Judgment Shiva Kirti Singh, J. 1. The sole accused/appellant, Chunda Hansda has preferred this appeal against his conviction under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence of R.I. for life vide judgment and order dated 15th December, 1993 passed by 3rd. Additional District & Sessions Judge, Dumka (S.P.) in Sessions Case No. 173/1992/109/93. 2. According to the prosecution story, one Pradhan Hansda, father of deceased Raska Hansda lodged an F.I.R. on 28.7.91 at 10.30 p.m. disclosing therein that on that date at about 4 p.m., he returned to his house from another village and found his son Raska Hansda in injured condition. He was informed by his grand-son Parmo Hansda, son of Raska Hansda that at about 2 p.m. while Raska Hansda and appellant Chunda Hansda were drinking wine, an altercation took place and suddenly, the appellant Chunda Hansda lifted a stone and assaulted Raska on the entire head as a result whereof Raska Hansda fell down and become senseless. It was further disclosed that villagers Gopin Kisko and Therhu Murmu were present at the time of the alleged occurrence. They tried to intervene but Chunda Hansda threatened to assault them also and hence, they fled away. The informant brought the injured Raska Hansda to Dumka Hospital for treatment but he died in the hospital. Originally, the case was lodged under Secs. 337, 324 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code but when Raska Hansda died in course of treatment Sec. 302, I.P.C. was added. After investigation chargesheet was submitted under Sec. 302, I.P.C. against the sole accused/appellant Chunda Hansda and after trial he was convicted and sentenced by the trial Court as noticed above. 3. In course of trial, the accused denied the charge and claimed to be innocent. Defence has suggested that the deceased Raska was in drunken state and he sustained injuries due to fall on rocks which proved fatal. The accused claimed that he has been falsely implicated due to previous differences. 4. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined altogether 11 witnesses. Out of them P.Ws. 2 and 8 have been tendered by the prosecution. P.W. 3 is Pradhan Hansda, the informant. The accused claimed that he has been falsely implicated due to previous differences. 4. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined altogether 11 witnesses. Out of them P.Ws. 2 and 8 have been tendered by the prosecution. P.W. 3 is Pradhan Hansda, the informant. P.W. 4 Govind Hembran is a hearsay witness who came at the place of occurrence on hulla, saw the injured in unconscious state with injuries on head and P.W. 7, Parmo Hansda disclosed the name of the appellant, Chunda Hansda as the person who had assaulted with stone. P.W. 6, Dr. Pawan Tiggaheld post-mortem examination of the dead-body of the deceased on 31.7.1991 and has proved the post-mortem report as Exhibit-1. P.W. 9, Balram Prasad is a formal witness Officer-Incharge who has proved fardbeyan of Pradhan Hansda as Exhibit-2, but the investigation of the case was conducted by A.S.I. of Police, Ram Sagar Paswan who has been examined as P.W. 11, P.W. 10, in Dewan Tudu is a formal witness who has proved his signature on the inquest report as Exhibit-3. The remaining witnesses, i.e., Dudu Murmu (P.W. 1), Rani Kisko, P.W. 5 and Parma Hansda (P.W. 7) are the eye-witnesses of the alleged occurrence. 5. On behalf of appellant, it was submitted that although Dudu Murmu is an independent witness and unlike P.W. 5 and P.W. 7 does not belong to the family of the deceased but no reliance should be placed on his evidence because he had admitted that due to threat of assault by the appellant, he had moved away to a distance of about 50 and therefore, it was not possible for him to witness the subsequent assault on the deceased which had taken place in the Varandah in front of the house of the deceased. Regarding P.Ws. 5 and 7 it was submitted that they are respectively, the widow and son of the deceased who had admitted that they came on hulla and hence, they could not have seen the actual assault and such claim has been made by them only because they are interested witnesses. 6. A perusal of evidence of the independent witness, P.W. 1 shows that he was present through-out the occurrence in question. He has disclosed that the accused/appellant talked ill about the in-laws of the deceased which led to verbal alteracation followed by fisticuffs. This witnesses intervened and seperated them. 6. A perusal of evidence of the independent witness, P.W. 1 shows that he was present through-out the occurrence in question. He has disclosed that the accused/appellant talked ill about the in-laws of the deceased which led to verbal alteracation followed by fisticuffs. This witnesses intervened and seperated them. Chunda, the appellant, however, picked up a stone and when this witness tried to dissuade him then the appellant threw stone on him which did not hit him. Thereafter the appellant assaulted the deceased with a stone hitting on the head at 3-4 places causing bleeding injuries. The witness saw the assault from a distance of about 51. Several persons assembled there and the appellant was caught and taken to Jama police station along with the injured and from there the injured was sent to Dumka hospital where he died. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant appearing amicus curiae attempted to discredit this witness as a tutored witness on the basis of his admission that by village relationship the father-in-law of the deceased would be in the category of his brother. The village relationship is neither a relationship by blood or by marriage, etc. and it is acknowledged only on account of prevalent custom and courtesy even enemies of a villager will acknowledge their village relationship on account of custom and courtesy. Hence, P.W. 1 cannot be held to be an interested witness. Learned Counsel for the appellant also referred to one statement in cross-examination that A.S.I. has not taken the statement of this witness but in the same breath, this witness stated that he had made all the relevant statements to the Chaukidar. On this issue, the statement of the I.O., P.W. 11, shows that the defence has not put any question as to whether the statement of P.W. 1 was recorded under Sec. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or not. Instead, the defence itself has elicited statements from the I.O. to the effect that the informant and witnesses are Santhals and the I.O. understands very little Santhali. Instead, the defence itself has elicited statements from the I.O. to the effect that the informant and witnesses are Santhals and the I.O. understands very little Santhali. The I.O. has admitted that he has not mentioned in the case diary as to whose help he had recorded the statement of the informant but he has explained that Chaukidar was knowing Hindi as well as Santhali language and Chaukidar had gone with the I.O. For some reasons the I.O. appears to avoiding admitting that recording of statement of witnesses was done with the help of the Chaukidar because of language problem but even if such Act on the part of the I.O. amounts to some irregularity in course of investigation, it alone cannot prove fatal to the prosecution case. The defence has not suggested that statement of P.W. 2 under Sec. 161, Cr.P.C. is not available on record nor it has succeeded in establishing any contradictions between such statement and the deposition of P.W. 1 in the Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there is nothing in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 to discredit his testimony as an eye-witness of the alleged occurrence. 8. The evidence of P.W. 5 and P.W. 7 to the effect that although they came on hulla but they saw the assault on the deceased appears quite probable and acceptable in view of manner of occurrence given in details by independent witness P.W. 1. According to P.W. 1 the occurrence was proceeded by altercation and initial intervention by P.W. 1., In course of such altercation, there was bound to be noise to attack the inmates of the house specially P.W. 7, the son of the deceased who as per P.W. 1 was engaged in cutting of grass in the compound. The presence of P.W. 7 at the place of occurrence as eye-witness is evident even from the F.I.R. as well as the statement of the informant, P.W. 3. Thus, even if some reservation be maintained in accepting the claim of P.W. 5 that he came from the the paddy field on hulla and saw the actual assault on her husband made by the accused-appellant with stone, there is absolutely no good ground for not placing reliance upon the evidence of P.W. 7, the son of the deceased. 9. Thus, even if some reservation be maintained in accepting the claim of P.W. 5 that he came from the the paddy field on hulla and saw the actual assault on her husband made by the accused-appellant with stone, there is absolutely no good ground for not placing reliance upon the evidence of P.W. 7, the son of the deceased. 9. The law is well-settled that in serious offences like murder the close relations of the victim who are critised as interested witnesses are more worthy of reliance because they would not like to falsely implicate some body else and leave the real culprits. In this case, the witness has failed to establish any enmity or other reason for false implication rather there are materials on record to show that deceased and the appellant had lived out of village together for earning their livelihood in the past and further the deceased had offered wine for consumption by the appellant at his own house. Thus, circumstances also do not support the defence plea of false implication. On the other hand, the eye-witness account given by independent witness P.W. 1 and supported by P.W. 7, the son of the deceased proves beyond any reasonable doubt that at the time and place alleged by the prosecution the sole accused/appellant Chunda Hansda assaulted the deceased with stone and caused injuries which in normal course, even after some treatment caused the death of the deceased. The extent, nature and location of injuries show that the appellant gave several blows causing a large number of injuries located at forehead, face, ear and parietal region of head of the deceased. Several injuries were bone-deep and on dissection of the skull the doctor had found depressed fracture of the frontal bone left side as well as of left parietal bone. Further in the opinion of the doctor death was caused due to shock and heaemorrhage as a result of skull injuries i.e. injury Nos. 1 and 2 which were sufficient enough to cause death in ordinary course of nature. In the opinion of the doctor, the weapon used was a hard and blunt substances. Further in the opinion of the doctor death was caused due to shock and heaemorrhage as a result of skull injuries i.e. injury Nos. 1 and 2 which were sufficient enough to cause death in ordinary course of nature. In the opinion of the doctor, the weapon used was a hard and blunt substances. The findings and opinion of the doctor (P.W. 6) have not been seriously challenged by the defence and in the facts of the case, a statement by the doctor in cross-examination that the injuries may be possible by fall on hard and blunt substance does not affect the prosecution case. A close scrutiny of nature and location of injuries Rules out the suggestion of the defence that they may have been caused due to accidental fall of the deceased on stones. In fact, the evidence of I.O. goes to show that he did not find any stone at the place of occurrence. 10. A last submission advanced by learned Counsel for the appellant that at best the appellant can be convicted only under Sec. 304 of the Indian Penal Code is also fit to be rejected in view of repeated injuries caused by the appellant and when the doctor has found that two of such injuries were sufficient enough to cause death in ordinary course, of nature. The mere fact that the deceased and the appellant had taken wine just before the occurrence does not help the defence. The version of the occurrence as given in detail by P.W. 1 shows that it was the appellant who abused the in-laws of the deceased leading to some altercation and subsequently, he ignored the efforts of intervention by P.W. 1 and caused injuries to cause the death of the deceased. 11. In view of aforesaid discussions and findings, it must be held that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charge under Sec. 302, I.P.C. against the appellant and in the facts of the case, there is no good ground to interfere with the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial Court. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.