Judgment :- 1. All these revision petitions are filed by tenant, i.e., Central Warehousing Corporation, a Government of India Undertaking. 2. Three landlords filed R.C.O.P. 7, 8 and 9 of 1993 for evicting tenant on the following allegations:— Landlord in R.C.O.P. 7 of 1993 is one Indersain Goyal. Other two eviction petitions were filed by his wife and sister. Reason for eviction is common. 3. Petitioner in R.C.O.P. 7 of 1993, i.e., Indersain Goyal is the Director of M/s. Tamil Nadu Steel Tubes Limited. Petitioner as well as his wife and sister purchased all these godowns, which are subject matter of these revision petitions under three sale deeds which stands in their individual names. It is the case of petitioner in R.C.O.P. 7 of 1993 that he has purchased scheduled premises i.e., Godown No. 9 for the use of the Company M/s. Tamil Nadu Steel Tubes Limited, which according to him is a family concern. In that family concern, he is the Director and substantial investment was made by the family members of the petitioner. It is said that all these godowns are required for the business of the Company since Company requires much volume of raw materials as well as finished products to be stored. Petitioner also informed tenant about the same and it is further case that petitioner also assured landlord that they will vacate the premises without any delay. In respect of various demands, tenant did not vacate and, therefore, eviction petition was filed. 4. In the other two petitions, i.e., R.C.O.P. 8 of 1993 fded by Durga Devi, wife of Indersain Goyal wanted eviction on the ground that the godown No. 5 which she has purchased is also required for the business of the Company. She said that her husband is the Director of the Company and for the use of the Company, Scheduled premises is required. 5. In R.C.O.P. 9 of 1993 filed by Manju Bansal, sister of Indersain Goyal, it was stated that since her brother is Director of Tamil Nadu Steel Tubes Limited, he requires the Godown No. 6 for the bona fide own occupation of the company. 6. For all these eviction petitions, tenant took a common defence. Apart from disputing bona fides of claim, it was said that the applications themselves are not maintainable. 6. For all these eviction petitions, tenant took a common defence. Apart from disputing bona fides of claim, it was said that the applications themselves are not maintainable. It is also found that respondent is dealing with essential commodities and they are not liable to be evicted. I do not want to extract other contentions raised in the counter statement since main argument raised by learned counsel was on the maintainability of the rent control petitions. 7. Rent Controller by separate orders allowed all these applications. It took analogy of partnership and held relying on the decision reported in (1968) 81 L.W. 432 = 1969(1) M.LJ. 184 (Danmull Sowcar v. Syed Ali Mohamed) that landlord can seek eviction even if the building is required for partnership purpose. Even though it is stated that Tamil Nadu Steel Tubes Limited is an incorporated Company, Rent Controller took the view that it is partnership and on that basis applied the principles laid down in the decision cited supra and ordered eviction. 8. When the matter was taken in appeal, Appellate Authority simply copied the order of Rent Controller word by word and sentence by sentence and dismissed the appeal. 9. The concurrent findings of the authorities below are assailed in this revision petition under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 10. Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act provide the grounds on which eviction could be had. Sub-section (1) of Section 10 says that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this Section or Sections 14 to 16. Sub-section (3) of Section 10 deals with grounds of eviction of residential and non-residential building. Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) to Section 10 says that landlord may seek eviction if landlord or any members of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own. 11. Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) to Section 10 says that landlord may seek eviction if landlord or any members of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own. 11. From the above provision, it is clear that landlord is entitled to get eviction of non-residential premises if he or any member of his family is not occupying for the purpose of business which landlord or member of his family are carrying on and he is not in possession of any non-residential building. It is clear there from that requirement of landlord that is taken into consideration and it must also be seen that landlord is doing business or carrying on business. 12. In the eviction petition, it is said that Indersain Goyal is the Director of M/s. Tamil Nadu Steel Tubes Limited. It is an incorporated company is not disputed though investment was made by petitioner and members of his family. Once Company has been incorporated under the Companies Act, petitioner cannot say that he is doing business or requirement of Company is the requirement of the individual. Both the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority, who copied the order of Rent Controller did not understand the distinction between partnership and Company. 