Judgment :- 1. Tenant in R.C.O.P. 7 of 1991 on the file of Rent Controller, Ootacamund is the revision petitioner. 2. Landlord claimed eviction on the ground that she requires the building for her own occupation. The scheduled building is a residential building occupied by petitioner and he is paying a monthly rent of Rs. 150/-. According to landlady, when she was living with her husband, they resided in the house of one Putta Gounder, a relative. After the death of her husband, she went and resided with her brother-in-law and his family temporarily. Later, she had to shift her residence to one of her relatives house in Ootacamund. She wants to occupy the scheduled building since she intends to settle down at Ootacamund, where her other relatives are also residing. She wanted D. Nos. 42, 43 and 44 to be evicted for the said purpose. Petitioner is occupying D. No. 43 and 44. Against the tenant of D. Nos. 42 also, proceedings were initiated and she wanted all these buildings to be made use of for her resideence. 3. Revision petitioner in his counter statement alleged that the claim of landlady is not bona fide. She got other buildings of her own and taking into consideration her status, she will not be in a position to reside in the scheduled building, which is very small and which is without convenience. He prayed for dismissal of the eviction petition. 4. On the above pleadings, parties went on trial. Exs.P1 and P2 were marked on the side of landlady and she got examined herself as PW1. On the side of petitioner, he gave oral evidence as DW1. Rent Controller as per order dated 30.11.1994 found that the claim of landlady is bona fide and ordered eviction. Petitioner was given four months time to surrender vacant possession. 5. Rent Controller held that landlady is not in possession of any other building anywhere in India and at present she is residing only with her relatives. It is further found that upstairs portion of the building is non-residential and landlady cannot occupy the same for residential purposes. Even though tenant contended that upstairs portion became vacant during pendency of litigation and again re-let, Rent Controller held that it is all along used as non-residential premises and subsequent letting was also for non-residential purpose. It is further found that upstairs portion of the building is non-residential and landlady cannot occupy the same for residential purposes. Even though tenant contended that upstairs portion became vacant during pendency of litigation and again re-let, Rent Controller held that it is all along used as non-residential premises and subsequent letting was also for non-residential purpose. Only subsequent letting of upstairs portion will not affect bona fides of landlady in claiming possession of scheduled building. Rent Controller also found that in Ex.A1, landlady issued notice asking tenant to vacate premises in which there is statement that for the last one year, landlady is repeatedly demanding to surrender possession for her own occupation. Even though tenant contended that landlady got other building of her own, not a scrap of paper was produced before Rent Controller. Petitioner also admitted that the contention is taken only on the basis of hearsay and not based on any document. 6. Against the order of Rent Controller, petitioner preferred R.CA. 6 of 1995 on the file of Appellate Authority. Appellate authority also reconsidered the entire evidence and did not find any reason to take a different view. The appeal was dismissed. Petitioner was given one month time to surrender vacant possession. 7. It is against the concurrent findings of authorities below, the revision petition is filed by the petitioner. 8. I heard the counsel on both sides. 9. The question whether building is required for bona fide own occupation of landlady or not is purely a finding of fact. Both the authorities below have found that landlady is not having any building of her own and she is now residing along with her relatives and her claim is bona fide. Landlady has asserted that she intends to occupy the scheduled building since her relations are also residing close by. Even during the lifetime of her husband, she was residing with one Putta Gounder and after his death, she went and resided with her brother-in-law temporarily. Now, she is residing with some of her relatives. It is clear from the evidence that only because she is not in a position to occupy scheduled building, she had to reside along with others. A feeling that one is under his own raoof and as of right, is a comforting one duly recognised and protected by law and legal institutions. It is clear from the evidence that only because she is not in a position to occupy scheduled building, she had to reside along with others. A feeling that one is under his own raoof and as of right, is a comforting one duly recognised and protected by law and legal institutions. Even if one need not be apprehensive that a close relation like a father or mother, brother or sister may not drive him out of the house owned by any of them, the need felt by the individual to have a separate establishment is a perfectly justified one. Landlady wants to occupy her own building and there is nothing to doubt her bona fide claim. 10. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that landlady is financially in high position and her status will not permit her to reside in scheduled building. It is not suitable for her residence and even basic amenities are not available in the building. I do not think that the said submission could be accepted. Once it is found that the claim is bona fide, Court is not concerned as to how landlady is going to use it. Law does not insist that the building should be used only as it is. 11. This question has already been decided by Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1964 S.C. 1676 (R.P. Mehta v. I.A. Sheth), a case arising under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. In that case, landlord wanted to occupy building for his own occupation. But he wanted to occupy it after demolition and reconstruction. The question was whether eviction petition should be one for own occupation or for reconstruction. Considering the same in paragraphs 9 to 15, learned Lordships have held thus, “9. The sole question to determine in this appeal is whether the resppondents case came within the provisions of S. 13(1)(g) of the Act or fell within the provisions of S. 13(1)(hh). We may now set out these provisions:— “13(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of S. 15, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied. We may now set out these provisions:— “13(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of S. 15, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied. (g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit, the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust; or (hh) that the premises consist of not more than two floors and are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished.” 