ORDER: The petitioners herein are the accused before the trial Court. They have come forward with the instant criminal original petition to quash the proceedings pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Sathiyamangalam in C.C.No.168 of l999. 2. This criminal original petition has arisen in this way: One Venkateswari preferred a complaint before the respondent alleging that the first petitioner herein is her husband, petitioners 2 and 3 are her parents-in-law and the fourth petitioner is her sister-in-law and that subsequent to the marriage, the petitioners herein demanded dowry from her. The respondent received the complaint and registered a case in Crime No.13 of 1998 for the offences under Secs.498-A and 506(ii), I.P.C. and also under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The matter is pending investigation. At this stage, the learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the matter in C.C.No.168 of 1999 and issued summons. Aggrieved by the issuance of summons; the petitioners have come forward with the instant criminal original petition to quash the said proceedings on the ground that the essential ingredients of Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and Secs.498-A and 506(ii), I.P.C. are not made out. Further, their case is that petitioners 2 to 4 have been impleaded only to rope them in the crime only on the ground of being close relatives of the husband-first petitioner. 3. Heard both the sides and perused the records. I have very carefully gone through after the marriage, the petitioners demanded dowry from her. It cannot be said that there is no overt act against any of the petitioners. In the complaint, the defacto complainant had stated that 4. The only question is whether the allegation would attract offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Sec.498-A, I.P.C. Sec.2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act recites as under: “2. It cannot be said that there is no overt act against any of the petitioners. In the complaint, the defacto complainant had stated that 4. The only question is whether the allegation would attract offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Sec.498-A, I.P.C. Sec.2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act recites as under: “2. Definition of”dowry“: In this Act,”dowry“means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or Maher in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.” Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act recites as under: “4. Penalty for demanding dowry: If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees; Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.” 5. Following the decision of a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court reported in Sankar Prosad Shaw v. State, 1991 Crl.L.J. 639 in an earlier proceedings in Crl.O.P.No.22394 of 1999, I have held that there should be a prior agreement to pay dowry and the demand for fulfilment of the same may be made at any time before or at or after marriage. In fact, in the decision reported in Sankar Prosad Shaw v. State, (cited supra) the Calcutta High Court has pointed out as under: “...Although in common Parlance we very often use the term “dowry demand” in the cases where the husband or his relations demand valuable security from the parents and other relations of the wife after the marriage, yet, in my opinion this will not amount to demand for dowry under the Act in view of the definition of dowry contained in Sec.2 of the Act. Demand for dowry under the Act in the legal sense will mean the demand for dowry only when it refers to property or valuable security given or agreed to be given at or before or after the marriage.” 6. Now, the learned counsel for the petitioners drew my attention to two decisions, viz., (i) State of H.P. v. Nikkuram, 1995 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1090, wherein the Apex Court has held that in case of demand of dowry after marriage, an implied agreement to pay dowry can be presumed; (ii) My learned brother R.Balasubramanian, J. has followed the view expressed this view in Boopathy and another v. State, etc., (1998)1 L.W. (Crl.) 52. 7. Therefore, at the time, when the earlier proceedings in Crl.O.P.No.22394 of 1999 was disposed by me, the decision rendered by the Apex Court and the decision rendered by may learned brother R.Balasubramanian, J. were not brought to my notice. 8. Now, in the light of the above two decisions cited supra, it is evident that a later demand would also attract provisions of Secs.2 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act on a fiction of implied demand. At this stage, it cannot be said that the de facto complainant had not made out any ground for proceeding under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the petitioners herein. 9. So far as the next contention, i.e., the ingredients to constitute offence under Sec.498-A, I.P.C. are not made out, I feel, it would be useful to recall the provisions of Sec.498-A, I.P.C., which recite as under: “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty: Whoever, being the husband of the relative of the husband of a woman; subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation: For the purposes of this Section, “Cruelty” means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her to any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” The essential ingredients of this Section are: (i) the woman must have been married; (ii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment; and (iii) such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by the husband of the woman or by the relatives of the husband. 10. I have referred to the relevant plea raised in the complaint in para 3 of this judgment. That would clearly show that there had been a demand for money from the married woman and she had been subjected to cruelty and harassment and that harassment was made by the husband and the relatives of the husband. I am satisfied that in the complaint, a prima facie case under Sec.498-A, I.P.C. is also made out. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that petitioners 2 to 4 are close relatives of the first petitioner-husband and they have been roped in only on the grounds of being close relatives of the first petitioner. In support of his contention, the learned counsel cited an authority reported in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, 2000 Crl.L.J. 2993. The facts of the decision cited are different from the facts of the case on hand. That was a case where the couple were living away from the parents at the time the dowry death occurred and no specific averments were made connecting the in-laws of the deceased with the crime. But, in the instant case, specific averments are made out against each one of the petitioners. When that being the case, it cannot be said that there is no prime facie case to hold that petitioners 2 to 4 have been roped in the case. I do not find any merits in this criminal original petition. This criminal original petition is accordingly dismissed. When that being the case, it cannot be said that there is no prime facie case to hold that petitioners 2 to 4 have been roped in the case. I do not find any merits in this criminal original petition. This criminal original petition is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, Crl.M.P.Nos.8497 and 8498 of 2000 are also dismissed.