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2000 DIGILAW 1280 (ALL)

CHANDRA PRAKASH GUPTA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2000-09-29

BHAGWAN DIN, G.P.MATHUR

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G. P. MATHUR, BHAGWAN DIN, JJ. ( 1 ) THE appellant belongs to U. P. Palika Centralised Service and was working as Sanitary and food Inspector in City Board, Hapur. district Ghaziabad, in the year 1992. He was placed under suspension by the State Government on May 11, 2000. The order recites that the appellant had been prima facie found to be guilty of having committed forgery in the records and illegal and un-authorised withdrawal of Rs. 17,49,000 in the name of 583 fictitious beneficiaries from jawahar Rojgar Yojana funds. A disciplinary enquiry was ordered to be held against him and additional Commissioner (Administration) Meerut was appointed as inquiry officer. This order was challenged by the appellant by filing a writ petition which was summarily dismissed by a learned single Judge on 4. 8. 2000. However, the learned single Judge directed that the disciplinary enquiry may be completed within six months. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has preferred the present special appeal. ( 2 ) SRI Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that two other employees of City Board, Hapur, namely, Khursheed "ahmad Faridi, who was working as executive Officer and Sudhir Kumar Sharma. who was working as Water Works Engineer, had also been placed under suspension for the same charge on the same date and they preferred Writ petition No, 781 (S/b) of 3000 and Writ Petition No. 821 (S/b) of 2000 before the Lucknow bench where the operation of the suspension order passed against them on 11. 5. 2000 was stayed on 21. 7. 2000. The learned counsel has submitted that since the identical suspension order has been stayed by a Division Bench at Lucknow, therefore, the learned single Judge was in error in dismissing the writ petition. We have given our careful consideration to the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant. The order passed in Writ Petition No. 781 (S/b) of 2000, khursheed Ahmad Faridi v. State, by Lucknow Bench reads as follows : time was granted to learned standing counsel to seek instructions but he has not been able to obtain instructions. Six weeks time is granted to learned standing counsel to seek instructions. List thereafter. In the mean-time, further operation of suspension order dated 11. 5. 2000 as contained in annexure-1 to the writ petition shall remain stayed. Six weeks time is granted to learned standing counsel to seek instructions. List thereafter. In the mean-time, further operation of suspension order dated 11. 5. 2000 as contained in annexure-1 to the writ petition shall remain stayed. The enquiry shall, however, be concluded expeditiously. Sd. Pradeep Kant, J. Sd. M. A. Khan, J. 21. 7. 2000" exactly similar order was passed in Writ Petition No. 821 (S/b) of 2000 on the same date. ( 3 ) WITH profound respects, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench in the aforesaid order. The mere fact that the standing counsel was not able to obtain instructions, cannot be the only ground for passing a stay order. The stay order does not give any reason as to why the suspension order passed by the State Government was liable to be stayed by the Court. It has been held by the Apex Court in Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 662 (Para 58), that every Bench hearing a matter on facts and circumstances of each case should have the right to grant interim order on such terms as it considers fit and proper and if it had granted interim order at one stage it should have the right to vary or alter such interim order. No principle of law has been enunctated in the interim order dated 21. 7. 2000 nor there is anything to indicate that any case has been made out for staying the operation of the suspension order. We are. therefore, not inclined to pass a similar order as has been passed in Writ Petition No. 781 (S/b) of 2000. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel has next contended that the alleged misappropriation of funds took place in the year 1992 and the impugned suspension order has been passed after more than 8 years in may, 2000. It has been thus alleged that the matter had become stale and. therefore, placing the appellant under suspension was wholly unjustified. In support of this submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on Lal Bahadur Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, 2000 (1) UPLBEC 515 . In our opinion, the mere fact that the suspension order has been passed after 8 years, cannot be sole ground for quashing or setting aside the said order. therefore, placing the appellant under suspension was wholly unjustified. In support of this submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on Lal Bahadur Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, 2000 (1) UPLBEC 515 . In our opinion, the mere fact that the suspension order has been passed after 8 years, cannot be sole ground for quashing or setting aside the said order. In a matter of financial irregularity or misappropriation of funds, it is quite likely that it may not be discovered or brought to light forthwith. Whenever the misappropriation of funds is revealed or brought to the notice of the higher authorities, they may choose to take action in accordance with law. The delay in taking action cannot, in every case, vitiate the order for holding enquiry or placing the employee under suspension. ( 5 ) THE principle on which this Court can interfere with an order of suspension has been laid down by the Apex Court in U. P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv Ratan, JT 1993 (2) SC 550 and State of Orissa v. Vimal Kumar Mohanti, JT 1994 (4) (SC) 51. It has been held in these cases that suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of his office or the post held by him. It has been further held that the Court should not interfere with an order of suspension unless they are passed mala fide or without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employee with misconduct in question. There is a very serious allegation of misappropriation of a huge amount against the appellant. The suspension order has been passed by the Governor and as such, it cannot be urged that the authority, passing the order, had no jurisdiction to do so. The allegation is that fictitious records were prepared and a big amount was misappropriated. The Officer to hold enquiry has already been appointed. The learned single Judge has also directed that the enquiry be completed within six months. In these circumstances, we do not at all consider it a fit case in which discretion may be exercised in favour of the appellant under Article 226 of the constitution of India. ( 6 ) THE appeal lacks merit and is dismissed at the admission stage. .