13. Lindley on Partnership, 14th Edition, has given the distinction between a Company and Partnership which reads thus, “A Corporation is an artificial person created by special authority (by the law of England, by the Crown, or by Parliament), and endowed by that authority with a capacity to acquire rights and incur obligations, as a means to the end for the attainment of which the Corporation is created. A Corporation, it is true, consists of a number of individuals, but the rights and obligations of these individuals are not the rights and obligations of the artificial person composed of those individuals; nor are the rights and obligations of the body corporate exercisable by or enforceable against the individual members thereof, either jointly or separately, but only collectively, as one artificial whole. As the civilians neatly express it: si quid universitati debetur singulis non debetur, nec quod debet universitas singuli debent. As the civilians neatly express it: si quid universitati debetur singulis non debetur, nec quod debet universitas singuli debent. (If any thing is owed to an entire body, it is not owed to the individual members, nor do the individual members owe what is owed by the entire body.) With partnerships the case is otherwise; the members of these do not form a collective whole, distinct from the individuals composing it; nor are they collectively endowed with any capacity of acquiring rights or incurring obligations. The rights and liabilities of a partnership are the rights and liabilities of the partners and are enforceable by and against them individually; Si quid societati debetur singulis debetur et quod debet societas singuli debent. (If any thing is owed to the partnership, it is owed to the individual members and the individual members owe what is owed by the partnership.)”. 14. Palmer on Company Law, Volume I, 23rd Edition in Chapter 18 deals with Corporate Existence and learned author has said thus, “Upon the issue of the certificate of incorporation, the Company becomes a body corporate or, in other words, a corporation (1948 Act, S. 13(2), as amended by the 1980 Act.) Prior to the date of the certificate, the Company has no legal existence. A Corporation is not, like a partnership in English Law or a family, a mere collection or aggregation of inviduals. In the eyes of the law it is a person distinct from its members or shareholders, a metaphysical entity or a fiction of law, with legal but no physical existence. It is, as Lord Selborne said, “A mere abstraction of law.” and, as Lord Macnaghten observed, “at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum of association.” In page 206 of the Volume in para 24, learned author has stated the distinction between a Company and partnership which reads thus, “The principle that, apart from exceptional cases, the company is a body corporate, distinct from its members, lies at the root of many of the most perplexing questions that beset company law. It is a fundamental or cardinal distinction - a distinction which must be firmly grasped. It is a fundamental or cardinal distinction - a distinction which must be firmly grasped. The principle is thrown into clear relief by contrasting an incorporated Company with a partnership, for under English law (though not under Scottish law or that of most Continental systems), a firm or partnership is not a se parate entity from its members. The principal distinctions between a Company and an English Partnership are as follows: 1. In the case of a partnership, the property of the firm belongs to the individual members. They are collectively entitled to it, whereas, in the case of a company, it belongs to the company, and not to the members. 2. Creditors of a firm are creditors of the members of the firm, and on obtaining judgment against the firm can levy execution on the property of the partners in the firm, whereas, in the case of a company, “the creditors has no debtor but that impalpable thing, the corporation,” and judgment against the company normally gives no right to levy execution against the members. 3. A member of a firm can on behalf of the firm dispose of property and incur liabilities, within the scope of the business, to any extent (unless this authority is expressly excluded), whereas a member of a company, as such, has no such power. 4. A Partner cannot contract with the firm, whereas a member of the Company can contract with the Company. So far as Scottish Partnerships are concerned, the position in the above matters is as follows:— 1. The partnership property belongs to the firm. Generally title is taken in the name of the partners in trust for the firm and its partners present and future. 2. As in England. 3. As in England. 4. A contract between a partner and his firm is possible.” 