ORDER S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This revision is filed under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment dated 16-10-95 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 95/94 by the IInd Addl. Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, arising out of judgment delivered in Criminal Case No. 342/94 on 29-9-94 by the JMFC, Jabalpur. 2. The question involved in this revision is whether an offence committed by the applicant under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (for short "the Act") is compoundable. 3. Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") does not mention any other offence under another enactment. The table mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 320 of the Code mentions offence under Indian Penal Code which are compoundable without the permission of the Court. Sub-section (2) of Section 320 of the Code gives a table of those offences committed under the Penal Code which are compoundable with the permission of the Court. According to sub-section (5) of Section 320, leave has to be obtained from the Court for compounding the offence after conviction. The Revisional Court, be it the High Court or the Court of Session is also authorised to compound an offence by giving permission as per sub-section (6) of Section 320 of the Code. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code reads as under:-- "No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section." 4. It is not in dispute that Section 138 of the Act does not make any provision whereby it can be inferred that an offence committed under Section 138 of the Act is compoundable. The legislature did not grant power to a Court under the Act the power of compounding the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act by an express provision of compounding an offence at trial, appellate or revisional stage before or after conviction. 5. Despite there being no provision in the Act or in the Code, it has been argued that the Court can compound an offence, even after conviction, as there is no bar either under the Act or under the Code. It has been argued that the offence culpable under Section 138 of the Act was made with a view to protect the complainant. The society at large is not at all affected. It has been argued that the offence culpable under Section 138 of the Act was made with a view to protect the complainant. The society at large is not at all affected. Therefore, the Court should in absence of any provision either way, grant permission to compound the offence after conviction. Reliance has been placed on a matter reported in 1999 (2) Crimes 79 (Naimesh P. Pandya Vs. State of Gujrat) and also on II (1996) BC 24 (M. Mohan Reddy Vs. Jairaj D. Bhale Rao) for supporting the contention of the applicant that this Court can compound an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. 6. This Court is respectfully of the view that in the case of Mohan Reddy (supra), it was not rightly held that sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code does not come in the way of the Court in compounding an offence and consequently the Court had powers to compound the offence committed under Section 138 of the Act. 7. Mention was also made in the case of Mohan Reddy to the 41st report of the Law Commission regarding Section 345 of the Code of 1898 wherein the policy for framing the present Section 320 of the Code was stated. It is true that Section 320 of the Code was framed with a view to give the facility of compounding the offences which are of private nature and are not relatively serious as observed by the 41st report of the Law Commission. However, the Law Commission itself stated that it will not be suitable to provide a general provision saving that offences punishable up to three years imprisonment shall be compoundable though this provision would be definite. However, it is clear that this report as well as Section 320 of the Code are confined to offences under the Penal Code and they are not, in any way, connected with any other offence covered by other enactments. The question is, if in absence of any express provision in the law enacting the offence, can the Court still compound the offence merely because no guideline has been given by the Code. In the opinion of this Court, by not providing anything in Section 320 of the Code, the legislature enacting the special enactment, framing a special offence is required to make a provision for compounding an offence. In the opinion of this Court, by not providing anything in Section 320 of the Code, the legislature enacting the special enactment, framing a special offence is required to make a provision for compounding an offence. The empowerment of compounding an offence is a legislative act. It would be obvious that in absence of any provision in Section 320 of the Code, no Court would have power to compound any offence. Therefore, this Court cannot enter into the realm reserved for the legislature by the Constitution. It cannot usurp the power of legislature for giving itself the power to compound the offence. This Court respectfully disagrees with the cases decided in the matters of M. Mohan Reddy and Naimesh P. Pandya (supra) that mere because there is omission in Section 320 of the Code and in the Act, this Court can confer powers of compounding upon itself, nor is this Court impressed by the reasoning given in the case of M Mohan Reddy (supra) to the effect that empowerment may be inferred from the enactment of a new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the reason there is no provision in this Code like that one in Schedule II of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 mentioning that offences under the other laws, not covered in Schedule II shall not be compoundable. The scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is different from that Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. It was not necessary to say anything about other enactments in view of tables given as per Section 320(1) and 320(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On the other hand, sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code makes it specifically clear that no offence, that is not mentioned in Section 320 shall be compoundable. This makes the intention of the makers of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 very clear and effective. 8. For all these reasons, this Court is of the view that there is no power to compound an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. The contentions of the learned counsel for the parties is, therefore, not accepted. LA. No. 6840/2000 an application for compounding the offence is rejected. 9. However, the Court can always exercise its powers to reduce the sentence awarded to the applicant. 10. The contentions of the learned counsel for the parties is, therefore, not accepted. LA. No. 6840/2000 an application for compounding the offence is rejected. 9. However, the Court can always exercise its powers to reduce the sentence awarded to the applicant. 10. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and that the parties have already made a statement that they have made a compromise over the issue, and the amount involved is only Rs. 10,000/-, this Court reduces the sentence awarded to the applicant to the period of four days which has already undergone by him. 11. Accordingly the impugned order sentencing the applicant to six months R.I. is modified. 12. The revision is partly allowed on the question of sentence alone. 13. Criminal Revision partly allowed.