Honble BALIA, J.–Heard learned counsel for the parties. (2). The petitioner, State of Rajasthan challenges the award dt. 17.4.98 (Annexure/22) passed by the Industrial Tribunal & Labour Court, Udaipur reinstating six workmen who are respondents here and were declared surplus in pursuance of direction of the Government. (3). By the said order dt. 26.8.89 the workmen who were appointed between 1.7.84 to 14.1.85 only were retrenched. The workmen have claimed that termination of their services was contrary to Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act as well as Section 25G, inasmuch as persons junior to them and appointed after retrenched workmen in question were asked still to continue in service. (4). The Tribunal agreeing with both the conditions further found that the present petitioner has failed to make out a case that Mahi Project come to a close and their reinstatement is not possible. With these findings the six workmen were reinstated with 50% back wages. (5). The award was made on 17.4.98 and was published soon there after on 21.7.98. Now this petition has been filed on 27.2.99 and reply was filed by the respondents on 5.11.99 copy of which was delivered to the petitioner on 4th Nov. 1999. The respondents alleged that petitioner has not disclosed material facts and events that have taken place subsequent to passing of the award before filing of the writ petition. It was alleged and supported by requisite documents that a settlement was arrived at between the Executive Engineer, Mahi Project, Banswara, who is the employer within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, and the workmen in question along with President Mahi Karamchari Sangh, Banswara, according to which the workmen agreed to forgo 50% back wages granted to them, on reinstatement the Management agreed to count entire intervening period since date of termination as continuity of service for all other purposes. The workmen also gave up their claim to the interest on the arrears of wages and the cost awarded by the Labour Court. It was further agreed between the parties that the amount paid to the workmen as compensation at the time of their declaration of surplus shall be recovered from the workmen in 12 monthly instalments out of salary payable to them. After this agreement was duly signed on 6.7.98 by respective parties. It was further agreed between the parties that the amount paid to the workmen as compensation at the time of their declaration of surplus shall be recovered from the workmen in 12 monthly instalments out of salary payable to them. After this agreement was duly signed on 6.7.98 by respective parties. The office order was issued on 14.8.98 making a reference to aforesaid settlement by reinstating all the six workmen at different places. Thereafter by order dt. 19.12.98 the Executive Engineer informed the workmen that settlement dt. 7.7.98 is cancelled. (6). In the first instance the substance of the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioners have not disclosed the facts relevant for the purposes of challenging the award fully and truly in the writ petition. There is no whis-per in the petition about the afore-mentioned facts of entering into agreement with the workmen giving effect to that agreement and thereafter resiling therefrom unilater-ally. If valid settlement has been arrived at and has been acted upon by reinstating the workmen the subsequent repudiation of settlement would not automatically denude the workmen of their rights which have come to be vested in them under the agreement while it was operative and deprive them from rights flowing from the workmen. (7). I do not find any substance in the merit of the case also. The only ground raised in the petition is that the provision of Industrial Disputes Act relating to retrenchment under Sections 25F and 25N are not applicable to the termination effected by the petitioners in the Irrigation Deptt. because the same is not an `industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (8). Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of Honble the Supreme Court in Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (1). That case arose from a co-operative department. Against that learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on another decision of Supreme Court in Des Raj vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2), which is a decision by larger bench in which the Supreme Court has categorically held that Irrigation Deptt. of the Government to be industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act and in view of workmen employed thereunder governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. (2), which is a decision by larger bench in which the Supreme Court has categorically held that Irrigation Deptt. of the Government to be industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act and in view of workmen employed thereunder governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of direct decision of Supreme Court applicable to the department of Irrigation, the observations made by the Supreme Court in another case partaining to controversy relating to some other department cannot be automatically made applicable to the facts of the present case. (9). That apart the principle is well settled, since the decision of Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa & Ors. (3), wherein seven Judges Constitutional Bench construing the provision of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act laid down that where there is systematic activity, organised by co-operation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is chimerical) for the production and or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss e.g. making, on a large scale, prasad or food, prima facie, there is an `industry in that enterprise. (10). While devising the dominant nature test to qualify any department of the Government as industry the Court in unequivocal terms stated: ``Sovereign functions, strictly understood, (alone) qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by Government or statutory bodies. Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come within Section 2(j). (11). This decision was followed consistently and recently in Samishta Dube vs. City Board, Etawah (4). (12). This enunciation of law still holds good, is apparent from a recent decision of Supreme Court in Coir Board Ernakulam Kerala State vs. Indira Devai P.S. (5), wherein the Court has categorically declined the need to reconsider the principle enunciated in Bangalore Water Supplys case regarding the meaning of term industry under Sec. 2(j) which is now being well established over two decades. (13). (13). After considering the aforesaid decision in Bangalore Water Supplys case the Supreme Court in Des Raj vs. State of Punjab (supra) has held that Irrigation Department of Government, its functions, when subjected to dominant nature test, clearly come within the ambit of `Industry and subject to the provisions of the said Act. (14). In view of aforesaid larger Bench decision of Supreme Court directly pronouncing on considering functions discharged by the Irrigation Deptt. of the Government and declaring activities in Irrigation Department of the State to be an `industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the contrary in that regard cannot be accepted. (15). That apart there is no dispute about the fact that persons appointed later than the workmen in question are still continuing in service under the same establishment. Termination of services of respondents would still be invalid being in violation of Section 25G and if not under the provision of Industrial Disputes Act the same shall be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, if any person appointed later is continued in services while persons earlier are discharging the same or similar duties in the absence of any sufficient reason for the same. That apart the principle emanating from Section 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act to offer employment on priority basis in future in case there is a valid retrenchment of the workmen also applies where the persons have been appointed after validly retrenching the employees by duly complying with the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. (16). In view of the uncontroverted position on facts I am of the opinion that no exception can be taken to the award made by the Labour Court in finding termination of service of the respondents the workmen, to be invalid and ordering their reinstatement. Before parting with this case I find that the State Government feels not bound by the agreement dt. 6.7.98 entered between the workmen and the Executive Engineer, they will be under an obligation to implement the award in full including release of payment of arrears, back wages along with interest and costs awarded thereunder. Before parting with this case I find that the State Government feels not bound by the agreement dt. 6.7.98 entered between the workmen and the Executive Engineer, they will be under an obligation to implement the award in full including release of payment of arrears, back wages along with interest and costs awarded thereunder. However as the answering respondents have been reinstated after settlement arrived at between the parties on 7.7.98, in terms thereof the workmen will be deemed to have forgone their claim to back wages and interest and costs if their reinstatement is not disturbed. (17). Accordingly this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.