JUDGMENT 1. - These appeals raise common point and were therefore heard together and are being decided together. 2. The appellants are desirous of being appointed to the post of Junior Ayurved Nurse/Compounder in the Department of Ayurved of the State of Rajasthan. They claim to be eligible for being considered as according to them, they held qualifications prescribed for the post. According to the appellants, till April, 1999, the procedure followed for recruitment to the post of junior Ayurved Nurse/Compounder was governed by an order issued by the Medical and,Health Department of the State of Rajasthan on 16.11.89. According to the order dated 16.11.89, the merit list of the candidates found suitable for appointment was to be prepared on the basis of marks obtained in the training examination batchwise and merit list was to be prepared on the basis of chronological batchwise seniority. All earlier selections were made by following this method. Howe er, on 19.4.99, the State Government revoked the order dated 16.11.89 and 15r a separate order also directed that the vacant posts be filled in in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Rule 20 of the Rajasthan Ayurvedic, Unani, Homoeopathy and Naturopathy Subordinate Service Rules, 1966 (in short 'the Rules'). Consequently,Sn employment notice for filling in 200 posts was issued on 24.4.1999. 3. The effect of revocation of the order dated 16.11.89 and directing recruitment in accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules was that those who were senior according to the batchwise seniority were relegated to lower position if the candidate in the subsequent batch had higher marks in the training examination than the marks obtained by them. In other words, preparation of merit list on the basis of marks obtained in the training examination irrespective of the year of passing of batch of the candidate came in the way of selection of the candidates who would have been selected on the basis of batchwise seniority if the order dated 16.11.89 had not been revoked. The appellants therefore, contend that the revocation of the order dated 16.11.89 is prejudicial to their interest and is illegal and arbitrary. 4. The State of Rajasthan, on the other hand, contends that the action was taken strictly in accordance with the Rules and nobody can be said to be aggrieved by strict compliance of the Rules. The appellants therefore, contend that the revocation of the order dated 16.11.89 is prejudicial to their interest and is illegal and arbitrary. 4. The State of Rajasthan, on the other hand, contends that the action was taken strictly in accordance with the Rules and nobody can be said to be aggrieved by strict compliance of the Rules. It is also contended that the State Government has authority to change the Rules and no grievance can be made against such a change of procedure. It was also contended on behalf of the State of Rajasthan that the order dated 16.11.89 was found to be against the Rules and was, therefore, recalled. 5. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions finding no merit therein. Learned Single Judge upheld the contention that the order dated 16.11.89 was dehors the Rules and therefore, no grievance could be made if that order was recalled. Learned Single Judge also observed that there was no provision, whatsoever in the Rules requiring preparation of the merit list on the basis of batchwise merit. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, these appeals have been filed. 6. On behalf of the appellants it was contended that the order dated 16.11.89 was a valid and reasonable order which could not have been said to be against the Rules. The consideration of batchwise merit provided by the order was based on a reasonable classification and it could not be said that the order dated 16.11.1989 was arbitrary or illegal. It was further contended that the order dated 16.11.89 held out the promise to those who underwent training on the basis that later on they would be employed on the basis of their batchwise merit and one batch of candidates passing the training will not be required to compete with the candidates from any other batch. According to the appellants, the change of the Rules and revocation of the order dated 16.11.89 abruptly would be hit by the principles of promissory estoppel. It was also contended that the order dated 16.11.89 raised a legitimate expectation amongst the candidates undergoing training, that when they apply for the post of Ayurved Junior Nurse/Compounder, they would be selected on the basis of their batchwise merit and they would not be required to compete with candidates from all the other batches. It was also contended that the order dated 16.11.89 raised a legitimate expectation amongst the candidates undergoing training, that when they apply for the post of Ayurved Junior Nurse/Compounder, they would be selected on the basis of their batchwise merit and they would not be required to compete with candidates from all the other batches. It was also contended that because of operation of order dated 16.11.89 many candidates were not selected in earlier selections because candidates with lesser marks from earlier batches were preferred to them on the basis of the order dated 16.11.89. Such candidates would now suffer because they have to compete with candidates with higher marks from subsequent batches. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the State has a right to change the Rules of recruitment and what actually was done was to bring the selection process in line with the Rules in force. It was contended that no order issued by the Government can continue for all times to come and the Government has a right to change the Rules or the procedure whenever it deems necessary. It was contended that no promise was held out to anyone while admitting them to training because training and employment are two different matters and the particular procedure for employment was not guaranteed to the candidates when they were admitted to the training. It was further contended that the doctrine of legitimate expectation was not attracted because a candidate acquiring training does not have a guarantee of employment after successful completion of training and cannot legitimately expect that he would be employed in all circumstances. The question only was whether it was necessary to decide the selection of the candidates on the basis of batchwise merit. No such promise was ever given to the appellants and there could be no legitimate expectation on this count. Learned counsel for the Interveners supported the stand taken by the State Government. 8. Several decisions have been cited on behalf of the parties in the case, many of them, in our opinion, are quite unnecessary and irrelevant for the decision of real questions in controversy. 9. The decisions of the Supreme Court in (1) Narinder Kumar and others V. The State of Punjab and others ( AIR 1985 SC 275 ) and (2) U.P.S.R.T. Ors. 9. The decisions of the Supreme Court in (1) Narinder Kumar and others V. The State of Punjab and others ( AIR 1985 SC 275 ) and (2) U.P.S.R.T. Ors. V. U.P. Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh and others ( AIR 1995 SC 1115 ) were cited on behalf of the petitioners. These are the decisions under the Apprentices Act and have no application to the facts of the present case. Likewise, the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of (3) Union of India V. N. Hargopal ( AIR 1987 SC 1227 ) and (4) Arun Tewari V. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh (AIR 1998 SC 331) were cited which also have no application to the facts of the present case. 10. The decision of the Supreme Court in (5) M.P. Oil Extraction and another V. State of MP and others (1997) 7 SCC 592 was cited to press into service the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Para 44 of the judgment was specifically referred to and it was contended that the doctrine of legitimate expectation has been judicially recognised by the Supreme Court which operates in the domain of public law and in appropriate cases, constitute a subjective and enforceable right. In our opinion, whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation would apply or not would depend on the facts of a particular case in which it is to be inferred whether the petitioner could have legitimately expected that a particular action will be taken by the State. Actually, in the present case, what falls for decision is whether the order issued by the State Government providing for batchwise assessment of merit of the candidates could be changed or recalled or not. In the facts of the present case, as would be shown later, this ruling has no application. 11. The decision of the Supreme Court in (6) M/s. Moti Lal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. V. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others ( AIR 1979 SC 621 ) was cited in supp t of the plea of promissory estoppel. In the facts of the present case, as would be shown later, this ruling has no application. 11. The decision of the Supreme Court in (6) M/s. Moti Lal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. V. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others ( AIR 1979 SC 621 ) was cited in supp t of the plea of promissory estoppel. Our attention was attracted to the observations made by the Supreme Court in this decision to the effect that the true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a dear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. It was further observed in the decision that it is not necessary in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel that the promisee acting in reliance on the promise should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. 12. The decision of the Supreme Court in (7) State of HP and others V. Ganesh Wood Products and others (1995) 6 SCC 363 was also cited in support of the plea of promissory estoppel. Referring to para 54 of the decision, it was argued that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognised in India. But it should be noticed that it is a evolving doctrine, the contours of which are not yet fully and finally demarcated. 13. In (8) Col. Referring to para 54 of the decision, it was argued that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognised in India. But it should be noticed that it is a evolving doctrine, the contours of which are not yet fully and finally demarcated. 13. In (8) Col. A.S. Sangwan V. Union of India and others ( AIR 1981 SC 1545 ) it was observed by the Supreme Court that the policy once formulated with regard to promotion of employees in a cadre of Defence Forces by the Union of India is not good for ever. It is perfectly within the competence of the Union to change it, recharge it, adjust and readjust it according to the compulsions of circumstances and the imperatives of the material considerations. There is no bar to its changing the policy formulated earlier if there are good and weighty reasons for doing so. It is entirely within the reasonable discretion of the Union of India. It may stick to the earlier policy or give it up but if it does change its policy it must do so fairly and should not give the impression that it is acting by any ulterior criteria or arbitrarily. Whatever policy is made subsequently should be done fairly and made known to those concerned. It was contended on the basis of this decision that though the Government is entitled to change the policy, it should not affect the appellants because they have completed their training on the hope that they will get employment on the basis of their batchwise merit and would not be compelled to compete with any other persons than their batch-mates. 