10. A landlord can sue for the ejectment of his tenant in view of S. 13(1) for various reasons including the one that he requires the premises reasonably and bona fide for occupation by himself. The respondent alleged, and the Courts below have found, that he bona fide required the premises in the suit for occupation by himself. The respondent stated in the plaint that he would take up residence in the premises after overhauling it. It is on this account, that the appellant submits that the case falls under S. 13(1)(hh), as the respondent wants the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and erecting a new building. 11. It is further contended for the appellant that the two grounds for ejectment under Cls.(g) and (hh) are mutually exclusive and, therefore, a landlord cannot take advantage of Cl.(g) when his case falls under Cl.(hh) in view of the immediate steps he has to take after getting possession of the premises. We need not express an opinion on this point, as, for reasons to be mentioned later, the case falls under Cl.(g) when his case falls under Cl.(hh) in view of the immediate steps he has to take after getting possession of the premises. We need not express an opinion on this point, as for reasons to be mentioned later, the case falls under Cl.(g) and riot under Cl.(hh) of S. 13(1) of the Act. 12. We need not express an opinion on this point, as for reasons to be mentioned later, the case falls under Cl.(g) and riot under Cl.(hh) of S. 13(1) of the Act. 12. We agree with the Courts below that the respondents case falls under Cl.(g) when he bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he intends to make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet Will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, does not affect the question of his requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his occupation, when he has proved his need for occupying the house. There is no such prohibition either in the language of Cl.(g) or in any other provision of the Act to the effect that the landlord must occupy the house for residence without making any alterations in it. There could not be any logical reason for such a prohibition. Under ordinary law, the landlord is entitled to eject his tenant whenever he likes, after following certain procedure except in cases where he has contracted not to eject him before the happening of a certain event. The Act restricts that general right of the landlord in the special circumstances prevailing in regard to the availability of accommodation and the incidental abuse of those circumstances by landlords in demanding unjustifiably high rents. 13. The Act has provided sufficient protection to the tenants against being harassed by threat of ejectment in case they are unable to satisfy landlords demands. Various restrictions have been placed on the right of the landlord to eject the tenant. Section 12(1) provides that the landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the Act. Section 13 provides exceptional cases in which the landlord can eject the tenant even though he had been paying rent regularly or be ready and willing to pay rent. Section 13 provides exceptional cases in which the landlord can eject the tenant even though he had been paying rent regularly or be ready and willing to pay rent. The provisions of S. 13 are for the advantage of the landlord and the various grounds for ejectment mentioned in that section are such which reasonably justify the ejectment of the tenant in the exercise of the landlords general right to eject his tenant. There is, therefore, no reason why restrictions not mentioned in the grounds be read into them. We do not therefore agree with the contention that Cl.(g) will apply only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the premises without making any alteration in them i.e., to occupy the identical building which the tenant occupies. There is no justification to give such a narrow construction cither to the word ‘premises’ or the word ‘occupies’ which have been construed by this Court in Krishnalal Ishwarlal Desai v. Bai Vijkor, Civil Appeal No. 804 of 1962 dt. 18.1.1963 referred to later. 14. There are provisions in the Act which ensure that the provisions of Cl.(g) are not abused. Section 17 provides that if the premises are not occupied within a period of one month from the date the landlord recovers possession or the premises are re-let within a period of one year of the said date to any person other than the original tenant, the Court may order the landlord, on the application of the original tenant within the time prescribed, to place him in occupation of the premises on the original terms and conditions. This tends to ensure that a landlord does not eject a tenant unless he really requires the premises for occupation by himself. 15. We are, therefore, of the opinion that once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of it from tenant in view of the provisions of Sub-clause(g) of Section 13(1) irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the premises without making any alteration to them or after making the necessary alterations.” 12. In 1969 K.L.T. 133 (Sarada v. Kwnaran) a similar question arose for consideration where landlord wanted to make use of building for own occupation for the purpose of converting the same as pathway. Learned Judge in that case held that occupation does not necessarily mean residence. In 1969 K.L.T. 133 (Sarada v. Kwnaran) a similar question arose for consideration where landlord wanted to make use of building for own occupation for the purpose of converting the same as pathway. Learned Judge in that case held that occupation does not necessarily mean residence. A owner can occupy the building in any manner. Learned Judge said that converting of existing building into a pathway for the use of landlord is also a need and coming under bona fide own occupation. Once landlord gets possession of the building for his own occupation it is not the concern of the Court whether it is used as it is or after reconstruction or after making material alterations in the same. 13. Similar view was taken in the decision reported in 1987 (1) K.L.T. 671 (Devaky v. Krishnankutty), wherein it is held thus, “Once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the building for his occupation or the occupattion of any member of his family, he can recover possession of the building from the tenant irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the same with or without making any alterations.” 14. Once it is found that the claim of landlady is bona fide, inconvenience or lack of amenities is a matter in which tenant has no say. It is for landlady to look out whether the building is sufficient or whether it should be used after making such alteration, etc. 15. The concurrent finding of fact is not liable to be interfered with under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act Learned Counsel for petitioner was not in a position to satisfy the Court that the decision of the authorities below is not ‘in accordance with law’. Authorities below have considered the materials on record and have taken the view believing the evidence of landlady. It is not the case of tenant that any irrelevant evidence was given importance or material piece o f evidence was omitted to be considered. 16. I do not find any merit in the revision petition and the same is dismissed. No costs.