Judgment :- F.M. IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. This writ petition is for the issuance of writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the third respondent relating to the notice dated September 7, 2000 and quash the same and direct the first respondent to refer the dispute for adjudication after receipt of the failure report from the second respondent and till then direct the third respondent to continue to maintain the existing service conditions that prevailed prior to September 7, 2000 awaiting any award that may be passed by the Industrial Tribunal in respect of the issues contained in the notice, dated March 5, 2000 of the third respondent issued under Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. According to the petitioner on December 29, 1992, a settlement was entered into between various unions representing the workmen including the petitioner and the third respondent, in and by which the third respondent agreed to reopen the Mills on December 30, 1992 which was under lay off for about six months, that subsequently, the third respondent again declared a lay-off between March 22, 1993 and May 4, 1995, that the mill was again reopened on May 5, 1996, that there was a lockout between June 1, 1997 and August 17, 1999, and that thereafter, a settlement was entered into on November 19, 1999 under Section 18(1) of the Act regarding work load and revision of wages. It is contended that on March 5, 2000, the management issued a notice under Section 9-A of the Act and proposed a reduction in basic wages, stoppage of annual increments for five years, fixed dearness allowance of Rs. 2000 for five years, withdrawal of variable dearness allowance, ceiling on house rent allowance at Rs. 52 per month, etc., and that those changes would come into effect from February 1, 2000. It is the case of the petitioner that subsequent to the notice of the third respondent, dated March 5, 2000, purporting to introduce certain changes in the service conditions of the employees, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute on March 11, 2000 and that conciliation in respect of the said dispute pending. The petitioner contends that in those circumstances, the third respondent put up a notice, dated September 7, 2000, expressing its decision to give effect to the notice, dated March 5, 2000. The petitioner contends that in those circumstances, the third respondent put up a notice, dated September 7, 2000, expressing its decision to give effect to the notice, dated March 5, 2000. It was in those circumstances, the petitioner has come forward with this writ petition.The writ petition was resisted by the third respondent contending that the third respondent suffered huge loss over the period, that as on March 31, 2000, the accumulated loss crossed Rs. 14 crores, that due to various constraints faced by the third respondent, it was decided to seek for reduction of wages, dearness allowance, etc., that the notice, dated March 5, 2000, seeking for modification of the terms of the settlement, dated November 19, 1999, had to be issued, that the reasons for effecting the proposed changes were also duly explained in the annexure to the notice issued under Section 9-A of the Act, that since the third respondent has become a sick industrial company under the provisions of SIC Act, 1985, an application No. 139 of 1997 has been preferred before BIFR for framing a rehabilitation scheme, that the said application is still pending, that subsequent to 9-A notice, dated March 5, 2000, no conciliation has been initiated by the second respondent that therefore there could be no violation of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, that under the fond hope that the workmen and the unions would agree for the changes proposed in the 9-A notice, implementation was postponed for few months, that since losses were mounting up at the rate of Rs. 5 lakh per month. It was decided to implement the 9-A notice on and from September 7, 2000 commencing from the wages payable for the month of August, 2000, that 12 workmen have received wages as per the 9-A notice, that two other unions out of three unions functioning in the third respondent's mill namely Sri Seetha Venkatesh Mills Limited, Kathirvedu, Chennai, affiliated to LPF and Dr. Ambedkar Panchalai Thozhilalar Sangam have also signed a settlement under Section 18(1) of the Act on September 29, 2000 accepting the terms of 9-A notice with certain modifications, that 16 other workmen have also signed similar such settlement of various dates commencing from March 29, 2000, that the two unions who have signed the settlement command a membership of 42 workmen out of the total strength of 172 workmen, that as on date 88 workmen have signed the settlement under Section 18(1) and agreed to abide by the modified terms of 9-A notice, dated March 5, 2000 and therefore, there was no illegality in issuing the 9-A notice and the implementation of it cannot be called in question.At the instance of the petitioner, filed a supplementary counter-affidavit was filed contending that the attempt of the third respondent in its notice, dated September 7, 2000, in giving effect to 9-A notice, dated March 5, 2000, being one in violation of Section 33 of the Act, the same cannot be permitted in law, that as a matter of fact, the conciliation in respect of the changes proposed in the 9-A notice has already commenced and therefore, the present attempt of the third respondent to give effect to the 9-A notice, dated March 5, 2000 is in violation of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the same is liable to be interfered with. In the course of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that any change proposed in the notice issued under Section 9-A of the Act, cannot be given effect to except by way of settlement or an award, that the dispute with regard to the very same issue having been raised by the petitioner, and when the same is pending conciliation, during the pendency of the said dispute, the third respondent cannot give effect to the changes proposed in its 9-A notice, dated (sic) that the settlement put forward by the third respondent being one signed under Section 18(1) of the Act, that the same will not bind the members of the petitioner-union and therefore the existing service conditions should continue to prevail till the resolution