14. In the next case cited (9) U.P. State Road Transport Ors. and another V. U.P. Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh and others (1995) 2 SCC 1 it is observed that in absence of clear and unequivocal promise, doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable. It would meet the legitimate expectation of the trainess if the time, energy and public money spent on them is properly utilised and is not allowed to go waste. Relying on these observations, it was argued that even if it is held that no specific promise of employment was given to the trainees, the time, energy and money spent on their training should not go un-utilised. Relying on these observations, it was argued that even if it is held that no specific promise of employment was given to the trainees, the time, energy and money spent on their training should not go un-utilised. These observations are made in the context of the claim of the trained persons as against direct recruits. It would not apply to the case in hand which relates only to the assessment of merit on the basis of a particular batch of all candidates taken together. 15. Plethora of judgments was also cited on behalf of the respondents and interveners. We do not consider it necessary to refer to each and every decision cited but would discuss some of these rulings. 16. In (10) State of M.P. and others V. Raghuveer Singh Yadav and others (1994) 6 SCC 151 it was held that the State had power to prescribe qualifications for recruitment and the candidates who had appeared for the examination and passed the written examination had only legitimate expectation of consideration of their claims according to the Rules then in vogue. The Government is entitled to conduct selection in accordance with the changed Rules. 17. A decision of the Supreme Court in (11) Jai Singh Dalai and others V. State of Haryana and another (1993) 2 SCC 600 was cited in support of the contention that a candidate has no vested right to compel the Government even to complete the process of selection already started. It was held in this case that "the recruitment process could be stopped by the Government at any time before a candidate is appointed. At the most, the Government may be required to justify its decision as not being arbitrary". It was contended that in the case before us, the process of recruitment had started only after the revocation of the earlier Rules. 18. In (12) Dr. P.N. Dubey and others V. State of M.P. (1997) 3 SCC 497 it was held that the rules in force on the date of advertisement were relevant for deciding the validity of selection. 19. A decision of the Supreme Court in (13) P.D. Agrawal and others V. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1987 SC 1676 ) was cited for the proposition that statutory rules cannot be amended or superseded by office memoranda or administrative orders. 19. A decision of the Supreme Court in (13) P.D. Agrawal and others V. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1987 SC 1676 ) was cited for the proposition that statutory rules cannot be amended or superseded by office memoranda or administrative orders. On the basis of this decision, it was contended that with the amendment in the Rules, the earlier order dated 16.11.89 ceased to have force. 20. A decision of the Supreme Court in (14) M/s Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and others V. State of Haryana and others (1981) 1 SCC 11 was cited for the proposition that the principles of promissory estoppel are not applicable against actions of the State in exercise of its legislative or statutory powers. They also do not apply when the promise held out is beyond the scope of authority. It was thus contended that the rule making power being a legislative power, the Government will not be estopped from changing the Rules because of its earlier actions. It was also contended that the order dated 16.11.89 was against the Rules and therefore, cannot be enforced on the principle of promissory estoppel. 21. In (15) Union of India and another V. Yogendra Singh (1994) Supp. (2) SCC 226 it was held by the Supreme Court that where applications for recruitment were invited subsequent to the amendment of educational qualifications in the Rules, a candidate not possessing the currently prescribed qualifications, although possessing the pre-amendment qualifications, was not entitled to appointment even against any unfilled vacancy that had arisen prior to amendment. Every candidate who aspires to fill any vacancy must possess the requisite educational qualifications that are currently prescribed. 22. In (16) Union of India V. Hindustan Development Ors. and others (1993) 3 SCC 499) it was held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation only operates in public law field and provides locus standi for judicial review. Its denial is a ground for challenging the decision/action but denial could be justified by showing some over-riding public necessity. Denial does not by itself confer an absolute right b claim relief. Grant of relief should be limited only to cases where denial amounts to denial of any right or where decision/action is arbitrary, unreasonable, not in public interest and inconsistent with principles of natural justice. Denial does not by itself confer an absolute right b claim relief. Grant of relief should be limited only to cases where denial amounts to denial of any right or where decision/action is arbitrary, unreasonable, not in public interest and inconsistent with principles of natural justice. The Court should not interfere merely on the ground of change in Government policy as it does not by itself vitiate the action taken pursuant to the changed policy if the changes reasonable and rational. 