JUDGEMENT M. R. Verma, J.: The fate of this petition hinges on the answer to the question as to how the period of 15 days notice under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereafter referred as the Act) is to be computed. 2. In the present case Cheque dated December 30, 1998 was issued by the petitioner to liquidate the liability. The Cheque bounced when presented to the banker for encashment. The respondent herein received information from the banker about the bouncing of the Cheque on March 19, 1999. He served demand notice dated April 3, 1999 and when the payment was not made within the prescribed period, he filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Act. On the basis of the complaint, the accused/petitioner has been summoned by the learned trial Magistrate, Hence the present petition. 3. It was contended for the petitioner that the notice of demand was issued after expiry of 15 days from the date of knowledge of bouncing of the Cheque, therefore, the complaint and summoning orders are liable to be quashed. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the information about bouncing of the Cheque was received by the respondent (complainant before the trial Court) on March 19,1999, whereas the notice had been issued on April 3,1999, which was beyond the prescribed time of 15 days. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the day on which the information was received, i.e. March 19, 1999, is also to be taken into account while computing the period of 15 days. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the day on which information about the bouncing of the Cheque is received, has to be excluded while computing the prescribed period. 4. To appreciate the rival contentions for the parties, it would be expedient to reproduce Section 138 of the Act which reads as under: "138. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the day on which information about the bouncing of the Cheque is received, has to be excluded while computing the prescribed period. 4. To appreciate the rival contentions for the parties, it would be expedient to reproduce Section 138 of the Act which reads as under: "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge; in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act. be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank "within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability." 5. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability." 5. A bare reading of Section 138 supra makes it clear that when any Cheque drawn by a person is returned unpaid by the banker, such person shall be guilty of the commission of an offence provided that clauses (a), (b) and (c) supra are satisfied. Clause (b) above shall stand satisfied if the payee or holder in due course of the Cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for payment of the amount of Cheque by a written notice to the drawer of the Cheque within 15 days of the receipt of information from the banker about return of Cheque as unpaid. The controversy between the parties is about the manner of computing the said period of 15 days. 6. The Act does not provide any specific mode of computing the period prescribed there under for issue of notice of demand, for payment and for filing the complaint. Therefore, the controversy can be resolved by keeping in view the principle of reckoning the period as in the General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act. 7. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows: "9. Commencement and termination of time.- (1) In any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a Santa Mehta v, Sharvanjit Singh 501 series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "from", and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "or". (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887," 8. It is apparent from the above provision that it gives recognition to the well-established principle applicable to the construction of statutes that ordinarily in computing time, the. rule observed is that the first day is excluded and the closing day is included. 9. The Honble Supreme Court while dealing with the principle of reckoning the prescribed time .in case Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 1, has held as follows: "6. rule observed is that the first day is excluded and the closing day is included. 9. The Honble Supreme Court while dealing with the principle of reckoning the prescribed time .in case Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 1, has held as follows: "6. Similar contention was considered by this Court in the case of Haru Das Gupta v.State of W.B. wherein it was held that the rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded; the effect of defining the period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. In the context of that case, the Court held that in computing the period of three months from the date of detention, which was 5-2-1971, before the expiration of which the order decision for on firming the detention order and continuing the detention there under had to be made, the date of the commencement of detention, namely, February 5th has to be excluded; so done, the order of confirmation dated 5-5-1971 was made before the expiration of the period of three months from the date of detention. The Court held that there is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not be applied. For the aforesaid principle, the Court referred to the principle followed in English courts. The relevant discussion is hereunder: (SCC p. 641, para 5) drawn a distinction between a term created within which can act may be done and a time limited for the doing of an act. The rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmiths Co. v. West Metropolitan Rely. The rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmiths Co. v. West Metropolitan Rely. Co., KB at p.5) This rule was followed in Cartwright v. Mac Cormack: all ER at p. 13, where the expression fifteen days from the date of commencement of the policy in a cover note issued by an insurance company was construted as excluding the first date and the cover note to commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd., a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment, where for purposes of computing the period of limitation the date of the accident, being the date of the cause of action, was excluded. (See also Stewart v. chapman and North, Re, ex p Hasluck.) Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. (See Halsburys Laws of England, (3rd Edn.), Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95.) There is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not also be applied here." 10. The relevant portion of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: "12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings. - (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order Appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded." 11. Evidently, the principle aforesaid for reckoning the period is embodied in these provisions of the Limitation Act also. 12. Evidently, the principle aforesaid for reckoning the period is embodied in these provisions of the Limitation Act also. 12. In this case the information about return of the Cheque as unpaid was received by the respondent on March 19, 1999 and this day is, therefore, to be excluded from being reckoned to compute the period of 15 days for the purpose of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act. After doing so, the last day for making a demand for payment of the amount of the Cheque by notice in writing was April 3, 1999, i.e. the admitted date of the notice of demand in this case. 13. In view of the above, the contention for the petitioner is unsustainable. 14. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that at the material time there was sufficient amount deposited with the banker out of which the Cheque could be paid. This is a contention on the factual side of the case and cannot be examined at this stage. The petitioner may, however, raise the plea before the trial Court at the appropriate stage. 15. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated therein, this petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. None has put in appearance for the parties. Petition Dismissed