of the industrial dispute raised by the petitioner union. The learned counsel also contended that under Section 10(1) of the Act, mere apprehension was sufficient for the first respondent to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication, that the action of the third respondent being in violation of Section 9-A read with Section 20 of the Act, the same is liable to be set aside.As against the said submission, the learned counsel for the third respondent contended that the petitioner is only seeking for setting aside of the notice, dated September 7, 2000, which in effect would only restore the earlier notice dated March 5, 2000, that the writ itself is not maintainable as against the third respondent, that at best conciliation officer can take into account the subsequent settlement reached under Section 18(1) of the Act, since enquiry is pending, before the second respondent, that as various notices issued by the second respondent only talks of enquiry, it cannot be taken that conciliation proceedings have commenced, that no strike notice as prescribed under the provisions of the Act having been issued, Sec. 20 of the Act will not get attracted that even if there is any violation as alleged, the remedy of the petitioner would be only to resort to Section 33-A of the Act and therefore the writ itself being not maintainable no relief could be granted in this writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions in support of his various submissions made by him : i) Ramakrishna Mills (Coimbatore) Ltd. v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others) 1984-II-LLJ-259 (Mad-DB); ii) Voltas Volkart Employees Union, Madras v. Voltas Ltd. Madras 1994 (4) LLN 1107; iii) M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v. State of M.P. and another 1985-I-LLJ-519; iv) Avon Services (Production Agencies) (Private) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana, Faridabad, and others 1979-I-LLJ-1; v) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another v. Doly Das; vi) South Arcot District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Employees Association v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madras 1999 (4) LLN 1102;vii) Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others viii) A. K. Ansari and another v. Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd., Madras and another 1999 (3) LLN 310 The learned counsel for the third respondent relied upon (Gordon Woodroffe Employees Union v. State of Tamil Nadu (by Commissioner and Secretary to Government. Labour Department) Madras and others 1988 (1) LLN 196 : (Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Staff Union and others 2000-II-LLJ-1223 (Mad-DB) and also relied upon Thanikachalam M. and Others v. Maduranthakam Agricultural Producers Co-operative Marketing Society 2001-I-LLJ-285 (Mad). The question for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether the petitioner's claim seeking for reference in respect of the dispute raised as against the issuance of 9-A notice, dated March 5, 2000, which is sought to be implemented by the impugned notice dated September 7, 2000, could be considered in this writ petition and if so, what would be the consequential relief that can be granted. Inasmuch as the relief claimed in this writ petition also relates to a reference at the instance of the first respondent based on the proceedings pending on the file of the second respondent, I proceed on the basis that the writ petition cannot be held to be one as against the third respondent alone so as to hold that the writ is not maintainable. As far as the consideration of the issue involved in the writ petition as to the legality of the action proposed in the impugned notice, dated September 7, 2000, which in turn revolves primarily around the implications of Section 9-A of the Act read along with Section 33 of the Act. In the judgment reported in Gordon Woodroffe (supra) a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court had occasion to consider a similar prayer made therein which was also for the issue of writ of mandamus to direct the management not to implement the 9-A notice until the dispute is resolved either by way of a settlement or an adjudication. In the said case the distinguishing feature was that subsequent to 9-A notice issued by the management at the instance of the Union, an industrial dispute was raised before the conciliation machinery and the conciliation ended in failure which was evidenced by the receipt of the failure report by the Government. After the receipt of the failure report by the Government, the management came forward with another notice intimating that they would implement the changes proposed in 9-A notice. After the receipt of the failure report by the Government, the management came forward with another notice intimating that they would implement the changes proposed in 9-A notice. While dealing with the question in the above stated circumstances, the Division Bench was pleased to hold that a combined reading of Sections 33 and 9-A of the Act provide for the procedure for alteration of conditions of the service with respect to matters specified in the Fourth Schedule, when there is no industrial dispute or conciliation proceedings are pending. The Division Bench went on to hold that there is no provision in the Act prohibiting the management from altering the conditions of service after following the procedure prescribed therein. The Division Bench further held that once the management complied with the express provisions of the Act, it cannot be said that it still owes a public duty or a statutory duty awaiting a reference which could be made at the instance of the workers before implementing the proposals contained in the notice issued under Section 9-A of the Act.While applying the ratio of the above said Division Bench judgment to the facts of this case, the following facts can be usefully referred to : (i) The existence of settlement, dated November 19, 1999, between the management and the workmen under Section 18(1) of the Act regarding workload and revision of wages. (ii) The issuance of a notice under Section 9-A of the Act on March 5, 2000 by the management proposing reduction in basic wages, stoppage of annual increments for five years, fixed dearness allowance of Rs. 2000 for five years, withdrawal of variable dearness