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2000 DIGILAW 129 (KAR)

RAJAGOPAL GANGADHAR SAJEKAN v. THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE

2000-02-11

B.B.BAJENTRI, R.I.DSOUZA, RAVI VERMA

body2000
R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J. ( 1 ) THESE four petitions filed by the same petitioner, involving interlinked and overlapping issues, are heard together by consent and disposed of by this common order. The facts leading to filing of each of these four writ petitions, are briefly as follows: i. In W. P. No. 16487 of 1989: ( 2 ) PETITIONER was appointed as a district judge on 9-2-1979 by direct recruitment, under the Karnataka district judges (recruitment) rules,1962. ( 3 ) BY letter dated 11-8-1989, the registrar of the high court communicated to the petitioner, the following adverse remarks entered by the Hon'ble chief Justice in the confidential report for 1987 (1-1-1987 to 20-8-1987):"the officer has a tendency to take up light work and bypass old and complicated matters, and there is scope for improvement in his work. On the whole, his work is not upto the standard expected of a senior district judge". the above adverse remark will, for convenience, also be referred to as "adverse remark i (1987)". The petitioner filed objections dated 29-8-1989 and 31-8-1989 to the said adverse remark i (1987 ). ( 4 ) BY letter dated 10-8-1989, the registrar of the High Court of Karnataka communicated the following adverse remark by the Hon'ble chief Justice on 10-8-1989 (while considering the remarks made by petitioner in his capacity as principal district judge, gulbarga in the annual confidential reports of the judicial officers of gulbarga district working under him):"the learned principal district judge has not applied his mind at all. Has expressed his opinion mechanically in a casual manner. In part-ii point 2, he was required to express his opinion on each point. The recording of the remarks shows complete non-applicability of mind". the above adverse remark will, for convenience, also be referred to as "adverse remark ii (1987)". The petitioner filed a representation dated nil (submitted on 28-8-1989) to the said letter dated 10-8-1989 for ex- punction of the remarks. ( 5 ) BY another letter dated 11-8-1989, the high court communicated the following adverse remarks recorded in the petitioner's confidential report for the year 1988. ( 21 ) THERE after, the screening committee of the high court considered his case for retirement in public interest under Section 285 (4) of the Karnataka civil service rules ('kcsr' for short) on 15-11-1996. ( 21 ) THERE after, the screening committee of the high court considered his case for retirement in public interest under Section 285 (4) of the Karnataka civil service rules ('kcsr' for short) on 15-11-1996. After considering the crs, work performance and service records, the committee opined that it is not in public interest to continue the petitioner in service and he should be retired under Rule 285 (4) of the kcsrs and made a recommendation to the full court accordingly. The full court by resolution dated 22-11-1996 after considering the resolution dated 15-11-1996 of the committee and after considering the crs, work performance and relevant service records, resolved to accept the recommendation of the screening committee to compulsorily retire the petitioner in public interest under Rule 285 (4) of the kcsrs. Consequently, a notification dated 10-12-1996 (Annexure-Q) was issued by the governor of Karnataka retiring the petitioner from service under Rule 285 (4) of the kcsrs. The petitioner has filed W. P. No. 18151 of 1999 for quashing the said notification dated 10-12-1996 and a direction to the respondents to treat him as having retired from service only on attaining the age of superannuation on 30-11-1997 and for consequential benefits including arrears of salary. Contentions of petitioner: ( 22 ) THE petitioner put forth the following contentions in support of the several reliefs sought in these petitions. 22. 1 the administrative committee No. 1, which considered fifteen district judges (including the petitioner) for promotion to supertime scale, found the petitioner not fit for being selected, because of the adverse remarks entered in his confidential records for 1987 and 1988. The adverse remarks were communicated to him only on 10-8-1989 and 11-8-1989. Even before he could file objections thereto and his request for expunction thereof was considered, the administrative committee No. 1 considered him for promotion on 29-8-1989 and full court considered him for promotion on 6-9-1989 and rejected him, obviously on the basis of the said adverse remarks. No adverse remark in the confidential record could be used for the purpose of overlooking the claim for promotion, unless an opportunity was given to the officer concerned to file his objections/representation in that behalf. In other words, during the pendency of a representation for deletion of adverse remarks in the confidential record, the adverse remarks cannot be relied on for ignoring an officer's claim for promotion. In other words, during the pendency of a representation for deletion of adverse remarks in the confidential record, the adverse remarks cannot be relied on for ignoring an officer's claim for promotion. In this case, the adverse remarks in the confidential records for the years 1987 and 1988 have been wrongly considered by the high court on 6-9-1989 to ignore him for promotion to the cadre of district judges (supertime scale) and, therefore, the promotion of his juniors (respondents 5 to 8 in W. P. No. 16487 of 1989) and failure to promote him, are illegal. 22. 2 when objections to the adverse remarks are considered and the adverse remarks are either toned down/modified/expunged, then there should be a de novo consideration of the case of the officer concerned for promotion as from the date when his juniors were promoted. In this case, as petitioner was not promoted to the cadre of district judges (supertime scale) when his juniors were promoted by notification dated 16-9-1989, on the basis of the adverse remarks relating to 1987 and 1988, the high court ought to have reconsidered his case for promotion to the cadre of district judges (supertime scale) after its order dated 4-5-1990 (holding that the adverse remark No. Ii (1987) was not an adverse remark, but only for guidance) and the order dated 8-2-1990 (deleting the adverse remarks in columns 9 to 11 of confidential record for the year 1988) and failure to do so is illegal. 22. 3 the reports of the inquiring authority dated 29-6-1993 and 30-6-1993 in di case No. 1 of 1989 and di case No. 2 of 1991 were made by the inquiry authority after the announcement regarding his appointment as the chief Justice of the Madras High Court and therefore the reports should be treated as having been given by a person without jurisdiction or authority. 