15. A.K. Aggarwal on his Commentaries on the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 has said thus: “a registered company occupies the position of a juristic ‘or fictitious or legal’ person. The rights and obligations of the Company are not the rights and obligations of the individual members. Nor is the property held by the company the property of members thereof. A.K. Aggarwal on his Commentaries on the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 has said thus: “a registered company occupies the position of a juristic ‘or fictitious or legal’ person. The rights and obligations of the Company are not the rights and obligations of the individual members. Nor is the property held by the company the property of members thereof. Thus, the creditor of a company must look to the legal person and not the members who actually constituted it.” The Indian Act, like the English Act, avoids making a firm a Corporate body enjoying the right of perpetual succession. (See: 61 L.W. 432 = 1948 P.C. 100, Bhagwanji v. Alembic Chemical Works). A partnership is not a Corporation nor legal entity. The word itself implies that all partners individually and collectively. It is further said by the learned author in page 61 that the argument that the position of shareholders in a company is analogous to that of partners inter se is wholly inaccurate. Partnership is merely an association of persons for carrying on the business of partnership and in law the firm-name is a compendious method of describing the parties. Such is, however, not the case of a company which stands as a separate juristic entity distinct from the shareholders. Learned author has further said thus: “In the matter of a company, there is no relationship of principal and agent i.e., there is no mutual agency as is in a partnership. Therefore, the members of the company are not bound by the rules of conduct which are based upon the relationship among the partners of a firm. In the same way all the partners are liable for the repayment of the debts etc. in regard to a partnership firm whereas the liability of the members of a company is limited to the extent of their share in the company. All the membe rs of the Company have no authority to bind the company by their acts although this authority is confined to the directors and other persons authorised by the regulations of the company whereas in a partnership, every partner is the agent of another and can bind the other partners by his acts within the scope of the partnership. Every person dealing with a company is bound to acquaint himself with its regulations but secret limitations of a partners authority are of no avail to a stranger who acts without knowing them. Unless there is something otherwise contained in the deed of partnership, a partnership dissolves by the death of a person whereas in a company, a company is not dissolved by death of any of its members. In the case of a company which consists of a fluctuating number of members, new members can be introduced while in a partnership, no new partner can be introduced in a firm without the consent of the other partners, nor does an assignee of a partner acquire the rights of his assignor as in the original firm. It is very clear that an incorporated company is a juristic person or a legal entity.” 16. In (1977) 1 S.C.C. 431 , (C.I.T. v. R.M. Chidambaram Pillai), their Lordships defined partnership thus, “A firm is not a legal person even though it has some attributes of personality. Partnership is a certain relation between persons, the product of agreement to share the profits of a business. ‘Firm’ is a collective noun, a compendious expression to designate an entity, not a person.” 17. In (1979) 3 S.C.C. 83 ( Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee), in para 17 of the Judgment their Lordships considered the question as to what is meant by Partnership and held thus, “‘Partnership’ as defined in Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them for the benefit of all. The section further makes it clear that a firm or partnership is not a legal entity separate and, distinct from the partners.. Firm is only a compendious description of the individuals who compose the firm.” 18. Similar view was taken in the decision reported in 1991 Supp (1) S.C.C. 402 (Mahabir Cold Storage v. CI. T.), wherein it is held thus, “Under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 the Partnership firm registered thereunder is neither a person nor a legal entity. It is merely a collective name for the individual member of the partnership.” 19. Similar view was taken in the decision reported in 1991 Supp (1) S.C.C. 402 (Mahabir Cold Storage v. CI. T.), wherein it is held thus, “Under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 the Partnership firm registered thereunder is neither a person nor a legal entity. It is merely a collective name for the individual member of the partnership.” 19. From the above decisions, it is clear that petitioner in R.C.O.P. 7 of 1993 cannot say that merely because he happened to be the Director, the Company belongs to him and whatever may be the business of the Company is his business. If it is a case of partnership, the scope is entirely different. When partnership is doing business, each and every partner can say that it is his business. 20. In (1974) 1 S.C.C. 708 ( D.N. Sanghavi v. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das ), a case coming under Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, the question was whether partnership business can be said to be his business. Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act enables landlord to get possession of non-residential building, which reads thus: “Section 12(1)(f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or of any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.” Considering the same, their Lordships held that accommodation must be needed directly and substantially for his own occupation for the purpose of continuing or starting his business. In that case, their Lordships distinguished the decision of the Court of Appeal reported in 1962 (2) All England Reporter 417 (Tunstall v. Steigmann). 