23. In (17) Ghaziabad Development Authority V. Delhi Auto and General Finance Pvt. Ltd. and others (1994) 4 SCC 42 it was observed that "the doctrine of legitimate expectation forms part of rule of non-arbitrariness to ensure procedural fairness in decision making. It is not an independent legally enforceable right. Requirements of public interest can outweigh the legitimate expectation of private persons and the decision of a public body on that basis in exercise of statutory power is not assailable." 24. Learned counsel for the appellants laid great stress on the fact that the order dated 16.11.89 was a valid and legal order. Learned counsel for the respondents also joined the issue on the point quite unnecessarily because the point to be decided in this case is not as to whether the order dated 16.11.89 was a valid order or not, but the question is whether it could be changed or revoked or not. It is not a case where something which has already been done under the order dated 16.11.89 was being under challenge. The contention of the appellants is that they were entitled to be governed by order dated 16.11.89 even after its revocation. This contention is based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel and doctrine of legitimate expectation. It cannot be contended that the order dated 16.11.89 was irrevocable in any circumstance and would be in force for ever. The contention of the petitioners is that the order dated 16.11.89 was a promise held out by the State Government to all concerned specially the trainees undergoing training that they will be selected for employment on the basis of their batchwise merit. It was further contended that because of this promise, the petitioners altered their position by joining the training and filling in a bond for employment with the State Government. It was further contended that because of this promise, the petitioners altered their position by joining the training and filling in a bond for employment with the State Government. Alternatively, it was submitted that if the principle of promissory estoppel is not applicable, then, the doctrine of legitimate expectation would apply because according to the appellants, they legitimately expected that the Rules of recruitment in force at the time of their joining the course would be applicable to them in seeking employment on the basis of training. In the circumstances of the case, all these contentions are devoid of any substance. There is nothing on record to show that the candidates were guaranteed employment on behalf of training. The eligibility qualification for the post is departmental training of two and half years of diploma with internship of three years. There is no question of promising employment to persons who were not eligible at all till they completed training. There was no promise held out to any of the trainees that employment would be offered on testing the merit on particular basis. Likewise, the contention that the doctrine of legitimate expectation would apply, is also fallacious. It would be an extremely remote and far-fetched expectation that the candidate on completion of his training will be governed by the Rules which were in force when he joined the training. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no connection established between the training and the employment. Actually, the completion of training is a pre-requisite for applying for the post and there is no question of any legitimate expectation of employment for a person before he becomes eligible for the post. 25. It has been demonstrated by the respondents that the Rules do not prescribe batchwise assessment of merit. There is no basis for holding that anyone could have a vested right in continuance of a practice which was not supported by the Rules. A practice which was based on an administrative order could remain in force only at the pleasure of the State Government and till the administrative order is kept in force by the State Government. 26. There is no basis for holding that anyone could have a vested right in continuance of a practice which was not supported by the Rules. A practice which was based on an administrative order could remain in force only at the pleasure of the State Government and till the administrative order is kept in force by the State Government. 26. As regards the argument that the candidates have suffered in earlier years because of operation of order dated 16.11.89 because if the rule of batchwise merit had not been there, they would have been selected because of their higher marks in comparison with the marks of competitors from earlier batches, firstly, there is no authentic pleading or material placed on record in this regard. Secondly, only because such candidates did not challenge the order dated 16.11.89 and suffered it in silence, the respondents cannot be made to suffer when the Government realising its folly subsequently wanted to correct the situation by revoking the order dated 16.11.89 and by changing the Rules. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any force in these appeals.They are therefore, hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.Spl. Appeal Dismissed. *******