22. 4 the petitioner had raised several objections to the inquiry reports dated 29-6-1993 and 30-6-1993. Though normally the disciplinary authority need not give reasons where he agrees with the findings of the inquiring authority, where issues relating to competence of inquiry authority to hold or continue the inquiry are raised in the objections, the disciplinary authority is bound to consider them. Though normally the disciplinary authority need not give reasons where he agrees with the findings of the inquiring authority, where issues relating to competence of inquiry authority to hold or continue the inquiry are raised in the objections, the disciplinary authority is bound to consider them. Further the failure of the disciplinary authority to deal with several points raised by petitioner in his objections to the inquiry reports amounts to non-application of mind, vitiating the final orders of the disciplinary authority accepting the inquiry reports and imposing punishments. Therefore the orders dated 17-11-1993 imposing punishment in di case nos. 1 of 1989 and 2 of 1991 are liable to be set aside. 22. 5 there is no justification or grounds for the high court to retire him under Rule 285 (4) of the kcsrs. On the other hand, on account of blemishless service rendered by him, he should have been considered for promotion to supertime scale retrospectively with effect from the date his juniors were promoted to supertime scale. Principles relating to adverse remarks: ( 23 ) WE will first refer to the decisions relied on by the parties. ( 24 ) IN gurdial singh fijji v State of Punjab, the appellant was not granted in integrity certificate because of an adverse report. The representation made to the appellant against the adverse report was not considered and disposed of. In the meanwhile, the selection committee did not select him for promotion. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court observed thus. "one of the reasons which evidently weighed with the selection committee in not putting the appellant's name on the select list was that the chief secretary had not issued the integrity certificate in his favour. Thus the non-inclusion of appellant's name in the select list and the non-issuance of the integrity certificate are closely linked whether or not there was another reason also for which the selection committee kept him out from the select list. The principle is well-settled that in accordance with the rules of natural justice, an adverse report in a confidential roll cannot be acted upon to deny promotional opportunities unless it is communicated to the person concerned so that he has an opportunity to improve his work and conduct or to explain the circumstances leading to the report. The principle is well-settled that in accordance with the rules of natural justice, an adverse report in a confidential roll cannot be acted upon to deny promotional opportunities unless it is communicated to the person concerned so that he has an opportunity to improve his work and conduct or to explain the circumstances leading to the report. Such an opportunity is not an empty formality, its object partially, being to enable the superior authorities to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person concerned, whether the adverse report is justified. Unfortunately, for some reason or another, not arising out of any fault on the part of the appellant, though the adverse report was communicated to him, the government has not been able to consider his explanation and decide whether the report was justified. In these circumstances, it is difficult to support the non-issuance of the integrity certificate to the appellant. The chain of reaction began with the adverse report and the infirmity in the link of causation is that no one has yet decided whether that report was justified. We cannot speculate, in the absence of a proper pleading, whether the appellant was not found suitable otherwise, but is to say, for reasons other than those connected with the non-issuance of an integrity certificate to him". ( 25 ) IN amar kant choudhary v state of Bihar and others, the main contention urged was that the selection committee had committed an illegality in rejecting the claim of appellant for being included in the select list by relying upon adverse entries made in the confidential rolls, which had not been communicated to him or against which he had made representation which had remained undisposed of and which had been subsequently expunged. Following the decision in gurdial singh fijji's case, supra, the Supreme Court held that the case of appellant had not been considered in a just and proper manner and observed as follows:"the decisions of the selection committee recorded at its meetings in which the case of the appellant was considered are vitiated by reason of reliance being placed on the adverse remarks which were later on expunged. The high court committed an error in dismissing the petition of the appellant and its order is, therefore, liable to be set aside. We accordingly set aside the order of the high court. The high court committed an error in dismissing the petition of the appellant and its order is, therefore, liable to be set aside. We accordingly set aside the order of the high court. We hold that the appellant has made out a case for reconsideration of the question of his promotion to the Indian police service cadre of the state of Bihar as on December 22,1976 and if he is not selected as on that date for being considered again as on March 12, 1981. If he is not selected as on March 12,1981 his case has to be considered as on October 14, 1981. The selection committee has now to reconsider the case of the appellant accordingly after taking into consideration the orders passed by the state government subsequently on any adverse entry that may have been made earlier and any other order of similar nature pertaining to the service of the appellant. If on such reconsideration the appellant is selected he shall be entitled to the seniority and all other consequential benefits flowing therefrom. We issue a direction to the respondents to reconsider the case of the appellant as stated above. We hope that the above direction will be complied with expeditiously but not later than four months from today". ( 26 ) IN brij mohan singh chopra v State of Punjab, the Supreme Court held that unless an adverse report is communicated and representation, if any, made by the employee is considered, it cannot be acted upon to deny promotion to him or to retire him prematurely. The Supreme Court observed:"there is no doubt that whenever an adverse entry is awarded t