21. In that case, the question that came up for consideration was under Section 30(1)(g) of Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954. In that case, their Lordships distinguished the decision of the Court of Appeal reported in 1962 (2) All England Reporter 417 (Tunstall v. Steigmann). 21. In that case, the question that came up for consideration was under Section 30(1)(g) of Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954. The provision says: “subject as hereinafter provided, that on the termination of the currrent tenancy, the landlord intends to occupy the holding for the purposes, or partly for the purposes, of a business to be carried on by him therein, or as his residence.” In that case, landlord gave notice to tenant under Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954 and in the meanwhile, he transferred his business in incorporated Company. Thereafter he instituted a proceeding for eviction. According to him, he is controlling entire Company and therefore, business of the Company is his own business. In the Judgment of Justice Ormerod at page 420 of the reports it is held thus: “. In my judgment the fact that she holds virtually the whole of the shares in the limited company and has complete control of its affairs makes no difference to this proposition. The object of a limited liability company, as I understand it, is that the shareholders shall have some protection and some limit to the liability which they may incur in the event of the company being unsuccessful. It is to be assumed that the landlord in this case assigned her business to the limited company for some good reason which she considered to be of an advantage to her. She cannot say that in a case of this kind she is entitled to take the benefit of any advantages that the formation of a company gave to her, without at the same time accepting the liabilities arising therefrom. She cannot say that she is carrying on the business or intends to carry on the business in the sense intended by para (g) of the subsection and at the same time say that her liability is limited as provided by the Companies Acts.” The argument put forward before Court of Appeal could be seen in page 422 of the reports. The argument was that construing the language of the subsection in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words used, the landlord here did intend to occupy the holding for the purposes of a business to be carried on by her. The argument was that construing the language of the subsection in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words used, the landlord here did intend to occupy the holding for the purposes of a business to be carried on by her. The business was in substance her business, the company being a mere piece of mechanism to enable the landlords business to be carried on. This argument was considered by the Court in the concurring judgment of Justice Willmer which reads thus, “I have certainly felt the force of the argument on behalf of the landlord; but in the end I am satisfied that it cannot prevail. There is no escape from the fact that a comany is a legal entity entirely separate from its corporators - see Salomon v. Salomon & Co. (1897 AC. 22). Here the landlord and her company are entirely separate entities. This is no matter of form; it is a matter of substance and reality. Each can sue and be sued in its own right; indeed, there is nothing to prevent the one from suing the other. Even the holder of one hundred per cent of the shares in a company does not by such holding become so identified with the company that he or she can be said to carry on the business of the company. T his clearly appears from Gramophone & Typewriter, Ltd v. Stanley ((1908) 2 K.B. 89), a decision of this Court which seems to me, on due consideration, to be destructive of the argument for the landlord. As was pointed out by Fletcher Moulton, LJ. ((1908) 2 K.B. 98) control of a Company by a Corporator is wholly different in fact and law from carrying on the business himself; the individual corporator does not carry on the business of the Corporation”. This being so, I do not see how it is possible for the landlord in the present case to assert that she intends to occupy the holding for the purpose of a business to be carried on by her. Her intention, as has been made plain, is that the company which she controls shall carry on its business on the holding. Her intention, as has been made plain, is that the company which she controls shall carry on its business on the holding. But that, unfortunately for her, is something for which the Act makes no provision” (emphasis supplied) In the concurring Judgment of Justice Danckwerts, it is held thus, “A somewhat similar question arose in Pegler v. Craven ((1952) 1 All E.R. 685) in which Pegler was the tenant but the property was occupied by a company in which Pegler held just under half the share capital and obtained a majority share holding only with the help of ten shares held by his wife. The decision of the Court of Appeal was adverse in that case, but the position of a company in which all or so great an amount of