why that relief was given to the worker was because the Labour Court was of the opinion that the worker was bound to be kept only at Coonoor and that he was entitled to receive the benefits of 1/2 Kg. of tea and firewood. Since we have held that his transfer was justified, we hold that even that relief cannot be given to the worker. We set aside the findings of the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge on that issue also. The writ appeals are allowed. The orders under appeal are set aside. No Costs. Consequently, connected C.M.Ps. are closed.