Judgment B.J. Shethna, J.-Before commencing the arguments, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in other identical cases notices have been issued by another Division Bench of this Court and the matters are going to come up for hearing on notice on October 17, 2000, therefore, it was prayed that this matter be also adjourned to October 17, 2000. This request has to be rejected because number of writ petitions of similar nature were dismissed by this Bench itself in limine. Thus, it becomes a precedent and we are bound by our own order. 2. Fromthe impugned award passed by the Labour Court it is clear that the appellant petitioner had worked for few months, to be precise from February 1990 to April, 1991, as Chowkidar and that too on daily wages basis as an unskilled labour. The Labour Court found that the termination of the workman was illegal, therefore, held that termination was bad. However, instead of passing the order of reinstatement with back wages, the Labour Court awarded compensation of Rs. 28,000/-to the workman. Aggrieved of this award the workman filed writ petition before this Court which was dismissed by the learned single Judge on May 23, 2000. Hence, this special appeal. 3. Relying upon the Supreme Court Judgment in case of Management of M.C.D. v. Prem Chand Gupta & Anr., AIR 2000 SC 454 : 2000-I-LLJ-533 learned Counsel for the appellant workman vehemently submitted that both the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge of this Court committed error in not passing the order of reinstatement with back wages. Mr. Chaudhary submitted that the learned single Judge was wrong in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the termination was dated March 1, 1991 and the reference was made on April 13, 1994 and the award was passed on February 26, 1999. He submitted that merely because there was a delay in passing the award after the date of retrenchment, the workman should not have been denied reinstatement and for no fault of him he should not be made to suffer. 4. In case of Prem Chand Gupta (supra) the workman was appointed by the Corporation on temporary post of Section Officer (Civil) on May 5, 1964 with the condition that he would be considered for confirmation after one year on satisfactory service. 4. In case of Prem Chand Gupta (supra) the workman was appointed by the Corporation on temporary post of Section Officer (Civil) on May 5, 1964 with the condition that he would be considered for confirmation after one year on satisfactory service. However, he was never considered, for confirmation and on August 1, 1964 he was told that his services were not required by the Corporation w.e.f September 1, 1964. However, once again he was reappointed w.e.f October 1, 1964 on a vacant post because of termination of service of another employee. Accordingly, he continued to remain in service without any break till March 31, 1965. Thereafter, once again he was re- employed on April 1, 1965, and continued to be in service till April 29, 1966, the date on which his services were terminated. Thus, from October 1, 1964 till April 29, 1966 for about 18 months the workman remained in continuous service as temporary Section Officer and worked on substantive post because of termination of services of another employee. 5. On the above facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that his termination’ amounts to retrenchment and non-payment of retrenchment compensation renders his termination as null and void. Accordingly, the Hon’ ble Supreme Court held that the workman was entitled for reinstatement. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself refused full back wages on the ground that it would be harsh to saddle the Corporation to pay full back wages after passage of 33 years since his order of termination. 6. Ordinarily, tenure of service of a person would be around 35 years and if a person is to be reinstated in service without back wages then he or she would be entitled only to salary of remaining one or two years and the total would come to roughly about Rs. 25,000/-or so depending upon the Grade. 7. Coming to the facts of this case, it is clear that the workman was appointed on the post of Chowkidar on January 1, 1990 and his services were terminated on March 1, 1991. It may also be stated that no such order appointing the workman was passed in writing. His appointment was oral and the termination order was also oral. Thus, the terms and conditions of his appointment were not clear. He was appointed on the post of Chowkidar as an unskilled labourer on daily wage basis. He was getting only Rs. It may also be stated that no such order appointing the workman was passed in writing. His appointment was oral and the termination order was also oral. Thus, the terms and conditions of his appointment were not clear. He was appointed on the post of Chowkidar as an unskilled labourer on daily wage basis. He was getting only Rs. 22/-per day. After the termination order dated March 1, 1991, the reference came to be made after a period of three years i.e. April 13, 1994 and for some or the other reason the award came to be passed only on February 26, 1999 i.e. almost after 8 years of the termination. 8. Under the circumstances, considering the relevant facts and circumstances and number of Judgment s of Hon’ble Supreme Court, referred to by the Labour Court in its order, the Labour Court thought it not fit to pass the order of reinstatement with back wages and instead of that it ordered to pay Rs. 28,000/-as compensation which, in our opinion, is slightly on a higher side. 9. Be that as it may, when the other side has not thought it fit to challenge the said order of compensation then we would not like to interfere with the same. Suffice it to say that while passing the impugned award the Labour Court has taken sufficient care and passed the order of compensation by denying reinstatement with back wages. 10. In that view of the matter, when the learned single Judge refused to entertain the writ petition in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India then certainly this Court would not interfere with such order in special appeal. 11. Thus, on facts of this case the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Chand Gupta v. case (supra) has no application and accordingly, this special appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.