the share capital was held by one person that the company could be said to be the altar ego of that person was left open. If the strict position in company law, exemplified by Salomon v. Salomon & Co. (1987 A.C. 22) and Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd., v. Stanley ((1908) 2 K.B. 89) be applied, the landlords contention must fail, for, a company is not the same legal entity as the corporators who compose it. It was, however, urged on behalf of the landlord that regard should be had to realities and to the fact, in particular, that for practical purposes the landlord and the company are the same thing; she owns the company in the fullest sense and in fact will be herself running the business. I feel some sympathy with this contention, for the control of businesses through a limited company has become a common place in present-day business life. The interdependence of companies through holding of shares has been recognised for limited purposes by S. 42 of the Act, but the fact that the legislature has provided to that extent for company cases can also be an argument against giving a wider construction to S. 30(1)(g). The interdependence of companies through holding of shares has been recognised for limited purposes by S. 42 of the Act, but the fact that the legislature has provided to that extent for company cases can also be an argument against giving a wider construction to S. 30(1)(g). It has also been urged that the Court has not hesitated to have regard to the position of persons who control a company or its shares in other cases; e.g., where there is a deadlock between equal shareholders in the case of a private company, and winding up (i.e., dissolution) is ordered as though it were a partnership (Re Yenidje Tobacco Co., Ltd., (1916-17 All E.R. 1050)), and where a shipping company is really run by one individual, for the purpose of S. 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 ( Lennards Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. (1914-15) All E.R. 280), or for the purposes of trading with the enemy ( Daimler Co., Ltd., v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co. (Great Britain), Ltd., (1916-17) All E.R. 191). But when the careful analysis of Lord Parker of Waddington in the Daimler case (1916-17) All E.R. at p. 203), is read, it is, I think, apparent that the personality of those in control of the company was only to be regarded as material in special circumstances, such as a state of war, and only as indicating the nature of the company without really departing from the principle that a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act is a distinct legal entity, differing from the individuals who hold the shares in the company or control it through the mechanism of the Companies Acts. As Ormerod, LJ., pointed out (CF.P. 420, letter I, ante), if persons choose to conduct their operations through the medium of a limited company with the advantages in respect of responsibility for debts thereby conferred, they cannot really complain if they have to face some disadvantages also. I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that, Mrs. Steigmann being the present landlord, the requirements of S. 30(1)(g), will not be satisfied if the property is to be occupied by the Company or the business therein is to be carried on as the business of the Company. I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that, Mrs. Steigmann being the present landlord, the requirements of S. 30(1)(g), will not be satisfied if the property is to be occupied by the Company or the business therein is to be carried on as the business of the Company. I reach this result with some reluctance, because it is from a common-sense point of view an artificial result (though the conception of a limited company, it must be said, is a legalistic and artificial conception); and also because I have a feeling that, if the landlords business affairs had been suitably arranged, the requirements of the Act might have been satisfied (provided, of course, that any such arrangements were genuine and not a mere sham: Teasdale v. Walker (1958) 3 All E.R. 307). Consequently, my conclusion is that the appeal must be allowed.” 22. It is clear from the above decision that business of an incorporate Company cannot be treateed as business of landlord an< Consequently, he cannot claim eviction on the ground mat he is carrying on business. It is the Company that is carrying on business. Likewise, wife and sister also cannot claim eviction on the ground that her husband/brother is Director of the Company and consequently the Company requires the buildings. Even if we admit that Company belongs to the petitioner or his family members, law is very clear that it is only business of the company and not of the Landlord. If that be so, these eviction petitions are not maintainable. 23. Both the Rent Controller as well as Appellate Authority, who copied the order of Rent Controller ordered eviction only on the ground that the Company is a Partnership and Principle of partnership was applied in ordering eviction. 24. The decision of authorities below are, therefore, set aside and the eviction petitions are dismissed. 25. The revision petitions are allowed however without any order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P. Nos. 150 to 152 of 2000 are also closed.