allowance, etc. (iii) A dispute was raised at the instance of the petitioner-union on March 11, 2000 opposing the move of the management to effect change in the conditions of the service in the notice, dated March 5, 2000. (iv) Pursuant to the dispute raised by the petitioner-union, a notice was put up by the management on July 17, 2000 to the effect that in view of the dispute raised by the various trade unions before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, without prejudice to its right to implement the changes proposed in 9-A notice, salary would be paid for the month of June 2000. (v) Similar such notice was exhibited for payment of the salary for the month of July, 2000 on August 8, 2000. (v) Similar such notice was exhibited for payment of the salary for the month of July, 2000 on August 8, 2000. (vi) The dispute raised at the instance of three of the units was conciliated upon by the second respondent and the conciliation commenced on March 29, 2000 as disclosed in the second respondent's notice, dated March 22, 2000. (vii) From the records placed before the Court, I find that the conciliation proceedings which commenced on September 23, 2000 was subsequently posted on April 6, 2000, August 5, 2000, July 6, 2000, July 26, 2000, August 24, 2000, September 14, 2000 and October 16, 2000.(viii) In the mean time on September 7, 2000, the notice impugned in this writ petition has been issued by the management intimating that the 9-A notice, dated September 5, 2000, would be implemented. (ix) It is also on record that on September 26, 2000, a settlement had been entered into between the management and one Sri Seetha Venkateswara Mills Ltd. Kathirvedu, covering the issues contained in 9-A notice, dated March 5, 2000, and as per Clause 5 of the said settlement, it was agreed between the parties to the settlement that the management will not implement the various changes in the conditions of the service proposed in its notice, dated March 5, 2000, to such of those workmen who had signed the settlement. (x) On September 29, 2000, an identical settlement was signed by one Sri Seetha Venkateswara Mills Ltd. Dr. Ambedkar Panchalai Thozhilalar Sangam. (xi) It is claimed that 10 persons out of 90 names mentioned in the list of workmen furnished in the typed set of papers filed by the petitioner have also signed the said settlement on various dates between March 29, 2000 and October 14, 2000. (xii) In the supplement counter-affidavit, dated November 17, 2000, it is claimed by the management that 88 workmen have so far signed the settlement subsequent to 9-A notice. According to the management, the total compliment of the work force is 172, out of them, only 84 workmen have not so far accepted the settlement which came into being after the issuance of 9-A notice. (xiii) The dispute in which conciliation commenced on March 29, 2000 is yet to reach a finality. According to the management, the total compliment of the work force is 172, out of them, only 84 workmen have not so far accepted the settlement which came into being after the issuance of 9-A notice. (xiii) The dispute in which conciliation commenced on March 29, 2000 is yet to reach a finality. In the above background when the case pleaded by either parties are considered, it will have to be stated that as on date having regard to the pendency of the dispute on the file of the second respondent, the contention of the petitioner that if any change is sought to be introduced as is attempted to be done by the third respondent-management would be in violation of Section 33(1)(a) of the Act, in the absence of any express permission in writing of the Authority, namely, the second respondent herein, before whom the conciliation proceedings are factually pending. In this context Section 33-A of the Act is also required to be noted inasmuch as the said section provides for certain remedies in such a situation. Under Section 33-A, when an employer contravenes the provision contained in Section 33 during the pendency of conciliation proceedings, any employee aggrieved by such contravention can make a complaint in writing and on such complaint being made, such authority should adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were dispute referred to or pending before it in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and should submit the award to the appropriate Government and thereafter the provisions of the Act would apply accordingly.In the case on hand as found by me, the dispute relating to the changes proposed in 9-A notice, dated March 5, 2000, is admittedly pending conciliation before the second respondent. Though it is claimed on behalf of the third respondent that out of 172 workmen, 88 workmen have signed a settlement subsequent to 9-A notice, dated March 5, 2000, and the impugned notice, dated September 7, 2000 according to the petitioner substantial section of the workmen are still aggrieved against the proposed changes and are not prepared to sign the settlement. Therefore proceeding on the basis that 84 out of 172 workmen are not prepared to be governed by the subsequent settlement which came into being on June 20, 2000, the question remains as to in what manner, the controversy involved in this writ petition could be resolved. Therefore proceeding on the basis that 84 out of 172 workmen are not prepared to be governed by the subsequent settlement which came into being on June 20, 2000, the question remains as to in what manner, the controversy involved in this writ petition could be resolved. Having regard to the fact that 88 workmen out of 172 workmen have consciously signed the settlement with the third respondent-management, agreeing for certain changes which were sought to be introduced by the management in its notice, dated March 5, 2000, I feel that in such a situation what has emerged between those parties should not be disturbed, inasmuch as to some extent the subsequent settlement with those workmen paved the way for both parties to arrive at a situation whereby the functioning of the mill is continued and the production carried out without any disruption. Nevertheless, since it is claimed that 84 out of 172 workmen still feel aggrieved against these proposed changes sought to be introduced by the management and the said set of workmen are determined to pursue their remedies available under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, such