BINOD KUMAR ROY AND P. K. JAIN, JJ. ( 1 ) THE appellants, who were respondent Nos. 2. 1 and 3 respectively in Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 13299 of 1997 assail validity of the judgment dated 21. 5. 1997 quashing the order dated 1. 9. 1992 passed by appellant No. 3 the Judge, Family Court, Allahabad and the order dated 12. 3. 1997, passed by appellant No. 2 the then Honble Inspecting Judge, Allahabad. ( 2 ) VIDE order dated 1. 9. 1992, the writ petitioner who was appointed on ad hoc basis as an accounts Clerk in the scale of Rs. 1,200-1,560-EB-40-2,040 was reverted in public interest and for smooth running of the office work as Copyist in the scale of Rs. 950-30-1,150-EB-25-1,500 as during that period, his work was not found to be satisfactory and his writing was also very poor. Vide order dated 12. 3. 1997, the then Honble Inspecting Judge, Allahabad held that the appointing authority has powers to revert an employee from higher scale to lower scale, if his work and conduct is not satisfactory. ( 3 ) THE impugned judgment reads thus : "this writ petition has been filed against the impugned order dated 1. 9. 1992 passed by the family Court and the impugned order of the Inspecting Judge dated 12. 3. 1997 Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The petitioner was appointed as an ad hoc class II employee in the scale of Rs. 1,200-2,040 vide annexure-2 to the writ petition. By the impugned order dated 1. 9. 1992 true copy of which is annexure-3 to the writ petition, he was reverted as Copyist in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1,500. He filed an appeal on the administrative side before the Inspecting Judge but that was rejected, hence this petition. It was held by the Supreme Court in Hussain Sasansaheb Kaladgi v. State of Maharashtra, 1987 (55) FIR 304, that a direct recruit cannot be reverted to a lower post. On the same principle, I am of the opinion that a person appointed on higher pay scale directly cannot be reverted to a lower pay scale. In view of the above this petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 1. 9. 1992 and 12. 3. 1997 are quashed. No order as to costs. On the same principle, I am of the opinion that a person appointed on higher pay scale directly cannot be reverted to a lower pay scale. In view of the above this petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 1. 9. 1992 and 12. 3. 1997 are quashed. No order as to costs. M. Katju, J. " The original pleadings : ( 4 ) THE case of the respondent, who was the writ petitioner, in short was to this effect : "he was appointed by the Judge. Family Court, Allahabad with effect from I6tb July, 1991 till 30th September, 1991 on purely ad hoc basis as class III employee whose service was liable to be terminated at any time without any notice ; he was allowed to work from 16. 7. 1991 itself on the substantive vacant post of Accounts Clerk and even after 30th September. 1991, he has been continuously working in the office of the Judge, Family Court at Allahabad ; even though his service record has always been good and he was never communicated of any adverse entry against him. yet to his utter surprise the Impugned order dated 1,9. 1992 was passed casting stigma without giving him an opportunity of hearing and thereby there has been a gross violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play ; he went up in appeal under clause 6 of para 7 of allahabad High Court Rules, 1956, on the administrative side of the Court but it was dismissed vide order dated 12. 3. 1992 ; to the best of his knowledge under Rule 4 (1) (f) of the U. P. Subordinate Courts Staff (Punishment and Appeals) Rules. 1976, punishment of reduction to a lower post, time scale or grade, or to a lower stage in a time scale or graded scale can be imposed but it falls under the category of major punishment and that under Rule 5 thereof no order of reduction in rank can be passed unless a person is informed in writing of the ground on which is proposed to take such action and had been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself : that sub-rules (2) (3) and (4) of Rule 5 aforementioned lays down the procedure which is required to be followed in case of major punishment, which were not at all followed and thus the order dated 1. 9. 9. 1992 is void-ab-initio and liable to be set aside. " ( 5 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed by appellant Nos. 1 and 2, which was sworn by O. S. D. (Litigation) of the Court, it has been stated, inter alia, that as per the character roll entries recorded for the years 1992-93 and 1993-94, his work was not found satisfactory, his handwriting was also not good ; as he was appointed purely on ad hoc basis, hence as per the rule, there was no need to give him show cause notice or opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order, under Section 6 of the Family Courts Act, the Judge, Family Court is the appointing authority, who has powers to revert an employee from higher scale to lower post, if his work and conduct is not found satisfactory ; after obtaining report from the Judge, Family court and the District Judge, Allahabad and thereafter the representation of the petitioner was rejected on 12. 3. 1997 which was aiso communicated ; his reversion was not a punishment but an order simpliciter ; he was simply deputed to work on a higher scale and was reverted when his work and conduct was not found satisfactory ; the U. P. Subordinate Courts Staff (Punishment and Appeals) Rules. 1976, does not apply to his case and it would be just and expedient in the interest of justice to dismiss his writ petition. ( 6 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of appellant No. 3. 1976, does not apply to his case and it would be just and expedient in the interest of justice to dismiss his writ petition. ( 6 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of appellant No. 3. It has been asserted, inter alia, that the establishment of the Family Court, Allahabad itself is a temporary establishment, which is being extended year to year, as is evident from the G. O. appended as Annexure C. A.-1 : vide notification dated 4th April, 1995, published in the Official Gazette, the State Government has framed rules known as "uttar Pradesh Family Court Rules, 1995" : the writ petitioner had wrongly approached appellant No. 1 for redressal of his grievances, as proper authority was the state Government, since the dispute had arisen prior to the aforesaid Rules ; the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as the person alleged to have been promoted in his place has also not been made party to the writ petition as even assuming though not admitting that such a person has been promoted in his place : his appointment was made without completing legal formalities on temporary and ad hoc basis, though he worked till 1992 without any further extension during which period his work was not found satisfactory and was reverted to the post of Copyist ; there was a break in his service on 1. 7. 1992 and at his own request, he was assigned the same work but till 30th August, 1992, he did not improve himself ; prior to passing of the impugned order due to unsatisfactory performance and work and even thereafter he failed to improve his work therefore his services were again given break on 13. 7. 1993 : he was warned several times to improve his work but he did not improve, it is wrong to say that he was neither given any warning nor was communicated of any adverse entry and the writ petition being devoid of any merit is liable to be dismissed with costs. 7. 1993 : he was warned several times to improve his work but he did not improve, it is wrong to say that he was neither given any warning nor was communicated of any adverse entry and the writ petition being devoid of any merit is liable to be dismissed with costs. ( 7 ) THE respondent filed a rejoinder-affidavit to the aforesaid counter-affidavit stating, infer alia, that the services of none of the similarly placed employee has not been terminated on the ground of the temporary character of the Family Court : since the placement was purely temporary, therefore, he was advised not to irnplead other persons as party to this writ petition, but in case it is desired that they be impleaded then he be permitted to implead them as party so that justice be done ; the very act of promoting the persons itself proves that the manner of appointment was not very relevant and that all the appointments made will be deemed to have been made on permanent basis as all of them are continuously working since the date of their appointment ; even after coming into force of the Rules, one Sri Abdul Rahman Zafri was appointed on 17. 5. 1995 in the scale of Rs. 1,200-2,040 on a class III post in similar fashion as that of the petitioner and other employees by calling applications only and not in accordance with the Rules : the entries of the year 1993-94 pertains to the year subsequent to the year of his reversion about which he was never communicated and, thus, no reliance can be placed on the same ; it is denied that there was break in his service on 1. 7. 1992 due to his unsatisfactory performance and work ; it is also denied that since he failed to improve his work, his services were again given a break on 13th July, 1993 ; the order of break in service has been passed not only in his case but in cases of another employees ; he was never issued any warning to improve his work ; his handwriting is important at the place where he has been reverted and not as Accounts Clerk. ( 8 ) IN his rejoinder-affidavit to the counter-affidavit of appellant Nos. 1 and 2, similar facts have been asserted. ( 8 ) IN his rejoinder-affidavit to the counter-affidavit of appellant Nos. 1 and 2, similar facts have been asserted. The submissions : ( 9 ) SRI S. M. A. Kazmi and following him Srt Sudhir Agarwal, learned counsel appearing in support of this special appeal, had contended as follows : " (i) The judgment is cryptic and has not even stated what was the precise case of the appellants and issues raised by them. (ii) Since undisputedly, the respondent was not appointed even on ad hoc basis after 30. 9. 1991 and on 1. 9. 1992, on class III post even on ad hoc basis, therefore, he had no right to hold the post of class III and this significant aspect of the matter was completely lost sight of by the learned single Judge, who had proceeded to presume that the petitioners appointment as an ad hoc employee had continued till 1. 9. 1992 when he was reverted back as Copyist and, thus, the impugned judgment is vitiated. (iii) The learned single Judge has committed an apparent error in applying the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Hussain Sasansaheb Kaladgi v. State of Maharashtra, 1987 (55) FLR 30 : AIR 1987 SC 1627 , which was a case of a temporary employee and not of an ad hoc employee for a fixed term period. (iv) The respondent was deemed to discharge functions of a class IV employee though as class hi employee in the scale of Rs. 950-1,500 and the order impugned had changed his assignment and not reduced his rank. In support of his submissions on merit, Sri Agarwal placed reliance on following decisions ; (i) Director, Institute of Management and Development, U. P. v. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, 1992 (4) SCC 33 ; (ii) S. P. Vasudeua v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1975 SC 2292 , and (iii) State of Haryana v. Shri S. M. Sharma and others. JT 1993 (3) SC 740 : AIR 1993 SC 2273 . JT 1993 (3) SC 740 : AIR 1993 SC 2273 . " ( 10 ) SRI Ranjit Saxena followed by Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, had contended as follows ; " (i) As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, 1986 (2) UJ (SC) 235 : AIR 1986 SC 1626 , the provisions prescribed under Article 311 of the Constitution are squarely applicable to ad hoc employees also, the writ petitioner who was an ad hoc employee and even though his services were not renewed after 30th September, 1991. but having regard to the fact that his appointing authority had proceeded to take work from him continuously and on the same salary and thus he was an ad hoc employee and the impugned order had cast a stigma against him by staling that his work has not been found to be satisfactory and writing is also very poor and thus he is being reverted and posted as Copyist at a lower salary, it was illegally passed and was rightly quashed by the learned single Judge. The use of the word reversion in the order impugned cannot be dubbed as mere placement of the respondent as suggested to by Sri Agarwal. (ii) Bad handwriting was not relevant for holding the post of Accounts Clerk but may be relevant for the post of a Copyist, which shows that the order has been passed on an irrelevant ground. (iii) The respondent was never communicated of any adverse entry at all and the entries relied upon in the counter-affidavit are of a subsequent period. (iv) The decisions relied upon by Sri Agarwal do not apply to the facts of the instant case. " Our findings : ( 11 ) THE moot question for our adjudication is : "whether a fixed term ad hoc employee, who was continued to discharge his functions even after expiry of his term, can be reverted to a post with a lesser salary with a sitgma in regard to non-satisfaction of his work without giving any opportunity to have his say?" ( 12 ) WHAT should contain a judgment is well-known to every one of us. Unfortunately the judgment of the learned Judge does not disclose what was the precise case of both parties and what were the submissions made before him. As an appeal lay against the judgment, it is expected that the judgment should contain even briefly the respective cases of the parties, the issues raised and pressed by them which requires adjudication. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, we do not wish to set aside the judgment on this ground and remand the case. We have ourselves taken pain to peruse the case of the respective parties and proceeded to state them earlier and heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. ( 13 ) NOW we proceed to consider the cases cited at the Bar. In S. P. Vasudeva v. State of Haryana and others, supra, the Apex Court held as follows : ". . . . . . it may not be a correct use of the phrase ad hoc because he was not appointed for any special or particular purpose, so that it could be said that till that purpose was over he could not be discharged. The phrase seems to have been used in the sense of temporary. xx x we may in this connection point out that where an order of reversion as in the present ease, of a person who had no right to the post, does not show ex facie that he was being reverted as a measure of punishment or does not cast any stigma on him, the Courts will not normally go behind thai order to see if there were any motivating factors behind that order. . . . . . " In Director, Institute of Management and Development, U. P. v. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, (supra), when the post itself was ultimately sought to be abolished, the Apex Court held that the appointment being contractual and ad hoc which came to an end by efflux of time, the employee had no right to continue on the post and claim regularisaiton in service in absence of any rule. In State of Haryana v. S. M. Sharma, (supra), what the Apex Court held was that entrustment or withdrawal of current duties charge in ones own pay scale did not amount to either promotion or reversion. In State of Haryana v. S. M. Sharma, (supra), what the Apex Court held was that entrustment or withdrawal of current duties charge in ones own pay scale did not amount to either promotion or reversion. The Apex Court in Jarnail Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others (supra) had laid down that the provisions as contained in Article 311 of the Constitution are applicable in case of an ad hoc employee and that it is open for such an employee to show that while terminating his services on the ground that he was no longer required, it was open for such an employee to show that persons who are junior to him have been retained and thus Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution will come into play. ( 14 ) NOW the facts of the instant case. The impugned order dated 1. 9. 1992 clearly shows that the respondent was reverted to the post of Copyist at a lower salary from the post which he was continuing to hold on the ground that his work was not satisfactory. Thus, clearly a stigma was attached. The order of respondent No. 3 was thus in teeth of the ratio laid down in S. P. Vasudeva cited by Sri Agrawal himself and Jarnail Singh cited by Sri Saxena. In this backdrop alone, we arc constrained to hold that as stigma was attached while passing the impugned order dated 1. 9. 1992 thereby an opportunity to have his say to the respondent was must before its passing. ( 15 ) THE other decisions relied upon by Sri Agarwal do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, who also failed to show us any rule of the relevant time vesting such powers in appellant No. 3 as stated in the order of the then Honble Inspecting Judge. The result : ( 16 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, we hold that this appeal is without any merit. It is dismissed accordingly, but without there being any order as to cost. ( 17 ) THE office is directed to handover a copy of this judgment within two weeks to Sri Sudhir agarwal, the special counsel of the Court. .