an attempt of the said workmen cannot be held to be unjustified or unlawful. In such circumstances, I am obliged to observe that while recognizing the settlement reached between the third respondent and 88 workmen, the remaining contesting workmen either through the petitioner-union or through any other Union could still pursue their remedies in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and seek for its ultimate conclusion in the manner provided under the said Act. As pointed out by me earlier construing for a moment, the action of the third respondent in issuing the impugned notice, dated September 7, 2000, as one in contravention of Section 33(1)(a) of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to invoke Section 33-A of the Act by preferring a complaint before the second respondent pointing out the alleged violations as stated to have been committed by the third respondent. It is pertinent to point out that in the event of the petitioner preferring a complaint under Section 33-A of the Act before the second respondent, it would be incumbent on the second respondent to deal with the said complaint as if it were a dispute referred to it or pending before it. It is pertinent to point out that in the event of the petitioner preferring a complaint under Section 33-A of the Act before the second respondent, it would be incumbent on the second respondent to deal with the said complaint as if it were a dispute referred to it or pending before it. If as pleaded by the petitioner and as claimed by the third respondent, the changes proposed in the notice, dated March 5, 2000, in so far as it related to such of those workmen who have not entered into a settlement with the third respondent, it will have to be stated that the third respondent would be inviting for a situation to subject itself for an adjudication of the various issues before the second respondent if and when a complaint is preferred by the petitioner in the pending dispute as contemplated under Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The second respondent will then be obliged to adjudicate the said complaint as an industrial dispute as if it were referred to it under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is needless to point out that such an adjudication would be with reference to the justification or otherwise of the various changes which were sought to be introduced in the proposed notice, dated March 5, 2000, as well as the subsequent notice, dated September 7, 2000, and only after the conclusion of such an adjudication and depending upon the ultimate award that may be passed, resort can be had by the third respondent in the matter of implementation in so far as those who prefer a complaint under Section 33 of the Act.I am therefore of the view that when such a statutory remedy is very much available to the petitioner, the petitioner can as well avail of the said remedy instead of seeking for the issuance of mandamus from this Court to direct the first respondent to refer a dispute for adjudication after receiving a failure report from the second respondent. When a statutory remedy providing for the resolution of the dispute is rightfully available to the petitioner invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art, 226 of the Constitution of India would be, in my opinion superfluous and would not be proper in the facts and circumstances of this case. When a statutory remedy providing for the resolution of the dispute is rightfully available to the petitioner invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art, 226 of the Constitution of India would be, in my opinion superfluous and would not be proper in the facts and circumstances of this case. When the authority concerned is vested with the necessary power and jurisdiction to deal with a stated situation, it is not for this Court to advise the parties as to in what manner they should react to such situations. The prayer of the petitioner in this writ petition for a reference to be made through the first respondent after receipt of the failure report of the second respondent and that till then the third respondent should continue to maintain the existing service conditions that prevailed prior to September 7, 2000 cannot therefore but be countenanced. It is also claimed that till an award is passed in a reference that may be made to the Tribunal in respect of issues concerned with the 9-A notice dated March 5, 2000, the said changes should not be given effect to. When the various reliefs claimed in the writ petition could be reserved by the petitioner by preferring a complaint before the second respondent on the basis of the alleged violation sought to be made at the instance of the third respondent in its notice, dated September 7, 2000 there is no reason why the petitioner should seek for the issuance of the writ for that purpose. The issuance of the writ being an extraordinary remedy available to an aggrieved party, I am of the view that the said remedy cannot be resorted to for mere asking. Therefore in view of the self imposed restrictions to be observed in the exercise of the power vested with this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and also taking into account the efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner in the form of a complaint that could be preferred under Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, I am not inclined to entertain this writ petition. The apprehension of the petitioner is that the third respondent is likely to implement the various changes proposed in its notice, dated March 5, 2000. The apprehension of the petitioner is that the third respondent is likely to implement the various changes proposed in its notice, dated March 5, 2000. The said apprehension can be well protected through the very same second respondent who has been vested with ample powers to deal with a situation as apprehended by the petitioner. Therefore there is no scope for granting any relief in this writ petition. Having regard to these conclusions reached based on the above stated legal position, I am of the view that the various rulings stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner will have no application to the facts of this case.In the result, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No cost. Consequently, W.M.P. is also dismissed.